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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the performance of NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements in the implementation of the Infrastructure Short-term 
Action Plan (STAP). Specific reference is made to NEPAD’s roads programme. This 
research is qualitative. Primary and secondary data is used for analysis. The various 
issues arising out of the analysis and interpretation of data are addressed. 
 
The findings of this research indicate that the key causes of the identified implementation 
challenges include lack of institutional capacity, particularly in NEPAD’s governance 
and management structures and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This problem 
is exacerbated by NEPAD’s inordinate reliance on external institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for programme planning and implementation support, with negative 
implications for programme management, evaluation and communication. What has 
amplified implementation delays is NEPAD’s apparent reliance on aspirational projects 
for implementation and aspirational project structures for implementation management/ 
coordination. Instead, when implementation challenges arose, NEPAD merely addressed 
the effects of problems, and even then only superficially.  
 
In the short-term, the use of relevant project management methodologies may facilitate 
effective planning at the various stages of the project life cycle and efficient management 
of project management functions based on programme/project requirements. To support 
NEPAD’s objectives for integrated regional development and integrated project 
implementation, transformational interventions will be required. In addition, relevant 
trans-sectoral and trans-disciplinary institutional mechanisms and arrangements may need 
to be integrated at the various levels of planning/management subject to situational or 
project specificity. The development of effective supranational authorities at 
regional/sub-regional levels including a strong role of the state with its broad-based 
institutional formations at national levels will help to enforce implementation of 
collective agreements that have implications for the implementation of cross-border 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
  
The purpose of this research is to examine the performance of NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements in the implementation of the Infrastructure Short-term 
Action Plan (STAP). In particular, NEPAD’s role and relevance to facilitate effective 
integrated implementation management/coordination vis-à-vis the mandate of the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is examined. This research is qualitative.    
 
The findings of this research indicate that the key causes of the identified implementation 
challenges include NEPAD’s inordinate reliance on exogenous factors for the 
development and implementation of its regional infrastructure programme as well as 
standardized and bureaucratic approaches to the management of development 
programmes, which have not worked previously in developing countries. Because of 
imprudent optimism of programme success, as a consequence of the reliance on external 
resources from partnerships with the institutions/institutional structures of the developed 
north, NEPAD failed to assume responsibility to systemically address the age-old 
underpinning structural problems to the implementation of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects, and to prioritise relevant programmes/projects for 
implementation to meet effective demand. This approach resulted in the over-
simplification of constraints in the implementation of regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects. Instead, when implementation challenges arose, NEPAD merely 
addressed the effects of problems, and even then only superficially.  
 
What has amplified the implementation delays is NEPAD’s apparent reliance on 
aspirational projects for implementation and aspirational project structures for 
implementation management/coordination. As a result, NEPAD mandated institutional 
structures that neither possessed authority, nor institutional capacity to drive integrated 
implementation or implementation management/coordination of planned regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects: these institutional structures include NEPAD’s own 
governance and management structures, and RECs. However, the much talked about lack 
of institutional capacity in RECs appears to have been used as a ‘stalking horse’ to deflect 
attention from NEPAD’s lack of wherewithal to facilitate the development of regional 
infrastructure, or as a pretext to avoid addressing the underlying causes to NEPAD’s 
failure to facilitate effective implementation of the Infrastructure STAP. In this respect, 
NEPAD has failed to learn from the lessons of past implementation failures of similar 
cross-border regional infrastructure programmes, such as the Lagos Plan of Action’s 
 v 
(LPA) Transport and Communications programme, and the Trans-African Highways 
(TAH) and “missing links” initiative. Significantly, NEPAD’s inadequate communication 
regarding implementation progress/challenges has resulted in the questionable status of 
projects and impaired NEPAD’s integrity in the eyes of development partners, media, and 
development analysts. 
 
In the circumstances, it will be difficult for NEPAD to institute effective institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management of cross-
border regional infrastructure without candid examination of mistakes made and 
commitment to the implementation of transformational interventions. In the short-term, 
the use of relevant project management methodologies may facilitate effective planning 
at the various stages of the project life cycle and efficient management of project 
management functions based on programme/project requirements. An integrative 
approach to the management of cross-border regional infrastructure projects may be used, 
for example, to combine inputs from various project management models (i.e., strategic, 
structured and systematic project management) and trans-sectoral, trans-disciplinary 
application areas based on project or situational specificity. Other relevant institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements may be integrated at the various levels of 
planning/management subject to situational or project specificity. At regional/sub-
regional levels, the development of effective supranational authorities will help to enforce 
implementation of collective agreements that have implications for the implementation of 
cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. At national levels, a strong role 
of the state with its broad-based institutional formations will be critical to institute and 
support the reform/development of inadequate institutions: commitment at national levels 
would also facilitate the effective coordination and implementation of collective 
agreements or trans-state transactions by the identified regional/sub-regional institutions.   
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background 
 
“…NEPAD represents perhaps the most important initiative ever advocated for 
moving the African continent from crisis to renewal in the past forty years…it 
has much potential for success if implemented by the majority of African 
states…In many ways it represents the one last opportunity to get the global 
economy to take Africa seriously…However, the consequences for failure will 
be costly, and will undoubtedly return the continent to its marginalised status 
and prove the African pessimists right.”    
        
      Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., 2002 
 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) launched the 
Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) during May 2002. NEPAD’s 
Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) approved 
the Infrastructure STAP for implementation during June 2002; the African Union 
(AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government (HoSG) subsequently 
endorsed the programme during July 2002 (African Union (AU), 2002b). 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP elaborates a combination of programmes and 
projects for implementation in various infrastructure sectors (i.e., energy, 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT), transport and water sectors). 
All the identified Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects are characterised by 
multiple development objectives planned for simultaneous implementation. For 
example, the transport programme identifies the development of regional transport 
infrastructure as a mechanism to facilitate regional integration, global/intra-
African trade, capacity building and poverty reduction.  
 
To support implementation, NEPAD mandated Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) – through their Secretariats, Commissions, and technical units – to 
coordinate implementation management/coordination of the approved regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects (NEPAD, 2002c). Diverse and multiple 
institutional structures at various spatial categories – such as international, 
regional, sub-regional and national levels – were also assigned responsibilities and 
roles in the Infrastructure STAP at various stages of the project life cycle. 
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Ultimately, NEPAD planned for the identified regional infrastructure projects to 
be implemented at national levels, although implementation management/ 
coordination would be facilitated by regional and sub-regional structures.  
 
NEPAD primarily sought external partnerships with international institutions for 
programme/project development, provision of sustainable financing, procurement 
of professional/construction services, and project implementation support. These 
partnerships include international finance institutions (IFIs), regional development 
finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral institutions, foreign/national governments, 
donors from the highly industrialised (northern) countries, and foreign private 
sector operators. NEPAD also sought internal partnerships with regional, sub-
regional and national institutions/organisations for programme development, 
funding, implementation, and implementation management/coordination in order 
to give practical effect to the attainment of its (NEPAD’s) vision for the 
development of domestic institutional capacity. As a result, the environment for 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP is characterised by complexity 
in project management functions (i.e., project scope, project organisation, cost, 
time and quality management): this complexity is particularly increased cognisant 
of NEPAD’s objectives for “integrated regional development” and “integrated 
practical implementation” of the identified regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects.  
 
In certain communiqués of HoSG who are NEPAD’s founding members, strong 
expectations were also expressed of African institutions, organisations, and 
experts to elaborate the relevant development programmes/projects and 
implementation plans in support of NEPAD’s vision for Africa’s regeneration, 
including the development of regional infrastructure. Various pertinent 
international and regional workshops were also held, since the launch of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, to support implementation. It also appears that 
various regional programmes were launched by the various IFIs and multilateral 
institutions to support the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and 
other (NEPAD) programmatic interventions in the identified priority sectors 
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(Hope, 2006: 209-210). However, the afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements for implementation support appear to have elicited limited 
implementation progress, particularly in cross-border facilitation projects like the 
roads sector. 
 
1.2 Definition of Terminology 
 
The definitions of relevant terms/concepts are presented in APPENDIX A. In 
some cases, other definitions by select authors are included to illustrate different 
perspectives and to highlight the multi-faceted nature of the said terms/concepts. 
The operational definitions of the following terms/concepts are discussed: 
institutions; institutional structures; institutional mechanisms; institutional 
arrangements; institutional capacity; integrated implementation management; 
project management; project; programme; levels of management; physical and 
non-physical infrastructure; transit facilitation; spatial categories; region and sub-
region; and “technical hair-splitting.”   
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
 
1.3.1 Who or what is to blame for implementation delays? 
 
The challenges with the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP are 
complex and multi-faceted. Various reports (AfDB, 2003; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003; 
Mail & Guardian, 2007c; Mashele, 2006; NEPAD, 2003/2004; TCII & NEPAD, 
2005) have generally attributed the lack of implementation progress in NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP to the lack of institutional capacity. South Africa’s former- 
President Mbeki, in support of this premise, made the following remarks: 
 
We are not going to achieve some of the programmes we have set (out) to 
(achieve) because of lack of capacity…Even if we do have the resources, the 
institutions do not have the capacity, and African renewal needs 
capacity…The embarrassing thing is that they (developed nations) have 
committed resources, but we do not have the capacity to implement (cited in 
Kotzé & Steyn, 2003: 104). 
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It appears that the lack of institutional capacity for implementation of NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects has generally impacted on NEPAD’s 
integrity to produce the expected results. For example, Alfeld Haiko, Director: 
World Economic Forum (WEF) Africa, commented on NEPAD’s failure “…in its 
duty to get infrastructure development projects off the ground, (and for) creating a 
stumbling block for economic growth” (Sunday Times, 28 May 2006).   
 
He made the following statement: 
 
Businesses and others have tried to cajole Nepad to be more responsive to the 
needs of the continent (author’s emphasis); but with patchy success…There’s 
a sense of disillusionment about Nepad. It has lost steam, and is seen as an 
ethos rather than a programme of action. It has no implementation 
capacity…These projects have become a nice-to-have wish list, but very few 
of them are costed, are bankable, or have been subjected to feasibility studies 
(ibid).  
 
According to Breytenbach (2004:154), the (South African-led) NEPAD Business 
Group also criticised the “slow pace of project implementation” at a meeting of 
the WEF meeting held in Maputo-Mozambique, during May 2004. Apparently 
(ibid), NEPAD’s Secretariat refused to accept responsibility for the tardy 
implementation of its sectoral programmes, particularly the Infrastructure STAP. 
NEPAD has instead identified RECs as the weak links in the implementation of 
the Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes/projects. According to 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure Sectoral Review report (NEPAD, 2004a:2), the “lack of 
capacity and appropriate leadership by the… (RECs) is another serious challenge 
in the implementation of NEPAD projects.”  
 
The sentiments expressed in NEPAD’s Infrastructure Sectoral Review report 
regarding the lack of capacity in RECs are not new. The lack of institutional 
capacity in RECs, which has over the years culminated in their slow pace to 
implement regional integration initiatives, has been widely acknowledged since 
the RECs were first established in the 1980’s with the advent of the Lagos Plan of 
Action (LPA) of 1980 (see: Amoako, 2001; Anyang’ Nyong’o et al., 2002; Bond, 
2002; Breytenbach, 2004; Buthelezi, 2001; Buthelezi et al., 2001; Cheru, 2002; 
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Chibba, 2003; ECA, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Herbert, 2003; Hope, 2002; IAG & JA, 
2003; Isaksen & Tjønneland, 2001; Kanbur, 2001; Kritzinger-van Niekerk & 
Moreira, 2002; Malewezi, 2001; Mandaza, 1990; Martin, 1990; Mbachu, 2003; 
Mills, 2000/1; Mills, 2002; Moshe, 2001; Muuka, 1998; Senghor, 1990; 
Sidiropoulos et al., 2003; Willis, 2003; Zarenda, 2001). Various NEPAD reports 
(AfDB, 2003; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2003/2004; TCII & NEPAD, 2005) have 
also consistently acknowledged the “lack of capacity” and “lack of resources” in 
RECs since the launch of the Infrastructure STAP. Therefore, one would have 
expected that NEPAD would take cognisance of the lack of institutional capacity 
in RECs during programme planning, in order to propose relevant institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements to support programme development and 
implementation.   
 
From the discussions above, however, it appears that there is lack of clear 
accountability between the various institutions/institutional structures for the 
performance of project activities. It is even unclear whether resources by the 
international institutions/institutional structures were made available at all to 
NEPAD, or other relevant structures, for the implementation of the identified 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Significantly, NEPAD’s inadequate 
communication increasingly appears to exacerbate the problem: conflicting 
reports of implementation progress have been presented over the years at different 
forums (see: Mashele, 2006; Taylor, 2005). As a result, a lack of common 
understanding prevails regarding the role of the various institutional structures in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, and projects’ status – i.e., whether or not the 
identified regional infrastructure projects existed at all or were ready for 
implementation.  
 
However copious the information presented on sectoral programmes/projects in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and various NEPAD reports, some of the 
fundamental details to illustrate the links between NEPAD’s policy strategies/ 
response actions, programme/project objectives, external/internal institutional 
environment, programmes/projects, and structures for project implementation or 
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implementation management/coordination remain ambiguous. For example, the 
details of practical steps taken by NEPAD’s governance and management 
structures to ensure the timely progression of diverse sectoral projects through the 
different stages of the project life cycle are rather obscure. It is also unclear what 
practical steps NEPAD has taken to facilitate institutional capacity development 
for effective implementation. The afore-mentioned aspects are particularly 
concerning since the development of an enabling environment for the agreed 
development objectives to manifest was identified as one of NEPAD’s primary 
roles in the Infrastructure STAP – i.e., to identify projects that had stalled for 
various reasons, and where NEPAD’s interventions would make a difference 
(NEPAD, 2002c).  
 
The absence of agreed frameworks or pre-determined measures to evaluate project 
implementation progress and success also add to the confusion, resulting in 
diverse expectations of projects’ delivery. Also, some of the comments by 
development analysts on implementation challenges in NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP appear as attempts to exonerate NEPAD/NEPAD’s Secretariat from blame 
in the event of perceived implementation failure. Thus, the remarks attributed to 
Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade (another NEPAD founder) during 
NEPAD’s multi-stakeholder three-year review conference, held in Johannesburg-
South Africa during October 2004, are instructive of the possible lack of 
alignment between the outcomes of planning hierarchies at the various levels of 
management/planning and responsibilities/roles of the various institutional 
structures: they also highlight gaps in the links between planning hierarchies at the 
different levels of management, programme/project objectives, external/internal 
environmental analysis, programmes/projects, and institutions/institutional 
structures for project implementation or implementation management/ 
coordination.  
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1.3.2 What is NEPAD’s role in relation to RECs and other institutional 
arrangements? 
 
Significantly, the views articulated by some of NEPAD’s founding HoSG suggest 
a diverse understanding of NEPAD’s approach or role in the development of 
regional infrastructure, or even the nature and extent of challenges to 
implementation. For example, President Wade had the following to say about the 
lack of implementation progress in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP:  
 
We have not had one project that has been realised. It is time to reflect and to 
go back to the authentic Nepad approach…We are spending lots of resources 
on conferences and we still don’t know our objectives (The Star, 23 October 
2004). 
 
As Mashele (2006: 7) further noted, “…as recently as 20 June 2005… (President 
Wade) would state that ‘[s]ince (sic) Nepad was founded (in 2001), its officials 
have spent $15m; they have not moved anything forward an inch and they will not 
move anything forward.’” Although President Wade seems to be the most 
vociferous critic of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP – a welcome approach in the 
context of large-scale regional/national (infrastructure) development projects that 
are often shrouded in secrecy because of the workings of bureaucratic 
international institutional structures, or IFIs, or multilateral institutions (see: 
Addison, 1997; Mail and Guardian, 08-14 June 2007), with the tacit support of  
national governments under the guise of ‘national interest’ – the relevance of 
Senegal to drive or address project implementation challenges in NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP is unclear.  
 
In theory, Senegal is responsible for coordinating NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programme, together with the AfDB as the lead agency 
(Zounmènou, 2006; NEPAD, 2002f). In this context, how the interface between 
Senegal and NEPAD’s Secretariat on the one hand, and Senegal/NEPAD 
Secretariat and RECs on the other is managed remains ambiguous. The example 
of Senegal above may also underscore the lack of collective engagement and 
agreement on the range of roles countries play in the implementation of NEPAD’s 
                                                                                                                               8 
 
Infrastructure STAP vis-à-vis NEPAD’s management and governance structures, 
RECs, and other regional/sub-regional structures.  
 
It also appears that NEPAD’s implementation challenges, and the associated 
concerns from various quarters, have remained unresolved despite the various 
meetings held at different levels of management/planning. These include the 
workshops/conferences and programmes established by various institutions or 
development partners to support the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP (see: Hope, 2006; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). In an interview with a West 
African TV channel, Africable, President Wade is reported (Ntingi, City Press, 17 
June 2007) to have made the following remarks:  
 
I’ve decided no longer to waste my time going to meetings where nothing 
gets done. It’s very agreeable to meet among ourselves but it doesn’t drive 
things forward. Expenses adding up to hundreds of millions of dollars have 
been spent on trips and on hotels. But not a single classroom has been built, 
not a single health centre has been completed. Nepad has not done what it 
was set up for. 
 
The range of comments depicted above, including NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
reviews (AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005), allude to a deeper malaise in 
respect of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated 
implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP, with 
implications for project implementation progress. Cognisant of the well-
documented lack of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories, in 
particular RECs, this status quo may impede the attainment of NEPAD’s 
objectives for “integrated (regional) development” and “integrated practical 
implementation” of its regional infrastructure programmes/projects. It is also 
possible that the confluence of a combination of mutually reinforcing 
underpinning challenges in institutional, organisational, political, socio-economic, 
ideological, technical, and behavioural/attitudinal aspects has created an 
environment of intractable challenges for NEPAD’s effective implementation of 
the Infrastructure STAP.  
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Previously, a range of authors have identified a plethora of institutional problems 
with respect to the development of Africa’s infrastructure and its performance 
(see: AfDB, 1999; Adedegi, 2002; Amjadi & Yeats, 1995, Amoako, 1997; 
Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1990; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 2002; Bond, 2002; Calderon & 
Serven, 2004; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Estache, 2006a; Founou-Tchigoua, 
2002; Gelb, 2001; Hope, 2002, 2006; Howe, 2001; Lakshmanan & Anderson, 
2000; Limão & Venables, 2000; Mail and Guardian, 2004a; Mills, 2002; 
Nabudere, 2002; N’diaye, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; OAU/AU, 2002; 
Onyeani, 1990; Patrick, 1998; Paul, 1990; Picciotto & Weaving, 1994; Rodney, 
1972; Taylor, 2005; World Bank, 1994, 2000, 2002). Although the adverse 
institutional issues are well-documented, how they are interrelated and impact on 
the planning and implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects with multiple development objectives planned for 
simultaneous implementation, particularly in a context of integrated development, 
appears not so well-documented.  
 
Using NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP as a case study, this research is an attempt 
to unpack how the characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements in 
the development of cross-border regional infrastructure influence the management 
of the relationship between the outcomes of planning hierarchies at the different 
levels of management, external/internal institutional environment, programmes/ 
projects, and structures for implementation management for effective performance 
in the implementation/implementation management of programmes/projects. 
Therefore, the question for research is: how is NEPAD’s inadequate performance 
in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP linked to the institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation 
management/coordination of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects? What is the relevance of RECs and the underpinning influences of the 
internal/external institutional environment on project delivery?  
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The following sub-questions are addressed in this research: 
 
• What institutional mechanisms and arrangements has NEPAD established to 
facilitate the development and implementation of Infrastructure STAP 
programmes/projects? 
• What are the peculiar characteristics of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements vis-à-vis general expectations of effective institutions (or 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements) in the provision of (cross-
border regional) infrastructure? In other words, what are the lessons learnt 
from the previous implementation of cross-border regional transport/roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation projects similar to those mooted by 
NEPAD?  
• What is NEPAD’s role vis-à-vis the various institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements, and how are these roles related to the perceived lack of 
institutional capacity in RECs or lack of implementation progress? 
• What do external/internal perceptions and assessments of implementation 
challenges reveal in respect of NEPAD’s approach to the development of 
regional infrastructure? In other words, how has NEPAD developed its 
programme for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure, or 
addressed perceptions or evidence of tardy implementation?  
• What has been left unsaid in the various assessments of NEPAD’s 
performance that alludes to the underpinning causes of implementation 
challenges, and what generalisations can be made from the emerging 
patterns to develop an understanding of constraints to effective performance 
by  NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements, or to facilitate 
effective integrated implementation management/coordination of cross-
border regional infrastructure programmes/projects? 
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1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
 
The aim of this research is to examine how NEPAD’s inadequate performance in 
the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP is linked to the institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation 
management/coordination of the identified programmes/projects. The role of 
NEPAD, relevance of RECs, and the underpinning influences of the 
internal/external institutional environment on project delivery are also examined. 
 
The objectives of the research are as follows: 
  
(i) The first objective is to describe NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for implementation/implementation management of the 
Infrastructure STAP. Examples of previous implementation of cross-
border regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/projects, similar 
to those mooted by NEPAD, are discussed: this is in order to, at a later 
stage, establish the lessons learnt and how these have been integrated – if 
at all – in NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support 
effective implementation.  
 
(ii) The second objective is to examine implementation challenges in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Prevailing perceptions regarding the 
reasons for the lack of project implementation progress are juxtaposed 
with NEPAD’s self-assessment from successive Infrastructure STAP 
reviews: this is in order to establish what perceptions and independent 
analyses of implementation challenges reveal, how they are related to 
NEPAD’s responses, and what inferences can be drawn from this analysis.  
 
(iii) The third objective is to establish the possible underpinning causes for the 
identified implementation challenges. 
 
(iv) The fourth objective is to interpret data from the preceding chapters in 
order to determine the implications for NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements for integrated implementation of NEPAD’s 
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Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects, specifically the roads 
programme. Suggestions for corrective interventions in the short-term are 
made.  
 
1.5 Assumptions  
 
(i) The first assumption is that NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, in particular 
the roads programme, is aligned to the mandates, development priorities 
and objectives of RECs in its centrality to their regional integration and 
trade agenda. This perceived alignment may explain the reasons for 
NEPAD’s mandate to the RECs as the primary institutions to facilitate 
integrated implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure 
STAP, in spite of their current apparent lack of institutional capacity to do 
so. This is because alignment between NEPAD’s and RECs’ programmes 
may elicit the requisite implementation support from the regional, sub-
regional and national structures, facilitate the development of institutional 
capacity in RECs for current implementation and for future spatial 
expansion as well as provide the impetus for RECs to accelerate the 
implementation of the identified regional infrastructure projects so that 
they can meet their mandates for regional integration/sectoral cooperation.  
 
(ii) The second assumption is that investments for projects in the roads sector 
will be made primarily at national levels by the public sector (see: 
NEPAD, 2002c; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). However, adequate project 
funding will depend on the allocation of adequate resources from national 
capital budgets (in the affected countries); harmonisation of national 
transport policies, regulatory and governance regimes; and institutional 
reforms/development at national levels to support regional/sub-regional 
prerogatives. Meeting the requirements depicted above will be determined 
by the extent to which the identified regional roads infrastructure projects 
meet the following requirements: inclusion in the national development 
plans (NDPs) and RECs’ development priorities/initiatives for regional 
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integration; ability of the affected countries to fund the said programmes/ 
projects; and NEPAD’s contribution to facilitate integrated 
implementation management/coordination, mobilise external resources for 
project implementation, and facilitate institutional capacity development at 
national and sub-regional levels. In addition, long-term political support 
and commitment to the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
by national governments and regional/sub-regional institutions will be 
critical for project implementation success.     
 
(iii) The third assumption is that most, if not all, of the projects included in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP at its launch, during May 2002, had 
already commenced in one form or another. Therefore, implementation 
progress will not be inordinately delayed by factors outside the peculiar 
knowledge of NEPAD, AfDB, RECs, and various supporting structures for 
programme development and implementation management regarding the 
projects’ status. NEPAD’s main objective will be to unlock any existing 
blockages through the establishment of the relevant institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for implementation of the identified 
programmes/projects.  
 
1.6 Methodology 
  
This research is qualitative research. The research extensively reviews literature 
and analyses qualitative and quantitative primary and secondary data; the research 
also integrates descriptive data and explanation in various sections because of the 
different levels of development of the various concepts and phenomena studied. 
Inductive and deductive reasoning are used at various points of the study.  
 
This research uses various analyses on NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, including 
NEPAD’s self-assessments of implementation progress, as the basis from which 
to examine NEPAD’s performance and implementation challenges in the 
Infrastructure STAP. Although the study attempts to provide causal explanations, 
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the mutually reinforcing multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary issues that impact 
on the development of cross-border regional infrastructure make it difficult at 
times to establish “temporal order” (i.e., where a cause must come before an 
effect (Neuman, 2000: 52)): this problem probably results from simultaneous 
causality and spurious relationships that occur between the variables studied. As a 
result, this research uses various frameworks to test for temporal order, verify 
causal links and eliminate some of the spurious relationships.  
 
A “case-oriented approach” (Neuman, 2000: 148) is used to examine the previous 
implementation of large-scale regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/ 
projects in the regional (African) and international contexts. Examples from the 
previous implementation of large-scale regional transport/roads infrastructure 
programmes/projects are used to establish and to illustrate how the causes and 
consequences of identified problems in the development of cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure were addressed in circumstances that are similar to, 
or different from NEPAD’s.  
 
Therefore, this study analyses trends and patterns from historical data regarding 
the implementation of similar programmes in order to make generalisations about 
the occurrence of certain phenomena and to, at a later stage, suggest interventions 
germane to situational and project specificity in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, 
particularly the roads programme. Although the character of the research is ex 
post facto, the focus of corrective interventions will be to identify how similar 
challenges may be addressed in both ongoing and future implementation 
processes. This approach is different from that espoused in ex post studies: Hope 
(2002: 398) argued that these studies are by definition too late to facilitate 
corrective interventions in the phenomena studied.  
 
This research also uses various models to elaborate a framework for an integrative 
approach to the development and implementation of cross-border regional 
infrastructure. These models include Turner’s Seven Forces Model (1999: 70) as 
an ideal type of a structured approach to project-based management; Paul’s (1990) 
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approach to the strategic management of development programmes is also used to 
identify unique characteristics in strategic management of development 
programmes/projects – i.e., the management of interrelationships between 
planning hierarchies, influences of the external/internal institutional environment, 
programmes/projects and structures for implementation/implementation 
management. The overlay of the afore-mentioned models in this research 
illustrates the complexity to manage NEPAD’s (cross-border) regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects, and that different approaches may need to be 
combined in NEPAD’s case subject to project and situational specificity.    
 
The research uses a mix of evidence or data collection techniques including 
documents (books, journal and newspaper articles), existing statistics, non-
resource-based knowledge, and observation. Qualitative/interpretative versions of 
content analysis are also used in order establish broadly the meaning of data or to 
verify some of the findings of the research (i.e., in the SWOT analysis of 
perceptions of NEPAD’s external/internal institutional environment, analysis of 
perceptions of implementation delays, and analysis of the findings of NEPAD’s 
self-assessment in the 1st and 2nd
Second, the focus of the research is generally on NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects in various infrastructure sectors, particularly cross-border 
regional roads infrastructure projects. NEPAD’s roads programme is one of the 
sectoral interventions under the Infrastructure STAP. The planning frameworks, 
 Infrastructure STAP reviews in order to establish 
their implications for NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
the development of regional infrastructure).  
 
1.7 Delimitations and Limitations of the Research 
 
First, the study examines the performance of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements within the parameters of NEPAD’s approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure, although multi-disciplinary frameworks 
are used for analysis.  
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institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation 
management/coordination at the overlapping integrative and strategic levels of 
management in both NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and roads programme are all 
derived and cascaded from NEPAD’s Strategic Framework at the integrative 
levels of management. However, the focus on NEPAD’s roads programme in this 
research illustrates the interrelatedness or divergence of institutions at the various 
levels of management/planning, and in various infrastructure sectors as well as 
how the manner in which their interface is managed impacts on the practical 
implementation of programmes/projects to support the (effective) delivery of 
cross-border regional infrastructure at the operational levels of management. 
 
Third, the questions posed in an earlier section above may not all be answered, or 
even addressed in this research report. Given the impact of the vagaries of the 
external/internal institutional environment on Africa’s development landscape, 
this research attempts to establish lessons from institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements in other/similar regional infrastructure development programmes/ 
projects to make generalisations on NEPAD’s. This research also attempts to 
identify, at a global level, some of the negative issues that contribute/have 
contributed to implementation failure of Africa’s development programmes/ 
projects, using NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP as an example. Detailed 
examination of these afore-mentioned issues may be conducted in future research.    
 
Fourth, the lack of consistency in NEPAD’s communication and reporting on 
infrastructure projects may result in inaccuracies in the analysis of implementation 
progress. In a number of cases, the authors and ownership of reports and even 
programmes or outcomes of planning processes between NEPAD and its agencies 
are not so clear (such as NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). 
As a result, this study makes certain assumptions regarding the sources of data 
and ownership of planning inputs/outputs based on the author’s interpretation of 
certain subjective and objective factors.  
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1.8 Structure of the Report  
 
The remainder of the report is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the related literature in order to develop a framework for the 
understanding of the relationship between institutions and the structured/ 
integrative management of programmes/projects in the delivery of cross-border 
regional infrastructure. Examples of models are provided to illustrate how project 
management methodologies may be used to define the link between the various 
planning hierarchies at the different levels of management/planning, programme/ 
project objectives, external/internal institutional environment, programmes/ 
projects, and institutional structures for effective implementation management so 
that relevant interventions may be found to move NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects forward.  
 
Chapter 3 describes NEPAD’s strategic interventions for the development of 
regional infrastructure, in particular integrated implementation management/ 
coordination of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects. The 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the implementation of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP are explained. Lessons from the previous 
implementation of similar regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/ 
projects in the African and international context are outlined in order to 
determine, at a later stage, their implications for NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management/ 
coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, in particular the roads 
programme.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the external and internal assessments of NEPAD’s 
performance and implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP. This is in 
order to establish the extent of implementation challenges, how they are related to 
or impact on each other, and what their implications are for NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional 
infrastructure. 
                                                                                                                               18 
 
Chapter 5 examines the underlying issues highlighted by the stakeholder 
comments on projects implementation delays. These include planning, project 
management and stakeholder relationship management issues:  their implications 
for NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the 
implementation of the Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects are also 
examined. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses concerns regarding the recommendations proffered in 
NEPAD’s 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews. In addition, earlier perceptions 
of the influence of the external/internal institutional environment on NEPAD vis-
à-vis expectations/concerns of current performance are examined. 
 
Chapter 7 examines the underpinning planning, political and socio-economic 
influences in NEPAD’s responses in respect of its performance in implementation 
management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP. 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the influence of key underpinning structural constraints that 
NEPAD failed to address in programme planning and assessments of 
implementation challenges. Specific reference is made to the transport/roads 
sector to illustrate the implications of flawed decisions and actions at the higher 
levels of management/planning for the implementation of different regional 
infrastructure sectoral interventions at the lower levels of management.  
 
Chapter 9 provides the summary and conclusions. Interventions to ameliorate the 
status quo in the short-term are outlined from a project management perspective. 
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2. INSTITUTIONS, PROGRAMMES/PROJECTS AND DELIVERY 
OF (CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL ROADS) INFRASTRUCTURE 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews related literature in order to develop a framework for the 
understanding of the relationship between institutions and the structured 
management of programmes/projects in the delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure. First, strengths of and opportunities in adequate institutions to 
support the attainment of multiple regional infrastructure development objectives 
are examined. Second, weaknesses and threats/constraints in the external or 
internal institutional environment, particularly in the provision of cross-border 
regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, are 
discussed. Third, institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate effective 
integration of planning hierarchies at the different levels of management/planning, 
programmes/projects, and institutional structures for implementation 
management, particularly in the context of integrated development, are discussed. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 examines the role of institutions 
in the provision of regional infrastructure. A synopsis of the parlous state of cross-
border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services is 
provided to illustrate the impact of inadequate institutions on infrastructure 
delivery. Section 2.3 discusses the causes of inadequate institutions on the 
development of cross-border regional infrastructure to support the attainment of 
multiple development objectives similar to those mooted by NEPAD. Examples 
of delivery in other infrastructure sectors are made from time-to-time to illustrate 
different views, or for emphasis. Section 2.4 explores how links may be 
developed between institutions, planning hierarchies at different levels of 
management, programmes/projects, and structures for project implementation/ 
implementation management to facilitate a structured/integrative approach to the 
management of projects. This is in order to establish how the effective use of 
relevant project management methodologies can support identified institutional 
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mechanisms and arrangements to foster a structured approach to the management 
of development programmes/projects in a highly politicised environment of trans-
state transactions, which may also be characterised by the predominance of 
(inadequate) institutions at the various spatial categories. Section 2.5 is the 
summary and conclusion.   
 
 2.2 Role of Institutions in the Development of (Regional) Infrastructure 
 
2.2.1 Impact of effective institutions in the implementation of development 
programmes/projects  
 
The level of development of institutions at state and trans-state levels influences 
the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support 
successful implementation of (cross-border) regional development 
programmes/projects. Various authors (Baum, 1982; Baum & Tolbert, 1985; 
DBSA, 2004; Deng, 2002; (DFID, 2003; World Bank, 1994) have highlighted the 
centrality of effective and efficient institutions to maximise the impact of 
development interventions. Other authors (DFID, 2003; Lakshmanan & 
Anderson, 2000; World Bank, 1994) have also emphasised the role of effective 
institutions to support the development of institutional capacity in organisations. 
This includes the development of adequate institutional infrastructure, knowledge 
management, and human capital in organisations tasked with the role of 
supporting trans-state actions. In the context of infrastructure development, these 
afore-mentioned aspects are said (ibid) to increase the efficiency of physical and 
non-physical infrastructure assets in order to meet effective demand for 
infrastructure services.    
 
Different institutional structures emphasise different aspects of institutional 
capacity in the provision of infrastructure based on their core business or 
situational specificity. For example, the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) (2004) has identified good governance as a key influence to ensure 
beneficial outcomes of infrastructure development initiatives at sub-regional or 
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regional levels. Furthermore, the DBSA (ibid) argued that sound policy and legal 
frameworks, institutional capacity development in the public sector, and broad-
based stakeholder participation all contribute to the development of sound 
institutions. In the DBSA’s case, sound institutions are considered integral “…to 
maximise the development impact of financial assistance” (ibid).  
 
The DBSA’s focus areas for institutional development are particularly pertinent 
for NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, where investments in facilitation and 
construction projects involve multiple institutional stakeholders with diverse 
development objectives and multiple structures for implementation management. 
In addition, complex funding arrangements in (cross-border) regional 
infrastructure programmes require effective governance regimes to maximise the 
impact of development assistance: this aspect is particularly significant since the 
institutional environment in development programmes/projects is typified by 
limited resources and capacity for implementation.  In this respect, the levels of 
development at country levels play a crucial role in the development of adequate 
institutions and related institutional capacity.  
 
Box 2.1:  Relationship Between the Institutional Environment and Project Success  
 
A sound institutional environment and effective performance of institutions is, in a circuitous 
manner, a function of the level of development in any country. For example, in SADC’s bilateral 
agreement between Mozambique and South Africa (to resuscitate an old transportation corridor 
that had been abrogated by disuse,) the creation of physical transport infrastructure systems, such 
as the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), was facilitated through the concurrent development 
of appropriate institutional arrangements for implementation, operation, and management of the 
physical infrastructure assets. This approach was viewed as a pre-condition for the envisaged 
integrated and diversified complementary investments (by other sectors) to manifest in order to 
ensure sustainable economic development. 
 
Yet, inadequate or inappropriate institutional arrangements, combined with complications of 
institutional mechanisms to minimise the blow to displaced workers in the process of transferring 
public-sector activities to private concessionaires, had the potential to limit the extent to which the 
MDC initiative meets expectations. In certain cases, the inappropriate institutional arrangements 
were traceable to the diversity in levels of development between the two countries (such as the 
inefficient state of Mozambican institutions after a long period of warfare). The development of 
institutional capacity for effective delivery of project objectives was paramount in this context. As 
Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 32) noted: “The ultimate success of the MDC may well depend 
upon the ability to develop non-physical infrastructure (emphasis in original) such as smooth 
border operations, good business logistics systems, and other knowledge and competencies in 
transportation and trade facilitation.”     
Source: Derived from Lakshmanan and Anderson, 2000, pp. 31-32.   
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The example of institutional arrangements in the implementation of the MDC, in 
Box 2.1, illustrates the symbiotic relationship between the level of development in 
institutions/organisations at national levels and their impact on institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for effective implementation of trans-state “trans-
actions,” such as cross-border programmes/projects, in the delivery of regional 
infrastructure. The example of the MDC also highlights the trans-/multi-sectoral 
and trans-/multidisciplinary characteristics of institutions that support integrated 
implementation of development programmes/projects in the context of integrated 
development. Notably, the MDC’s example underscores the complex 
requirements for integration of diverse spheres of institutional influence in the 
delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure, within and across 
the various spatial categories where projects are implemented.  
 
A cross-country study conducted by the World Bank (1994), to compare the 
performance of infrastructure services, established that effective institutional 
arrangements played a central role to support the development of the requisite 
efficiencies in the delivery of infrastructure services to meet effective demand. 
The study (ibid) also established that effective institutional arrangements played a 
critical role to ensure that infrastructure performance supports the delivery of 
development benefits. The aforementioned views validate the positive influence 
of effective institutions on infrastructure delivery.  
 
When taken in conjunction with Bastani’s remarks (1988: 67) regarding the 
fundamental role of adequate institutional capacity in the delivery of development 
projects, the findings of the World Bank’s study highlight the close relationship 
between effective institutional arrangements and mechanisms and the success of 
infrastructure developments projects. Bastani’s remarks (ibid) also circuitously 
emphasise the centrality of development projects as institutional mechanisms, or 
instruments, to translate (the state’s) policy initiatives and interventions into 
practical delivery on the ground. The World Bank study (1994) also underscores 
the significance of an enabling institutional environment at national levels to 
support the attainment of planned development outcomes.  
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As the World Bank (ibid) argued:  
 
…there is great variation both within and across countries in the efficiency 
of providing infrastructure services…these findings indicate that the 
performance of infrastructure derives not from general conditions of 
economic growth and development but from the institutional environment, 
which often varies across sectors and within individual countries.   
 
Contrary to the World Bank’s view, the relationship between the adequacy of the 
institutional environment and the levels of economic growth and development at 
country levels is, however, not mutually exclusive as the MDC example, in Box 
2.1, illustrates. A number of issues also emanate from the various definitions of 
institutions, presented in APPENDIX A, with implications for projects, in 
particular development programmes/projects. First, the definition proffered by 
Velasquez (2006) of institutions as “fixed patterns of activity” highlights the 
inherent challenges of co-existing contradictory actions, structures and behaviours 
between the fixed and transient endeavours in programmes/projects and their 
external/internal institutional environments. To the extent that Velasquez (ibid) 
describes the “patterns of activity” as “fixed” in business institutions may augur 
well for projects that are undertaken in predictable business environments, 
although such predictability is not assured. At the same time, whereas 
development programmes/projects are characterised by multiple (and often 
contradictory) objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation, in a 
business environment project objectives tend to be streamlined, focused, and 
therefore easier to attain. 
 
In particular, the thesis proffered by Velasquez is debatable in the context of 
globalisation, where businesses operate in highly dynamic institutional 
environments across international borders. The principles, values, norms and rules 
that underpin trans-actions across international border may be fixed to the extent 
that they are designed to provide consistent guidance for individual and collective 
actions and behaviours in global institutions/organisations across international 
boundaries. Such guidelines, however, may be amended to suit situational or 
territorial specificity: they may not always be observed by all the parties. These 
afore-mentioned observations have implications for the participation of trans-
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national companies (TNCs) or foreign private sector companies in NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure (development) programmes/projects, particularly so in 
countries that are characterised by weak institutions.  
 
Second, the definitions of institutions used by Velasquez (2006) and Keohane 
(Møller, 2005), when juxtaposed with the issues raised by Deng (2002), Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2006), and Zounmènou (2006) in respect of the potential positive 
impact of integrating traditional institutions in Africa’s development 
programmes/projects, highlight the diverse spheres of influence of institutions in 
development programmes/projects: the formal and informal, implicit and explicit, 
and fluid and doctrinaire rules that govern collective and individual behaviours 
and actions. The nuanced differences between institutions in trans-/ 
multidisciplinary and trans-/multi-sectoral contexts also allude to the challenges 
imposed by the confluence of diverse institutions in a project’s environment in the 
development of cross-border regional infrastructure. This is especially so since the 
‘rules of the game’ differ in various sectors, disciplines, and spatial categories.  
 
Therefore, approaches or processes to attain common objectives may differ 
significantly, between and within institutions: these differences are attributable to 
the inherent diversity in the underpinning ideologies, norms, values, principles, 
methods and rules that define institutions. As a result, the DFID (2003: vi) argued 
that since the institutional environment is dynamic, it “presents a challenge to the 
traditional concept of the project cycle with its essentially linear approach of 
identification, design, appraisal, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.”  
 
The various perspectives on institutions also underscore the need to reform both 
the internal and external institutions in order to facilitate efficient implementation 
of development programmes/projects to meet effective demand. Hence, the 
change from an external focus and the tendency to ascribe all of Africa’s ills to 
colonialism – whilst avoiding to address the breakdown of domestic institutions 
which manifests in poor governance regimes to regulate individual and collective 
behaviours or actions – are some of the issues NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms 
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for governance, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the 
AU’s Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance 
ostensibly seek to address in a constructive manner, and through the relevant 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for collective engagement.  
 
This study however does not discuss the efficacy of these afore-mentioned 
instruments to address Africa’s institutional failures, including their implications 
for the development of regional infrastructure. Suffice to say, the issues discussed 
above illustrate the range of complexities in the institutional environment that 
impact on integrated implementation management of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes, such as NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.  
 
The view of rigid/prescriptive planning processes, favoured in business 
environments as mechanisms for external control, is an important consideration in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, which relies primarily on the foreign private 
sector for implementation of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects. According to Mintzberg (1994: 349), the need for control by a powerful 
“external influencer” encourages the adoption/imposition of prescriptive planning 
systems. As Mintzberg noted (ibid), the afore-mentioned systems typify large-
scale institutional structures/operations: they are also preferred to manage the 
risks of capital intensive, large-scale investments. The environment in NEPAD’s 
cross-border development programmes/projects is, therefore, influenced by a 
dynamic institutional environment across international borders and trans-
disciplinary institutions. As a result, the planning and implementation of 
NEPAD’s cross-border regional infrastructure projects may tend to denote the 
combination of tensions and contradictions in international relations including 
political and socio-economic institutions across international borders. 
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2.2.2 Synopsis of problems in the provision of cross-border transport/roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation services  
 
2.2.2.1 Impact of inadequate institutions on the delivery of cross-border 
transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services  
 
The parlous state of Africa’s physical transport/roads infrastructure and transit 
facilitation services is widely acknowledged (see: AfDB, 1999; Adjasi, 2006; 
Amjadi & Yeats, 1995; Amoako, 1997; Anyango, 1997; Cheru, 2002; 
Commission for Africa (CFA), 2005; Estache, 2006; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; 
Guest, 2004; Hope, 2006; Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000; Limão & Venables, 
2000; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; OAU/AU, 2002; Ocran, 2006; Onyeani, 
1990; Rodney, 1972; Soko, 2006; UN, 2002; UNECOSOC, 2003; Walters, 1998; 
Watson, 1998; World Bank, 1994, 2002). A significant part of the problem is 
attributed to the lack of internal linkages in Africa’s transportation networks 
(Adjasi, 2006; AfDB & ECA, 2003; Bond, 2002; CFA, 2005; Hope, 2006; 
NEPAD, 2002c; Ocran, 2006; Rodney, 1972; Soko, 2006). As a result, the CFA 
(2005: unnumbered) argued that the lack of internal coherence in Africa’s 
transportation networks results in higher transportation costs for Africa’s goods 
and services than, for example, would occur in a typical Asian country.  
 
To illustrate the afore-mentioned point, the CFA (2005), Jawara and Kwa (2004), 
and Adjasi (2006) noted that shipping a car from Japan to Abidjan costs US$1500, 
whereas moving the car from Abidjan to Addis Ababa costs US$5000. According 
to Hope (2006:207), the United Nations’ Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO) also had the following to say about Africa’s transportation 
infrastructure: “Not only does…(Africa’s inadequate infrastructure by any 
measure) hobble the growth of enterprises able to compete in world markets, but it 
also prevents global production networks from setting up facilities in Africa” 
Underlying the identified problems with Africa’s infrastructure (either at regional, 
sub-regional, or national levels) are inadequate institutions and institutional 
structures for implementation: they inhibit the development and implementation 
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of effective interventions for the development of infrastructure at the various 
spatial categories.  
 
In the transport sector, the ineffectiveness and/or collapse of relevant regional 
institutions/organisations for the delivery of regional transport/roads infrastructure 
products and services has resulted in the proliferation of diverse national sector 
policies, regulations and standards. Poor governance regimes, endemic corruption, 
and lack of institutional capacity to facilitate the development of adequate 
infrastructure stocks and services exacerbate the problem. As a result, the afore-
mentioned constraints have manifested in the following characteristics or 
outcomes in the provision of physical and non-physical roads infrastructure: 
  
• Decrepit roads infrastructure networks at national levels, some of which 
have links to regional/sub-regional networks (Guest, 2004; van Ryneveld, 
2001);  
• Lack of maintenance and missing links (AfDB, 1999; AfDB & ECA, 2003; 
Adjasi, 2006; CFA, 2005; Hope, 2006; NEPAD, 2002c; World Bank, 1994); 
and 
• Lack of internal coherence, with adverse impact on the development of 
intra-African trade (Adjasi, 2006; Bond, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; 
Hope 2006; Ocran, 2006; Soko, 2006). The implications of the poor state of 
Africa’s transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services are 
illustrated in Box 2.2 
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Box 2.2: Poor State of Africa’s Transport/Roads Infrastructure and Transit 
Facilitation Services  
 
Generally, the deficiencies in Africa’s transport/roads infrastructure have resulted in a broad 
range of negative sectoral, inter-sectoral, political, economic, spatial, financial, environmental 
and social impacts. In particular, the parlous state of Africa’s transport/roads infrastructure, and 
the equally ineffective interventions for redress of the identified challenges have resulted in 
deleterious impacts on the following spheres of Africa’s development: sectoral cooperation; 
implementation of regional integration initiatives; inter-African trade; sectoral development (in 
particular agriculture); development of Africa’s domestic private sector and related medium-
small enterprises; poverty reduction efforts, particularly through the use of employment 
intensive engineering applications and methodologies in the construction and maintenance of 
roads infrastructure; economic performance of landlocked countries; and restructuring of 
national and sub-regional economies.  
 
According to NEPAD (NEPAD, 2002c: 40), the negative impact of Africa’s poor transport 
infrastructure and related services is evidenced in all transport sub-sectors, but more so in the 
roads sub-sector: high costs, delays, and unreliability of road transport services pose serious 
problems across the board – particularly for Africa’s landlocked countries. Long distances, 
compounded by poor physical roads infrastructure and inadequate transit facilitation services 
contribute to high transport costs. For example, NEPAD’s report (ibid) estimates a road trip of 
2042 kilometres between the ports of Mombasa and Bujumbura to take on average between 12-
15 days; under ideal conditions, NEPAD argues that this trip could be covered in one third of 
the time. In mainland SADC, excluding Angola and Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), NEPAD (ibid) estimates the total costs of border delays at some US$48-60 million 
annually. That the afore-mentioned challenges in physical roads infrastructure and transit 
facilitation have persisted for more than four decades gives even more cause for concern. 
 
The decrepit, inefficient and poorly-integrated transportation systems, including the resultant 
high transportation costs, contribute to the perpetuation of negative impacts on Africa’s 
development aspirations. These negative outcomes include extraordinary development 
limitations on landlocked countries, decreased inter-African trade, Africa’s marginalisation in 
global trade, and perpetuation of colonial trade patterns that are reflected spatially in the 
existing transportation networks. Some authors or organisations (AfDB, 1999; Amoako, 1997; 
Howe, 2001; Kanbur, 2001) have also argued that the current approaches to the development 
of roads infrastructure do not result in direct, short-term benefits/effects or long-term impacts 
on poverty reduction and human development.  
 
2.2.2.2 Impact of aid and donor finance on transport/roads infrastructure delivery  
 
To exacerbate the problem, a report of the Commission for Global Safety (The 
Times News Service, Sunday Times, 22 April 2007) argued that Africa “…has the 
most dangerous road network, with 28.3 road deaths for 100 000 people every 
year compared with 5.6 deaths in Britain.” This report argued that in developing 
countries more than 90% of deaths occur, and have soared, because of the poor 
design of roads constructed with foreign aid. As a result, the report (ibid) further 
argued that by 2015, “Road crashes are on course to overtake HIV/Aids…as the 
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main cause of death and disability for children aged five to 14 in developing 
countries.”  
 
Although the vagaries of donor finance and its adverse impact on Africa’s 
(infrastructure) development are well documented, a former World Bank president 
still advised that more aid and investment in Africa needed to be directed 
“towards vital infrastructure like roads and railways, if the money… (Africa) has 
invested in its people is going to pay off” (Boyle, Sunday Times, 18th March 
2007). However attractive the prospects of increased aid and foreign investment 
for the development of Africa’s regional infrastructure assets, the associated 
conditionalities and prescriptions of the global financial architecture might 
exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the existing challenges in the provision of 
cross-border regional infrastructure. The CFA (ibid) also stated that the afore-
mentioned problems, amongst other issues, resulted from the insistence by donors 
on “discrete Project Implementation Units (PIUs), which (have) often poached the 
most qualified staff from government.” As the CFA (Para. 15, 2005: unnumbered) 
noted, donor assistance has undermined the development of institutional capacity, 
including the development of a capable private sector and governments that are 
accountable to their citizens for delivery. 
 
In addition, the CFA (ibid) listed some of the constraints that contribute to the 
ineffective use of aid for the intended purposes to include the cumbersome donor 
requirements for “procedural, reporting, monitoring and accounting” measures 
that bypass national budgeting and accounting procedures, including the 
ubiquitous conditionalities for “tied aid” (i.e., the insistence that aid funding is 
spent on the products and services of the donor country). Regarding NEPAD, 
Amaizo (Breytenbach, 2004: 150) argued that although “the conditionalities are 
less publicised (but implicit in good governance)… (they) may redirect finances 
to projects that are primarily of importance to foreign direct investors rather than 
Africans in the rest of Africa.”  
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Other problems in the administration of aid, which have persisted over the 
decades with impact on the delivery of planned infrastructure in the majority of 
African countries, include the following: the lack of commitment by the 
developed countries to the disbursement of pledged aid and the lack of 
consistency in the disbursement of aid – particularly in trade-related aid packages 
(ANC Today, Vol.4, #42, 2004; ANC Today, Vol.4, #45, 2004; ANC Today, 
Vol.4, #46, 2004; Business in Africa, 2004; CFA, 2005; Cheru, 2002; 
Mkandawire, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; OECD & AfDB, 2001/2002; 
Oxfam, 2002), post-war reconstruction efforts (Patrick, 1998), and poor 
coordination by both the donors and recipient countries (CFA, 2005; Mkandawire, 
2002; Patrick, 1998). According to the ANC Today (Vol.4, #44, 2004), Cheru 
(2002), and Patrick (1998), these afore-mentioned conditions have resulted in the 
inimical impact of aid on poverty reduction. The afore-mentioned inefficiencies 
have also hindered the development of institutional capacity for implementation 
of the identified development projects and for future spatial expansion.  
 
2.3 Causes of Inadequate Institutions in the Development of Cross-Border 
Regional Infrastructure 
 
2.3.1 Complexity of underpinning institutional mechanisms and arrangements 
 
Some institutions, media, development analysts, and intellectuals have previously 
identified a plethora of constraints and challenges underpinning the development 
of Africa’s infrastructure and its performance (see: AfDB, 1999; Adedegi, 2002; 
Amjadi & Yeats, 1995; Amoako, 1997; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1990; Anyang’ 
Nyong’o, 2002; Bond, 2002; Calderon & Serven, 2004; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 
2002; Estache, 2006a; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Hope, 2002, 2006; 
Howe, 2001; Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000; Limão & Venables, 2000; Mail and 
Guardian, 2004a; Mills, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; N’diaye, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; 
NEPAD, 2002c; OAU/AU, 2002; Onyeani, 1990; Patrick, 1998; Paul, 1990; 
Picciotto & Weaving, 1994; Rodney, 1972; Taylor, 2005; World Bank, 1994, 
2000, 2002). The said problems mirror the overall institutional quagmire in 
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infrastructure development at the various levels of management/planning and 
spatial categories.  
 
At the integrative/strategic levels of management or development/programme 
levels of planning, the identified problems in the delivery of Africa’s 
infrastructure are attributed to the following mutually reinforcing broad categories 
of causes: weak institutional environment; inappropriate development planning 
approaches; legacy of entrenched colonial influences in trade that are reflected 
spatially in the existing transportation patterns; lack of inclusive stakeholder 
participation; lack of institutional capacity for implementation compounded by the 
inordinate dependence on external funding and expertise; and lack of sustained 
political support for the implementation of agreed programmes.   
 
Although the adverse institutional issues are well-documented, how they are 
interrelated, and how their impact on the planning and implementation of 
programmes/projects has been managed appear not so well-documented; this is 
particularly so in the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects with multiple development objectives planned for 
simultaneous implementation.  Details of some of the identified institutional 
issues are listed under Box 2.3 
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Box 2.3: Institutional Factors that Contribute to Poor Infrastructure Development 
and Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The poor performance of infrastructure projects and services in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the 
transport/roads sector, is attributed to the non-performance of various interrelated supply-side and demand-
side factors listed below. Whilst these factors are mutually reinforcing, the list depicted below illustrates the 
categories of institutional causes of problems and related outcomes at the various levels of management.   
 
Weak institutional environment 
• Inappropriate paradigms that inform infrastructure development planning; 
• Lack of appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks; 
• Withdrawal of the public sector from infrastructure provision compounded by the negative effects of 
privatisation;  
• Questionable reliance on the private sector to achieve equitable development outcomes; 
• Minimal inter-African and inter-regional trade to induce increased demand and investment in regional 
transportation infrastructure and services; 
• Inappropriate reliance on and application of prescriptions contained in the Washington Consensus and 
related structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which curtail state expenditure on basic infrastructure 
and utilities. 
 
Inappropriate development planning 
• Misallocated infrastructure investments; 
• Poor development priorities resulting in lack of maintenance; 
• Lack of focus on geographical and infrastructure characteristics to determine costs; 
• Inadequate targeting of infrastructure investments to rural areas for direct impact on poverty reduction; 
• Inappropriate, over-ambitious, once-off infrastructure projects with no capacity for implementation and 
spatial expansion;    
 
Lack of inclusive stakeholder participation  
• Lack of inclusive user involvement in the value-chain from decision-making to operation; 
• Lack of wider consultation on, and ownership of development processes and outcomes. 
 
Inordinate dependence on external sources of funding and expertise  
• Crippling debt and balance of payments constraints; 
• Lack of binding commitments from development partners and the international community; 
• Unmet expectations of reliance on foreign private-sector investment; 
• Donor involvement in new infrastructure investments, with the associated negative conditionalities 
(favourably biased towards donors and not recipient countries) resulting in the inordinate influence of 
donors on new infrastructure programme/project design whilst ignoring maintenance projects; 
• Covert agendas of developed countries, some of which impact on the questionable relevance and 
appropriateness of infrastructure development interventions;  
• Failure of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to sustain planned expenditure on infrastructure 
programmes and other development priorities. 
 
Lack of capacity for implementation  
• Lack of capacity for, and inadequate attention to implementation; 
• Poor leadership; 
• Lack of political will to implement regional agreements. 
 
Governance failures  
• States’ failure or weak states; 
• Poor political, economic and corporate governance; 
• Widespread corruption, mal-governance and state capture in extreme cases. 
Source: Derived from various sources including the following: AfDB (1999); Adedegi (2002); Amoako 
(1997); Anyang’ Nyong’o (1990);  Anyang’ Nyong’o (2002); Bond (2002); Cheru (2002); Diescho (2002); 
Estache (2006a); Founou-Tchigoua (2002); Gelb (2001); Hope (2002, 2006); Howe (2001); Lakshmanan and 
Anderson (2000); Limão and Venables (2000); Mail and Guardian (2004a); Mills (2002); Nabudere (2002); 
N’diaye (2002); NEPAD (2001); NEPAD (2002c); OAU/AU (2002); Onyeani (1990); Patrick (1998); Paul 
(1990); Picciotto and Weaving (1994); Rodney (1972); Taylor (2005); World Bank (1994, 2000, 2002). 
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The problems depicted in Box 2.3 are compounded by poor political leadership in 
the implementation of development programmes/projects. Also, because of the 
failure by many African countries to develop infrastructure stocks and reach the 
“critical mass” required for increased investment, Estache (2006a: 10) has argued 
“…costly self sufficiency seems to be the norm to meet the demand of investors 
for infrastructure services.” Estache (ibid: 11), however, noted that 
approximations in transport are much more complex because of the location of 
transport in space.  
 
In addition, increased investment at national or regional levels is made difficult by 
the following circumstances.  
 
(a) The majority of African countries do not have adequate domestic resources 
to develop transport/roads infrastructure, in particular national roads 
networks with regional implications. The potential for “free riding” in the 
delivery of regional infrastructure programmes/projects is therefore 
enormous. In this regard, Hope (2006: 222) recommended that capacity 
development to support Africa’s infrastructure needs to “promote and allow 
for the pooling of resources with other countries, where this could lead to 
the development of infrastructure serving common needs.” In this context, 
the role of regional institutions would be to coordinate the development of 
regional infrastructure stocks that fall within the realm of global public 
goods. The efficacy of regional institutions in this role would depend on 
whether or not they posses the authority, institutional capacity (including 
technical, financial and human resources), and political support and 
commitment from member states.  
 
(b) The design and responsibility for the development of national networks with 
regional implications may be complicated by the trade imperatives that are 
linked to Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), and bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) that African countries have entered into with the 
various countries or regional blocks from the industrialised countries of the 
developed north (such as the US’s African Growth and Cooperation 
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Agreement (AGOA), or the EU-South Africa, or EU-ACP (Cotonou) 
Agreement), EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), or with some 
of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) (such as China) in south-south 
cooperation agreements. Moreover, issues pertaining to the development of 
cross-border regional infrastructure are the subject of dominant discourse on 
sustainable development finance of global public goods. The emphasis of 
these policy prescriptions is on Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and an increased role of the foreign private 
sector in the delivery of infrastructure products and services; these policy 
prescriptions introduce complex global institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements in the delivery of Africa’s cross-border regional 
(transport/roads) infrastructure assets and services.  
 
(c) Some aspects of technology, service provision and government procurement 
have also been brought under the ambit of World Trade Organisation’s 
(WTO) rules (the so-called “Singapore Issues”), with implications for the 
development of regional infrastructure. These issues are linked to the 
controversial provisions of the WTO’s institutional mechanisms, such as the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The afore-mentioned instruments 
have implications for access to affordable/borrowed technology by 
developing countries, and capacity development for domestic private sector 
operators to provide transport services and products as well as institutional 
reform/development in general.  
 
 For example, Jawara and Kwa (2004: 39) argued that the Singapore issues 
“…are essentially about removing any domestic legislation in developing 
countries that favours local companies over foreign companies”; they are 
also about ensuring the rights and unfair advantage of foreign companies 
over local/domestic companies (ibid). According to Jawara and Kwa (ibid), 
the imposition of the Singapore issues by the WTO is attributable to the 
“strong-arm tactics” of the powerful developed countries with the collusion 
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of the WTO and the global financial institutions, such as the IMF and World 
Bank (who, they (ibid) argued, “carrotize” technical assistance and loans to 
pressure developing countries into acquiescing to these controversial WTO 
rules). In this regard, Jawara and Kwa (ibid) argued that the Singapore 
issues, in addition to the vagaries of trade facilitation, are tantamount to 
“self-legislated and self-regulated colonialism all over again.”    
 
The issues discussed above allude to an environment of increased complexity in 
the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, particularly so cognisant of 
global rules and policy prescriptions of the global financial architecture with 
respect to sustainable financing of global public goods. This complexity suggests 
that the short-term effects and long-term impact of cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure development on trade, regional integration, capacity 
development, and poverty reduction (i.e., NEPAD’s multiple objectives for the 
development of  regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous 
implementation) assume much more fluid dimensions based on the context within 
which roads infrastructure programmes/projects are developed. In this regard, 
Lakshmanan and Anderson (2002: 7) have identified the development of relevant 
institutional capacity in organisations, in particular non-physical infrastructure, as 
critical to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of physical roads infrastructure 
assets and services. The afore-mentioned suggestions also underscore the 
significance of the development of a coherent and effective institutional 
framework for the effective and efficient delivery of infrastructure.  
 
It is cognisant of this realisation that various authors (Bastani, 1988; Baum & 
Tolbert, 1985; DBSA, 2004; DFID, 2003; World Bank, 1994; Paul, 1990) have 
acknowledged the need for institutional reform/development to ensure the 
effectiveness of institutions and the adequacy of institutional capacity to support 
infrastructure delivery and performance. However, the underpinning linear 
approach of the stages of the project life cycle in a projects environment presents 
challenges for institutional reform/development (DFID, 2003: vi), or vice versa; 
this is particularly so cognisant of rigid requirements in project management 
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functions including the management of constraints and the inherent risks in all of 
the aforementioned.  As the DFID (ibid) noted: 
 
With institutional development, interventions have to be informed by 
experience and developed as they go along. In addition, institutional 
development is often long term, requiring a willingness to maintain 
involvement over a decade or more. It thus lends itself to a process approach 
where, within the agreed overall objectives for institutional change, outputs 
and the activities required to attain them are defined more clearly as 
development proceeds. This requires particular attention to monitoring, to 
provide a framework for adapting interventions to take account of progress 
and of changing conditions.   
 
2.3.2 Constraints to the implementation of Africa’s development programmes/ 
projects 
 
Whilst diverse views prevail regarding the causes of ensuing problems in the 
implementation of programmes/projects to deliver regional infrastructure, the 
African region appears encumbered with all the conceivable reasons for the 
identified constraints and challenges in the provision of cross-border regional 
infrastructure. These include the following interrelated issues (not in any order of 
priority):  
 
• large size of the continent vis-à-vis the multiple fragmentation of borders; 
• arduous physical/geographic constraints;  
• small size of African economies and low levels of income growth in the 
majority of (non-oil producing) countries;  
• semi-colonial links with developed countries exacerbated by the intricacies 
of asymmetrical relations and inequitable trade agreements with developed 
countries/their institutions; 
• inadequate institutions; 
• archaic management systems/inadequate frameworks to manage institutional 
relationships including the interface between the various spatial categories 
with implications for the implementation of development programmes/ 
projects;  
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• multiplicity of (inadequate) national transport policies, regulatory and 
governance regimes at sub-regional/regional levels;  
• inadequate public-sector transport structures;  
• existing low levels of infrastructure stocks, which deter foreign and 
domestic investment to increase infrastructure stocks;  
• missing links or inadequate transport/roads linkages for internal coherence 
exacerbated by the prevalence of externally-focused transportation networks, 
which are reminiscent of colonial transportation and trade patterns;  
• low levels of human development, which impede efforts to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of physical infrastructure assets;  
• non-existent or outdated technology resulting in failure to develop adequate 
institutional infrastructure in order to increase the efficiencies of existing 
infrastructure assets and to support the attainment of planned infrastructure 
development outcomes; and 
• mal-governance, corruption, and massive externalisation of domestic 
resources.  
 
These afore-mentioned issues circuitously exacerbate and are in turn exacerbated 
by the institutional maladies and lack of capacity for effective integrated 
implementation management and implementation of the identified regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects in the transport/roads sector. Some authors 
(Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1990; Bastani, 1988; Bond, 2002; Cheru, 2002; Deng, 2002; 
Dunham, 1978; Fair, 1987; Gore, 1984; Mabogunje et al., 1978; Mills, 2002; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Taylor, 2005; Todaro, 1985; Zenawi, 2002; Zounmènou, 
2006) have argued that the breakdown of parameters set by institutions at the 
various levels of management and in/across the various spatial categories denotes 
institutional failure, with implications for development programmes/projects. In 
Africa’s case, however, there is a prevalent tendency to attribute institutional 
failure to the vagaries of colonialism. For example, Deng (2002: 213) argued that 
institutional failure was instigated and perpetuated by the imposition (on Africa’s 
development discourse,) of foreign values, rules and methodologies. As a result, 
Deng (ibid) argued that the consequential institutional failure undermines 
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(domestic) public policy that facilitates the implementation of effective 
development strategies.  
 
This institutional failure, Deng’s argument (ibid) goes, has manifested in Africa’s 
inability to participate in the global political economy. As Deng (ibid) further 
argued, the working rules of collective action were broken down because of 
colonialism; the reciprocal relationships between the individual and community 
on the one hand, and between communities on the other were destroyed, thereby 
circuitously resulting in institutional failure, erosion of safety nets afforded by the 
community to the individual and pervasive poverty. Deng, however, failed to 
elaborate on the range of other reasons for institutional failure in Africa’s context, 
beyond attributing this problem to the erosion of traditional institutions by 
colonialism. Other authors (Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1990:3) have argued that the 
erosion of Africa’s institutions contributed to the prevalence of weak states, which 
were inherited at independence i.e., the legacy “that colonialism bequeathed to 
Africa” (ibid). 
 
Similar arguments regarding the detrimental impact of colonialism were proffered 
previously by some Marxist or neo-Marxist scholars (Mabogunje et al., 1978) in 
their analyses of institutional failure in developing countries, Africa in particular.  
Other scholars/authors (Bastani, 1988; Bond, 2002; Cheru, 2002; Dunham, 1978; 
Fair, 1987; Gore, 1984; Todaro, 1985) underscored the negative impact, 
particularly on developing countries, of various inappropriate mainstream 
(regional) development theories; or the negative impact of foreign methodologies 
on the development of institutional capacity for the implementation of 
development/infrastructure programmes and projects. 
 
The argument of colonialism being the cause of institutional failure in African 
countries (Deng, 2002: 213), however, appears to ignore the role of the neo-
colonial, patrimonial and neo-patrimonial African state in instigating and 
perpetuating institutional failure in Africa’s contemporary development 
landscape. For example, the narrow mercantilism displayed by various African 
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countries/governments in their failure to implement regional agreements, the 
venality of African governments and political leaders, and the endemic patron-
client relations that manifest in mal-governance and corruption in the majority of 
African states (Mills, 2002; Taylor, 2005; Zenawi, 2002) are, in addition to the 
legacy of colonialism, some of the causes of institutional failure. As a result, one 
may argue that the neo-patrimonial African state has resulted in the deepening of 
poverty and the failure of development programmes/projects in the majority of 
African states.  
 
Some African scholars (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Zounmènou, 2006) have also 
highlighted as integral to Africa’s development discourse the need to incorporate 
African values, culture and integrated management systems in the development of 
programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned scholars (ibid) suggested that this 
approach would facilitate the development of alternative indigenous development 
models that are underpinned by indigenous institutions, to effectively support the 
implementation of Africa’s development programmes/projects. As Zounmènou 
(2006: 20) noted, African values form part of Africa’s cultural system, which 
“embodies the Indigenous Knowledge System, the art of governance, as well as 
the economy of the communities” (ibid). In this regard, Zounmènou (ibid) argued 
that African values typify traditional institutions.  
 
The arguments posited above have implications for the development of alternative 
approaches to Africa’s development programmes/projects that are suited to 
situational specificity. Notwithstanding their merits or demerits, the suggestions 
proffered by Deng (2002), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) and Zounmènou (2006) 
regarding the significance of African traditional institutions in the development of 
relevant/effective interventions for sustainable development require further 
examination. 
 
The views expressed above regarding the significance of traditional institutions 
for the attainment of effective development outcomes are, however, not new. For 
example, it appears that the recent successes of the East Asian emerging 
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economies, or NICs, in various regions of the developing world, which were 
previously also affected by colonialism, are underpinned by the development of 
effective interventions through the integration of (formal) western and traditional 
regional/national-specific institutions (Mills, 2002). In the case of Malaysia and 
Taiwan, the increasing adequacy of the countries’ institutions to tackle 
development challenges has been attributed to the prudent combination of formal 
and informal institutions to facilitate and evince people-centred development 
approaches (ibid). In countries like Singapore, Mills (ibid) has argued that the 
effectiveness of the adopted development approach was based on the integration 
of the underpinning traditional Asian values. As a result, Mills (ibid) averred that 
NICs like Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong-Kong and Thailand have achieved 
prosperity through the shrewd balancing of technology, global integration and 
openness, human development, and economic empowerment of their people 
through a mix of western and traditional values. 
 
It has also been argued (ibid) that the development approach followed by the 
NICs has minimised the negative impact of the ‘discontents’ of globalisation. 
However, Mills (ibid: 146) argued that the Asian financial crises underscored the 
need to reform both the domestic institutions of governance (in countries like 
Indonesia), and those of the contemporary global financial architecture 
(particularly in development finance and trade), in terms of the “…legitimacy, 
speed and efficacy of external policy prescriptions” (ibid). In this regard, the 
arguments advanced by Mills above illustrate the necessity for the alignment of 
interventions for institutional reform/development at the various spatial categories 
and levels of management, and how such interventions may be used to support the 
structured management/implementation of development programmes/projects.  
 
Some of the adverse influences in the internal/external institutional environment 
on project implementation are presented in Box 2.4 
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Box 2.4 Adverse Influences in the Institutional Environment on Project 
Implementation  
 
Various authors have highlighted a range of mutually reinforcing negative influences in the 
internal and external institutional environment, which impact on project implementation. Some of 
the negative influences, which have resulted in implementation failure of (Africa’s) 
infrastructure/development programmes and projects, include the following: 
• Legacy of disempowering colonial and neo-colonial influences on Africa’s development 
initiatives (Bond, 2002; CFA, 2005; Diescho, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, Rodney, 1972);  
• Inappropriate contemporary approaches to Africa’s integration with the developed north, or 
global political economy (Adedegi, 2002; Bond, 2002; Gelb, 2002; Mills, 2002; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2006; Taylor, 2005; Zounmènou, 2006);  
• Inordinate reliance by African governments on the foreign private sector to deliver successful 
infrastructure development outcomes (Estache, 2006a);  
• Inordinate reliance on external resources, such as funding and technical support: this reliance 
is reinforced and exacerbated by the onerous prescriptions of the global financial architecture 
and conditionalities for technical support and loans from the international finance institutions 
(Adedegi, 2002; CFA, 2005; Ekpo, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Guest, 2004; Jawara & 
Kwa, 2004; Mills, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Tandon, 2002; Taylor, 2005);  
• Lack of institutional reform and/or development (CFA, 2005; DFID, 2003); 
• Weak government policies, in particular the negative impact of economic policy failure on 
development programmes/projects and on institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
infrastructure delivery (Bastani, 1988; World Bank, 1994);  
• Poor governance regimes that are exacerbated by corruption and neo-patrimonial state 
relations, which manifest in patronage and rent-seeking activities (CFA, 2005; Gelb, 2001; 
Mills, 2002; Taylor, 2005; Zenawi, 2002);  
• Lack of institutional capacity for project selection, preparation and strategic management of 
development projects (Paul, 1990);  
• Lack of institutional capacity for implementation (Anyang’ Nyong’o et al., 2002; Bastani, 
1988; CFA, 2005; DFID, 2003; Hope, 2002, 2006; N’diaye, 2002; World Bank, 1994);  
• Attitudinal biases that are linked to the covert agendas of different stakeholders with adverse 
implications for projects’ implementation (Adedegi, 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o et al., 2002; 
Bond, 2002; Thwala, 2001);  
• Inadequate management of cultural difference in multinational projects to ensure projects’ 
implementation success (PMI, 1996; Turner, 1999); and 
• Adverse “developmental factors” – such as the persistent poverty, emigration of skilled 
human capital, deteriorating education system, weak governance systems, and HIV/AIDS 
epidemic – which have resulted in “capacity deficits” to implement development plans and 
projects to deliver products and services for sustainable development (Hope, 2006).  
 
Previously, the DFID (2003) argued that the lack of real commitment for 
transformational change from stakeholders – especially those at senior levels – is 
one of the reasons that contribute to institutional failure. In environments of 
inadequate institutions, the lack of political will and stakeholder commitment to 
support transformational change usually manifests in the tendency to define and 
articulate implementation challenges in development programmes/projects in 
vague technical contexts. This approach may result in the exclusive proposal of 
technical interventions to address the identified problems, to the exclusion of 
addressing the underlying causes of institutional inadequacies or identified 
                                                                                                                                42 
 
problems. In particular, the afore-mentioned technical interventions are usually 
proposed arbitrarily and fast-tracked for implementation. In the majority of cases, 
such technical interventions can be compared to ‘band aid’ solutions to 
entrenched and endemic problems of development, resulting in implementation 
failure. As the DFID (ibid: iv) noted: “Technical interventions that leave 
unsatisfactory institutions intact will probably achieve nothing”.   
 
Moreover, the possible impact of the proposed technical/development 
interventions on existing (inadequate/fragile) institutions and structures for 
implementation is hardly examined during programme/project preparation and in 
strategies for project implementation or implementation management, in order to 
propose relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support project 
implementation. Thus, the DFID (ibid), and the World Bank (1990) have 
identified the lack of institutional reform/development and lack of institutional 
capacity as the key challenges to the success of development programmes/ 
projects. This is particularly so since, according to the World Bank (ibid), policy 
makers tend to ignore institutional aspects because of their multi-faceted 
characteristics.  
 
Similarly, Baum and Tolbert (1985) and Paul (1990) argued that institutional 
aspects do not receive adequate attention in the management of development 
programmes/projects. They amplified this argument with the notion that 
institutional reforms circuitously encounter resistance when fragile institutions are 
overwhelmed by the imperatives of multiple development objectives (in 
development programmes) that are planned for simultaneous implementation.   
 
In this regard, critical issues in this study are:  
• How can the negative impacts of institutional failure be managed in order to 
facilitate the implementation of development programmes/projects to 
ameliorate the status quo? In other words, how can Africa’s development 
programmes/projects, in particular NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, be 
implemented effectively cognisant of the complexities of the 
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external/internal institutional environment in which such 
programmes/projects are conceptualised and implemented?  
• Specifically, in the short-term, how can the adverse influence of the 
prescriptions or conditionalities of external/international institutions 
(including global financial institutions, global trade rules, and so on) be 
managed so as not to stymie Africa’s development agenda in the delivery of 
cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure? 
• What and how can positive aspects in African institutions be harnessed to 
facilitate effective delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads 
infrastructure, cognisant of the negative impact of the fragmented states and 
institutional capacity deficits on the attainment of collective/regional 
development objectives?  
• In the long term, how can institutional reform/development be instituted in 
order to facilitate effective implementation of (cross-border) regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects, cognisant of the rigid requirements of 
the stages of the project life cycle and project management functions or 
resistance to change in the external/internal institutional environment?  
• What effective interventions may be implemented in planned 
programmes/projects in the short-term in order to accommodate the 
constraints of project management functions, or those imposed by the stages 
of the project life-cycle, cognisant of the long-term requirements for 
institutional reform/development and the development of institutional 
capacity?  
 
The questions posed above may not all be answered, or even addressed in this 
research report. Given the vagaries of the external/internal institutional 
environment in Africa’s development landscape, this research will, however, 
establish institutional mechanisms and arrangements instituted in other/similar 
settings to facilitate effective implementation of the approved development 
programmes/projects.      
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2.4 Link between Institutions, Programmes/Projects and Structures for 
Implementation Management  
 
As the discussions in the sections above illustrate, the implementation of 
development programmes/projects is increasingly influenced by the external/ 
internal institutional environment including the nature of institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements to support implementation. As a result, a starting point or 
parallel process to facilitate effective implementation of development 
programmes/projects would be the reform/development of inadequate institutions. 
Since the development arena is dynamic, with multiple stakeholders who have 
their own development agendas and priorities, the discussions above suggest that 
some of the requisite inputs in Africa’s development of programmes/projects are 
beyond the control of even the implementing internal (regional, sub-regional or 
national) institutional structures/organisations.  
 
It appears the institutional environment in the delivery of cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure is much more complex and politicised, with 
significant influence by external institutions of the developed north on the 
mapping of development objectives and desired outcomes in programmes/ 
projects. Significantly, the cross-border regional transport/roads sector intersects 
multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary spheres of influence thereby increasing 
complexity. Therefore, solutions must be found to facilitate a structured approach 
to the management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects 
within the ambit of limited internal/domestic resources. A critical question is: how 
can institutional, sectoral and project aspects be managed coherently to facilitate 
effective implementation?  
 
The models for the structured management of development programmes/projects 
illustrated in this section are, at best, used to highlight some of the mechanisms 
that have been used to support integrated implementation/implementation 
management of projects. Admittedly, the environments in which such models 
have been used in the past may not be as complex as the present-day internal/ 
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external institutional environments in which Africa’s development programmes/ 
projects are implemented – including NEPAD’s. The challenges in Africa’s 
development landscape discussed in this chapter are, however, not 
insurmountable. Therefore, the models discussed below can be modified and/or 
used in combination with a range of trans-/multidisciplinary interventions to suit 
project and situational specificity. Since these models have been used successfully 
in diverse settings, and have universal applicability, they may also be used as 
inputs to the development of indigenous models for the management of Africa’s 
development programmes/projects.      
 
2.4.1 A case for the effective use of integrative project management 
methodologies  
 
In the context of integrated development and integrated implementation 
management of Africa’s cross-border regional infrastructure projects, standard 
project management guidelines seem inadequate for the task. Therefore, the 
structured and creative integration of relevant inputs from trans-sectoral and trans-
/multidisciplinary knowledge areas may assist to develop integrative project 
management methodologies to overcome some of the structural challenges in 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation 
management of cross-border regional infrastructure projects.  In this regard, the 
role and capacity of institutional structures is critical to create an enabling 
environment for the planned integrated development interventions to manifest. In 
particular, some of the crucial aspects to support the effective development and 
application of integrative project management methodologies include the 
approach to planning, characteristics of institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for implementation management, substance of planning, and 
characteristics of institutional structures/organisations and organisational 
environments in which projects are implemented. 
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2.4.1.1 Approach to planning  
 
The relationship between institutions, planning hierarchies, projects, and 
implementation management may be defined by the approach to planning. An 
approach to planning may either facilitate the forging of links between 
institutions, strategies at various levels of management, objectives, 
external/internal institutional environment, programmes/projects, and structures 
for implementation management: it may also entrench what Mintzberg (1994) 
referred to as “the great divide” in planning hierarchies, programmes/projects, and 
structures for implementation management.  
 
Integrative project management methodologies, as some of the mechanisms for 
effective project planning and management, may facilitate the development of 
links between institutions, programmes/projects and structures for implementation 
management in order to facilitate effective implementation and implementation 
management of projects. Integrative project management methodologies also 
provide frameworks for analysis in order to link action planning with performance 
management as well as to facilitate the management of influences of the 
internal/external environment in so far as these impact on project management 
functions. The characteristics of these integrative frameworks, however, will be 
determined by the approach and attitude to planning in various institutions/ 
organisations for implementation of projects. 
 
Since this study assumes NEPAD used the prescriptive model to the development 
of regional infrastructure, using Mintzberg’s (1994: 26-27) analogy regarding the 
separation between key planning processes and implementation in prescriptive 
models, one may argue that integrative project management methodologies may 
provide effective mechanisms to bridge the gap between institutions, planning 
hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for implementation management. 
Integrative project management methodologies enunciate through the use of 
relevant project management tools and techniques how integrative links can be 
developed and operationalized in order to bridge the gap between what Mintzberg 
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(ibid) referred to as the divide (in prescriptive models) between “strategy and 
tactics,” “analysis and synthesis,” “thinking and acting.”  
 
2.4.1.2 Characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation management  
 
In project implementation management, the use of integrative project management 
methodologies facilitate the integration of formal and informal rules, formalised 
and emergent/intuitive management systems/behaviours with the organisational/ 
project structures that perform the work of projects. In this regard, integrative 
project management methodologies may be construed to contain elements of both 
the prescriptive and the descriptive/emergent models to planning. In projects, 
these models are either used on their own or in combination with other trans-/ 
multidisciplinary interventions at the various levels of management and stages of 
the project life cycle.  
 
Some authors (Mintzberg, 1994; Turner, 1999) have emphasised the wisdom of 
integrating both formal and informal approaches to planning in the management 
of projects based on situational specificity and the project’s requirements. To 
paraphrase Mintzberg (1994), the integration of emergent approaches, particularly 
in the development and implementation of programmes/projects, results from the 
realisation that effective strategies can emanate from various levels of 
management, particularly those that are closer to the coal-face of implementation.  
 
2.4.1.3 Substance of planning 
 
Accepting Turner’s (1999) and Viljoen’s (1997) views of the objectives, process 
and substance of the implementation stage, the development of effective links 
between conception/ideas, strategies, projects, and structures for implementation 
also depends on the substance of  planning: these afore-mentioned links may be 
illustrated through the development of strategy and how this is operationalized. A 
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process that links institutions with planning hierarchies, objectives, internal/ 
external environmental issues, performance control and structures for 
implementation management is referred to by Mintzberg (1994: 336) as “strategic 
programming.” Mintzberg (ibid) expressly recommended strategic programming 
for explicating, elaborating, and implementing a strategy that has already been 
formed. Mintzberg (ibid), however, argued that strategic programming is 
appropriate under certain conditions: i.e., capital intensity of projects; large scale 
of projects; a combination of large-size, hierarchical, elaborated or diverse 
organisational structures; powerful external influencers, and so on. (Some of the 
conditions described by Mintzberg are similar to those evidenced in NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP.) 
 
The elements of strategic programming are also inherent in integrative project 
management models. At the same time, integrative project management models 
are also underpinned by the premises of prescriptive models to planning, primarily 
for purposes of analysis and performance management/control. Emergent 
approaches to the management of projects also form an integral part of integrative 
project management models and project activities at different stages of the project 
life cycle based on project specificity. The confluence of elements from the afore-
mentioned diverse models illustrate the strong links between strategy, objectives, 
projects, and project structures for implementation management that evolving 
project management practice seeks to evince in integrative or structured 
approaches to the management of projects.  
 
2.4.1.4 Characteristics of institutional structures/organisations and 
organisational environments 
 
The characteristics of institutional structures/organisations and organisational 
environments in structures for implementation management are crucial for 
successful implementation. The concern about the organisational environment and 
human behaviour in organisations is particularly pertinent for present-day project 
management, particularly so in a context of integrated development. In the words 
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of Eric Gabriel, Vice-President Association for Project Management (Turner, 
1999: xv), project management has evolved “from a systems-oriented 
methodology, through ‘goal orientation’, to project-based management. From a 
topic in which computers were pre-eminent, to one in which people, interpersonal 
and inter-group relationships predominate.” This comment reminds us of how 
important human relations management and attitudes to work are for effective 
implementation of projects. In management literature/practice and in studies of 
organisational behaviour, these afore-mentioned issues have assumed growing 
importance over the past few decades. In this regard, a growing body of 
knowledge in project management, which draws from the vast management 
literature, illustrates the impact of the human element in organisational and project 
structures, and their implications for implementation and implementation 
management of projects.  
 
As Mullins (Lynch, 1997: 729) argued: 
 
Managers need to consider how structural design and methods of work 
organisation influence the behaviour and performance of members of the 
organisation. The operation of the organisation and actual working 
arrangements will be influenced by the style of management, the personalities 
of members and the informal organisation. These factors may lead to the 
differences between the formal structure of the organisation and what happens 
in practice. Building an organisation involves more than concern for structure, 
methods of work and technical efficiency. The hallmark of many successful 
business organisations is the attention given to the human element: to the 
development of a culture which helps to create a feeling of belonging, 
commitment and satisfaction.    
 
Turner (1999: 132), however, argued that the starting point or anchor for flexible 
approaches in structures for project implementation, what he terms the “versatile 
organization” (ibid), appeared to be the existing (formal) functional structures in 
organisations. The point made here is worrisome in the context of inadequate 
institutional structures/organisations and inadequate institutional capacity 
particularly in the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure 
development programmes/projects: if existing functional structures/organisations 
are dysfunctional, then the associated project structures for implementation 
                                                                                                                                50 
 
management will operate like rudderless units that float in a sea of complexity 
without guidance.    
 
2.4.2 Guidelines to address the challenges of integrated implementation/ 
implementation management in development programmes/projects  
 
There is paucity in general texts on how to overcome the challenges of integrated 
development, with implications for integrated implementation management of 
development programmes/projects with multiple objectives that are planned for 
simultaneous implementation. Thus, in addition to the prescribed standards for 
project management, or prescriptive models that emphasise performance 
management/control, effective project implementation planning and management 
in the context of integrated development needs to combine deliberate, inclusive, 
emergent, learning and flexible approaches based on project specificity and as the 
implementation process unfolds. In this context, critical concerns in the 
implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects 
similar to those proposed by NEPAD are the following:  
 
• How can the existing formal/functional structures in institutions/institutional 
structures such as the RECs, NEPAD and AU be used as anchors or 
reference points for project structures when the afore-mentioned 
organisational structures require radical transformation or 
reform/development in order to translate the new vision espoused by 
NEPAD into tangible positive development outcomes? The afore-mentioned 
question is particularly significant since these afore-mentioned institutional 
structures appear to not posses adequate institutional capacity (i.e., 
institutional infrastructure and human capital with the relevant 
competencies) to drive transformational change. 
• What effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project 
implementation management may be used to coordinate the planning 
inputs/outputs and activities of multiple, diverse institutional structures that 
operate in trans-sectoral infrastructure projects and trans-disciplinary 
application areas with influence on the implementation of cross-border 
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regional transport/roads programmes and in diverse spatial categories at 
international, regional, sub-regional and national levels?     
• How can formal procedures be applied or modified to suit project/situational 
specificity when such procedures do not exist either at the institutional, or 
organisational levels, or spatial/sectoral categories – or in the event that the 
said procedures are inadequate to operationalize strategies for project 
implementation in alignment with NEPAD’s new vision/mission?  
• How can an enabling environment be created to support organisational/ 
project structures for integrated implementation management when some of 
the major influences in the project’s external/internal environment are 
beyond the capability of project managers/project structures to influence or 
manage, how are such structures created in the first place and how do they 
facilitate effective integrated project implementation in the absence of an 
enabling external/internal institutional environment? 
• What guidelines are available for the implementation of cross-border 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects that involve multiple 
institutions, multiple and diverse institutional structures and stakeholders for 
implementation management/support that span over different spatial 
categories at international, regional, sub-regional and national levels?   
 
The questions raised above appear to suggest that in addition to technical 
interventions, such as the use of integrative project management methodologies, 
the effectiveness of NEPAD’s project implementation and implementation 
strategies will be determined by the extent and rate of institutional reforms/ 
development and the building of institutional capacity at the various spatial 
categories. In addition, institutions like the DFID (2003) and the World Bank 
(1994) have suggested that challenges that arise in the management of 
international projects in developing countries require flexible organisational or 
planning frameworks for their management based on project and situational 
specificity. The difficulty may be that flexibility becomes a misnomer in an 
environment where even structured approaches to implementation/implementation 
management appear non-existent. In NEPAD’s context, the afore-mentioned 
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constraints appear to be exacerbated by the participation of multiple institutional 
structures/organisations of diverse scale/size, ideological orientation and 
capabilities as well as the proposal of multiple infrastructure programmes/projects 
of varying characteristics, size and from different infrastructure sectors that are 
planned for simultaneous implementation.  
 
Various authors/institutions provide guidelines for the management of 
programmes/projects (including design and implementation,) within different 
contexts. Similarly, the standard requirements for effective project 
implementation are set out in the various project management procedures and 
guidelines: these include the international quality standards set out in PRINCE 2, 
ISO 9000, and project-specific standards set out in ISO 10006 (Turner, 1999) as 
well as the requirements for integration of relevant knowledge areas set out in the 
PMBOK (PMI, 1996). Turner (1999: 364-396) provides a broad introduction to 
the various standard project management procedures and systems. The bulk of 
project management literature, however, appears to focus on processes and 
methods – i.e., procedures, systems and (quality) controls – rather than the 
substantive aspects of project implementation management, which include 
collective engagement and people-centred management of the work of projects. In 
this regard, there is paucity of models and instruments for project 
implementation/management that overcome the distinction of, and facilitate 
integration in institutional, technical, organisational, and managerial/behavioural 
issues in projects, particularly in the context of integrated development.   
 
For these reasons, the growing concerns (Turner, 1999; PMI, 1996) with the 
impact on projects of behavioural aspects have resulted in the integration of a vast 
body of knowledge and frameworks from human resource management and 
organisational dynamics in project management. In the context of integrated 
implementation management, a combination of various project management tools 
and techniques may also be used to facilitate the coherent integration of 
institutional, organisational, PESTLE, trans-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary 
inputs: this integration seeks to ensure the efficacy of project management 
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interventions in the context of integrated development/implementation 
management. This integrative approach may also facilitate the attainment of 
cumulative and broader development impacts that extend beyond the 
implementation of, for example, unique infrastructure projects. Thus, the 
combination of institutional, behavioural, management and technical interventions 
in integrated development has been identified as critical to project implementation 
success in previous analyses of development programmes (see: Paul, 1990; 
Picciotto & Weaving, 1994; Thwala, 2001). 
 
In order to mitigate the negative impact of centralised decision-making in 
development programmes and projects, Picciotto and Weaving (1994) suggested 
inclusive stakeholder participation, and applying different management 
approaches to different stages of the project life cycle. Thwala (2001) also 
suggested the use of project management methodologies in dynamic institutional 
environments – similar to those in which NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and 
roads programme are implemented. This notion also takes cognisance of the 
dynamic external/internal institutional projects’ environment, which is driven by 
overlapping stages of a project life cycle (although somewhat rigid in orientation) 
to deliver novel products and services (ibid).  
 
Paul (1990: 33) argued that satisfying the preconditions of political commitment, 
availability of resources, leadership and strategic management by top management 
are critical for successful implementation of development programmes. For 
infrastructure development and maintenance programmes, Paul (ibid) also argued 
that standard systems, good management and control are critical. In addition, for 
harmonisation and regulatory programmes, similar to some of the elements of 
NEPAD’s roads programme, Paul (ibid: 34) noted: “…political and bureaucratic 
bargaining may be critical.” Paul (ibid), however, cautioned that prescriptions of 
“good management control,” and “community participation,” must not be 
generalised “without fully realising how key interventions will differ with the 
environment and the nature of different programmes.” This afore-mentioned view 
takes cognisance of the unique nature of projects and their diverse requirements, 
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particularly so in a developmental context that often involves multiple and 
contradictory development objectives that are planned for simultaneous 
implementation, and the participation of diverse institutional structures from 
international, regional, sub-regional and national contexts. 
 
The Project Management Institute (PMI) also provides detailed guidelines on how 
the identified ten component processes of project management knowledge and 
practice it has identified interact, in order to produce novel work in projects (PMI, 
1996). (These project management knowledge areas are referred to by the PMI as 
the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK); they include project 
integration, scope, time, cost, quality, human resource, communications, risk, and 
procurement management.) Within this context, the PMI briefly describes the 
influence of institutions and organisations on the performance of projects; it also 
identifies general management skills that are required as a basis for developing 
project management skills, and for use in projects based on project or application 
area specificity (ibid: 20-25). The PMI (ibid) conceded, however, that there may 
be other knowledge areas in project management in addition to the ones it 
proposes, whose relevance will be based on project specificity. 
 
Turner (1999) also proposed comprehensive guidelines for a structured approach 
to the management of projects. The processes outlined by Turner (ibid) integrate 
the project, related management functions, and management process; these 
processes encapsulate the stages of the project life cycle in relation to the 
fundamental levels of management over which the project is managed. In this 
regard, some of the project management methodologies that are universally used 
to perform the work of the projects appear to create a structured environment for 
the development of creative processes of engagement and continuous learning in 
dynamic environments.  
 
Strategies for implementation and sub-strategies for implementation management 
may be developed in this context in alignment with the articulated project 
objectives and project strategy for implementation, cognisant of the 
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projects’/situational specificity and the opportunities/constraints of the 
external/internal institutional environment as well as the organisational/ project 
structures for implementation management. Although flexible approaches to 
project organisation are increasingly adopted subject to situational specificity, 
Turner (ibid: 134) has argued that these emergent approaches to project 
organisation are still rooted within existing functional structures in the respective 
organisations.  
 
2.4.3 Models to facilitate integrated management of programmes/projects 
 
An example of Turner’s “seven forces model” is presented in Figure 2.1 in order 
to illustrate a framework that links institutions, various hierarchies of planning at 
different levels of management (including strategies, programme/project 
objectives and external/ internal environmental analyses) and organisational/ 
project structures for project implementation management. (This study assumes 
that Turner’s structured model for project-based management is used to explicate 
a strategy that already exists at policy/organisational levels at the integrative 
levels of management, which is cascaded over the strategic and operational levels 
of management/planning.)  
 
Figure 2.1: The “Seven Forces Model” of Project-Based Management   
 
Source: After Turner, 1999. The Handbook of Project-Based Management, p.70. 
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Box 2.5: Explanation of the “Seven Forces Model” of Project-Based Management  
External Context – According to Turner (1999: 69), two forces are imposed by the external context: 
• Sponsorship and schedule: The finance provided by the sponsor without which the project cannot begin. 
Much of the project definition will be driven by the available sources of finance and the expected benefit to 
the sponsor in return, with financiers wishing to minimise the risk especially in the choice of technology. 
The project’s completion date is a key parameter in the project’s viability, milestone scheduling, and 
strategies to mitigate project risks. 
• External influences: The management of the influence of PESTLE factors on the project and on the parties 
involved is critical, as these external influences are a primary cause of many project overruns. Projects that 
need political support must ensure that the political issues are raised at the outset: political acumen is thus a 
critical trait that is required for people working on such projects. Effective stakeholder management and 
environmental impact analyses (EIAs) can be used to reduce potential opposition and to facilitate 
consultation with the diverse parties involved in or affected by the project from the outset.           
Project Strategy - Two forces arise from within the parent organisation. These include the strategic 
importance given to the project and the strategy for undertaking it:  
• Attitudes: These represent the importance attached to the project and the support received from all strata of 
management, from the leaders to the followers. The development of a clear vision or mission, the linking 
of project plans to business plans, and the active cooperation of functional and task managers to achieve 
the same objectives assist to build positive attitudes about a project. Ensuring that projects receive criticism 
from the specification stages, and as the process evolves, are some of the critical factors for the 
development of sensible projects. 
• Project definition: This includes defining what the project is required to do, the approach to its design and 
technology expected to deliver it. A comprehensive project definition should be developed from the start to 
incorporate all the essential elements to the project’s viability. A competent project definition can be 
achieved by:  
- setting clear and unambiguous project objectives; 
- defining realistic scope, cost, time, and performance criteria. These can be done through the strategic and milestone 
plans, which must be developed comprehensively from the start. If the project objectives change, then the scope 
definition and investment criteria must also be reconsidered; 
- setting functional strategies and assessing technical risks. The former require the determination of the design, the 
technology to be used, the method of its implementation and eventual operation best suited to achieving the 
project’s objectives; the latter needs to be particularly assessed to obviate huge overruns that can result from 
technical problems; 
- Managing the design process by achieving a balance between meeting the schedule and making technological 
improvements on the design; 
- Managing resources and the context. As Turner (ibid: 83) notes, “…getting adequate resources, managing them 
well and ensuring that the context is supportive are at the heart of successful strategic management.”             
Internal Implementation: Three driving forces come from within the project: 
• People: their management, leadership, teamwork and industrial relations. In many cases, significant 
institutional resistance must be overcome to ensure that the work of the project is accomplished. 
Considerable leadership and championing are thus required during the start-up phase to get the project 
started. Team work, positive management of conflicts and good communication are some of the essential 
aspects that need emphasis, particularly at the start-up phase. The composition of project teams should 
incorporate the technical and social perspectives; 
• Systems: These include systems of planning, integration, reporting and control (of significant project 
functions including scope, quality, cost, time, risk, and other elements identified as appropriate) by which 
progress will be measured and managed; 
• Organisation: This includes clarifying the roles, responsibilities and contractual relationships of the parties 
involved. Three issues must be considered at the earliest stages: 
- the relevant management structure i.e., either project, matrix, or functional structures. Implementing a matrix 
structure takes time: effort must be put into developing the appropriate organisational climate; 
- the extent of owner involvement; 
- the expected use of contractors, contract and procurement strategies need to be defined at the outset.  
Source: Derived from Turner, 1999. The Handbook of Project-Based Management, pp.69-70; 80-86. 
 
                                                                                                                                57 
 
Turner (1999: 486-490) also identified problems in cross-border international 
projects to occur in the following areas:  
• Culture;  
• Distance (i.e., time zone, organisational behaviour, language and culture, 
professions);  
• Organisation, management, and communication;  
• Productivity and logistics; and  
• Local legislation and regulation.  
 
Paul (1990) emphasised the significance of strategic management in development 
programmes. This approach entails identifying the requisite synergies to develop 
congruency between the various planning hierarchies, internal/external projects’ 
environment, project inputs, and structures for implementation management in 
order to support successful implementation of development programmes/projects. 
Some of the critical elements to facilitate integrated project implementation and 
implementation management that can be gleaned from models for strategic/ 
structured/systematic project management (see: Paul, 1990; PMI, 1996 & 2002; 
Turner, 1994) include the following: 
 
• The integration of vertical and horizontal organisational and project 
hierarchies at the various levels of management;  
• The explication of linkages between the internal and external projects’ 
environment and their implications for project management functions at the 
various stages of the project life cycle;  
• The articulation of clear linkages between performance control on the one 
hand and action planning on the other hand through the application of 
relevant tools and techniques such as the Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS); and  
• The development of links between programmes/projects and structural units 
in the hierarchy through tools and techniques such as the Organisation 
Breakdown Structure (OBS). 
 
Thus, integrative project management methodologies may be described as 
depicting a practical link between what Mintzberg (1994: 78) termed “action 
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planning” (illustrated in hierarchies of what are supposed to be before-the-fact 
strategies and programmes) and “performance control” (illustrated in the 
hierarchies of operating plans, objectives and budgets) in prescriptive models. 
Significantly, an integrative approach to the management of cross-border regional 
infrastructure projects may be used, for example, to combine inputs from various 
project management models (i.e., strategic, structured and systematic project 
management) and trans-sectoral, trans-disciplinary application areas based on 
project and situational specificity.  
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The environment in which Africa’s development programmes/projects are 
implemented is complex. In the development of cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure, for example, the projects’ environment is 
characterised by adverse influences of the external/internal institutional 
environment, inadequate internal institutions exacerbated by lack of institutional 
capacity, and asymmetrical relationships with institutions/institutional structures 
of the developed north. In the majority of cases, the afore-mentioned factors have 
resulted in endemic institutional failure in the majority of African countries, 
external control of Africa’s development agenda, and the subordination of the 
will/development needs of Africa’s peoples for the benefit of global financial 
multilateral donors, foreign private sector operators, and governments of the 
developed north. These afore-mentioned aspects have resulted in the perennial 
underdevelopment of institutions and lack of institutional capacity in the majority 
of African states. Yet, various studies have confirmed that strong institutions, 
including effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements, and capable 
institutional structures are critical for the efficient development of infrastructure to 
meet effective demand.      
 
The discussion in this chapter does not suggest that the constraints and challenges 
inherent in inadequate institutional environments in the provision of cross-border 
regional infrastructure are insurmountable. What the discussion above 
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underscores is that at the various levels of management, integrated 
implementation management of regional development programmes requires astute 
understanding of the internal/external institutional environment and its 
implications for projects. Such understanding will assist in the development of 
relevant models for programmes/projects and appropriate strategies/ 
methodologies for project implementation/implementation management. The 
factors that depict pressures and resistance to projects as well as other 
internal/external environmental issues need to be clearly defined at the outset and 
managed over the various stages of the project life-cycle. At the integrative levels 
of management, long-term commitment and political will shall be required to 
reform and/or develop inadequate institutions in order to facilitate successful 
implementation of technical interventions/projects for the desired development 
outcomes to manifest.  
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3. NEPAD’S STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes NEPAD’s strategic interventions for the development of 
regional infrastructure, in particular for integrated implementation management/ 
coordination of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects. 
Lessons from the previous implementation of similar regional transport/roads 
infrastructure programmes/projects in the African and international context are 
outlined, in order to determine, at a later stage, their implications for NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation 
management/coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, in particular the 
roads programme.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for integrative implementation management/ 
coordination of the Infrastructure STAP. Section 3.3 outlines lessons from the 
previous implementation of similar regional cross-border transport/roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes/projects in order to identify 
learning points for NEPAD. Details of the related programmatic interventions 
from the African and international experiences are presented in APPENDIX B. 
Section 3.4 is the summary and conclusion. 
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3.2 Institutional Mechanisms and Arrangements to Support 
Implementation  
 
3.2.1 Project approach to integrated development of regional infrastructure  
 
NEPAD adopted the “project approach” to the implementation of the 
Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes (NEPAD, 2001: Para.188:55): 
this is albeit the argument that “the promoters of… (NEPAD) appreciate the 
dangers of a project approach to development” (ibid, Para.188: 55). NEPAD, 
however, failed to elaborate on the said “dangers” of the project approach, 
including their relevance for the development and implementation of its regional 
infrastructure programme/projects. At the same time, in a series of confusing 
statements, NEPAD described the proposed projects in infrastructure as “crucial 
to integrated regional development” (ibid). As NEPAD explained, the identified 
projects will “…strengthen country and regional development programmes” as 
well as “…go a long way in kick-starting the regeneration of the continent” (ibid).  
 
This afore-mentioned view is confusing: although NEPAD stated its preference 
for a project approach to the development of regional infrastructure (although it is 
unclear how NEPAD defines a “project approach”), its references to “integrated 
regional development” and  “country and regional development programmes” 
simultaneously suggested that regional infrastructure projects will be implemented 
within a programme approach. NEPAD’s reference to “integrated regional 
development” is also ambiguous. It is susceptible to diverse interpretations based 
on one’s frame of reference: it can be construed to refer to either integrated 
development, or regional integration, or both of the afore-mentioned concepts 
although they are not mutually inclusive. NEPAD’s reference to integrated 
development in the context of projects also suggests the adoption of an approach 
that combines multi-/trans-disciplinary and multi-/trans-sectoral inputs in 
programme development, project selection, preparation and implementation based 
on bottom-up, or even a combination of  top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
planning and implementation of projects. Because of the complexity in planning 
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including the multiplicity of institutions, institutional structures and trans-state 
actors at the various spatial categories that integrated project implementation/ 
integrated development implies, a structured and integrative approach to the 
management of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects will thus 
be required.         
 
Parallels may be drawn between the integrative approach suggested above and the 
approach depicted in Turner’s model for the structured management of projects in 
Chapter 2. According to Turner (1999: 265), at the start of a systematic approach 
to projects, the emphasis at the top level is on identifying the project’s context, the 
shared vision and the project strategy. In NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
programme, this context appears to be defined and cascaded from the integrative 
levels of management, where the premise for the development of regional 
infrastructure and related projects is outlined. There is no indication, however, of 
the developers of NEPAD’s Strategic Framework having canvassed and/or 
integrated/aggregated upwards inputs from broad-based stakeholders or popular 
support prior the development of its programmatic initiatives and sectoral 
interventions.  
 
As a result, wide-spread criticism or reproach was levelled at what was perceived 
as NEPAD’s exclusionary and top-down approach to programme development 
(see, for example, Adedegi, 2002; African Civil Society Declaration on NEPAD, 
2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o; 2002; Bond, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Nabudere, 2002).  
Hence, this study argues that NEPAD adopted primarily a prescriptive approach 
to the planning of regional infrastructure and related projects. NEPAD’s 
prescriptive approach thus permeates significant decisions in a number of key 
areas in the development and implementation of its projects as will be discussed 
in the various chapters of this report.  
 
In addition, some of the recommendations by various analysts also emphasised the 
significance of institutional aspects, particularly territorial integrity, for effective 
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implementation of NEPAD’s projects (Hope, 2002; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003). For 
example, Kotzé and Steyn (2003: 5) argued that implementation success for 
NEPAD will hinge “…on the extent to which NEPAD can garner a common 
African identity” to support implementation processes. In addition, Hope (2002: 
396) suggested that the success of NEPAD’s initiative will depend on its 
ownership “by Africans themselves,” and its implementation by “a number of 
African countries”.  
 
To the extent that the bulk of the standard project management literature focuses 
on projects as a point of departure, it fails to explain adequately how the links 
between policy/organisational strategies, internal/external institutional 
environment, development programmes/projects and structures for 
implementation management can be developed in a programme approach, 
particularly in a context of cultural diversity in the delivery of multi-national 
cross-border regional infrastructure. Therefore, how the relationships between 
NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions, articulated multiple development 
objectives, external/internal environment, programmes/projects, strategies for 
project implementation/ implementation management, and institutional structures 
for implementation management/coordination are defined and managed will be 
key determinants to operationalize NEPAD’s approach for the development of 
regional infrastructure. In addition, NEPAD’s approach to planning in all the 
stages of the project life cycle will be critical to facilitate the attainment of 
NEPAD’s multiple objectives for the development of cross-border regional 
(transport/roads) infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation 
in an integrated manner.  
 
3.2.2 Programme interventions  
 
When NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP was launched during May 2002, most 
projects listed under the roads sub-sector were scheduled for completion by the 
end of 2005/6 (see NEPAD, 2002c: 184-191). The institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements underpinning NEPAD’s approach to the development of regional 
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infrastructure are cascaded from NEPAD’s Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) 
at the integrative levels of management to the Infrastructure STAP and roads 
programme at the overlapping integrative and strategic levels of management. In 
its Strategic Framework (ibid), NEPAD articulated the renewed commitment by 
Africa’s political leadership to the “integrated practical implementation” of 
Africa’s development programmes in the aftermath of the Cold War (ibid, Para. 
42-43: 9). NEPAD’s Strategic Framework also seeks to evince the collective 
commitment and determination by Africa’s political leadership to “ensure… 
(Africa’s) development by bridging the gap between Africa and the developed 
countries” (ibid, Para.55: 12).  
 
Under the identified pre-conditions for development, NEPAD outlined the policy 
strategy/response actions and the key transformational principles planned for 
integration in all its programmatic interventions. Some of these proposed 
interventions include institutional reform/development, improvements in 
governance regimes (democracy, political, economic and corporate governance), 
and the development of institutional capacity to support the attainment of 
(NEPAD’s) articulated multiple development objectives (ibid: Para. 79-98: 17-
19). With the afore-mentioned programmatic interventions, one may conclude 
NEPAD espoused integrated development and a programme approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure.  
 
As NEPAD (ibid, Para. 41: 8) argued, its approach was based on the recognition 
that the challenges facing the continent in the delivery of global public goods 
(such as the provision of cross-border regional roads infrastructure,) require an 
integrative perspective. As NEPAD (ibid, Para.194: 56) also enunciated: “The 
view of the initiating presidents is that unless the issue of infrastructure is 
addressed on a planned basis – that is, linked to regional integrated development – 
the renewal process of this continent will simply not take off.” NEPAD (ibid) 
further argued that inherent externalities, or cross-border spillovers, require 
integrated coordination and management in order to optimise the delivery of 
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physical infrastructure and related services.  According to NEPAD, effective 
delivery in this context would be based on the commitment of broad-based 
partnerships (including governments, private sector, and civil society) “to a 
genuine integration of all nations into the global economy and body politic.” 
 
3.2.3 Political support and commitment 
 
NEPAD planned for the regional infrastructure programmes/projects identified in 
its priority lists to enjoy extensive implementation support internationally, 
regionally, sub-regionally and nationally. Thus, political support was expressed at 
the highest levels of management/planning and engagement: i.e., in NEPAD’s 
Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001); at the AU Assembly of HoSG, held during 
2002 in Durban-South Africa (AU, 2002b); at the Seventh Summit of NEPAD’s 
HSGIC, held during 2003 in Abuja-Nigeria (NEPAD, 2003, Para.10: 
unnumbered); and in the G8 Africa Action Plan (G8AAP) (2002). According to 
the AfDB (2003: 46), the infrastructure projects on NEPAD’s priority lists were 
planned to be “…highly visible indicators of NEPAD’s activities and influence… 
(and to) benefit from a special NEPAD effort in terms of promotion; keeping 
them at the forefront of funding agencies’ attention; special reporting on them at 
heads of state meetings; and focusing on them for raising finance.”   
 
However, the details of the interface between NEPAD’s various priority sectoral 
programmes and the Infrastructure STAP on the one hand, and the links between 
NEPAD’s priority sectoral programmes, its Infrastructure STAP and other 
regional/sub-regional/national infrastructure development plans, priorities and 
programmes/projects on the other hand have remained vague. These include 
details of RECs’ programmes/programmes and national projects included in 
national development plans (NDPs), but which have a regional impact, which 
were included in NEPAD’s programme for the development of regional 
infrastructure.     
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3.2.4 Institutional partnerships 
 
To support the attainment of NEPAD’s multiple objectives for the development of 
cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure that are planned for 
simultaneous implementation, NEPAD proposed diverse international, regional, 
sub-regional and national partnerships for implementation support. In this regard, 
NEPAD’s proposals may be viewed as an attempt to break new ground, cognisant 
of the complexity presented by the diverse and multiple structures for 
implementation management as well as the dynamic external/ internal institutional 
environment in which the regional infrastructure projects are implemented.  
 
For example, NEPAD sought external partnerships with international institutions 
for programme/project development, provision of sustainable financing, 
procurement of professional/construction services and project implementation 
support. These partnerships include the international finance institutions (IFIs), 
regional development finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral institutions, foreign/ 
national governments, and donors from the highly industrialised (northern) 
countries as well as foreign private sector operators. NEPAD also sought internal 
partnerships with regional, sub-regional and national institutions/organisations for 
programme development, funding, implementation, and implementation 
management/coordination in order to give practical effect to the attainment of its 
(NEPAD’s) vision for the development of domestic institutional capacity.  
 
The apparent predominance of international institutions in the planning of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, also underscored in NEPAD’s statements 
regarding the role of the international institutions/institutional structures, lends 
credence to assertions (Breytenbach, 2004:147) that NEPAD is “the product of 
African visions shaped by African leadership as well as Western Financial 
Institutions.” For example, according to NEPAD documents (NEPAD, 2002f), in 
a meeting held between NEPAD’s founding/promoting presidents and the 
President of the World Bank as well as the Managing Director of the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF), during February 2001, the World Bank gave its support to 
the proposed initiative for Africa’s development; the World Bank agreed to the 
requests (presumably from NEPAD) for assistance as a technical partner, 
particularly in the field of infrastructure.  
 
The World Bank also agreed to be a major partner in resource mobilisation and 
implementation (ibid). Similarly, the then-MD of the IMF, Mr. Horst Köhler, 
proposed that the IMF’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) be 
considered in NEPAD’s processes/frameworks “a very useful contribution to 
Africa’s development” (ibid: unnumbered). The afore-mentioned institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements were to have a significant impact on the planning, 
implementation, and implementation management of NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programme/projects.   
 
As a result, NEPAD’s endorsement of the instruments of the afore-mentioned IFIs 
– much to the consternation of civil society groups and analysts/African 
intellectuals (see Adedegi, 2002; African Civil Society, 2002; Bond, 2002; 
Cherry, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002) – is reflected in NEPAD’s Strategic 
Framework document (NEPAD, 2001). NEPAD stated as follows: “The New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development will support a PRSP Learning group to 
engage in the PRSP process, together with the World Bank” (ibid, Para.148:38). 
Similarly, NEPAD listed “the IMF-led PRSPs” as some of the partnerships 
between Africa, industrialised countries and multilateral institutions that would be 
maintained under the initiative (ibid, Para.184:52). Regarding the development of 
infrastructure in the context of regional integration, NEPAD (ibid, Para.193:56) 
clearly articulated the significance of the collaboration with institutions of the 
developed north, particularly the IFIs, as follows: 
 
 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development process has identified many 
energy, transport, telecommunications and water projects that are crucial to 
Africa’s integrated development. The projects are at various stages of 
development and require funding. The next step is to accelerate their 
continued development in collaboration with the African Development Bank, 
the World Bank and other multilateral institutions” 
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Recent reports, such as the TCII and NEPAD (2005:20), have also indicated that 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP was developed as a joint effort under the auspices 
of the NEPAD Secretariat and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in close 
collaboration with the RECs, the World Bank, DFID, and the European Union 
(EU). According to Hope (2006: 207), the AfDB, World Bank and EU also made 
commitments to assist with the financing of new regional infrastructure and 
rehabilitation projects. In addition, the Africa Infrastructure Consortium, whose 
Secretariat is hosted by the AfDB, was also created by NEPAD institutions and 
the (international) development partners to facilitate the development of Africa’s 
regional infrastructure (ibid). Indeed, NEPAD’s institutional partnerships in the 
Infrastructure STAP depicted above seemed to give practical effect to NEPAD’s 
vision, articulated in its Strategic Framework, that “The adoption of a 
development strategy…together with a detailed programme of action, will mark 
the beginning of a new phase in the partnership and cooperation between Africa 
and the developed world” (NEPAD, 2001, Para.204:59).  
 
Also, the reliance by NEPAD’s political leadership on African institutions, 
organisations and experts to elaborate the relevant development programmes/ 
projects and implementation plans for Africa’s regeneration appears to have 
underpinned the (high) expectations of NEPAD’s success. Thus, the comments 
made by South Africa’s President Mbeki (one of the founders of NEPAD,) during 
NEPAD’s first multi-stakeholder workshop held in Benoni-South Africa, during 
January 2002, demonstrate the level of trust and responsibility placed on Africa’s 
institutions, institutional structures/organisations and individuals at various levels 
of management to drive the implementation of NEPAD’s initiative including its 
related programmatic interventions, for the benefit of the African continent and its 
peoples.  
 
President Mbeki made the following comments: 
 
As African institutions and expertise, it is only through you that this continent 
can succeed in overcoming past injustices and failures and make this the century 
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of African development and prosperity. The burden now rests on your 
shoulders. The masses of our people, our governments and our development 
partners await the results of this workshop and anticipate the plans that must 
forever change their lives and enable all of us to carve our own way in the world 
(NEPAD, 2002a: 7).     
 
3.2.5 Practical implementation support 
 
Various pertinent international and regional workshops1
Based on the literature reviewed, however, an obscure relationship is illustrated 
between the inputs/outputs of the various workshops and planning outcomes: how 
the inputs/outputs of various planning hierarchies are linked to specific 
programmes/projects in various infrastructure sectors including the development, 
refinement and review of strategies for project implementation and 
implementation management/coordination remains vague. (This is particularly so 
to the extent that the afore-mentioned workshops occurred after NEPAD’s 
programmes/projects in the Infrastructure STAP were already approved for 
 have been held since the 
launch of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP in order to support implementation. It 
also appears the specific purposes of the different workshops were to map 
frameworks/guidelines for implementation, review implementation progress, 
identify challenges for implementation and propose the requisite interventions to 
facilitate effective implementation. One may surmise from the afore-mentioned 
activities that the primary objective of the afore-mentioned workshops was to 
prepare the mandated structures for integrated implementation management/ 
coordination at the regional or sub-regional levels, and for practical 
implementation at the national levels.  
 
                                                 
1 Some of the workshops and project reviews include the following: the workshop on 
Implementation of NEPAD (Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, August 2002); the AfDB and/or NEPAD 
Infrastructure STAP First Review of Implementation Progress and The Way Forward (May 2003); 
the workshop on Mechanisms for Capacity Building of RECs and Speeding Up Implementation of 
NEPAD STAP Projects (Abuja: Nigeria, March 2005); the AfDB, NEPAD Secretariat and African 
Business Roundtable (ABR) seminar on Fostering Private Investments in NEPAD Infrastructure 
Projects (Abuja: Nigeria, May 2005); the Participatory Workshop (Tunis: Tunisia, July 2005); and  
the TCII and/or NEPAD Infrastructure STAP Second Review of Implementation Progress and the 
Way Forward (2004).  
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implementation.) It is even less clear how the inputs and outputs of the afore-
mentioned workshops are linked to NEPAD’s aims/objectives to facilitate 
integrated development (ID) in regional infrastructure including integrated 
implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP 
programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned views take cognisance of (NEPAD’s) 
multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned 
for simultaneous implementation.    
 
It appears that separate regional programmes/projects were also launched by the 
various IFIs and multilateral institutions, to support the implementation of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and other (NEPAD) programmatic interventions in 
the identified priority sectors (Hope, 2006: 209-210). These programmes include 
initiatives launched by the World Bank, EU, and Africa Partnership Forum (APF). 
[The APF comprises a group of African countries and development partners: it 
includes the representatives of the G8 countries, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, IMF, UN, World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), NEPAD, AU, AfDB, and RECs (ibid).] How these afore-
mentioned programmes/projects are linked to NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, 
either as elements of programmes or once-off projects, remains unclear. 
 
In addition, Hope (ibid: 222-224) identified various partnerships that were 
launched or strengthened to specifically support capacity development for the 
implementation of NEPAD’s programmes and, generally, the implementation of 
development programmes in African countries and in RECs. According to Hope 
(ibid), the key institutions/organisations participating in the afore-mentioned 
partnerships for capacity development include the African Capacity Building 
Foundation (ACBF), the World Bank – through both its assistance to the ACBF 
and its newly-created Operational Taskforce on Capacity Development in Africa – 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through both its global 
programme on capacity development and its Southern Africa Capacity Initiative 
(SACI) that was launched during 2004.  
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The afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation support of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, however, appear to 
have elicited limited implementation progress, particularly in cross-border 
facilitation projects like the roads sector. There are indications, however, of 
progress in the implementation of investment projects in the energy and ICT 
sectors as well as in multi-modal transport/roads development corridors (DCs) 
financed or implemented by the World Bank in the East African Community 
(EAC). According to the TCII and NEPAD report (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 12), 
for example, “considerable progress” was made to achieve financial closure on the 
West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), the Regional African Satellite 
Communications Organisation (RASCOM) Phase 1, the West African Power Pool 
(WAPP), the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP), and the development of 
generation and transmission capacity within l’Union du Maghreb Arabe/the Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA/AMU). Regarding the ICT and energy projects as well as 
the EAC’s investment projects in roads construction mentioned earlier, the 
specifics of this “considerable progress” are unclear from the literature reviewed.  
 
3.2.6 Funding approach 
 
NEPAD advocated the concept of partnership with international/foreign 
institutions and governments to finance the delivery of its regional infrastructure 
programmatic interventions. As NEPAD argued, this view recognised the inherent 
constraints (in Africa’s region and individual countries) in relation to the 
interdependencies (international, regional, sub-regional, and national) that 
characterise the provision of global public goods, such as regional transport/roads 
infrastructure. The views articulated by NEPAD were in line with the 
contemporary discourse on development finance for sustainable development. 
These issues have long been discussed in various international fora resulting in the 
recommendations/outcomes of the Rio Summit of 1992, specifically Agenda 21: 
Chapter 33; the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000; the Zedillo Report of 2001; 
the Monterrey Consensus of 2002; and the WSSD of 2002 (see: DBSA, 2003). 
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NEPAD argued that critical elements of financial assistance from the international 
community, which impact on the delivery of Africa’s regional infrastructure, need 
to include the following elements: increasing resource transfers and the 
effectiveness of ODA; increasing FDI; improving terms of trade; and resolving 
the debt burden in favour of African countries. According to Taylor (2005: 45), 
the “deal” between the developed and African countries/NEPAD on the aspect of 
funding for NEPAD programmes/projects is that in return (for increased 
disbursements/investment), “African countries will set up and police standards of 
good governance across the continent – while respecting human rights and 
advancing democracy.”  
 
Indeed, NEPAD arguments although vague on detail lend credence to Taylor’s 
afore-mentioned assertions.  As NEPAD (2001, Para.46: 22) argued:    
 
 The changed conditions in Africa have already been recognised by 
governments across the world. The… (UN) Millennium Declaration, adopted 
in September 2000, confirms the global community’s readiness to support 
Africa’s efforts to address the continent’s underdevelopment and 
marginalisation. The Declaration emphasises support for the prevention of 
conflict and the establishment of conditions of stability and democracy on 
the continent, as well as for the key challenges of eradicating poverty and 
disease. The Declaration further points to the global community’s 
commitment to enhance resource flows to Africa, by improving aid, trade 
and debt relationships between Africa and the rest of the world, and by 
increasing private capital flows to the continent.       
 
NEPAD, however, appears to still rely on the support/commitment of 
international community or its institutions to (even) keep its part of the deal. This 
issue raises concerns as to what Africa’s institutions/institutional structures at 
regional, sub-regional and national levels will actually do or commit to, in order 
to create an enabling environment for the continent’s regeneration and facilitate 
the effective implementation of NEPAD’s programmes. For example, NEPAD 
expected a favourable response from the international community to ensure the 
improvement of Africa’s infrastructure (ibid, Para.100: 22), and to translate the 
commitments made by both Africa and the international community into practice 
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(ibid, Para.46: 22). At the same time, and confusingly, NEPAD (ibid, Para.5: 1) 
appeared to denounce any perceived perpetuation of Africa’s dependency by the 
developed north.   
 
As NEPAD stated:  
 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development calls for a reversal of this 
abnormal situation (i.e. Africa’s underdevelopment) by changing the 
relationship that underpins it. Africans are appealing neither for further 
entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions.      
 
The details of funding for NEPAD’s various individual regional infrastructure 
projects have remained vague. It is also doubtful whether the partnership 
envisaged by NEPAD with the developed north including its institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements shall, for example, elicit the resources at the scale 
and magnitude required to address the prevailing challenges and needs in cross-
border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation. NEPAD’s reliance for 
funding on foreign institutions also raises concerns regarding the extent of 
external influence on the identification, design and implementation of regional 
infrastructure projects including the identity of beneficiaries from the 
implementation of said projects. Thus, NEPAD’s strategy for project 
implementation may need to consider the development of creative instruments for 
domestic resource mobilisation, including exploring diverse approaches to 
funding to cater for the different infrastructure sectors – based on project, sector 
and situational specificity. 
 
3.3 Lessons from the Previous Implementation of Regional Transport/ 
Roads Infrastructure Programmes  
 
An overview of past (and current) approaches to the development of cross-border 
regional transport infrastructure and transit facilitation, and lessons learnt, are 
presented in APPENDIX A. Previous programmes researched in this study 
include the Transport and Communications Plan of the Lagos Plan of Action 
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(LPA) of 1980, the Trans-African Highway (TAH) and “missing links” initiative 
that was launched in the 1970’s, and the EU’s Trans-European Networks (TENs) 
regional transport infrastructure programme that was launched in 1994. Examples 
of initiatives by other global regional blocks to address similar problems in 
transportation and transit facilitation – such as the initiatives in the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Mercado Commûn del Sur (Mercosur), and South Asian Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA) – are also included.  
 
A summary of lessons from the implementation of the afore-mentioned 
programmes/initiatives is presented below: 
 
(i) The example of failed implementation in the LPA’s transport and 
communications programme demonstrates that the successful integrated 
implementation of transformational programmatic interventions needs to be 
premised upon the reform/development of inadequate internal institutions, 
including the development of institutional capacity at the various spatial 
categories. These are some of the key preliminary conditions for broader 
integrated development technical interventions, such as development 
programmes/projects and related planned outcomes, to manifest. In addition, 
institutional reform and/or development need to occur within an enabling 
international, trans-regional, regional, sub-regional, and national 
institutional environment in order to facilitate the attainment of the 
articulated objectives. The active role of the state is critical in this context. 
As Mills (2002:169) argued, “…there are interventions that states can make 
without external assistance: examples are prudentiality, fiscal reforms, and 
corruption fighting.” The LPA ignored the reform and/or development of 
inadequate institutions in favour of sectoral programmes/projects to achieve 
the goals of integration, but with limited success. 
 
 For example, the LPA’s transport programme proposed the implementation 
of technical and institutional interventions in the transport/communications 
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sectors to facilitate the coordination and efficiency of transportation systems 
for internal coherence, increased intra-African trade, and regional 
integration. At the same time, the LPA relied on proposed or desired 
institutional reforms at the international levels, under the dictates of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO), to support the attainment of its 
objectives. Corresponding institutional development at regional, sub-
regional, and national levels was proposed to achieve the LPA’s stated goals 
in the transport and communications sectors; internal institutions, however, 
were inadequate to support the attainment of the LPA’s objectives, 
particularly so since the LPA failed to propose institutional mechanism and 
arrangements to enforce the requisite institutional reforms.  
  
 Governance issues were not addressed in the (overall) LPA’s programme, 
resulting in wide-spread condemnation from the international community. 
According to various authors (Adedegi, 2002; Anyang’Nyong’o, 2002; 
Diescho, 2002), this omission precipitated the World Bank’s response, in the 
infamous Berg Report, as a counter-proposal to the LPA. In addition, the 
LPA’s sub-regional structures for integrated implementation management 
lacked the authority and power to enforce implementation of the agreed 
collective agreements at the regional/sub-regional levels, as well as to 
pronounce on national prerogatives that had resulted in diverse (and 
multiple) transport policies, regulatory regimes, systems, standards and 
practices. Notably, the LPA had no control over, or influence on the 
proposed reforms of external (international) institutions upon which it 
premised the attainment of its developmental objectives.  
 
(ii) The systematic, rigorous and integrated definition of programme/project 
planning inputs/outputs is paramount in processes to support the attainment 
of planned outcomes in the delivery of programmes/projects to support the 
objectives of integrated development, particularly within a programme 
context. The EU successfully posited a rigorous integrated approach to 
planning, in order to determine the desired outcomes of the TENs initiative. 
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In comparison, the LPA’s framework for integrated implementation and 
management was not adequately elaborated to map the proposed integration 
of inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary project inputs, as well as to illustrate 
the requisite institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the 
attainment of its objectives for integration.  
 
(iii) The example of the TAH’s initiative confirms the observations by the DFID 
(2003) that technical interventions which leave inadequate institutions intact 
may achieve nothing. The TAH’s initiative neither proposed (nor proposes 
in its resuscitated form,) corresponding institutional reforms, nor the 
improvement of inadequate institutions to support the attainment of its 
objectives. In addition, the development of institutional capacity in regional 
structures for implementation management appears to have been ignored. As 
a result of the inadequate planning frameworks vis-à-vis programme design 
and strategies for project implementation and implementation management 
as well as the inadequate institutional frameworks for the management of 
relationships between the regional, sub-regional and national structures, 
haphazard institutional arrangements for implementation management 
ensued.  
 
(vi) The interface between regional, sub-regional and national programmes 
needs to be clearly defined and institutional mechanisms and arrangements 
to plan and manage the interface need to be effectively developed and 
structured. The inadequate management of the interface between the 
structures for implementation and programmes/projects at the various spatial 
categories is evidenced in both examples of the LPA and TAH programmes. 
The multiplicity of overlapping programmes and structures to attain the 
same objectives, but without effective and efficient coordination, resulted in 
either the duplication of programmes or the inability to define critical 
missing links (in the TAH). This resulted in confusion, wastage of limited 
resources and effort as well as implementation paralysis.  
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(v) The EU’s TENs initiative illustrates that institutional reform and 
development to support the provision of cross-border regional transport/ 
roads infrastructure and transit facilitation is a long-term process. It hinges 
on long-term political will and commitment, the development of institutional 
capacity to support the implementation of collective agreements, and 
committed support by all the stakeholders, in particular member states.  
 
(vi) One of the key lessons illustrated by the EU’s experience is the role of 
effective supranational structures to support project selection, preparation, 
and implementation as well as to enforce the implementation of collective 
decisions. In the EU’s case, these activities were supported by effective 
legislation for the integration of TTF systems in alignment with the 
objectives for a common transport policy for the EU. The supranational 
authorities were delegated the requisite authority and powers to make laws, 
rules, decisions and their enforcement mechanisms. In the event that 
national prerogatives derailed implementation progress, the far reaching 
decisions of the EU’s supranational authorities helped to bring the TENs 
programme back on track. In the TAH initiative, the lack of authority in 
structures for implementation, clarity with respect of roles and 
responsibilities, accountability and enforcement mechanisms were persistent 
problems. These problems resulted in the undermining of RECs and the 
curtailment of their influence by national governments wherein the 
ownership of both categories of roads networks (proposed in the TAHs 
initiative) resided. 
 
(vii) The EU’s experience illustrates that the combination of institutional 
reforms/development with transformational technical interventions and 
adequate institutional capacity are central to the successful implementation 
of improvements in cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit 
facilitation. The example of the EU’s TENs initiative also illustrates that 
processes to develop regional transport infrastructure and transit facilitation 
do not begin and end with technical interventions: that is, programmes/ 
                                                                                                                                78 
 
projects to develop physical infrastructure assets. Institutional reform and 
development are critical components of programmes to support the 
attainment of collective objectives in the implementation of technical 
interventions. These different programme elements and related projects need 
to be either implemented concurrently or prioritised appropriately within a 
programme approach, and based on situational specificity.  
  
 As Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 7) noted, in an improved transport and 
trade facilitation system, physical and non-physical barriers to transport and 
cross-border transit are reduced through a combination of several 
components. These include the development of physical infrastructure, such 
as complementary transport and communications infrastructure and 
facilities, and non-physical infrastructure, such as knowledge and 
competencies to increase the effectiveness of physical infrastructure in 
transport and trade facilitation. In addition, the adequacy of institutions is 
critical to support the implementation of technical interventions. 
 
(viii) The active role of the state (enshrined in the EU’s ‘principle of subsidiarity’) 
facilitates popular participation and ensures territorial integrity at the various 
levels of management and spatial categories in the selection, construction, 
and management of regional transport infrastructure projects. In the EU’s 
case, these processes were enabled at the outset by the clear definition of 
programme goals and project scope. The identification of specific, 
measurable, attainable, realistic, and time bound (SMART) objectives at the 
outset also obviated confusion and scope-creep; it also facilitated the 
attainment of the agreed programme/projects’ goals.  
 
(ix) The mobilisation of adequate domestic resources is the bedrock upon which 
domestic programmes/projects can be successfully implemented, with 
external resource mobilisation augmenting internal efforts. In the EU’s 
TENs initiative, programme/project implementation was supported by 
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adequate domestic resource mobilisation including self-financing 
instruments from the following sources:  
 
 (a)  the EU’s funds (contributing up to 10% of total project costs in the 
form of co-financing for feasibility studies, fees for loan guarantees, 
interest rate subsidies, and direct investment grants in limited 
circumstances); and  
 (b)  the member states (who contributed the remaining 90% funding 
requirements together with the private sector in member states under 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)).  
 
 According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid), these afore-mentioned 
measures contributed to the successful attainment of stated outcomes of the 
TENs initiative within a complex institutional environment. In the LPA’s 
transport and communications programme, the reliance on foreign funding 
vis-à-vis the lack of committed support from the global institutional and 
financial architecture – in contradiction to the LPA’s articulated objectives 
for self-reliance and domestic resource mobilisation – determined whether 
or not projects to support the attainment of the LPA’s objectives for regional 
integration in the transport and communications programmes were 
implemented. 
 
(x) The trade profiles in various countries within and across the different sub-
regions, and their impact on efforts to integrate transport regimes and TTF 
systems are critical to determine the success of cross-border regional 
infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes. In other international 
regional blocks, such as NAFTA, the similar economic and trade profiles of 
member countries (i.e., between the USA and Mexico) helped to address the 
identified challenges to ingrate TTF systems. According to Lakshmanan and 
Anderson (ibid), this feat was achieved despite the different levels of 
development of the member-states and the associated institutional 
complexities. (For example, NAFTA epitomises a case of north-south 
cooperation and integration. As Mills (2002: 167) notes, Mexico is 
                                                                                                                                80 
 
economically closer to North America, but its cultural profile is that of a 
Latin American country.)   
 
(xi) Institutional structures responsible for facilitating the standardisation/ 
harmonisation of relevant policy, sectoral, technical, governance and 
regulatory regimes need to be empowered with, and delegated the requisite 
authority and resources to perform their mandated role and associated tasks.  
This process, however, needs to be linked to relevant institutional reform 
and development. Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 15) indicate that in the 
case of NAFTA, efforts to address the variety of technical and safety-related 
regulations, which were developed by member states over the years, proved 
complex and multidimensional. This problem was attributed (ibid) primarily 
to the narrow mandates of the independent review panels established to 
address the most contentious issues via inter-governmental negotiations. 
According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid), considerable effort was 
often required to remove inconsistencies.  
  
 In the case of SAFTA and Mercosur (ibid: 39), special efforts were often 
required to overcome “historical intra-regional transport frictions.” 
According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid), the hurdles encountered by 
SAFTA and Mercosur characterise the problems of developing countries 
that band together to form trade blocks, because of persisting semi-colonial 
links with north-America and Europe. In addition, the overview of the other 
sub-regional blocks by Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid) underscores the 
significance of harmonising technical and safety-regulation regimes (in 
addition to other transport policy prescriptions,) as a precondition to be 
enforced at national levels. 
 
The significance of the LPA’s regional Transport and Communications 
programme and the TAH initiative for NEPAD’s roads programme is that they 
draw attention to the consequences of approaches that ignore to combine technical 
interventions with institutional reform/development and institutional capacity 
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development, particularly in the context of integrated (development and) 
implementation of regional development programmes. These afore-mentioned 
programmes underscore the implications of inadequate external/internal 
institutional environments for programme/project implementation, particularly so 
in the context of inadequate institutional capacity. The LPA’s Transport and 
Communications programme also illustrates the complexities that ensue for 
programme implementation when principles of divergent ideological perspectives 
are integrated incoherently in attempts to address the inequitable power relations 
in the global political economy, particularly in an environment of inadequate 
institutional capacity.   
 
The study by Lakshmanan and Anderson (APPENDIX A,) of interventions to 
improve cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation 
services in other global regional blocks confirms that technical improvements in 
cross-border TTF systems require parallel reforms in the institutional environment 
(such as rules governing cross-border physical flows including the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers). On the one hand, the findings of this study 
highlight the impact of efficient inter-sectoral interventions on the implementation 
of programmes/projects to ensure improvements in the provision of cross-border 
regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services; on the other 
hand, they highlight the significance of the symbiotic relationship between 
technical interventions and the institutional environment to elicit the 
desired/planned transformational outcomes, and the need for simultaneous 
transformation and development thereof.  
 
In this regard, the institutional mechanisms and arrangements adopted in the EU’s 
TENs initiative are instructive. Although the reference to the EU’s TENs initiative 
may seem inappropriate in the African context, given the regional specificity 
(such as the differences in the levels of development and institutions), this 
example illustrates the requisite interventions and best practice approaches to 
reach the levels of infrastructure development in Africa, which are comparable to 
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those of the developed countries that NEPAD (2001, Para.98: 22) aspires to. 
(Whether or not such levels of infrastructure development are appropriate – 
cognisant of regional, sub-regional and national specificity – is a moot point.)   
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion  
 
In NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, the relationship between the various planning 
hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for implementation management 
appears to be defined within the context of the peculiar characteristics of the 
diverse institutional structures and systems to manage institutional relationships – 
at the international, regional, sub-regional and national levels – rather than based 
on programme/project specificity. This approach increases complexity to 
determine a commonality of rules for implementation management of NEPAD’s 
cross-border regional infrastructure projects. In particular, NEPAD’s role in the 
development and implementation is unclear. 
 
NEPAD also appears to not have unpacked the implications of the complexity of 
its conception of “regional integrated development” or “integrated practical 
implementation” in so far as the afore-mentioned concepts apply to its programme 
for the development of regional infrastructure as well as in relation to available 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management. 
NEPAD has also failed to explain in specific terms how its “project approach” to 
the development of regional infrastructure is linked to the concepts of RID and ID 
in general, and in relation to “integrated practical implementation” in the delivery 
of (cross-border) regional infrastructure and/or its institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to support the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. 
This is particularly so since the espoused links between NEPAD’s conception of 
ID and the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects appear spurious, 
if not misleading.  
 
NEPAD’s notions for global integration/connectivity, openness and 
competitiveness as well as the management of institutional relationships with 
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development partners further confuse NEPAD’s intent for the delivery of (cross-
border) regional infrastructure. NEPAD’s definition of integrated implementation 
also appears to derive from the classical economic doctrines, which have been 
used to define the stages of regional integration. Arguably, the concepts espoused 
by NEPAD for integrated development are loaded, both ideologically and 
practically, resulting in complexity to articulate an effective platform for effective 
implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects. A clearer understanding of the context for the development of (cross-
border) regional infrastructure will thus be required for the effective translation of 
NEPAD’s notion for RID and “integrated practical implementation” into practical 
interventions for integrated implementation management. 
 
Given the extent and characteristics of NEPAD’s proposed institutional 
partnerships with the industrialised countries of the north, the impact of diverse 
trade regimes on the integrated implementation of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects needs further research to identify relevant 
learning points from other developing/developed countries. Such research may 
assist to facilitate appropriate interventions for the development of effective and 
efficient cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services 
within and between diverse countries, sub-regions, and regions as well as their 
related institutions. The adoption, however, of foreign methodologies from 
regional blocks in developed countries (such as the EU where regional integration 
and institutional reform are highly evolved,) without modification to suit Africa’s 
regional or sub-regional specificity might prove detrimental to the region’s 
aspirations for effective improvements in regional transport/road infrastructure 
and transit facilitation services. This is because of the huge disparities in levels of 
institutional development between the highly industrialised developed and 
developing countries, in particular Africa. These disparities are exacerbated by the 
diversity of trade profiles between African countries/sub-regions and the 
international community.    
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Similar impediments to cross-border transport and transit facilitation, such as 
those described in the case of NAFTA, EU, SAFTA and Mercosur above have 
prevailed in Africa’s sub-regions for decades. However, the inadequate 
institutional environment, lack of funding, lack of institutional capacity, political 
will and long-term commitment for the implementation of transformational 
interventions has their entrenchment and perpetuation. Remarkably, some of the 
challenges highlighted in SAFTA’s and Mercosur’s case are similar to those 
confronting Africa’s sub-regions in transit facilitation. This similarity suggests 
that lessons from sub-regional blocks in other developing countries may provide 
invaluable inputs to the requisite transformation of inadequate institutions in the 
provision of transport/road infrastructure and transit facilitation services.  
 
Such learning points may also facilitate the effective implementation of cross-
border regional infrastructure programmes/projects in support of Africa’s 
development agenda. The critical issue is, however, what institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements are relevant or will be effective at this stage in the 
development of Africa’s (cross-border) regional infrastructure? The assessment of 
NEPAD’s performance and implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP 
over the next chapters provides some of the clues to the question posed above.  
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4 ASSESSEMENTS OF NEPAD’S PERFORMANCE AND 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the external/internal assessments of NEPAD’s performance 
and implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP. This is in order to 
establish the underlying causes of the identified implementation challenges, how 
they are related to or impact on each other, and what their implications are for 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of 
regional infrastructure.  
 
Variable progress in the preparation of projects in the various infrastructure 
sectors has been reported. Notwithstanding some evidenced progress in some 
infrastructure sectors, such as the ICT and energy sectors, comments regarding 
implementation challenges in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP signify the 
prevailing attitudes/views regarding the relevance and/or health of NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional 
infrastructure, programmes/projects approved for implementation, and NEPAD 
itself. Whilst positive perceptions have implications for continued political 
support and increased resources for project implementation support, negative 
perceptions may further stymie implementation progress.  
 
NEPAD’s governance and management structures (in statements by various 
individuals in NEPAD’s governance and management structures, NEPAD’s 
published reports on implementation progress, and media interviews with 
NEPAD’s officials), media, development partners, and various analysts have 
raised concerns with implementation progress of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
(see: AfDB, 2003; Breytenbach, 2004; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003; Mail & Guardian, 
2007c; Mail & Guardian, 2007b; Mashele, 2006; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 
2003/2004; NEPAD, 2004a; Sunday Times, 28 May 2006; Taylor, 2005; TCII & 
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NEPAD, 2005; The Star, 23 October 2004). Based on the comments of the 
various stakeholders depicted above, it appears that progress in the 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP has been mired in 
implementation delays, which have been attributed primarily to lack of 
institutional capacity. 
 
Because of the magnitude of complex patterns of causes and effects, which may 
be attributed to simultaneous causality as well as reciprocal-effect causal relations 
in the identification of constraints and challenges to the provision of regional 
transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, this chapter 
juxtaposes the external/internal comments regarding the reasons for the lack of 
project implementation progress with NEPAD’s self-assessment from successive 
Infrastructure STAP reviews: this is in order to identify causal mechanisms and 
areas of convergence/divergence or, at a later stage, what has been left unsaid (and 
possibly why), verify causal links, and eliminate some of the major alternative 
explanations or spurious relationships.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses comments by the 
various external and internal stakeholders with regards to the lack of 
implementation progress in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Section 4.3 analyses 
the findings and recommendations of NEPAD’s “self assessment” in the 1st and 
2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews. Details of implementation progress including 
challenges, constraints and recommended actions for the way forward are 
presented in APPENDICES C, D and E. Key issues or emerging patterns from the 
analysis of the findings of NEPAD’s Infrastructure reviews are discussed. Section 
4.4 briefly discusses the implications of the various assessments for 
implementation management/coordination. Section 4.5 is the summary and 
conclusion. 
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4.2 Comments by NEPAD Structures, Development Partners, Analysts 
and Media 
 
Diverse reasons have been proffered for tardy implementation progress of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. The challenges depicted below have been 
proffered as some of the reasons for project implementation delays: 
 
• Lack of institutional capacity for implementation including lack of resources 
and poor leadership in RECs (AfDB, 2003; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003; Mashele, 
2006; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2003/2004; NEPAD, 2004a);  
• Failure by NEPAD to propose viable regional infrastructure projects for 
implementation (Sunday Times, 28 May 2006; Taylor, 2005), which are 
“more responsive to the needs of the continent” (Sunday Times, 28 May 
2006); 
• Lack of political will, resources, capacity, cooperation and support from 
member states (Mashele, 2006; Mail & Guardian, 2007c); and 
• Lack of capacity in NEPAD’s structures for implementation 
management/coordination. According to comments attributed (The Star, 23 
October 2004) to some of NEPAD’s founding HoSG, notably President 
Wade of Senegal, institutional capacity problems in NEPAD have been 
exacerbated by the lack of a common vision (within the NEPAD 
machinery,) and understanding of NEPAD’s objectives for the development 
of regional infrastructure. These aspects, it is further argued, have resulted 
in project implementation delays and NEPAD’s failure to posit viable 
projects for implementation. 
 
Some analysts/institutions have generally identified the lack of institutional 
capacity in RECs (i.e., the REC Secretariats, rather than the community of 
member states constituting a REC,) as the primary reason for project 
implementation delays. For example, Mashele (2006: 7) stated that during 2004, 
NEPAD’s HSGIC called for the “enhancement of the capacities of RECs for 
NEPAD implementation” because of the perceived lack of institutional capacity 
in RECs. Furthermore, Mashele (ibid) argued that the lack of capacity in RECs 
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subsequently resulted in changes in the type of infrastructure projects identified 
by NEPAD for implementation.  
 
According to Mashele (ibid):  
 
Originally, the RECs were expected to lead the implementation of regional 
projects, although there is a discernible shift in favour of commercially viable 
projects run as PPPs. This includes taking responsibility for project 
development, in some cases, as well as for technical planning and 
implementation monitoring. The skills challenges posed by these 
responsibilities cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the expected 
implementation capacity at this level (in RECs) is grossly inadequate.  
 
Arguably, Mashele’s assertions above underscore a number of fundamental issues 
that need clarification in respect of NEPAD’s approach to the development of 
regional infrastructure, including their implications for implementation progress. 
These issues include the following: 
 
• How has NEPAD managed expectations vis-à-vis reality?  
• What are NEPAD’s actual preferences for the development of regional 
infrastructure, why and how have these preferences (e.g., for PPPs) evolved 
over time from programme conception to implementation relative to the 
identified needs, constraints and challenges in the delivery of regional 
infrastructure as well as institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation identified by NEPAD?  
• What are the implications of NEPAD’s approach to project organisation 
management, project action planning and performance management? and   
• What is NEPAD’s role in the development of institutional capacity in terms 
of its articulated obligations in the Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001), 
particularly so when considering the extent and depth of external/internal 
institutional challenges that influence the performance of RECs.  
 
The issues identified above are not addressed conclusively in this research. A 
range of technical, planning and project management constraints in different 
institutional structures and at different stages of the project life cycle have also 
been identified as contributing to project implementation delays. For example, 
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media reports (Mail & Guardian, 2007c) also specifically cite the lack of 
institutional capacity for “programme development,” “technical planning” and 
“implementation monitoring” in RECs as some of the causes of project 
implementation delays. Other reasons proffered (ibid) include the lack of support 
by member states, and the lack of capacity (in member states and RECs) to 
manage projects through the various stages of the project life cycle.  
 
What is not clear from the comments depicted above is how project 
“implementation” is defined in relation to the various stages of the project life 
cycle and project management functions. This clarification may assist to 
contextualise the articulated concerns in order to identify the relevant corrective 
interventions. For example, Mashele (ibid) has argued that the “challenges that 
face many projects being conceived lie in implementation.” Mashele (ibid) has 
also argued that the problems with implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP were attributable to the lack of political will, funding and technical capacity 
(for implementation) in individual member states (rather than capacity constraints 
in NEPAD’s Secretariat.) As Mashele (ibid) further stated, “…the main problem 
is technical capacity, planning and engineering.” Mashele (ibid), however, noted 
that even NEPAD’s capacity building programmes were constrained by the lack 
of commitment to NEPAD’s programme by member states. Mashele also argued 
that even when the capacity building programmes were in place, Africa’s brain-
drain has resulted in the “inability to retain the much needed skills” (ibid).  
 
According to media reports (ibid), officials from NEPAD’s Secretariat also 
argued that the lack of cooperation amongst member states to facilitate the 
development of regional infrastructure, including the lack of harmonisation of 
regulatory regimes for economic integration within and between RECs, has 
resulted in implementation delays. In addition, the officials from NEPAD’s 
Secretariat assert that the Secretariat “…is working at a national level, urging 
states to integrate the Nepad values, principles and projects into their own 
development plans and put money into their implementation” (ibid). For these 
afore-mentioned reasons, officials from NEPAD’s Secretariat also identified the 
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need to “empower communities,” facilitate community capacity building as 
essential to ensure a “leadership transformation process,” which they argue 
recognises “leadership is at every level,” and to “view development as a demand-
supply situation” (ibid).  
 
Some of NEPAD’s founding HoSG (i.e., Presidents Mbeki and Wade,) and 
development partners have also made scathing remarks regarding the lack of 
implementation progress or lack of institutional capacity for implementation of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Some of the afore-mentioned remarks are 
depicted in Chapter 1. Other authors have raised questions regarding NEPAD’s 
integrity to produce the expected results, or to provide transparent reports on 
implementation progress. For example, Taylor (2005: 92) stated that during 
February 2004, NEPAD’s Secretariat “claimed that the recovery plan was ‘fast 
gaining momentum with scores of new sponsored projects’.” Taylor (ibid) further 
noted that six months later, after three years of no investments into NEPAD 
projects, “the Nepad Secretariat suddenly, in October 2004 decided that it was not 
about promoting projects anymore” (ibid). During the multi-stakeholder three-
year review conference, held in October 2004, NEPAD’s Secretariat is reported to 
have “clarified” matters by stating: “You are not going to see any Nepad projects. 
Ours is to analyse, inspire and be a catalyst. To get things moving” (The Star, 23 
October 2004; Taylor, 2005).  
 
Similarly, Mashele (2006: 7) noted that four years after the launch of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP, the “overall assessment of implementation reveals that most 
NEPAD (infrastructure) projects have not yet gone beyond a feasibility study.” 
According to Mashele’s report (ibid), the AfDB also indicated at the stage that 
NEPAD was “still trying to secure funding for feasibility studies.” As a result, 
Taylor (2005: 92) argued that NEPAD Secretariat’s statements during February 
2004 regarding the escalating “momentum” in the financing of new projects 
“were rather disingenuous.” For these afore-mentioned reasons, and possibly 
owing to NEPAD’s conflicting statements in various forums, Taylor averred: 
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“…Whether or not Nepad projects exist seems to depend upon the audience” 
(ibid: 92-93). 
 
Some of the comments on implementation progress detailed above also illustrate 
the possible negative implications for projects and institutional structures for 
project implementation/implementation management of media pronouncements, 
which appear to be based on limited application area knowledge of the mutually 
reinforcing institutional challenges in the delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects, or of the management of development 
programmes/projects in general. Suffice to say, the issues raised in the comments 
depicted above traverse a broad range of intra-/multi-disciplinary and multi-
sectoral spheres; this alignment further confirms the significance for NEPAD to 
create appropriate forums/platforms for collective engagement in order to 
facilitate effective integrated implementation/implementation management of 
NEPAD’s cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. The afore-
mentioned issues also particularly illustrate the significance of inter/intra-/ 
multidisciplinary project teams to support the implementation/implementation 
management of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure projects. In this respect, the 
development of relevant integrative project management frameworks and 
competencies will be critical.  
 
4.3 NEPAD’s Self Assessment: Infrastructure STAP Reviews 
 
Details of implementation progress, based on the 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP 
reviews, are presented in APPENDIX C. Other transport sub-sectors are included 
for sector-wide comparison within the transport sector and with the other 
infrastructure sectors in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. This is to establish 
emerging patterns in the implementation of projects in the various infrastructure 
sectors/sub-sectors that constitute NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, particularly so 
since all the regional infrastructure projects compete for the same pool of limited 
resources: project preparation and integrated implementation management/ 
coordination are also facilitated by the same institutional structures.  
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4.3.1 Analysis of findings and recommendations of the 1st Infrastructure STAP 
review 
 
During the 1st
• inadequate programme/project design and implementation planning;  
 Infrastructure STAP review, the AfDB report (2003: 34-40) – 
ostensibly prepared in consultation with the RECs, NEPAD Secretariat and 
development partners – identified eight broad constraints to effective 
implementation of NEPAD’s  Infrastructure STAP. These findings, with 
recommendations to address the status quo, are presented in APPENDIX C. Of 
the seven identified constraints to the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP (the eighth being “inadequate knowledge and cooperation on shared water 
resources” and therefore outside the scope of this study), five are directly related 
to NEPAD’s prescriptive approach to planning.  
 
NEPAD’s use of the prescriptive planning model in contradiction to the professed 
(NEPAD’s) aspirations for effective integrated practical implementation and 
integrated regional development, particularly so cognisant of the lack of 
institutional capacity to perform the requisite tasks, appears to have resulted in the 
following outcomes:  
 
• perpetuation of a strong sectoral focus;  
• lack of clarification of roles and responsibilities;  
• inadequate communication between the identified institutional structures for 
implementation management/coordination regarding the programme/project 
plans and envisaged processes for implementation; 
• inadequate strategy for project implementation;  
• poor stakeholder-relationship management exacerbated by the lack of broad-
based popular participation in various stages of the project life cycle; and 
• complex institutional arrangements for implementation management/ 
coordination.  
 
The remaining two of the seven identified constraints identified in APPENDIX C 
may be described as consequences of the first five. Notably, the AfDB stated in 
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the report (ibid: 34) that the 1st Infrastructure Review did not concentrate on the 
one constraint to implementation identified during the preparation of the 
Infrastructure STAP: lack of stability in certain regions. According to the AfDB 
(ibid), the lack of regional stability has undoubtedly affected implementation 
progress in certain RECs. However, similar to the comments on implementation 
challenges depicted in an earlier section above, NEPAD’s 1st Infrastructure STAP 
review appears to have focused on technical and planning issues at the strategic 
and operational levels of management as well as on the internal organisational 
arrangements in REC Secretariats. (The findings of NEPAD’s 1st Infrastructure 
STAP regarding the REC Secretariats also include lack of institutional capacity 
including lack of institutional infrastructure and human capital with the requisite 
competencies to execute the requisite tasks in the implementation of NEPAD’s 
programmes/projects.)  
 
An internal reading of the report on NEPAD’s 1st
Similarly, NEPAD’s role in integrated implementation management/coordination 
of the Infrastructure STAP vis-à-vis the similar mandate to RECs, or member 
states, is not explained. Instead, the 1
 Infrastructure STAP review, 
however, conveys an overwhelming sense of confusion regarding the RECs’ role 
in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. The view enunciated here takes cognisance of 
the overlapping roles assigned to RECs and member states for practical 
implementation and to NEPAD for integrated implementation management/ 
coordination of the identified regional infrastructure projects. As the RECs lack 
executing capacity (Breytenbach, February 2007: personal communication), their 
role in the practical implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure projects is 
however, not explained.  
 
st Infrastructure STAP review appears to 
have assigned all-encompassing responsibilities and roles to NEPAD’s Secretariat 
to facilitate the resolution of the identified problems at the various spatial 
categories, stages of the project life cycle, and levels of management/planning. 
These afore-mentioned roles are depicted in APPENDIX C. Yet, the 1st 
Infrastructure STAP review, in contradiction to the all-encompassing 
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responsibilities and roles assigned to NEPAD’s Secretariat in the same report, 
simultaneously narrowly defines NEPAD’s role as that of mobilising political will 
and facilitating donor support/finance. The relationship between the afore-
mentioned roles assigned to NEPAD is not explained.  
 
The afore-mentioned contradictions in respect of the responsibilities and roles 
assigned to NEPAD remain unresolved in the AfDB’s report (see: AfDB, 2003), 
or other related NEPAD reports reviewed for this study. Rather, various 
stakeholders appear to provide different definitions and interpretations of 
NEPAD’s role in the Infrastructure STAP, based on either their subjective 
assessment of NEPAD, or the characteristics/nature of the forums at which 
NEPAD/NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP are discussed. The critical issue then with 
respect to the allocation of certain responsibilities and roles during the 1st
Curiously, even the interventions assigned to NEPAD/NEPAD’s Secretariat to 
resolve the identified problems inadvertently or ultimately place the burden on 
RECs for their practical execution, despite the RECs’ widely acknowledged lack 
of institutional capacity or executing capacity to perform the requisite tasks. For 
example, although NEPAD’s 1
 
Infrastructure STAP review is as follows: did NEPAD’s Secretariat at the stage of 
the review posses the wherewithal and authority to perform or affect 
implementation of the requisite interventions depicted in APPENDIX C?  
 
st Infrastructure STAP review acknowledged the 
negative influences of the RECs’ internal/external environment on 
implementation progress, the burden to resolve the intractable problems of the 
RECs’ institutional environment is also inexplicably placed on REC Secretariats, 
who in any event lack the capacity to do so. As a result, one is left with the 
impression that NEPAD’s 1st Infrastructure STAP review failed to examine the 
implications of its suggested corrective interventions to ameliorate the status quo. 
In the circumstances, the allocation of responsibilities and roles to the various 
(incapable) institutional structures to resolve the identified implementation 
challenges, while subjective and objective conditions in the external/internal 
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institutional environment that stymie the effective implementation or regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects remain the same, is curious. 
 
The problem to address the identified constraints to project implementation in the 
Infrastructure STAP appears to lie with the contradictions or complexities of the 
“multiple logics” (Gelb, 2002) that underpin NEPAD’s status/position – as both a 
facilitating mechanism, and a (pre-eminent) programme for Africa’s regeneration 
– and how the afore-mentioned roles are related to, and impact on each other. 
Regarding NEPAD’s role as facilitator, NEPAD appears to have adopted the role 
of either a supranational authority, or programme manager, or both of the afore-
mentioned roles. The implications for RECs of NEPAD’s status as a supranational 
authority or programme manager vis-à-vis NEPAD’s mandate for RECs for 
implementation management/coordination are not spelt out. It is also unclear how 
the interface between the RECs and NEPAD’s Secretariat will be managed in 
terms of the afore-mentioned overlapping roles. As a result, it is unclear from the 
afore-mentioned framework which institutional structure will be held accountable 
for performance/non-performance in project implementation: under the 
circumstances a disinterested assessment would most likely hold NEPAD (i.e., its 
governance and management structures) accountable.   
 
Significantly, NEPAD’s position as Africa’s pre-eminent development 
programme appears to be defined in relation to its (NEPAD’s) role as a facilitator 
or vice versa. As a result, NEPAD expected regional structures, RECs, and 
national governments to align their development priorities, programmes/projects, 
and resources with NEPAD’s agenda. This expectation is also articulated by 
NEPAD’s officials in interviews with the media, as depicted in an earlier section 
above. In this regard, the tail (NEPAD) appears to be wagging the dog, 
particularly in the context of NEPAD’s assumed/assigned role as an integrative/ 
facilitating mechanism for the implementation of Africa’s regional integration 
projects. Similarly, NEPAD and its lead agency, the AfDB, assume the roles of 
player, referee, and spectator in the Infrastructure STAP reviews.  
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The allocation of the afore-mentioned responsibilities and roles between 
NEPAD’s governance and management structures on the one hand, and between 
NEPAD and other institutional structures on the other, and how the afore-
mentioned roles are related and interface with each other, is confusing. As a 
result, it is unclear which structure is ultimately responsible for various project 
activities. Thus, the convoluted institutional arrangements depicted above 
ultimately obfuscate the allocation of responsibility and roles as well as 
accountability for project delivery – or lack thereof.  
 
4.3.2 Analysis of findings and recommendations of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP 
review 
 
The 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005) identified 
overarching constraints to the timely and effective implementation of NEPAD’s 
infrastructure STAP programmes. The details of the identified constraints are 
presented in APPENDIX E. Some of the findings of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP 
review illustrate the negative implications of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements for the implementation management/coordination of the 
Infrastructure STAP. Others illustrate the ineffective role of member states/ 
national governments, RECs and development partners – not only in NEPAD’s 
programme, but in the implementation of Africa’s development programmes in 
general. The TCII and NEPAD report (ibid) also apportions accountability to the 
various institutions/institutional structures for the lack of implementation 
progress: it also provides details/feedback on the various project management 
functions. In this respect, the 2nd
In addition, the TCII and NEPAD’s 2
 Infrastructure STAP review has attempted to 
provide a balanced approach to problem identification.  
 
nd Infrastructure STAP review addresses 
some of the afore-mentioned information gaps in the 1st Infrastructure STAP 
review i.e., the lack of specific information on implementation progress in the 
various infrastructure sectors. For example, details of some of the actual projects 
implemented under the various initiatives of NEPAD’s roads programme (namely, 
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the regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes) are provided 
(see: APPENDIX D). The revised schedules for implementation of current 
projects are, however, not provided: this omission creates confusion, cognisant of 
NEPAD’s persistent changes in programme/project scope as illustrated in the 
various priority lists, or amendments to the original lists of roads sector projects 
submitted by the RECs in 2002 (see: NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB, 2003; TCII & 
NEPAD, 2005), but which appear unrelated to the projects reviewed in the TCII 
and NEPAD report. 
 
For example, the Infrastructure STAP originally listed under the transit facilitation 
programme a number of projects in different corridors. Besides preparatory 
processes detailed in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 
66-67), implementation progress of the identified transit facilitation projects 
appears limited, if at all. At the same time, the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid) 
provides examples of “achievements” in physical roads infrastructure/road 
corridor and transit facilitation (investment) projects that were, however, not 
included in the original lists of projects submitted for approval under NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP.  
 
As an example, in the DRC and Angola the AfDB, World Bank and EU are 
funding an Emergency Recovery Programme that includes a transport 
infrastructure recovery component, with an estimated budget of US$1.5 billion 
(ibid: 67). At the time of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review, the World Bank 
was apparently “considering financing a $100m road rehabilitation programme, 
which will include Benin, Burkina Faso and Ghana” (ibid). These afore-
mentioned projects neither appear in any of the earlier programme/project priority 
lists approved by NEPAD’s HSGIC (see in NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB, 2003), nor in 
any revised programme schedule in the 2nd
Similarly, approximately nine investment corridor development projects in the 
roads sector in the EAC, funded and/or implemented by the World Bank, had 
apparently advanced to the implementation/construction stage at the time of the 
 Infrastructure STAP review.   
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TCII and NEPAD review (ibid). The afore-mentioned projects were apparently 
not included in the original Infrastructure STAP list. According to the information 
provided in the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid), about five corridor projects 
“replace the separate projects listed in the 2003 STAP”; the remaining four 
corridor developments are incorporated into the five corridor projects depicted 
above. The unexplained changes to the EAC’s programmes/projects, and lack of 
detailed information on the projects’ scope create further confusion. The 
subsequent inclusion of the afore-mentioned projects may also be attributed to 
NEPAD’s confusing use of rolling-wave planning, which in this case amounts to 
scope creep as depicted in the discussions above.  
 
In this respect, one may conclude that NEPAD erroneously refers to its 
management of an indeterminate project scope as “rolling wave planning”; the 
disruptive effect of introducing new projects on existing work and project 
organisation management (Baird, 1997: 7) appears to not have been explored. 
Thus, the confusing use of project management concepts/terminology may explain 
assertions by the AfDB (2003) regarding the “perfectly understandable confusion” 
by institutional structures, such as the World Bank and EU, in NEPAD’s 
infrastructure STAP. However, the afore-mentioned structures ostensibly have a 
wealth of expertise in the management/implementation of development projects, 
which renders the assertions by the AfDB (2003) of their being perfectly 
“confused” questionable.  
 
Therefore, an impression is created that NEPAD failed to pay particular attention 
to the various project management functions. An impression is also created that 
only the investment programmes/projects in the roads sector funded and/or 
implemented by the World Bank, or similar institutional structure, are accorded 
priority, since “remarkable” implementation progress has been reported in respect 
of these projects in the roads sector. In this respect, one may argue that the 
influence of funding agents/sponsors on programme/project selection and 
implementation progress is discernible. In addition, the secretive workings of IFIs 
such as the World Bank, referred to by Addison (1997), may have contributed to 
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this lack of transparency and confusion in respect of NEPAD’s 
programme/project scope.  
 
With respect to the roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects, besides the 
afore-mentioned World Bank/EU/AfDB projects, it appears that progress since 
2002 – when NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP was launched – has been limited to 
(preliminary) intangible deliverables, as depicted in APPENDIX D. This 
assessment takes cognisance of NEPAD’s assertions regarding the status of the 
projects submitted by RECs, which were ostensibly at advanced stages of 
preparation for implementation (AfDB, 2003; OAU/AU, 2002; NEPAD, 2002c). 
Yet, approximately four years after the launch of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, 
project deliverables in the roads sector appear to have only advanced to the 
development stage.  
 
The afore-mentioned project deliverables include the approval of concepts for 
programme/project design; completion of certain studies; obtaining grants (by 
some RECs) for studies on harmonisation of technical standards and institutional 
arrangements on joint border posts (see: APPENDIX D). Some projects are still at 
the conceptual stage: these include contemplated surveys; and project proposals 
by RECs, although the same RECs lack the resources for the implementation of 
the said projects. In other cases, implementation progress on projects that some 
RECs have ostensibly focussed on cannot be ascertained (TCII & NEPAD, 2005): 
according to the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid), detailed records of the said 
projects are not available.  
 
Similarly, an analysis of the detailed reports provided by the respective RECs in 
the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid: 112-134) reveals that in all the RECs, none of 
the “facilitation” projects in the roads sector have moved beyond feasibility 
studies. According to the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid: 69), in the transit 
facilitation programme, a “key initiative” was the completion of a survey 
conducted in 2004 to review current vehicle overload practices in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The TCII and NEPAD report (ibid) identified the lack of funding as a 
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major impediment to the implementation of regional roads construction, 
rehabilitation and maintenance projects.  
 
It is unclear, however, on what basis the TCII and NEPAD report made the afore-
mentioned conclusion regarding the financing of regional roads infrastructure 
projects, particularly so since NEPAD failed to propose physical regional 
infrastructure roads projects (i.e., regional roads construction, rehabilitation and 
maintenance) in the original Infrastructure STAP (see: NEPAD, 2002c). Thus, an 
emerging defining characteristic of NEPAD’s 2nd
Since the majority of member states do not, in any event, have funds for the 
implementation of regional infrastructure projects, the implications of funding 
delays for the implementation of transit facilitation programmes as well as for 
protracted processes of collective engagement and identification of projects to 
 Infrastructure STAP review is 
the pattern of providing reasons for implementation delays in respect of projects 
that were never elaborated in the first place, or articulating certain positions on 
processes for collective engagement that were never undertaken/integrated in 
programme/project design in the first place, in contradiction with NEPAD’s 
policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management. Some of 
the recommendations depicted in APPENDIX E substantiate the assertions made 
above.  
 
Similarly, the TCII and NEPAD report (2005) indicates that the funding 
constraints are exacerbated by the failure of African governments to meet their 
obligations in terms of the “agreed funding mechanisms” for the roads sector. In 
this respect, the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid) makes sweeping statements 
regarding the “agreed funding mechanisms”: no evidence is found in the literature 
reviewed of concrete agreements with member states to support NEPAD’s 
(unilateral) decision for national governments to fund NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programmes in the roads sector (with the exception of NEPAD’s 
statements (see: NEPAD, 2002c) in respect of funding of projects in the roads 
sector by member states).  
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harmonise transport-sector policies, regulatory and governance regimes appear not 
to be addressed in the TCII and NEPAD report. Perhaps it is in recognition of the 
structural funding problems in member states, that the TCII and NEPAD report 
(ibid: 106) recommended the consideration of “an expansion of NEPAD IPPF 
(Infrastructure Project Planning Facility) to encompass facilitation projects”.  
 
The TCII and NEPAD report (ibid: 98-100) also attributed the delays for the 
requisite institutional reforms to facilitate harmonisation of sector policies, 
regulatory and governance regimes to the lack of political will, lack of 
institutional capacity (including funding and human capital), and lack of 
commitment to collective agreements at national levels. Yet, the progress report 
summarised in APPENDIX D reveals that financial closure has been achieved for 
projects identified in the ICT and energy sectors including the related 
harmonisation of policies, regulations, liberalisation and associated legislative 
frameworks. Thus, the lack of consistency in the performance of different 
infrastructure sectors suggests that NEPAD may have attached different priorities 
to different sectors and projects, based on investor interests, sector investment 
trends and size of projects, resulting in differential effort for implementation 
support.  
 
Regarding the harmonisation of sector policies, regulatory and governance 
regimes, the TCII and NEPAD report does not provide an explanation on what, 
and how the links between the afore-mentioned harmonisation processes and 
stages of regional integration will be managed and what the implications are for 
cross-border regional infrastructure facilitation projects, such as the roads 
programme, and whether harmonisation will, in any event, be feasible considering 
that regional integration in Africa’s sub-regions/RECs is still at the initial stages. 
It is also unclear how NEPAD/RECs will address the lack of political will in 
member states, which may be fuelled by their narrow mercantilism to perpetuate 
the prevailing diverse and multiple transport regimes. In this respect, the influence 
of state-centrism, contradictory principles to manage institutional relationships 
between the various spatial categories, and entrenchment of the principle of 
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sovereignty (which proscribes “non-interference” in the internal affairs of 
sovereign states,) illustrate the difficulties that need to be overcome for NEPAD 
to facilitate effective implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure 
projects.       
 
In SADC and COMESA, although it appears that some attempts are being made 
to address institutional impediments to integrated TTF systems (see: APPENDIX 
D), such interventions are pursued within the existing institutional framework. It 
is also unclear from the TCII and NEPAD report how far the initiatives to 
integrate TTF systems in COMESA and SADC have progressed. The TCII and 
NEPAD report (ibid) also details (in its progress report on NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP) interventions in transit facilitation that have been in 
existence since the 1980’s, such as the COMESA Yellow Card and Customs 
Document. It is thus unclear from this report what value NEPAD has added to 
these existing initiatives or why such initiatives are included in NEPAD’s 
progress reports on the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP.  
 
One needs to consider though that the support for the implementation of existing 
initiatives depicted above may be in accordance with NEPAD’s approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure, i.e., to integrate and strengthen existing 
initiatives under NEPAD (NEPAD, 2002f). Support for the implementation of 
existing initiatives also conforms to the NEPAD Secretariat’s mandate to avoid 
duplicating, replacing, or competing with other existing development initiatives or 
integration processes in the African continent (ibid). To the extent that NEPAD’s 
role and value-adding in these initiatives is not explained, however, creates 
confusion. It is also unclear from NEPAD’s progress reports what the interface or 
alignment is between these existing initiatives and NEPAD’s “new” approach to 
the development of regional infrastructure; how the interface between existing 
initiatives and NEPAD’s programmes/projects will be managed is also not 
explained; the implications of NEPAD’s prescriptive approach to the development 
of regional infrastructure for the existing programmes/projects or institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements also appear not to have been thoroughly examined. 
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Therefore, the issues depicted above suggest that NEPAD may not have 
adequately thought through the practical implications of its policy strategy/ 
response actions, responsibilities/roles, and institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure. The critical issues 
that need to be explained in order to establish the purpose, role and relationship 
between the existing initiatives with NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
programmes are the following:  
 
• How are the existing initiatives in the development of regional infrastructure 
related to NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme or different sectoral 
interventions?  
• How were the current initiatives originally conceptualised, which may have 
contributed to their tardy implementation or insignificant success, and what 
are the implications of previous programme/project conception, if any, for 
NEPAD’s “new” approach – in other words, what are the lessons learnt and 
how are they integrated in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, it al all?  
• Who has control and ownership of the development and implementation of 
the existing initiatives, and how will the interface with NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programmes be managed if separate NEPAD programmes 
exist in the various sub-regions or national levels?  
• Where do the resources for the implementation of existing initiatives come 
from, what are the conditionalities, and what are the implications for 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements?  
• Is there a possibility for the sharing of resources and skills transfer in order 
to contribute to NEPAD’s efforts for capacity building in regional, sub-
regional and national institutions?  
• Who benefits from the implementation of the existing initiatives and in what 
manner does support from NEPAD benefit the implementation of existing 
initiatives/programmes – if at all?    
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4.4 Implications of Performance Assessments for Implementation 
Management 
 
The consolidation of the various assessments indicates that NEPAD’s 
implementation challenges may be attributed primarily to the collective lack of 
institutional capacity in NEPAD’s governance and management structures, RECs 
and member states. Curiously, the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review appears to let 
NEPAD off the hook on the following issues: failure to clearly define 
responsibilities and roles for the various institutional structures; failure to 
effective manage the identified projects through all the stages of the project life 
cycle; failure to manage stakeholder expectations and relationships; failure to 
agree upfront with the various institutions/institutional structures on what it 
(NEPAD) stands for/its role is in the practical implementation of identified 
projects, and to integrated them in decision-making processes; and failure to 
address the lack of institutional capacity in RECs and member states.        
 
The recommendations of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews, however, raise 
some concerning issues in so far as they apply to RECs: they directly or indirectly 
shift the responsibility to RECs for implementation management/coordination and 
to manage institutional relationships, particularly in the more controversial 
facilitation programmes/projects to develop cross-border regional infrastructure. 
The facilitation projects, such as NEPAD’s roads programme, entail institutional 
reform/development and harmonisation of sector policy, regulatory and 
governance regimes at national levels. The afore-mentioned activity areas impact 
directly and indirectly on regional integration, intra-African trade, poverty 
reduction and institutional/individual capacity development – NEPAD’s 
articulated multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that 
are planned for simultaneous implementation. They are also at the heart of politics 
in the negotiation of collective agreements between member states and 
regional/sub-regional institutions or trans-state trans-actions.  
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In this regard, NEPAD’s shifting of the enormous burden to address the deeply 
entrenched, endemic and intractable institutional impediments to the effective 
delivery of cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure to the ineffective 
RECs is concerning. This is an area where the AU’s participation and that of its 
organs should also be strengthened, particularly so given the lack of institutional 
capacity and authority in RECs to coordinate trans-state institutional reforms.  
 
The lack of institutional capacity in RECs is also exacerbated by the proliferation 
of regional, sub-regional and national structures to address the same development 
concerns through a multiplicity of similar or diverse programmes/projects (AfDB, 
2003; AfDB & ECA, 2003). Historically, and in NEPAD’s context (NEPAD, 
2001, Para. 93:20), concerns around the proliferation of national, sub-regional and 
regional institutions for the implementation of Africa’s development or regional 
integration programmes abound. These concerns have resulted in suggestions to 
restructure, transform, rationalise, or harmonise the various overlapping sub-
regional structures, or to appropriately streamline interventions in alignment with 
their spheres of effectiveness.  
 
Table 4.1 outlines the consolidated key findings of the various performance 
assessments discussed under the various sections above.  
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Table 4.1: Consolidated Performance Reviews and Assessments of Implementation Challenges in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP  
Findings of 1st Findings of 2 Infrastructure STAP 
Review (2003) 
nd Stakeholder Comments on Implementation 
Delays (2003-2007) 
 Infrastructure STAP Review (2004) 
• Lack of clarity as to what NEPAD really 
is. 
• Lack of clarity as to what is expected of 
the RECs and countries. 
• Lack of definition regarding linkages 
between countries and RECS. 
• Overlapping REC responsibilities. 
• Failure by RECs to keep abreast of 
“NEPAD Type” programmes in which 
they are currently involved.  
• Lack of alignment between REC 
programmes and NEPAD priorities. 
• Lack of financial and technical capacity in 
the RECs. 
 
• “Lengthy and  complex decision-making processes of RECs, 
which may have been appropriate for their traditional activities but 
which are not well suited to their new role as implementing organs 
of NEPAD within their regions. 
• Failure by countries to translate genuine political will into 
concrete actions to ensure compliance with regionally agreed 
protocols, conventions and sectoral policies. 
• Limited capacity within RECs to provide technical assistance to 
countries and to adequately monitor sectoral harmonisation 
programmes. 
• Limited institutional structures and capacity within RECs to 
develop bankable cross-border infrastructure projects. The RECs 
were not originally mandated for this role. 
• Limited financial resources within RECs, which is a result of the 
manner in which most RECs are funded and the insufficient level 
of financing…(which does) not reflect the ‘new reality’ of their 
significantly increased commitments associated with their new 
NEPAD role. 
• Lack of a coherent package of policies to support and encourage 
private sector investment in the STAP. 
• A lack of effective institutional relationships and coordination 
between the various stakeholders in the management and 
implementation of the NEPAD infrastructure projects and 
programmes. 
• Limited capacity within…(AfDB) and the NEPAD Secretariat to 
meet the growing demands for their services and support in 
relation to NEPAD and in particular the infrastructure STAP.   
• Systems and practices of development partners that have hitherto 
not always been fully aligned with NEPAD priorities and adapted 
to support the efficient and effective implementation of NEPAD 
infrastructure programmes and projects.”   
• Lack of institutional capacity for implementation 
even when resources are available; 
• Lack of institutional capacity in RECs, including 
lack of resources and poor leadership; 
• Failure by NEPAD to propose viable projects that 
are more responsive to the needs of the continent; 
• NEPAD’s failure to “get projects off the ground,” 
thereby creating a stumbling block for economic 
growth; 
• NEPAD’s integrity to produce the expected results 
questionable;  
• Lack of political will, resources, capacity, and 
cooperation from member states; 
• Lack of a common vision and understanding of 
NEPAD’s objectives in structures for project 
implementation (including NEPAD structures, 
RECs, Lead Agencies) despite numerous 
workshops undertaken to address the said issues; 
• Lack of support from member states, including 
lack of technical capacity, engineering and 
planning competences to manage projects through 
the various stages of the project life cycle as well 
as lack of harmonisation of sector regimes; 
• Lack of commitment by member states to 
implement capacity-building projects. Brain-drain 
exacerbates the problem to retain needed skills; 
• Failure by member states to integrate NEPAD’s values, 
principles and projects into NDPs, and to use their 
budgets for project implementation; 
• Need to empower communities and for leadership 
transformation in communities, to ensure that 
infrastructure developments respond to effective 
demand. 
Sources: Derived from AfDB (2003), First Infrastructure STAP Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward, pp.34-40; and after TCII and NEPAD (2005), Second Infrastructure STAP Review of 
Implementation Progress and the Way Forward, p.17 
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The consolidated assessments illustrated in Table 4.1, however, all focus on the 
effects of problems, rather than attempting to identify and address the underlying 
institutional causes of implementation challenges in NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP. Only the external/internal stakeholder comments have, mustered courage 
to critically identify some of NEPAD’s failings in the implementation of its 
programmes. The consolidated assessments, however, do provide a broad picture 
of the range of issues contributing to the implementation challenges at the 
different levels of management and in the management of the interface between 
the planning hierarchies, programmes/projects, influences of the external/internal 
institutional environment and structures for implementation management/ 
coordination: they also illustrate the issues highlighted in the previous chapters of 
this report i.e., the negative consequences or effects of NEPAD’s prescriptive 
approach to the development of regional infrastructure. The issues highlighted in 
the 1st
• failure to posit relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to 
address the prevalent impediments in the development of cross-border 
 Infrastructure STAP review, for example, are particularly symptomatic of 
the outcomes of top-down, secretive and bureaucratic approaches to planning and 
implementation management of development programmes/projects.  
 
In NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, such approaches have resulted in confusion on 
what NEPAD stands for, what it is meant to achieve, and how. Thus, the 
assessments of implementation in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP depicted above 
possibly illustrate the effects of the disconnect in the links between NEPAD’s 
policy strategy/response actions, multiple development objectives that are planned 
for simultaneous implementation, influences of the external/internal institutional 
environments, programmes/projects and institutional structures for project 
implementation/implementation management.  Rather than the cause of problems 
being capacity deficits in RECs and member states, which were already prevalent 
in the afore-mentioned institutions/institutional structures when NEPAD’s 
Strategic Framework or NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP were launched, the 
assessments depicted above ultimately indicate the following failures by 
NEPAD’s governance and management structures:  
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regional infrastructure, or the implementation of regional integration 
initiatives, with implications for the implementation of the Infrastructure 
STAP, in particular facilitation programmes such as the roads programme;  
• failure to enforce consistent integration and implementation of the 
articulated response actions/policy strategies in the various infrastructure 
sectors (see NEPAD, 2001), which sought to address the identified capacity 
deficits and evidenced disconnect between strategy and implementation in 
Africa’s development programmes/projects;  
• failure to perform in their assumed/delegated roles and responsibilities in 
terms of their obligations for the development of regional infrastructure; and 
• inordinate reliance on foreign/international institutions and development 
partners to resolve Africa’s or NEPAD’s capacity constraints in NEPAD’s 
favour. In this respect, how NEPAD expects the development partners to 
realign their systems to suit NEPAD’s agenda, cognisant of the intractable 
asymmetrical power relations between Africa and the developed 
countries/their institutions, can only be described as astounding. It is the 
symptomatic consequence of NEPAD’s arrogating itself the position of the 
pre-eminent programme for Africa’s regeneration and as a reference point 
for all development interventions on the African continent as depicted in the 
various reports (see: NEPAD 2001, NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2002f; AfDB, 
2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005).  
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusion   
 
The discussions on the various assessments of implementation challenges in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and the related sectoral programmes, in particular 
the roads programme, suggest that since the failed implementation of the LPA’s 
Transport and Communications programme (of 1980) and the TAH and “missing 
links” initiative (of 1970), discussed in APPENDIX B, little has changed with 
respect to the institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the implementation 
of Africa’s infrastructure regional infrastructure programmes/projects: an endemic 
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collective denial to address the underpinning causes of problems in the delivery of 
cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation appears to persist.  
 
An internal reading of the responses to project implementation delays and 
findings of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews suggests a pervasive lack of 
clarity on the programme scope, projects’ status, implementation progress and 
roles and responsibilities of the various institutional structures for implementation 
management/coordination. In other words, the comments depicted above illustrate 
a lack of clarity regarding the essence of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP: i.e., 
what it aims to deliver, where, for whom, and by when. Thus, NEPAD appears to 
not have considered how policy strategies and programme/project objectives are 
linked to influences of the external/internal institutional environment, 
programmes/projects, strategies for project implementation/implementation 
management, and structures for project implementation or implementation 
management/coordination. Systematic consideration of the afore-mentioned 
aspects would assist in the evaluation of how action planning is related to 
performance control/management.  
 
Some of the media statements depicted in this chapter come across as attempts to 
exonerate NEPAD/NEPAD’s Secretariat from blame in the event of perceived 
implementation failure. Whether such “protection” is warranted, or even 
necessary, raises questions about the lack of understanding regarding the 
relevance of constructive criticism in development projects. Paul, (1990), for 
example, addresses the need for constructive criticism in development 
programmes/projects in order to facilitate implementation success. In the context 
of the concerns mapped above, the possible negative implications of NEPAD’s 
prescriptive approach to planning and inadequacy of NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for integrated project implementation/ 
implementation management of the regional infrastructure programme have 
received scant attention, if at all.  
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For example, it appears a lack of common understanding prevails in the media or 
various analysts regarding the vagaries and vicissitudes of NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure and 
their implications for project implementation. This lack of common understanding 
extends to the status of NEPAD’s infrastructure programmes/projects that are 
proposed for implementation, and whether or not such projects were, in any event, 
ready for implementation – or whether they existed at all. Therefore, it is unclear 
how credible/beneficial assessment of NEPAD’s implementation challenges can 
be made by the different stakeholders if, and when it is based on limited 
understanding of the range of concerns underpinning the development and 
implementation/implementation management of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.   
 
Other responses illustrate the underlying tensions between the various 
institutions/institutional structures, stakeholders and trans-state actors in the 
development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. They also underscore what 
has been left unsaid said about the implementation/implementation management 
of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, such as the broader implications of NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for NEPAD’s and Africa’s 
development agenda. Notably, the various performance assessments of NEPAD 
and implementation challenges of the Infrastructure STAP also highlight a 
number of underpinning institutional issues that appear to inform the prevailing 
attitudes towards NEPAD’s implementation of the Infrastructure STAP. These 
issues are discussed in the next chapter. 
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5  ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED BY THE ASSESSMENTS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the underlying issues highlighted by the stakeholder 
comments on projects implementation challenges. These issues include concerns 
around planning, project management and stakeholder relationship management:  
their implications for NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements to 
support the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects are 
also examined. 
 
At first blush, some of the articulated reasons for implementation delays, 
discussed in Chapter 4, appear incoherent. Some of the identified issues also come 
across as a shopping-list of diverse reasons for implementation challenges; some 
of the articulated concerns appear to be accepted as fact, although presented 
without any substantiating evidence. Such factual data would include the 
systematic identification and analysis of how the identified problems have ensued 
as well as establishing how they are related to NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure. To some extent, 
the range of articulated concerns also illustrates the negative impact of inaccurate 
information (ostensibly) provided on the projects’ status and the prevailing 
attitudes regarding project implementation progress. These concerning afore-
mentioned outcomes are exacerbated by unmanaged expectations of NEPAD’s 
performance, which appear to be based on indeterminate process flows, poor 
communication, and inadequate management of project management functions or 
poor articulation thereof. 
 
What is also missing from the external/internal comments on implementation 
challenges depicted in the previous chapter is a systematic examination of how the 
identified implementation challenges are linked to either NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
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STAP, or the challenges and constraints of the institutional environment in the 
provision of cross-border regional infrastructure, or the exerting requirements for 
integrated development/integrated implementation management – particularly so 
in relation to NEPAD’s proposals for the development of regional infrastructure, 
or any combination of the afore-mentioned issues.    
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 examines the underlying issues 
underscored by the stakeholder comments on NEPAD’s performance and 
implementation challenges of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP programmes/ 
projects. Section 5.3 is the summary and conclusion. 
 
5.2 Underlying Issues Highlighted by Stakeholder Responses to 
Implementation Challenges 
 
The varied comments on project implementation challenges underscore a number 
of issues outlined below:  
 
• Diverse perceptions regarding the relevance of NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects and of implementation progress. These 
perceptions seem to mirror the ambiguous messages from NEPAD; they 
reveal/confirm the lack of clarity regarding NEPAD’s role in the 
Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes. 
• Ambiguous links between planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project 
implementation/implementation management. 
• (Possible) lack of prior consultation between NEPAD, national governments 
and RECs on regional infrastructure programmes/projects for inclusion in 
the Infrastructure STAP, resulting in the lack of relevant implementation 
support from institutional structures in the various spatial categories. 
• Misinterpretation of the progression of projects through the different stages 
of the project life cycle, which either reflects the lack of understanding of 
the relationship between planning hierarchies and project management 
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functions vis-à-vis the stages of the project life cycle, or the consequences  
of inadequate planning, or poor scope management or all of the afore-
mentioned issues. 
• Poor communication by NEPAD’s governance and management structures 
resulting in their questionable integrity and lack of clarity regarding the 
projects’ status.  
• Inordinate attention on poor performance in RECs, to the exclusion of 
addressing the overall impact of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements on the development of regional infrastructure and on project 
implementation/implementation management. 
• NEPAD’s probable failure to link “strategy with tactics”, or “thinking with 
action” (Mintzberg, 1994), resulting in disjointed implementation outcomes 
and inability to hold the relevant institutions/institutional structures 
accountable for projects’ delivery, or lack thereof. 
• Lack of clarity regarding the responsible structures for NEPAD’s capacity 
building interventions at different levels of management and spatial 
categories. 
• Negative implications of uninformed media reports for the effective 
development of corrective interventions to support the implementation of 
NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects. The afore-
mentioned issues are discussed below. 
 
5.2.1 Diverse perceptions of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects  
 
Diverse perceptions regarding NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects and implementation progress can be gleaned from the comments of 
various stakeholders, including NEPAD’s structures at the various levels of 
management. NEPAD’s inadequate programme/project communication and 
failure to manage diverse expectations of planned outcomes at the various stages 
of the project life cycle compounds the problem. This problem also appears to be 
exacerbated by ideological differences amongst NEPAD’s HSGIC at the 
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integrative levels of management, thereby resulting in diverse understanding of 
the requisite planning and management interventions at both the integrative and 
strategic levels of management. As Mashele (2006: 11) stated: “… (President) 
Wade shocked his counterparts (Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo) when he said he 
had not seen a single NEPAD project.” Yet, President Wade’s statements should 
not have come as a “shock”, if the progression and communication of projects 
through the various stages of the project life cycle was managed in a structured 
and transparent manner. Alternatively, the said “shock” emanated from the 
perceived public airing of “internal” concerns pertaining to NEPAD’s haphazard 
planning and project organisation management by one of NEPAD’s founding 
HoSG.  
 
It is also possible that the diverse perceptions regarding the implementation of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP mirror the effects of NEPAD’s diverse and 
contradictory conceptual frameworks on the elaboration of regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects. These conceptual frameworks, although not discussed in 
this study, may be gleaned from NEPAD’s Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001): 
they are cascaded to the Infrastructure STAP. As a result, the ideological tensions 
and inherent paradox in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework appear to have 
manifested in contradictory pronouncements by NEPAD’s political leadership, or 
HSGIC, with implications for NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for programme/project design and implementation management. 
Significantly, NEPAD appears to have overlooked the potential negative 
implications of “world-wide connectivity in the fields of technology, political 
power relations and global capitalism” (Breytenbach, 2002: 83) for NEPAD’s 
approach to the development of regional infrastructure, which appears to be the 
raison d’être of NEPAD’s approach to the development of regional infrastructure. 
 
Arguably, the diverse understanding of the issues depicted below has contributed 
to equally diverse expectations for the implementation of NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programmes: 
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(a) NEPAD’s approach to planning, and how it impacts on the design of 
programmes/projects, strategies for project implementation/implementation 
management and structures for integrated implementation management/ 
coordination; 
(b) Activities/deliverables of the various stages of a project’s life cycle 
including the sequence of the stages themselves, the prioritisation of actions 
within and across the stages of a project life cycle and how these impact on 
project implementation in order to support the attainment of the articulated 
objectives;  
(c) Status of NEPAD’s infrastructure projects that were proposed for 
implementation and whether, or not, such projects were ready for 
implementation, or existed at all; 
 (d)  Implications of inadequate institutions in cross-border regional infrastructure 
for implementation progress of projects and diverse organisational/project 
structures for project implementation support. Other factors include the lack 
of institutional capacity (including physical and non-physical institutional 
infrastructure and human capital with the relevant competencies,) at the 
regional, sub-regional and national levels to facilitate the integration of 
multi-sectoral, sector-wide and multidisciplinary programme elements and 
complex management systems, which are required for effective 
programme/project design and implementation management of large-scale 
programmes/projects with complex funding arrangements and multiple 
stakeholders, and how inadequate institutions have impacted on the afore-
mentioned; and 
(e)   Significance of capacity assessment before/during programme/project 
development, in order to determine the appropriate project scope, 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support, and 
requisite institutional capacity for current implementation/future spatial 
expansion. 
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5.2.2 Limited understanding of the relationship between programmes/projects 
and NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements  
 
The comments from the various stakeholders suggest some limited understanding 
of the relationship between NEPAD’s planning hierarchies, programmes/projects, 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation, and 
diverse structures for project implementation/implementation management. For 
example, as Mashele (2006: 7) noted, “…as recently as 20 June 2005… (President 
Wade) would state that ‘[s]ince (sic) Nepad was founded (in 2001), its officials 
have spent $15m; they have not moved anything forward an inch and they will not 
move anything forward.’” Although President Wade appears to be the most 
vociferous critic of NEPAD – a welcome approach in the context of 
(infrastructure) development projects that are often shrouded in secrecy because 
of the workings of international institutional structures, or IFIs, or multilateral 
institutions (Addison, 1997; Mail and Guardian, 2007b) – the relevance or 
effectiveness of Senegal to address project implementation challenges in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP is questionable. (In theory, Senegal is responsible 
for coordinating NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme, together with the 
AfDB as the lead agency (Zounmènou, 2006; NEPAD, 2002f). How NEPAD’s 
Secretariat features in this arrangement is vague.)  
 
In this regard, the assessment of performance by the various institutions/ 
institutional structures, including member states and RECs, needs to be based on 
empirical understanding of institutional arrangements for project implementation/ 
implementation management in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, rather than being 
based on innuendo. Also, some of the internal/external comments on 
implementation progress illustrate NEPAD’s difficulties to translate in an 
integrated manner the outcomes of its planning hierarchies and ‘expectations’ of 
the various institutional structures/development partners into implementable 
programmes/projects and effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation management/coordination. The afore-mentioned comments may 
also be construed to illustrate NEPAD’s failure to design coherent processes for 
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integrated implementation management/coordination, or for action planning and 
performance control/management in a manner that facilitates “integrated practical 
implementation” in the development of regional infrastructure. 
  
5.2.3 (Possible) lack of prior consultation on projects with national governments 
and RECs 
 
Linked to the views articulated above, NEPAD’s comments regarding the 
necessity for countries to integrate NEPAD’s “values,” “principles” and 
“projects” into their plans and budgets – after the fact – suggest the (possible) lack 
prior negotiation/consultation with member states on the afore-mentioned issues. 
Programmes/projects, or frameworks for planning appear to have been prescribed 
in a top-down manner for implementation; the suggested (by NEPAD’s 
statements) lack of co-determination of the underpinning principles for the 
development and implementation of regional infrastructure projects at/across the 
various spatial categories lends credence to this view. Such negotiation/ 
consultation on projects would, for example, facilitate the integration of inputs 
from national development plans (NDPs) including agreement on (regional 
infrastructure) programmes/projects for inclusion into national budgets. Similarly, 
the perceived lack of consultation with RECs and member states during 
programme development is also substantiated by an internal reading of NEPAD’s 
“implementation actions” (NEPAD, 2002c: 89), where activities to mobilise 
RECs and other agencies for implementation in alignment with NEPAD’s 
already-approved Infrastructure STAP are illustrated.  
 
How NEPAD’s governance and management structures, RTAs, bilateral trade 
agreements, and prescriptions of the global financial architecture contribute to the 
perceived circumscribed role of the state or RECs in decisions about NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure programmes is a question for research. Thus, the apparent 
pressure from NEPAD’s Secretariat for countries to integrate – after the fact – 
“NEPAD’s values, principles and projects” into their NDPs illustrates the 
challenges for NEPAD to organically operationalize its prescriptive approach to 
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the development of regional infrastructure. Similarly, the fragmentation in 
inputs/outputs of planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for 
implementation management suggests that NEPAD failed to consult RECs during 
programme/project development. Such consultation would facilitate alignment 
between the RECs’ organisational objectives and development priorities with 
NEPAD’s policy strategies and objectives for the development of regional 
infrastructure. In addition, consultation with other key institutional structures at 
the various spatial categories would assist NEPAD to establish the availability of 
resources for implementation of NEPAD’s identified regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects.   
 
To illustrate the points made above, the regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects included in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP are ostensibly drawn from 
REC programmes, which were already “…at an advance (sic) stage of preparation 
and that can be fast-tracked…(and/or) projects that have stalled for political 
reasons and where NEPAD’s intervention could be expected to make a 
difference” (NEPAD, 2002c: 2). Yet, by no stretch of imagination may calling for 
a list of projects from RECs be equated to meaningful consultation at various 
stages of the project life cycle in order to ensure effective project implementation 
or implementation management/coordination. As a result, it appears from 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP Review reports (AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 
2005) that the links between the projects included in the Infrastructure STAP and 
the RECs’ programmes are anything but tenuous. 
 
A critical issue, however, is that although NEPAD stated that NDPs would be a 
starting point/provide a point of departure for the analysis of needs to be 
addressed through the development of regional infrastructure interventions 
(NEPAD, 2001, Para.196: 57), NEPAD simultaneously adopted a regional 
perspective for project selection (ibid, Para.197:57). Ultimately, NEPAD appears 
to have failed to either deductively cascade its identified programmes/projects for 
integration into NDPs, or aggregate them upwards from NDPs and REC 
programmes/projects into region-wide/sub-regional programmes in alignment 
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with either a national or regional perspective. In other words, it is not clear what 
links exist between NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes and NDPs, or 
between the projects in NDPs/REC programmes and NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP.  
 
The obscure linkages between institutions, institutional structures and 
programmes/projects at the various spatial categories are a recipe for 
implementation failure. As Turner (1999) argued, when a project manager 
imposes a project plan for implementation, project structures tend to ignore the 
plan and continue with their own. Small wonder then that, according to the 
comments by the officials from the NEPAD Secretariat, countries and RECs 
appear to have ignored NEPAD’s plans and projects, and continued with their 
own plans.  
 
It appears that NEPAD selected specific large-scale projects for implementation 
(although it is unclear from the infrastructure STAP reviews how the identified 
projects are linked to the RECs’ programmes or NDP’s). Also, it is unclear at 
times whether NEPAD or NEPAD’s Secretariat are promoting the development of 
Africa’s regional infrastructure in general, or whether there are specific regional 
infrastructure projects targeted for NEPAD’s focused implementation support, or 
whether there exists a clearly-defined NEPAD regional infrastructure programme 
at all. It is perhaps cognisant of these afore-mentioned developments that De Waal 
(cited in Taylor, 2005: 92) was prompted to comment: “…there has been a 
tendency to put everything worthwhile going on in Africa under the Nepad 
umbrella.”  
 
Thus, rather than attributing blame to other parties, such as RECs and member 
states, NEPAD’s Secretariat appears to have failed to examine the following 
issues: implications of its prescribed institutional mechanisms and arrangements 
for the development of regional infrastructure; how project selection criteria and 
strategies for project implementation or implementation management/coordination 
are cascaded to and/or aggregated upwards from the NDPs and REC programmes; 
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and what the implications of the afore-mentioned are for project implementation. 
NEPAD’s Secretariat also fails to illustrate whether concrete agreements were 
reached at all with the affected member states or RECs during the earlier stages of 
programme/project planning: the existence of agreed collective agreements would 
ensure that accountability for failed implementation of physical and non-physical 
infrastructure projects (including harmonisation of policies, institutional reforms 
and institutional capacity building,) is apportioned appropriately.  
 
In this respect, the discussions above suggest that prior agreement and alignment 
of objectives and projects to ensure a balance between the objectives and 
development priorities of the various spatial categories and institutional structures 
were not finalised, if negotiated at all. Agreement on the afore-mentioned issues 
would also facilitate the provision of support for the implementation of 
development programmes/projects in NDP’s; it would also facilitate NEPAD’s 
effective contribution to regional integration initiatives in various infrastructure 
sectors. Indeed, the apparent lack of prior consultation with member states, 
negotiation and upwards aggregation/integration of national programmes/projects 
into NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP appear to be recurring impediments to 
effective implementation.  
 
5.2.4 Misinterpretation of the progression of projects through the different 
stages of the project life cycle 
 
Some measure of confusion regarding the relationship between the outputs of 
planning vis-à-vis the stages of the project life cycle and project management 
functions is illustrated in the comments by the various stakeholders. In addition, 
the clear assessment of impediments to the progression of NEPAD’s projects at 
various stages of the project life cycle is obscured by the confusing use of 
planning/project management concepts and terminology in the media reports, or 
statements attributed to some development analysts. Notably, the suggestion that 
challenges in projects primarily “lie in implementation” ignores the implications 
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for project delivery/implementation of the integration of planning outcomes at 
various stages of the project life cycle and project management functions.  
 
Thus, the erroneous assumption that only the implementation stage deserves focus 
(in Africa’s development programmes) has probably resulted in scant attention 
being paid by NEPAD to planning – including the structured programme/project 
design and the development of effective strategies for project implementation or 
implementation management/coordination (i.e., programme/project development 
and implementation planning stages). As a result, some of NEPAD’s major large-
scale regional infrastructure projects display an incoherent process-flow of project 
activities, with implications for increased project risks during implementation. 
 
For example, the report presented by NEPAD’s Secretariat on the West African 
Gas Pipeline (WAGP) (see: Mashele, 2006:7) illustrates the singular lack of 
integrative alignment and attention to the development of a coherent process-flow 
of project activities at the various stages of the project life cycle, with implications 
for re-design, re-work, and implementation delays. In the report cited by Mashele 
(ibid), NEPAD indicated during April 2005 that land acquisition and engineering 
design were underway; full construction, both onshore and offshore, was 
scheduled for the 2nd half of 2005. According to the NEPAD report (ibid), 170km 
of pipe had already been manufactured, with the first shipment to the region 
(Africa/West Africa) scheduled for March 2005.  
 
It is unclear, however, on what basis/assumptions significant resources were 
committed to the commissioning or manufacture of materials if the land 
acquisition and engineering designs were still not completed; or whether the 
materials mentioned above were already manufactured under certain contractual 
agreements, irrespective of whether or not they were suitable for the WAGP. It is 
also unclear whether NEPAD carefully considered the constraints (cost, time and 
quality) including the risks associated with delays in land acquisition or incorrect 
specifications, particularly so since geotechnical surveys and approved 
engineering designs were (presumably) still forthcoming.  
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Cognisant of the afore-mentioned issues, the increased cost implications of 
shipment and storage of materials, irrespective of the type of contract concluded 
with service providers, allude to project scheduling errors. One may thus conclude 
that the inherent risks in the fast-tracking and rolling-wave approaches to activity 
planning adopted by NEPAD (see: NEPAD, 2002c) may increase project 
implementation risks, particularly so cognisant of lack of institutional capacity for 
planning and implementation. In addition, NEPAD appears to not have considered 
thoroughly the inherent risks of inadequate governance regimes on 
programme/project development and implementation plans. 
 
5.2.5 Poor communication by NEPAD’s governance and management structures  
 
The challenge for NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP to integrate diverse or similar 
multiple project interventions and institutional arrangements for implementation 
management/coordination of regional infrastructure programmes/projects is 
exacerbated by poor communication from NEPAD/NEPAD’s Secretariat. 
Conflicting reports have been presented over the years at different forums, 
resulting in the lack of clarity regarding the projects’ implementation status, or 
whether such projects existed at all. For example, Ruff (Taylor, 2005: 92) noted 
that when NEPAD projects were presented as “investment opportunities” to the 
finance and investment community “at a number of South African private banks” 
during 2004, they “all…only fell a little short of laughing at the complete non-
viability of most of the projects contained therein.”  
 
Therefore, although lack of project viability is also cited as one of the reasons for 
implementation delays, the obfuscation in NEPAD’s communication, however, 
impedes the development of relevant corrective interventions in the selection and 
preparation of projects. Significantly, NEPAD appears to not have adequately 
explored, or understood the implications of its inconsistent project communication 
on public perceptions regarding its performance or implementation progress of the 
Infrastructure STAP projects.        
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5.2.6 Inordinate attention on poor performance in RECs  
 
Linked to the statements made above, it is unclear how the inadequate execution 
of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure projects is now attributed primarily to the lack 
of institutional capacity in RECs. This is particularly so since one assumes that the 
lack of institutional capacity in RECs was in NEPAD’s peculiar knowledge even 
before the Infrastructure STAP was developed. In addition, overlapping 
responsibilities and roles were assigned to NEPAD’s governance and 
management structures, AfDB, and a host of other international, regional, sub-
regional and national institutions at the various stages of the project life cycle and 
levels of management/planning (see: AfDB, 2003; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 
2002c; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). NEPAD also appears to have assumed, or was 
assigned the role of a supranational authority, or project manager, or both the 
afore-mentioned roles (see: NEPAD, 2002c). In the afore-mentioned roles, 
NEPAD was made responsible for the overall implementation management/ 
coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Yet, the probable inadequacies of 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements in the delivery of regional 
infrastructure appear to have been ignored during implementation planning or 
NEPAD’s self-assessments. 
 
It appears, however, that the lack of institutional capacity at organisational levels 
in RECs is more a consequence of the adverse influences of their external/internal 
institutional environment. These influences include the exacting mandates to REC 
Secretariats to coordinate regional integration/sectoral cooperation initiatives, but 
without the institutional capacity to do so; the negative impact of overlapping 
regional integration arrangements on implementation of REC programmes; the 
influence on projects of protracted decision-making structures in RECs; and the 
lack of political will at national levels to support implementation of regional 
infrastructure projects in RECs (TCII & NEPAD, 2005), or collective agreements. 
The confusion arising out of NEPAD’s approach to the development of regional 
infrastructure, including the identified institutional mechanisms and arrangements 
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for programme development and implementation support, add to the prevailing 
institutional impediments in RECs.  
 
Significantly, NEPAD’s HSGIC made prior commitments to address the afore-
mentioned institutional constraints (see: NEPAD, 2001). This research assumes 
the proposed interventions by NEPAD’s HSGIC were to ensure that RECs and 
other regional/sub-regional/national structures were not assigned roles (to 
facilitate implementation management/coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP,) at their levels of incompetence. Therefore, the perceived failure in RECs 
or even national governments to deliver on their mandates in respect of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP indirectly and directly underscores the failure by NEPAD’s 
HSGIC to effectively deliver on commitments in terms of their obligations for 
capacity building in RECs and in member states at national levels.     
 
5.2.7 NEPAD’s failure to link strategy with tactics, or thinking with action 
 
NEPAD’s statements regarding challenges to facilitate economic integration “…if 
there is no infrastructure linking the different regional economic communities, or 
common laws around customs” (Mail and Guardian, April 2007c) are valid. It 
becomes difficult, however, to envisage how NEPAD’s mission, or articulated 
objectives, or policy strategy/response actions will be operationalized or translated 
into practice, when NEPAD failed to propose physical cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects, or to elaborate relevant projects in some 
infrastructure sectors – such as NEPAD’s roads programme – for internal 
coherence (see: NEPAD, 2002c; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). With the exception of a 
few energy/ICT projects, NEPAD has not elaborated programmes/projects for 
institutional reform or development, or for harmonising transport policies, 
standards, regulatory and governance regimes at sub-regional and national levels. 
Yet, NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of 
management identified the afore-mentioned issues as some of the critical pre-
conditions for integration into all of NEPAD’s sectoral programmatic 
interventions (see: NEPAD, 2001).  
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In the same way, NEPAD’s Secretariat fails to illustrate how its broad statements 
of intent (i.e., ensuring transformational leadership, community empowerment and 
capacity building, facilitating development processes that will respond to effective 
demand, and broad-based leadership development (Mail & Guardian, 2007c)) 
are/will be translated into practical actions with measurable outcomes. It is also 
not clear how the afore-mentioned actions to “empower communities”, “develop 
and ensure transformational leadership” are/will be linked to the implementation 
of the identified regional infrastructure projects. Cognisant of the afore-mentioned 
concerns, it appears that the following scenario may have occurred: (a) officials in 
NEPAD/NEPAD Secretariat are either not au fair with the objective 
elements/substance of programmes/projects proposed in the Infrastructure STAP; 
or (b) there is a singular lack of clarity in NEPAD’s structures regarding the 
cascade of NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions at the various levels of 
management/planning, and how these are linked to programmes/ projects in the 
various infrastructure sectors; or (c) proposals and/or concepts are arbitrarily 
introduced by various NEPAD officials in various forums, but without careful 
consideration of their implications for implementation of identified/approved 
projects or prevailing institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation management/coordination.  
 
At the same time, the views expressed by the officials from NEPAD’s Secretariat 
i.e., regarding the need to “empower communities,” to recognise that “leadership 
is at every level,” and to adopt a different view of development as a response to 
effective demand – suggest the proposal of a learning and inclusive approach to 
planning (i.e., an “emergent” approach that integrates broad-based consultation 
and popular participation in NEPAD’s programmes). Similarly, some of the 
delegates at the Tunis Participatory Workshop for Accelerated NEPAD STAP 
Implementation, held during July 2005 (TCII and NEPAD, 2005: 137) also 
suggested for NEPAD to “think ‘out of the box’ about procedures, to see where 
they can be improved to accelerate implementation of projects…create strong 
institutions to implement specific projects, capable of negotiating with all 
stakeholders.” Thus, the afore-mentioned views possibly indicate some 
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recognition that NEPAD’s prescriptive approach to planning of the Infrastructure 
STAP may not be relevant to all situations.  
 
The emergent approach, however, is premised upon different parameters than 
those advanced in the prescriptive approach to planning adopted by NEPAD and 
cascaded to the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes/projects, 
strategy for project implementation/implementation management, and institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management. As a result, the 
adoption of emergent approaches to programme/project development and 
implementation management planning of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
programme will require a paradigm shift, particularly from NEPAD’s political 
leadership, administrative structures and partnerships.  An emergent approach will 
also require the development of adequate institutional capacity to facilitate 
effective inclusive participatory processes for collective engagement in NEPAD.  
 
As Mintzberg (1994: 227) argued:  
 
…strategy making (as a product of the emergent model) is an immensely 
complex process involving the most sophisticated, subtle, and at times 
subconscious of human cognitive and social processes…it must draw on all 
kinds of informational inputs, many of them nonquantifiable (sic) and 
accessible only to strategists who are connected to the details rather than 
detached from them…Strategies inevitably exhibit some emergent qualities, 
and even when largely deliberate, often appear less formally planned than 
informally visionary. And learning, in the form of fits and starts as well as 
discoveries based on serendipitous events and the recognition of unexpected 
patterns, inevitably plays a key role, if not the (emphasis in original) key role 
in the development of strategies that are novel…the process requires insight, 
creativity, and synthesis, the very things that formalization (in prescriptive 
models) discourages.    
 
At the same time, one may appreciate the pressures underpinning NEPAD’s 
adoption of a prescriptive model to the development of the Infrastructure STAP. 
These include the reliance on diverse institutions/institutional structures with 
different frames of reference, or who primarily use prescriptive models in their 
operations; diverse ideological underpinnings for the development of regional 
infrastructure; and pressure of short time-frames for programme implementation 
compounded by the lack of institutional capacity to coordinate and integrate 
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diverse multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary inputs. The afore-mentioned 
challenges may have precipitated the use of prescriptive models in NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP. The effectiveness of prescriptive approaches to planning, 
however, depends on (amongst other things,) the characteristics of 
programmes/projects, institutional environment, competence of structures to 
perform the requisite planning tasks, adequacy and control of institutional 
architecture as well as adequacy of planning.  
 
Thus, the prescriptive approach may also not be wholly suitable in highly fluid 
contexts in development programmes/projects, where diverse inputs are required 
from various constituencies and stakeholders in order to facilitate the development 
of relevant programmes/projects and broad-based institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for implementation support. Hence, a combination of prescriptive 
and emergent/descriptive models may be required in institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to support the attainment of NEPAD’s multiple objectives for the 
development of regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous 
implementation. Significantly, NEPAD’s Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) 
proposes a new ethos to transform outmoded approaches, attitudes and behaviours 
that are no longer operative for Africa’s situational specificity in the 
implementation of development programmes. Therefore, NEPAD’s contradictory 
stance and apparent fixation with conventional systems and practices, which have 
in the past contributed to Africa’s development crises, is puzzling.   
 
5.2.8 Lack of clarity regarding the responsibility for capacity building  
 
NEPAD identified capacity assessment and capacity building at country levels as 
a priority and pre-condition for the implementation of its various programmatic 
interventions (NEPAD, 2001, Para.86, 87, 89: 19). As NEPAD argued:  
 
State capacity-building is a critical aspect of creating conditions for 
development. The state has a major role in promoting economic growth and 
development, and in implementing poverty reduction programmes. However, 
the reality is that many governments lack the capacity to fulfil this role. As a 
consequence, many countries lack the necessary policy and regulatory 
frameworks for private sector-led growth. They also lack the capacity to 
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implement programmes, even when funding is available (Para.86) (author’s 
emphasis). It is for this reason that targeted capacity-building should be 
given a priority. Programmes in every area should be preceded by an 
assessment of capacity, followed by the provision of support (author’s 
emphasis) (Para.87). The… (HSGIC) will mobilise resources for capacity 
building to enable all countries to comply with the mutually agreed minimum 
standards and codes of conduct (Para.89). 
 
Yet, no evidence exists from the literature reviewed that capacity assessments 
were conducted at national levels prior to NEPAD’s proposed capacity building 
interventions or even the development of programmes/projects in the 
Infrastructure STAP. Notably, capacity building for RECs was only included in 
NEPAD’s “Top Twenty projects” during 2003 (see: AfDB, 2003) – a year after 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP was launched; similarly, the report on capacity 
building assessment conducted (on behalf of NEPAD’s Secretariat,) by the ACBF 
in all the RECs was still not complete at the time of the 2nd
• have African countries steadfastly refused/ignored to implement funded 
capacity building programmes, or do they not even possess the capacity to 
implement funded capacity building programmes?  
 Infrastructure STAP 
review, during 2004 (see: TCII and NEPAD, 2005: 140). Therefore, it is unclear 
on what basis NEPAD Secretariat or development analysts allege that NEPAD 
has instituted capacity building interventions, when the proposed capacity 
assessments in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework were not even conducted to begin 
with. It is also unclear from the comments depicted in the previous chapters how 
member states are now viewed as not committed to capacity building vis-à-vis the 
role assigned to, and commitment articulated by NEPAD’s HSGIC to mobilise 
resources for the implementation of capacity-building programmes/projects and to 
monitor/enforce their implementation.  
 
Several issues may be drawn from assertions by NEPAD or various analysts, but 
which NEPAD does not address conclusively in order to identify areas for 
corrective intervention. For example, the following issues are not addressed: 
• How are NEPAD’s capacity building programmes structured cognisant of 
the capacity constraints for their implementation?  
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• How are the said institutional capacity building programmes linked to 
NEPAD’s prioritisation of programmes/projects and policy 
strategy/response actions for the development of regional infrastructure in 
various sectors, particularly so since the link between capacity assessments 
and capacity building interventions is not so clearly defined at the strategic 
levels of management?  
• Since the issue of failure to implement (capacity building) projects, or lack 
of institutional capacity for implementation “even when funds are available” 
was first raised in 2001 in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) 
as depicted above, and again in 2003 in President Mbeki’s comments to 
explain reasons for the lack of implementation progress (see: Kotzé & 
Steyn, 2003), was it a foregone conclusion that NEPAD’s (capacity 
building) programmes/projects will not be implemented at national levels? If 
so, what enforcement mechanisms did NEPAD’s HSGIC propose or develop 
during programme development in order to ensure compliance at national or 
sub-regional levels, and if not, why not?  
 
The questions posed above are not meant to exonerate member states or national 
governments from their responsibility to develop institutional capacity and to 
reform/develop inadequate institutions. They merely highlight the implications of 
the lack of alignment and agreement on programmes/projects between the various 
spatial categories, levels of management and institutional structures; incoherent 
development of programme elements resulting in ambiguous links between the 
various sectoral programmes; confusing or incoherent statements from, and lack 
of commitment by NEPAD’s governance and management structures to the 
implementation of their own programme; and inadequacy of NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate the development of 
common goals and objectives as well as the development of effective practical 
modalities to share limited resources.                  
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5.2.9 Negative implications of media reports for programme/project 
implementation  
 
There may be valid arguments that media reports on NEPAD’s implementation 
challenges impose unreasonable pressures on the affected institutions/institutional 
structures, particularly so cognisant of the complexity of institutional issues to be 
addressed in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. NEPAD must, 
however, shoulder the blame for the consequential fuelling of media/public 
perception of project implementation failure. From the onset, NEPAD’s 
unregulated optimism towards the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP, in 
addition to setting ambitious schedules for project implementation, created 
unreasonable expectations in the media.  
 
As a result, the afore-mentioned debacle has brought into sharp focus NEPAD’s 
(possible) limited understanding of the requirements for effective development/ 
implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ projects or 
even development programmes/projects in general; how to address the 
vicissitudes of the internal/external institutional environment in which the 
Infrastructure STAP, or Africa’s development programmes/projects are 
implemented; and what NEPAD really seeks to achieve in its programme for the 
development of regional infrastructure. The media’s limited understanding of the 
onerous requirements and protracted time lines in the development of cross-border 
regional infrastructure add to sensational, if not inaccurate, reporting on possible 
implementation failures of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme. 
Inadequate communication regarding NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, fragmentary 
and opaque processes regarding the progression of different sectoral programmes/ 
projects through the different stages of the project life cycle, poor management of 
project functions, and inadequate information on the overall implementation status 
merely fan the perceptions of implementation failure relayed to, and by the media.  
 
Addison (1997: 57) has cited studies that attributed the problem of 
communication in development projects to the potent combination of 
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“technocratic and secretive management” (of development projects) by 
multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and IMF. These communication 
problems, according to Addison (ibid) were exacerbated by “uninformed media 
reporting.” As a result, Addison (ibid) argued that the rigid rules for project 
implementation on which media assessment of implementation success/failure is 
based ignore that development projects are “experiments.” As Addison (ibid) 
further argued, the “misleading categorisation of projects as either ‘successes’ or 
‘failures’ has reinforced the public perception that development is a confusing 
business although the priorities should be simple.”  
 
Addison’s comments regarding media perceptions of development projects are 
particularly relevant in NEPAD’s context, given the widespread interest in its 
performance. They also illustrate the inordinate influence of the methodologies 
and behaviours of IFIs or multilateral institutions on the implementation of 
development programmes/projects, with implications for NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP. Whilst not so explicitly stated, Addison also alludes to the complexity for 
implementation planning of development programmes/projects that rigidly adhere 
to the following parameters: (a) the stages of the project life cycle vis-à-vis the 
dynamic and unpredictable institutional environment; and (b) either of the various 
planning processes – such as the prescriptive models that posit formal procedures 
to planning, or the descriptive/emergent models that posit flexible, emergent, 
adaptive, integrative and inclusive learning approaches to planning. With the use 
of any or a combination of the approaches depicted above, however, structured 
frameworks for planning, management, and collective engagement in complex 
projects need to be developed and agreed up-front based on situational or project 
specificity, rather than imposed as reactive responses when unintended 
implementation challenges/consequences emerge.  
 
Addison’s categorisation of (all) development projects as “experiments”, 
however, may inadvertently reinforce some of the reasons for implementation 
failures in public-sector programmes/programmes. These include the lack of 
accountability or performance control within the parameters of project 
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management functions (scope, organisation, time, cost, quality), and the lack of a 
clear definition/development of mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness of project 
management functions; failure to scrutinise and address the contradictions/ 
pressures posed by the complex external/internal institutional environments on 
development programmes/projects and institutional structures for implementation 
management/coordination in the context of a rigid project life cycle; and 
inadequate planning to support the effective delivery of novel projects within a 
programme context, subject to the parameters of the articulated constraints and 
situational/project specificity.  
 
Cognisant of the afore-mentioned statements, a number of issues also need to be 
explained: at what stage does experimentation begin and end in development 
programmes/projects; and how is this experimentation linked to pilot projects (or 
are the said experiments and pilot projects the same), availability/disbursement of 
resources and delivery of products and services to beneficiaries, project roll-out 
and spatial expansion? Thus, suggestions that development projects may just be 
implemented in an open-ended manner simply because they are “experiments”, or 
because they involve intangible social and human elements that cannot be easily 
subjected to quantification (ibid), are erroneous. How the questions posed above 
are addressed indicates the importance of developing adequate frameworks for 
programme/project design, implementation/implementation management and 
project communication. 
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The analysis of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project 
scope and organisation management at the various levels of management/planning 
in the previous chapters has revealed the following issues: NEPAD’s allocation of 
responsibilities and roles to the various institutional structures was at the outset 
ambiguous. In turn, poor project organisation management appears to be 
exacerbated by inadequate project scope management. In addition, the relationship 
between planning hierarchies, project management functions (including 
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constraints,) structures for project implementation/implementation management 
and how they impact on each other is tenuous, with implications for project 
implementation.  
 
In NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP or roads programme, however, a lack of clear 
linkages, or even omissions, prevails between NEPAD’s multiple objectives for 
the development of cross-border regional infrastructure, policy strategies/response 
actions, influences of the external/internal environment, programmes/projects, 
strategies for project implementation and implementation management, and 
structures for project implementation or implementation management/ 
coordination. As a result, the relationship between the programmes/projects and 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme/project scope and 
project organisation management is fragmentary.  
 
Similarly, whilst comments by some analysts are arguably based on their 
understanding of the responsibilities and roles of the various structures for the 
implementation of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects, there is 
no evidence to suggest that a “discernible shift” has occurred in the characteristics 
of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects. In other words, 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP proposed at the outset large-scale regional 
infrastructure projects for implementation primarily by the (foreign) private 
sector, particularly in the ICT and energy sectors (see: NEPAD, 2002c); roles of 
national governments to finance infrastructure development were also prescribed 
in sectors like roads, although (foreign) private sector operators would be 
procured for the construction of the physical roads infrastructure networks (ibid).  
 
Lead agencies such as the AfDB and other international institutions including the 
World Bank, EU and DFID provided the intellectual basis and technical support 
for programme development and project preparation (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 
2002f; TCII & NEPAD, 2005); they also provided funding and implementation 
support for regional infrastructure projects (ibid), which essentially appear to meet 
the requirements for global connectivity/integration, openness and 
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competitiveness, rather than for peculiar regional/sub-regional concerns for 
increased internal coherence, regional integration, intra-African trade, capacity 
building and poverty reduction. Therefore, suggestions that NEPAD later changed 
its model for programme/project design, because of lack of capacity in RECs, are 
misleading. 
 
In the same vein, institutional arrangements for implementation management are 
not clearly defined at the integrative and strategic levels of management between 
NEPAD’s HSGIC, countries, and regional/sub-regional structures for 
implementation management/coordination. Again, this problem appears to be 
exacerbated by NEPAD’s inadequate approach to planning, communication, 
project scope and project organisation management, resulting in poor project 
integration management. In turn, poor project integration management has 
negative implications for stakeholder-relationship management and project 
implementation progress. This problem also appears to have resulted in the 
pervasive lack of trust regarding the ability of NEPAD’s mandated regional/sub-
regional structures, or of NEPAD, to deliver on the implementation of agreed 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
The issues discussed in this chapter underscore the importance of relevant 
approaches to planning and implementation of development programmes/projects. 
Such approaches are particularly important to guide the implementation of 
complex projects similar to those proposed by NEPAD. In addition, the 
significance of relevant management systems for regional integration/sectoral 
cooperation initiatives, as well as clarifying roles and responsibilities within the 
framework of appropriate structures for implementation and implementation 
management cannot be underestimated. These are some of the core elements of an 
effective integrative strategy for project implementation management. Some of 
the concerns with the recommendations of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
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6 CONCERNS WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF NEPAD’S 
INFRASTRUCTURE STAP REVIEWS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses concerns regarding the recommendations proffered in 
NEPAD’s 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews. In addition, earlier perceptions 
of the influence of the external/internal institutional environment on NEPAD vis-
à-vis expectations/concerns of current performance are examined. This is in order 
to establish the relevance of NEPAD’s interventions to address implementation 
challenges, cognisant of the concerns regarding the recommendations of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews. This study also attempts to establish 
whether NEPAD learnt any lessons from the previous implementation of similar 
programmes/projects, or considered some of the articulated views from the earlier 
perceptions of NEPAD in its institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation support in the Infrastructure STAP.   
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.3 discusses concerns regarding the 
recommendations of NEPAD’s 1st Infrastructure STAP review. Section 5.4 
discusses concerns regarding the recommendations of NEPAD’s 2nd Infrastructure 
STAP review. Section 5.5 juxtaposes the afore-mentioned concerns against earlier 
perceptions of the possible influence of the external/internal institutional 
environment on NEPAD vis-à-vis expectations/concerns of current performance. 
Section 5.6 is the summary and conclusion.   
 
6.2 Concerns with the Recommendations of NEPAD’s 1st
A defining characteristic of NEPAD’s 1
 Infrastructure 
STAP Review 
 
st Infrastructure STAP is the inordinate 
focus on the lack of institutional capacity in RECs, particularly technical capacity, 
although concerns around broader institutional issues are also raised to a limited 
extent. (A similar emphasis on technical issues at the strategic and operational 
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levels of management may also be gleaned from the comments by the various 
stakeholders regarding the project implementation delays.) The narrow focus on 
RECs, however, precludes the development of a balanced view on the range of 
underpinning causes to the identified implementation challenges in the 
external/internal institutional environment, in order to facilitate the proposal of 
relevant interventions to ameliorate the status quo at the different levels of 
management/planning.  
 
Moreover, the narrow focus on (known) technical constraints in RECs gives the 
impression of some concerted avoidance to address the consequential pitfalls of 
NEPAD’s probable poor programme conception and planning, including 
inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation 
or implementation management/coordination. Cognisant of the known lack of 
institutional capacity at the various levels of management and spatial categories, 
one may thus argue that in fact, the emphasis on lack of institutional capacity in 
RECs deflects attention from the probable inadequacies in NEPAD’s conception 
and planning of the regional infrastructure programme. As a result, the 
recommendations to address the identified implementation challenges have tended 
to follow the prevailing patterns in NEPAD’s skewed assessments of 
implementation challenges. 
 
For example, NEPAD’s 1st Infrastructure STAP review criticised the RECs for 
undertaking ambitious programmes/projects, cognisant of their lack of 
institutional capacity (see: APPENDIX C). The relevance of some of the REC 
projects in the context of NEPAD’s “new” ethos was also questioned (ibid). Yet, 
the same concerns appear to characterise NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, 
specifically in the identification, development and implementation of the transit 
facilitation programme/projects under NEPAD’s roads programme. Arguably, 
every identified problem for project implementation/implementation management 
directly or indirectly relates to NEPAD’s non-performance (i.e., the non-
performance of NEPAD’s governance and management structures including 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme/project 
 137 
development and implementation/ implementation management), although this 
study does not exonerate RECs from this evidenced non-performance.  
 
A similar conclusion was reached in the analysis of perceptions in respect of 
implementation challenges discussed the previous chapter. This is because the 
extent of problems regarding the lack of institutional capacity in RECs was in the 
peculiar knowledge of NEPAD’s structures, lead agencies and development 
partners before, during and after the development of the Infrastructure STAP. 
Thus, this study argues that NEPAD failed in its duty to facilitate the development 
of institutional capacity in RECs, or in member states, in terms of the objectives it 
set itself in the Strategic Framework. Significantly, the assertions depicted above 
regarding the lack of institutional capacity for the implementation/implementation 
management of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP appear to be clouded by erroneous 
diagnoses of the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions/institutional 
structures. The role and impact of programme/project conception and planning on 
implementation outcomes appears to be ignored in the assessments of 
performance and implementation challenges including the apportioning of 
responsibility for the identified implementation delays.  
 
Mintzberg (1994: 284) illustrates the symbiotic relationship between formulation 
and implementation in order to demonstrate how (incorrect) diagnostics of 
implementation problems obscure the identity of culpable parties, who may in fact 
be conducting the assessment of implementation challenges, but with an interest 
in distorting the outcome of such diagnoses in their favour (i.e., what he refers to 
as “the thinkers, whether senior managers or central planers or the consultants 
who advise them, people who may have used their ‘outright dominance’ not only 
to create the problem in the first place but then to attribute the blame for it” 
(ibid)). Thus, Mintzberg has demonstrated, through a parody of the interplay 
between the different levels of management in projects, how the 
developers/formulators of plans tend to attribute blame for implementation failure 
to everyone else, presumably in indignation at their implied culpability/failure to 
institute relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project 
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development and implementation support. Mintzberg (ibid: 284-285) illustrates 
this interchange as follows: 
 
Seeing themselves ‘atop’ that metaphorical hierarchy, they point the finger at 
everyone else, ‘down below.’ ‘If only you dumbbells had appreciated our 
brilliant strategies, all would be well.’ But the clever dumbbells might well 
respond: ‘If you are so smart, why didn’t you formulate strategies that we 
dumbbells could implement? You knew who we are: why didn’t you factor 
our incompetences into your thinking?’            
 
The parody depicted above of the typical interface between the various levels of 
management in the implementation of projects when plans go wrong, particularly 
in the context of a prescriptive approach to planning, succinctly explains 
NEPAD’s dilemma. Notably, problems of inadequate planning in the 
development of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP (i.e., obscure linkages between 
strategies, objectives, programmes/projects and structures for implementation/ 
implementation management), and inadequate institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for implementation management are simply presented in NEPAD’s 
1st Infrastructure STAP Review as the consequence of poor communication.  
 
Similarly, NEPAD’s 1st
The issues discussed above illustrate some of the consequences of obscure 
linkages in prescriptive planning models identified by Mintzberg (ibid: 78) – i.e., 
the fragmentation between performance control on the one hand (that is mapped 
in the top-down after-the-fact hierarchies of operating plans, objectives and 
budgets), and action planning on the other hand (that is mapped in hierarchies of 
 Infrastructure STAP review recommends a bottom-up 
approach to projects, which is expected to evolve within a top-down, pre-
determined and formalised prescriptive process to the development of regional 
infrastructure. At the same time, clear institutional mechanisms and arrangements 
are not mapped in order to foster an effective platform for the upward aggregation 
of projects. It is thus doubtful whether or not the AfDB (the developers of the 
Infrastructure STAP on behalf of NEPAD) explored in the first place whether the 
upward aggregation of projects was feasible within the framework of NEPAD’s 
prescriptive approach to the development of regional infrastructure.  
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what are supposed to be before-the-fact strategies and programmes). As 
Mintzberg (ibid) argued, in prescriptive models the links between programs and 
structural units in the hierarchy are generally ambiguous. As a result, Mintzberg 
ibid: 72) argued that even if the objectives are aggregated upwards from different 
structural units in a bottom-up process, the divide entrenched by the different 
planning hierarchies between the formulation of objectives and strategies is 
problematic: a medium for integration even where objectives are “aggregating up” 
within the context of strategies that are “cascading down” does not appear to exist. 
For these reasons, Eigerman (ibid) averred: “In a purely bottom up system, the 
integration of strategy across units (in prescriptive models) is achieved with a 
stapler.”    
 
Based on the recommendations illustrated in APPENDIX C, the interrelated 
concerns in relation to the delegation of certain roles and responsibilities to 
NEPAD’s Secretariat to address the identified constraints are detailed below. The 
questions posed below also underscore the perpetuation in the recommendations 
of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP of the penchant in Africa’s regional 
development programmes (such as the LPA’s Transport and Communication’s 
programme and TAH and missing links initiatives discussed in APPENDIX B) to 
delegate (overlapping) roles and responsibilities for implementation/ 
implementation management either to structures that lack the requisite capacity, 
or at their levels of incompetence: 
  
• What authority has been delegated NEPAD’s Secretariat to ensure that the 
HSGIC meets its commitments in terms of its obligations for capacity 
building;  
• How will NEPAD’s Secretariat ensure that donors/funding agencies meet 
their commitments for funding in terms of NEPAD’s programme, 
particularly so since the issue of lack of commitment to funding agreements 
by developed countries and their institutions has, for decades, been one of 
the foremost intractable constraints to the implementation of Africa’s 
development programmes/projects that rely on donor funding?  
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• How will NEPAD’s Secretariat ensure that RECs independently develop 
capacity building plans, when capacity building under NEPAD’s programme 
is linked to the role assigned to/assumed by NEPAD’s HSGIC (i.e., to 
ensure the development of institutional capacity in regional/sub-regional 
structures and at national levels)?  
• What capacity/authority does NEPAD’s Secretariat have to enable it to 
address the issue of lack of support, cooperation, and funding from member 
states, particularly so since RECs depend on member states to approve/fund 
their (RECs’) capacity building programmes/projects?  
• Who will fund the development and implementation of the suggested 
capacity building programmes in RECs, particularly so since the RECs 
perpetually experience severe funding constraints, and how will the related 
issue of expected funding from member states be addressed – as member 
states also either have no funds, or withhold funding for capacity building, 
which would otherwise allow RECs to meet their obligations in terms of 
regional integration initiatives, or to tender competent performance in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP?  
• What are the links between the proposed capacity building programmes at 
the various spatial categories (regional, sub-regional, and national) and the 
various sectoral programmes in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, how should 
the proposed or existing capacity building programmes be effectively 
coordinated in order to use available limited resources optimally, and how 
are the proposed or existing capacity building programmes linked to the 
proposed/assumed roles of NEPAD’s governance and management 
structures, RECs and national governments/member states in capacity 
building?             
 
The questions posed above illustrate broadly that indiscriminate delegation of 
roles and responsibilities to address the identified constraints might have been 
made to structures (such as the NEPAD Secretariat or RECs,) that do not posses 
the power, authority and capacity to perform the delegated tasks. Possible 
corporate governance infringements are also reflected in the close links between 
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NEPAD and the AfDB, particularly so since no clear Terms of Reference (ToR) 
appear to have been developed regarding what the AfDB would deliver vis-à-vis 
the deliverables of NEPAD’s management and governance structures.  
 
For example, NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP was prepared by the AfDB for and 
on behalf of NEPAD, or in association with NEPAD; the 1st Infrastructure STAP 
Review (AfDB, 2003), was also conducted by the AfDB for and on behalf of 
NEPAD, or in association with NEPAD. Since the structures that developed 
NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme – i.e., NEPAD and AfDB – are the 
same structures evaluating project implementation progress, the lack of an 
independent assessment by disinterested parties, or lack of checks and balances in 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support, 
or the development of a non-aligned framework to evaluate project 
implementation progress potentially stymie effective problem identification, 
analysis and the development of relevant corrective interventions. 
 
Thus, by focusing on the capacity constraints in RECs’ Secretariats, or in other 
regional/sub-regional structures responsible for integrated implementation 
management of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP (such as the AfDB and NEPAD 
Secretariat), the 1st
This approach is surprising, given that the impact of Africa’s inadequate 
institutions at regional, sub-regional and national levels on the development and 
implementation of regional development programmes/projects, including the 
negative impact of the African state itself on the implementation of regional 
development interventions, has resulted in the underlying causes of problems in 
RECs. The afore-mentioned problems have arguably resulted in the RECs’ failure 
 Infrastructure STAP Review also significantly downplayed the 
relevance of the influences of the external/internal institutional environment at the 
international, regional, sub-regional and national levels, which has manifested in 
inadequate institutional capacity in RECs. Similarly, the examination of the 
possible inadequacy of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
the development of regional infrastructure is also ignored.  
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to effectively coordinate regional integration initiatives. In this respect, persistent 
concerns expressed over the previous decades (prior to NEPAD,) regarding the 
lack of institutional capacity in RECs, but without evidenced/successful 
interventions to implement corrective measures, raise a number of key questions:  
 
• First, why were the RECs allocated the primary responsibility to coordinate 
integrated implementation management of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
STAP in the first place, since their institutional/organisational constraints 
are well documented?  
• Second, why were parallel programmes to develop institutional capacity in 
RECs not instituted at the outset, particularly so since the success of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP is critical to evince NEPAD’s commitment 
to develop relevant solutions for Africa’s regeneration?   
• Third, since the challenges in regional roads infrastructure and transit 
facilitation are beyond the capacity of RECs to address on their own without 
transformational changes in their broader external/internal institutional 
environment – including at regional, sub-regional and national levels – why 
were the proposed institutional reforms/development at the various spatial 
categories, in particular at national levels, not enforced? 
• Fourth, given the limitations of technical interventions that are not supported 
by the reform/development of inadequate institutions (DFID, 2003:vi), 
would isolated capacity development projects in RECs help in any event, 
cognisant of the pervasive influence of entrenched inadequate institutions at 
the various spatial categories?   
 
6.3 Concerns with the Recommendations of NEPAD’s 2nd
The 2
 Infrastructure 
STAP Review 
   
nd Infrastructure STAP review also displays a proclivity for emphasis on 
capacity deficits in RECs. Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned, the 
recommendations of NEPAD’s 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, depicted in 
APPENDIX E, are comprehensive. To the extent that said recommendations focus 
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on RECs, they cover the various facets of RECs’ operations or their interface with 
the external/internal institutional environment and its impact on their participation 
in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. A number of the concerns regarding the 
recommendations of the 2nd
(ii) A perusal of the recommendations presented in APPENDIX E, to the effect 
that decision-making structures in RECs be restructured to ensure alignment 
with NEPAD’s agenda, or that RECs and member states restructure their 
operations to fit in/suit NEPAD’s agenda or the Infrastructure STAP’s, gives 
the impression that the tail (NEPAD/NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP) is 
wagging the dog (Africa’s development agenda/RECs/national 
prerogatives). As a result, a pertinent question is: what exactly is NEPAD, or 
what is the impetus for NEPAD’s programme, cognisant of the afore-
mentioned issues? Why would states’ functions/operations and the mandates 
or priorities of regional/sub-regional structures for organising Africa’s 
regional integration initiatives, or regional/sub-regional and national 
development objectives be realigned in accordance with the prerogatives of 
a development programme, or facilitating mechanism rather than the other 
way round?  A similar concern was broadly raised in a previous chapter 
regarding the comments by officials from NEPAD’s Secretariat reported in 
 Infrastructure STAP review are depicted below (not 
all the issues are, however, discussed here):  
 
(i) Some of the recommendations of the TCII and NEPAD report (2005), while 
relevant, extend beyond the spheres of the RECs’ operations, including the 
implementation or implementation management/coordination of regional 
infrastructure projects. For example, some of the recommendations in the 
TCII and NEPAD report (ibid) are applicable to decision-making issues at 
the higher levels of management at national levels, in spheres of influence 
beyond the control of RECs. In other words, some of the recommendations 
are more pertinent to the management of intra-/inter-state relations in a 
multilateral context, or the internal management of individual states’ 
apparatus.  
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the media – i.e., for member states to align their NDPs and budgets with 
NEPAD’s agenda.  
 
(iii) The roles and responsibilities of the various institutional structures for 
implementation management/coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
are still not clarified in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, since the 
findings and recommendations of NEPAD’s 1st Infrastructure STAP review. 
Instead, the lack of clarity and overlap in roles and responsibilities appear to 
have been accepted as permanent features of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. 
In this respect, the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid: 108) stated that RECs 
should develop a framework to strengthen institutional relationships 
between stakeholders, which “should take into account the overlapping 
responsibilities of the NEPAD Secretariat, RECs and Member/Partner 
States.”  
  
 Based on the recommendations of the 2nd
 Although various suggestions are proffered in respect of the structure for the 
recommended framework for RECs to manage institutional relationships, as 
depicted in APPENDIX E, the issues highlighted in the recommendations of 
the TCII and NEPAD report relate more to the logistics and process, rather 
than the substance of the underpinning principles for the management of 
 Infrastructure STAP review 
depicted in APPENDIX E, it is still unclear what the RECs’ mandate is in 
respect of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Alternatively, it appears that even 
the RECs’ mandate to coordinate regional integration initiatives was adapted 
or modified to ensure alignment with NEPAD’s or the Infrastructure 
STAP’s agenda. In such a scenario, what happens to the other functions of 
RECs to manage/coordinate regional integration/sectoral cooperation, or is it 
assumed or tacitly accepted that the RECs’ mandates and related functions 
will be subsumed under NEPAD’s programme or development agenda? And 
why does NEPAD appear to avoid, at all costs, clarifying the roles and 
responsibilities between the various institutional structures?   
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trans-state trans-actions. The perceived omissions in this respect include the 
lack of clarification or elaboration of the implications of the underpinning 
institutional frameworks for the implementation/implementation 
management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects by 
public sector institutional structures/organisations across the various spatial 
categories.  
 
 An explication of guidelines for the management of stakeholder 
relationships in regional infrastructure projects – which include partnerships 
between (foreign) private sector operators/institutions, foreign/national 
governments, and regional/sub-regional political structures (where RECs are 
(inexplicably) not involved,) – appears to be excluded from the proposed 
framework in the TCII and NEPAD report. In addition, it is unclear how the 
proposed institutional relationships’ management framework is linked to 
NEPAD’s strategies for integrated project implementation/implementation 
management, or lack thereof; or whether the development of the 
recommended framework delegated to RECs will supplant the requisite 
development (by NEPAD,) of effective/viable strategies for integrated 
project implementation/implementation management in alignment with 
situational and project specificity.   
 
 To illustrate the implications of the afore-mentioned concerns, NEPAD’s 
Secretariat presented a report on the WAGP at the meeting of the HSGIC in 
Sharm Shaik: Egypt, on the 19th April 2005 (Mashele, 2006:7). According to 
NEPAD’s report (ibid), the WAGP was “…‘progressing well under the 
guidance and collaborative leadership of a Steering Committee of Ministers, 
Project Implementation Committee that comprises representatives of the 
four countries; and Senior Management of Sponsors and Project Team 
comprising representatives of the four companies who have invested in this 
project’”. NEPAD’s energy projects, such as the WAGP, represent one of 
the few infrastructure sector programmes in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, 
where visible implementation progress has been reported (TCII and 
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NEPAD, 2005). Yet, it is unclear how the institutional arrangements 
illustrated above are linked to NEPAD Infrastructure STAP’s overall 
strategy or its institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation management/coordination. It is also unclear how NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management 
of the various sectoral programmes are linked to the existing regional and 
sub-regional structures for implementation management/coordination of 
regional integration initiatives in the infrastructure sector.  
 
(iv) The recommendation for RECs, or REC Secretariats, to increase the 
efficiency of decision-making structures (in RECs) is beyond the capability 
of REC Secretariats or project structures to address. As a result, an 
impression is created that either this recommendation is targeted at the 
wrong audience, or that the implications of the external/internal institutional 
environment in which RECs/REC Secretariats operate are ignored, rather 
than understood by NEPAD’s structures/agencies, so that they may be 
integrated in the planning of relevant institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for implementation management/coordination.  
 
 Given the inequitable power relations in REC structures, or between REC 
Secretariats and member states, it is also unclear whether REC Secretariats 
possess the power or authority to recommend that Ministerial 
Committees/Councils of HoSG change their modus operandi to suit the 
requirements of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects. It is 
also a remote possibility whether or not project structures/REC Secretariats 
would ever be mandated by the Summit of HoSG, or Ministerial 
Committees to explore modalities to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of decision-making in RECs. To illustrate the afore-mentioned 
concerns, an example of decision-making processes in RECs is presented in 
Box 6.1.    
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Box 6.1: Lengthy and Complex Decision-Making Processes in RECs 
According to the TCII and NEPAD report (2005: 97), the decision-making processes in 
most RECs are cumbersome. They follow the following steps: 
 
(i) “The relevant Technical Department prepares and circulates a paper on the subject at 
hand to the identified experts within all Member/Partner States. 
(ii) A meeting, or series of meetings, of experts, usually after donor funds have been 
obtained for the specific workshop(s), then consider the subject and make 
recommendations for the internal management and thereafter the Council of 
Ministers to consider. 
(iii) The Council of Ministers in their (typically bi-annual) meetings then consider and 
agree on recommendations to the conference of the Heads of State for adoption in 
their next meeting, which typically takes place once a year.” 
 
According to the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid), the   afore-mentioned “processes form a 
critical path, and therefore, if one critical stage in this process is delayed (for whatever 
reason), then the next stage cannot happen and the whole process stalls. Such processes, 
many of which were designed prior to the RECs being designated as the implementing 
organs of NEPAD, are quite lengthy and complex. The result of these inefficient decision-
making processes is that, too often, critical protocols and conventions can take years 
before they are finally agreed. This hampers policy harmonisation efforts.”  
 Source: Derived from TCII and NEPAD, 2005. NEPAD Infrastructure STAP – Second Review of Implementation 
Progress and the Way Forward, pp.97-98. 
  
 The point made here is that NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews need to 
focus on the issues directly related to implementation progress of the 
identified regional infrastructure projects, as may be depicted in projects’ 
activity plans. Although the various issues addressed by the Infrastructure 
STAP reviews in the RECs’ external/internal institutional environment 
affect project delivery in/by RECs, some of the recommended actions are 
beyond the capability or control of REC Secretariats/project structures to 
address on their own without concerted collective action by the national 
governments/member states in RECs, Africa’s HoSG/Ministerial forums in 
the various sub-regions, and AU organs. Therefore, the shopping list of 
issues depicted above suggests that NEPAD failed to draw and agree on 
detailed implementation plans including roles and responsibilities with the 
various institutional structures prior to implementation.  
 
 Moreover, the issues highlighted in the TCII and NEPAD 2nd Infrastructure 
STAP review regarding the inefficient processes for decision-making in 
regional/sub-regional institutions are long-standing and deeply entrenched. 
The inadequate operationalization of decisions is also linked to complexities 
of diverse legal, governance and legislative regimes at national levels. Thus, 
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the possible impact of inefficient decision-making structures or diverse 
policy, regulatory and governance regimes on proposed cross-border 
regional infrastructure projects should have been considered earlier on in 
programme development plans, so that more effective institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements to support project implementation could be 
proposed. To shift the responsibility for redress of the afore-mentioned 
governance structures/regimes to powerless REC Secretariats, after the fact, 
is tantamount to “papering over the cracks,” as the underlying/structural 
causes of problems remain unresolved.  
  
(v) It is unclear clear how RECs are to enforce commitment to regional 
protocols and collective agreements by member states: the issues regarding 
the lack of compliance to collective agreements are political, economic and 
institutional, rather than being a consequence of technical inefficiencies per 
se in member states (although technical/administrative inefficiencies also 
contribute to delays in the implementation of collective agreements). 
Similarly, one assumes that decisions around the restructuring of RECs 
would be made at the respective RECs’ Summit of HoSG, after 
recommendations on the issue are submitted by the relevant Ministerial 
Committees; alternatively, at the AU Assembly of HoSG, if region-wide 
models are considered.  
 
(vi) Other recommendations in the Infrastructure STAP reviews relate to 
mechanisms to facilitate commitment (either by RECs, or institutional/ 
project structures for implementation management/ coordination) to 
processes that were in any event eschewed during the development of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. These include the recommendation for the 
“implementation of community decisions relating to NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure projects” (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 105). Yet, lack of popular 
participation has since inception been considered a defining characteristic of 
NEPAD’s programme (see: Anyang’ Nyong’o, 2002; African Civil Society 
Forum, 2002; Bond, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; Taylor, 2005).  
 
 149 
 For example, broad-based popular participation in the selection, preparation 
and construction of regional infrastructure, and ensuring the provision of 
infrastructure products and services to improve internal coherence are some 
of the response/actions articulated at the integrative levels of management in 
NEPAD’s approach to the development of regional infrastructure (see: 
NEPAD, 2001). Yet, the afore-mentioned policy strategy/response actions 
have not been cascaded or integrated in programme/project development in 
the Infrastructure STAP and sectoral programmes, such as the roads 
programme. In other words, it is difficult to envisage how RECs will enforce 
commitment to processes that are not elaborated as part of the Infrastructure 
STAP’s modus operandi. As a result, it is possible that this aspect refers to 
intended (future) institutional mechanisms and arrangements for collective 
engagement and future project identification, rather than dealing with the 
current concerns in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. This lack of consistency 
in assessment is confusing.  
 
(vii) In addition, the entrenched reliance on external/international institutions or 
institutional structures for project implementation support, including 
financial resources and  technical assistance, whilst at the same time 
ascribing implementation failures to the same exogenous factors, appears to 
create ‘vicious cycles’ of dependency and apathy. For example, on the one 
hand, NEPAD proposed to “end the scourge of underdevelopment that 
afflicts Africa” through African ownership and prudent stewardship of 
Africa’s development agenda using the abundant resources at Africa’s 
disposal (NEPAD, 2001, Para.6-7: 1-2). On the other hand, NEPAD 
proposed partnerships with the developed countries of the north (which have 
previously contributed to Africa’s perennial underdevelopment and unabated 
extraction of Africa’s resources), to support Africa’s integration “into the 
global economy and body politic” (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002f) 
including the development of Africa’s regional infrastructure.  
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 NEPAD articulated the afore-mentioned position despite extensive empirical 
evidence of the decades-long lack of beneficial support, in Africa’s interest, 
by the developed countries and their institutions/institutional structures. As 
NEPAD argued: “… (NEPAD) is a call for a new relationship of partnership 
between Africa and the international community, especially the highly 
industrialised countries, to overcome the development chasm that has 
widened over centuries of unequal relations” (NEPAD, 2001, Para.8: 2). At 
the same time, NEPAD eschewed the previous role of “colonial powers” in 
the development of Africa’s infrastructure for extractive purposes (ibid: 
Para. 99: 22). 
 
As a result, the delivery on NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes 
appears to be bogged down by the cycle of dependency, exacerbated by 
NEPAD’s inoperative institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation support, particularly in the context of integrated 
development. Although NEPAD espoused the reform of the afore-mentioned 
unproductive relations, the contradictions and obfuscation in NEPAD’s 
Strategic Framework appear to lend credence to the afore-mentioned 
concerns regarding NEPAD’s inability to move beyond the rhetoric in order 
to facilitate successful project implementation.  
 
The dependency on external resources (including funding and technical 
assistance) also appears to permeate all facets of NEPAD’s development of 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects at the various levels of 
management and spatial categories. As a result, to illustrate the extent of this 
dependency and its implications for the implementation of regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects or institutional structures for project 
implementation or implementation management/coordination, the 2nd 
Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 105) recommended that 
“RECs re-structure and streamline their operations to efficiently manage 
their dependency relationship with donors”.  
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What the identified need for the realignment of the RECs’ relationships with 
donors effectively means is that the negative manifestations of NEPAD’s 
dependency on external resources, and the (inadequate) management of the 
ensuing dependency relationships have been neatly shifted (by NEPAD) to 
RECs. This assertion is made here particularly so since NEPAD is 
responsible for mobilising resources externally and, presumably, the 
management of stakeholder relationships that ensue from such agreements at 
regional and sub-regional levels. Moreover, the RECs are the same 
structures that have been identified (ibid) to lack the authority and 
wherewithal to astutely manage stakeholder/institutional relationships with 
donors.  
 
Therefore, a number of concerning issues underscores the lack of autonomy 
in RECs, which appears to have been ignored in the TCII and NEPAD 
recommendations (ibid), with implications for the implementation of RECs’ 
projects. First, it is unclear how the RECs can extricate their operations from 
donor influence, particularly so since donors appear to drive/fund REC 
operations; second, RECs (in theory) rely on member states for financial 
support – in turn, the majority of member states rely on donor-support for 
their funding including capital budgets, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle 
of dependency. Where and how NEPAD or its proposed interventions for 
capacity building and resource mobilisation fit in the afore-mentioned 
relationships is not clearly explained.  
 
Cognisant of the issues discussed above, an even more puzzling 
recommendation from the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review is that: “NEPAD 
and the RECs, with the support from the… (AfDB), should consider 
providing technical assistance and funding to countries to enable them to 
reform their administrative and legal frameworks, so as to achieve 
compliance with agreed regional decisions” (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 105). 
Yet, NEPAD and RECs are known to possess limited resources, to the 
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extent that they are unable to even independently fund/support their own 
administrative operations.   
 
(viii) A number of creative initiatives in various RECs are highlighted in the 
recommendations of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review. Yet, if the various 
comments on NEPAD’s implementation challenges discussed in the 
previous chapters are anything to go by, a view of REC Secretariats as 
hapless institutional structures tends to be conveyed. As a result, the 
contradictory examples of creative REC initiatives presented in the TCII and 
NEPAD 2nd
A detailed illustrative SWOT analysis of perceptions of the external/internal 
institutional environment on NEPAD is presented in APPENDIX F. The SWOT 
analysis is derived from a “random” selection of relevant comments during the 
early stages of NEPAD’s launch (i.e., NEPAD’s Strategic Framework with 
sectoral programmes for Africa’s regeneration). The comments presented in 
APPENDIX E depict perceptions of NEPAD’s external/internal institutional 
environment with regard to the expectations of NEPAD to facilitate effective 
delivery on its articulated programme objectives. The illustrative SWOT analysis 
uses Diescho’s framework of a SWOT analysis: in its original application, 
 Infrastructure STAP review report (2005) vis-à-vis the prevalent 
perceptions of lack of institutional capacity in RECs suggests either the 
incorrect utilisation of RECs’ resources in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, 
or that the various regional/sub-regional structures coordinate activities for 
regional integration at incorrect levels of work, where their contribution is 
either not appreciated or understood.  
 
An examination of the earlier perceptions of NEPAD vis-à-vis expected 
performance or concerns with recommended interventions is presented below.  
 
6.4  Earlier Perceptions of the Influence of the External/Internal 
Institutional Environment on NEPAD vis-à-vis Expectations/Concerns 
of Current Performance 
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Diescho’s uses this framework to analyse the political and socio-economic 
impacts of NEPAD (Diescho, 2002: 47-62). According Diescho (ibid: 49):  
 
Weaknesses are those factors that are inherent in the historical process and that, 
once they are overcome, will bear testimony to the commitment and tenacity of 
the drivers of the process. Threats are those factors that, unless they are 
understood and tackled with the necessary sensitivity and dexterity, at the right 
time by the right personages, can scuttle the whole agenda…Challenges (or 
opportunities) are those factors that in the face of risks offer real opportunities 
to move ahead in the context of clear targets and benchmarks.   
 
In addition, this study superimposes over Diescho’s political and socio-economic 
framework a conventional/generic framework proposed by Knutson (undated) for 
a SWOT analysis. According to Knutson (ibid) strengths and weaknesses deal 
with the internal analysis; opportunities and threats (or constraints) deal with the 
external analysis.  In contrast, in Diescho’s framework the various parameters of 
the SWOT analysis overlap between the internal and external analyses: this 
overlap may be construed to illustrate the interrelatedness of the impact of 
PESTLE factors in development programmes/projects. In addition, Africa’s 
asymmetrical integration in the global political economy and the consequences of 
historical (colonial and neo-colonial) behaviours, attitudes, methodologies and 
development interventions still impose significant mutually reinforcing negative 
impacts on Africa’s development agenda. Such impacts provide evidence of 
multiple and simultaneous causality to the identified challenges in the 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.  
 
A summary of the broad categories of issues/comments depicted in the SWOT 
analysis in APPENDIX F is presented in Table 6.1 for convenience. This study 
uses relevant project management methodologies and planning frameworks to 
interpret the data. 
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Table 6.1:  Summary of Illustrative SWOT Analysis of the External/Internal 
Environment in which NEPAD Programmes/Projects are Implemented  
 
  STRENGHTS OPPORTUNITIES 
• Reaffirmation of commitment by African HoSG to political, 
economic and corporate governance and related principles; 
 
• Collective ownership of, and active engagement by the 
political leadership in development processes; 
 
• Availability of strategic framework, development objectives, 
and detailed action plans in various priority sectors, with the 
invitation for inclusive participation by all stakeholder 
groups; 
 
• A strong sense of common identity across the African 
continent, which resonates strongly with the idea of a united 
Africa politically and economically. 
• Strengthen democracy and human development across the 
continent ; 
• Strengthen leadership and management structures at sub-
regional and regional levels; 
• Address long-standing political, and socio-economic 
structural constraints in African countries and sub-regions; 
• Provide inspired leadership and building blocks for ethical 
conduct that will strengthen efforts to improve political 
economic and corporate governance; 
• Promote and support the development of the African private 
sector including integration of the informal sector in 
development planning; 
• Ensure inclusive stakeholder participation from all segments 
of society; 
• Address gender discrimination and substantively promote 
women’s empowerment; 
• Facilitate the development of infrastructure, in particular 
transport infrastructure and related services; 
• Mobilise domestic resources; 
• Prioritise interventions for institutional reform, institution 
building, and the development of leadership and 
management capacity. 
WEAKNESSES THREATS/CONSTRAINTS 
• Lack of trust in the political and moral ability of political 
leadership to deliver on the articulated development 
objectives; 
• Activist orientation weak or lacking amongst Africa’s 
political leadership;  
• Entrenched colonial mindset: “decolonization of the mind” 
needs to precede the dialogue between the African leaders 
and the international development partners, so that the 
former can advance the interests of Africa’s people, 
communities, countries and sub-regions;  
• Lack of confidence in regional and sub-regional institutions 
to bring about transformational change; 
• Weak states, weak institutional environment and poor 
governance record; 
• Long-standing rivalries between the member states in 
regional blocks, and between the various sub-regional 
integration arrangements;  
• Poor development planning ability, lack of prioritisation, and 
poor communication; 
• Lack of engagement in development planning with all 
segments of society; 
• Lack of commitment by member-states to implement 
regional protocols and collective agreements; 
• Lack of financial resources, crippling debt, poor domestic 
resource mobilisation resulting in inordinate reliance on 
external sources; 
• NEPAD a “sophisticated begging bowl” that escalates the 
human development crisis and associated dependency 
burdens; 
• Transfer of inappropriate development models to Africa’s 
unique circumstances; 
• Lack of readiness in various spheres of development, 
resulting in marginalisation from the global economy. 
• Political conflicts, civil wars, lack of peace and security; 
• Continued poor governance in political, economic and 
corporate spheres; 
• Negative perceptions and damaged integrity of political 
leadership; 
• Lack of unity on NEPAD amongst the HoSG, compounded 
by political rivalry; 
• Lack of meaningful support and commitment by the 
international community to the attainment of the agreed 
development objectives; 
• Political leadership burdens and lack of goal-directed 
leadership behaviours; 
• The preoccupation with the ‘South African factor’ and 
related fears of political dominance; 
• Elitist tendencies and political patronage in appointments, 
and participation in programmes and projects; 
• Negative impact on NEPAD of dependency and external 
reliance for funding. 
Source: Derived from various sources including the following: Adedegi,  2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1990; Anyang’ 
Nyong’o, 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o et al, 2002; Bond, 2002; Buthelezi, 2001; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; ECA, 2002; 
Ekpo, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Herbert, 2003; IAG/ JA,  2002; Mills, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; 
NEPAD, 2002c; Tandon, 2002. In addition, the author converted some of the negative comments into positive statements in 
order to illustrate some of the opportunities to support the implementation of NEPAD programmes.   
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The summary of issues/comments illustrated in Table 6.1 and detailed in 
APPENDIX F are self-explanatory. The purpose of the illustrative SWOT 
analysis in this study is not so much to interrogate the veracity or relevance of the 
various comments for NEPAD: rather, the illustrative SWOT analysis seeks to 
map the patterns emerging from the general perceptions of NEPAD’s performance 
and the efficacy of its programmatic interventions since NEPAD’s programme 
was launched up to the assessments of performance and implementation 
challenges in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP; how these afore-mentioned aspects 
are  linked to the influences of the external/internal institutional environment in 
which NEPAD’s programmes/projects are implemented including NEPAD’s 
recommended interventions to ameliorate the status quo; and what the 
implications of the afore-mentioned issues are for NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.  
 
The overlay of the afore-mentioned frameworks for a SWOT analysis also seeks 
to establish which of the articulated concerns on NEPAD’s 
performance/implementation challenges primarily relate to either the external or 
internal institutional environment, cognisant of the impact of multiple and 
simultaneous causality of PESTLE factors on development programmes/projects. 
This is in order to identify emerging patterns from the combined performance 
assessments, and to identify areas for intervention and prioritisation for future 
integrated implementation support of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and related 
sectoral projects, if at all possible under the circumstances. Quantitative measures 
are not used in this exercise.  
 
 
The issues identified in earlier perceptions of influences of the external/internal  
institutional environment on NEPAD, which have significance for the 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP,  may be grouped in the broad 
categories discussed below. 
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6.4.1 Significant influence of the international community on NEPAD  
 
An analysis of the pattern of broad categories of comments illustrated in Table 6.1 
and APPENDIX F suggests that the range of articulated concerns on NEPAD 
related more to the internal rather than to the external institutional environment. 
As a result, NEPAD was urged to address as a priority the range of the identified 
internal/domestic institutional concerns rather than the evidenced preoccupation in 
the development/implementation of previous region-wide development 
programmes with the (external) prerogatives of the developed countries and their 
institutions.  
 
The exception in the identified external concerns (under threats/constraints) refers 
to the “lack of meaningful support by the international community for the 
attainment of agreed development objectives.” The articulated views on the role 
of the international community – regardless of their numerical significance in 
relation to the overall comments presented in Table 6.1 and APPENDIX F – 
illustrate the possible significant negative influence of international institutions on 
NEPAD and the development/implementation of its sectoral programmes/projects. 
The illustrated comments in this respect may be summed up as signifying the 
prevailing concerns regarding the potential adverse influence of “world-wide 
connectivity in the fields of technology, political power relations and global 
capitalism” (Breytenbach, 2004: 83) on Africa’s development agenda, cognisant 
of the fragile institutions/economies in the majority of African countries 
exacerbated by endemic lack of institutional capacity.  
 
6.4.2 Inadequate prioritisation of development interventions  
 
One of the key opportunities highlighted for NEPAD was to prioritise its 
development interventions for implementation to address internal institutional 
concerns, rather than attempting “to do too much,” cognisant of the endemic lack 
of resources and institutional capacity. Poor development planning including poor 
prioritisation and communication of development programmes/projects are 
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identified in APPENDIX F as some of the weaknesses in Africa’s regional and 
sub-regional institutions, in addition to the lack of managerial skills that are 
exacerbated by poor management practices, which have significant implications 
for the implementation of NEPAD’s programmes/projects. Therefore, the findings 
from the overlay of the two frameworks for a SWOT analysis suggest that 
NEPAD’s priority to create an enabling environment for the development of 
regional infrastructure must be premised primarily on addressing issues that 
pertain to the internal (domestic) institutional environment, rather than focussing 
on the external (international) institutional environment according to the dictates 
of the Washington Consensus.  
 
Based on the prevailing issues discussed above, and cognisant of the 
characteristics of NEPAD’s implementation challenges in the Infrastructure 
STAP, the priority interventions for NEPAD include the need to do the following:  
• focus on providing strategic direction and effective strategic management to 
the sequencing of relevant interventions to develop cross-border regional 
infrastructure; 
• facilitate the rationalisation of overlapping regional integration 
arrangements;  
• facilitate improvements in governance regimes, particularly at national 
levels;  
• ensure that capacity assessments are conducted and monitor implementation 
of recommendations or the related programmes/projects;  
• facilitate the development of institutional capacity at the various spatial 
categories including the development of leadership/strategic management 
capability including requisite competencies in institutional structures at  
regional, sub-regional and national levels;  
• facilitate institution-building and the reform/development of inadequate 
institutions;  
• facilitate the development of regional infrastructure for internal coherence to 
support the attainment of the articulated multiple objectives for regional 
infrastructure; and  
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• create an enabling environment to facilitate/support the development of 
relevant instruments for domestic resource mobilisation based on situational 
specificity.  
 
The range of issues depicted above is within the competency of NEPAD’s 
articulated policy strategy/response actions including the proposed interventions 
by NEPAD’s governance and management structures to unlock the blockages for 
the implementation of NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions (see the relevant 
provisions in NEPAD, 2001). A detailed discussion on the afore-mentioned 
aspects is beyond the scope of this study. NEPAD, however, has displayed a 
proclivity for reliance on international institutions for the operationalization and 
implementation of its response actions/policy strategy for the development of 
regional infrastructure (see: Hope, 2006; NEPAD, 2001; TCII & NEPAD, 2005).  
 
This reliance is evidenced even in areas where African states and institutions can, 
and need to take a leading role or assume primary responsibility for development 
processes and related outcomes in order to ensure implementation success of 
Africa’s development programmes. For these reasons, an active role of the state 
and the development of state institutional capacity are critical. These afore-
mentioned roles, however, need to be balanced with those of broad-based 
participation by various constituencies subject to project specificity: these 
constituencies include formal/informal business sector and institutions of civil 
society at national levels in order for the desired development outcomes manifest.  
   
6.4.3 Negative impact of foreign institutions/institutional structures and 
methodologies on Africa’s development agenda  
 
Some of the comments illustrated in APPENDIX F reveal concerns regarding the 
perceived inordinate influence on the development of NEPAD and its Strategic 
Framework of foreign methodologies that are not suited to Africa’s situational 
specificity. In this respect, the significant participation by institutions/institutional 
structures of the developed countries in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP appears to 
make a mockery of the political leadership’s avowed commitment to African 
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ownership and control of NEPAD’s/Africa’s development agenda. For example, 
the concerns raised by various African experts indicate that the range of 
underlying problems to the implementation of Africa’s development programmes/ 
projects, and the possible solutions to ameliorate the status quo are known.  
 
For example, the lack of institutional capacity and strategic management 
capability in Africa’s regional and sub-regional institutions is acknowledged in 
the range of comments depicted in APPENDIX F. However, one may conclude 
that the (largely-foreign) “sector-specialised agencies” NEPAD relied on to 
elaborate the regional infrastructure programmes/projects (see NEPAD, 2001) 
appear to have failed to competently analyse NEPAD’s policy strategy/response 
actions in order to propose relevant programmes/projects for the development of 
regional infrastructure. In terms of project management best practice, a competent 
analysis of NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions would have ensured that 
the key influences in the RECs’ and NEPAD’s external/internal environments, 
including the related assumptions for programme development/implementation 
are rendered explicit. Their possible impact on NEPAD’s pre-determined regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects and proposed strategies for project 
implementation and implementation management at the strategic levels of 
management would thus be thoroughly understood, with the relevant mechanisms 
to mitigate identified risks elaborated.  
 
As a result, the adequacy of the afore-mentioned planning processes would also 
facilitate the design of relevant programmes/projects subject to situational 
specificity; the said programmes/projects would be supported by the development 
of feasible strategies for project implementation and implementation management. 
The afore-mentioned measures would also assist in the identification or 
development of relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation support.  
 
Based on the analysis of NEPAD’s performance in the implementation/ 
implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP and roads programme, 
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NEPAD’s governance and management structures also seem to have failed to 
competently manage the inordinate influence of the international institutional 
structures on programme development and implementation planning. In particular, 
NEPAD’s governance and management structures appear to have failed to guide 
the development of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP according to the needs, 
constraint, challenges and dictates of Africa’s sub-regions in alignment with 
NEPAD’s articulated multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous 
implementations. NEPAD’s governance and management structures also appear 
to have failed to facilitate and ensure competent quality control of the deliverables 
of the AfDB, World Bank, EU and DFID (or their consultants) in the planning and 
development of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP (the afore-mentioned structures 
provided the intellectual basis and technical support for the development of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP (NEPAD, 2002f, TCII & NEPAD, 2005)).   
 
6.4.4 Circumscribed role of Africa’s “emergent professionals” 
 
Diescho (2002: 59) argued that the failure by (international/African) experts to 
elaborate relevant projects to suit situational specificity is one of Africa’s 
development challenges. In NEPAD’s context, it appears that Africa’s experts are 
primarily to blame for their failure to support NEPAD’s machinery to elaborate 
relevant development programmes/projects. According to Diescho (ibid), “For the 
most part, these experts are themselves job seekers who tend to describe the 
process for the leaders rather than subject the whole historical period that NEPAD 
symbolises to critical examination.” These afore-mentioned issues may explain 
the lack of adequate examination and analysis of the underlying causes to the 
identified performance constraints or implementation challenges: they may also 
explain the insipid recommendations for corrective interventions. 
 
In this study, African intellectuals, academics and technical professionals from 
diverse ideological, multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral perspectives who posit 
alternative ideas to those of mainstream/multilateral institutions or trans-state 
actors participating in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP are collectively referred to 
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as “the emergent professionals.” Therefore, some of the comments illustrated in 
APPENDIX F reveal concerns by Africa’s emergent professionals at their 
perceived circumscribed participation in the drafting of NEPAD and its 
programmatic interventions, including the Infrastructure STAP. For example, the 
active role of technocrats and organised form of knowledge in the development of 
economic, political, social and institutional systems is not new. According to 
Senghor (1990: 26), technocrats played a critical role in the mapping of 
integration activities during the development of the Latin American Free Trade 
Area (LAFTA), and in Central America. Their role was to craft institutional 
arrangements for mobilising broad-based stakeholder support as well as to provide 
intellectual justification for national cooperation and regional integration 
initiatives (ibid).  
 
Arguably, NEPAD tended to favour in the development of its programmes inputs 
(mainly) from mainstream economists, foreign (mainstream) academics, senior 
government officials and diplomats. In addition, the participation of mainstream 
development institutions/bureaucracies, IFIs and DFIs with a strong sectoral focus 
predominate in NEPAD’s programmatic interventions. Yet, contemporary debates 
on development itself suggest that a sectoral focus may no longer be operative in 
the context of integrated development and integrated implementation management 
of regional infrastructure programmes/projects, particularly in the development of 
cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure. Thus, the complexities of 
development in general, and in particular in the provision of cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure, require diverse and broad-based interventions to 
effectively address the challenges of development.  
 
The issue then is: do Africa’s emergent professionals not possess the courage to 
address controversial matters with respect to Africa’s development agenda?  This 
question is complex and beyond the scope of this study.  Suffice it to say, there 
are various schools of thought regarding the participation of African technocrats, 
or lack thereof, in the development of Africa’s development programmes. One 
school of thought (Anyang’ Nyong’o, et al., 2002; Diescho, 2002; Wilmont, 
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2002) has argued that pertinent questions need to explore whether African 
technocrats are supported, and their contribution in turn accepted by African 
institutions, particularly government structures. In NEPAD’s case, Anyang’ 
Nyong’o, et al., (2002: 15) argued that the failure to involve African technocrats 
in the development of NEPAD’s Strategic Framework undermined the symbiotic 
relationship between governments’ and technocrats’ institutions over policy 
development and implementation of policy interventions. 
 
The evidenced schism between these key actors – government and technocrats – 
has been ascribed (Adedegi, 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o, et al., 2002; Diescho, 2002) 
to either of mutually reinforcing processes.  First, it is the alleged by various 
African scholars (Adedegi, 2002; African Civil Society, 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 
et al., 2002; Bond, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; Wilmont, 2002) that 
there is an endemic rejection of indigenous skills, expertise and contribution by 
African governments, or a tendency by African governments to stymie broad-
based dialogue and consultation over joint policy development. Again, this 
observation was made in response to the (perceived) exclusionary approach 
adopted by Africa’s political leaders in the development of NEPAD and its related 
programmes of action.  
 
Second, Senghor (1990) argued that in the African context, the role of experts is 
circumscribed because of the high level of politicisation of the “development” 
sphere. Based on empirical evidence in other developing countries, Senghor (ibid) 
argued that the circumscribed role of experts is prevalent in situations of 
underdevelopment. Similarly, Paul (1990) argued that as development 
programmes are policy interventions, political decisions need to be made over the 
allocation of resources and implementation arrangements: there is a tendency for 
political appointments and loyalty to assume precedence over competence.    
 
Sometimes, the perceived exclusion by Africa’s emergent professionals in 
Africa’s development programmes manifests in robust debates that reveal 
ideological differences between the ideas of technocrats from the mainstream 
institutions (such as the UNECA and AfDB), but who have been actively involved 
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in elaborating Africa’s development agenda for decades, and those who are 
perceived as outsiders (i.e., independent academics, intellectuals and 
professionals). The extrapolation of ideas from diverse ideological persuasions is 
not necessarily a bad thing, particularly so cognisant of the need for further 
development and operationalization of complex concepts, such as integrated 
development integrated implementation management, in and across different 
spatial categories.  
 
The arguments depicted above, however, explain to some extent the reasons for 
the schism between Africa’s political leaders and (independent) technocrats in the 
developmental terrain: the latter are perceived to articulate neo-Marxist or 
developmental perspectives, which go against the grain of the predominant 
orthodox/neo-liberal approaches favoured by multilateral institutions and imposed 
by IFIs like the World Bank and IMF on African governments. The articulation, 
by Africans of alternative perspectives on Africa’s development that are not to the 
liking of foreign governments/institutions, however, does not condone NEPAD’s 
reliance on foreign technical/intellectual support and expertise, whilst 
simultaneously eschewing African expertise. This view takes cognisance of 
NEPAD’s articulated commitment to transform the internal/external relationships 
that have contributed to Africa’s perennial underdevelopment, regardless of its 
dependence on external/foreign resources that have traditionally contributed to 
this development malaise (NEPAD, 2001).  
 
Another school of thought (Onyeani, 1990: 106) highlighted as the cause of this 
schism the aloofness of African technocrats themselves to engage in processes of 
collective engagement and knowledge accumulation for the benefit of (African) 
society.  This school of thought avers that the failure by African technocrats to 
take responsibility and accountability for implementation outcomes in 
development programmes/projects contributes to the current schism between 
political leaders and “emergent thinkers” in development planning and 
implementation. Yet, some have argued (Mbeki in ANC Today, Vol.4 #40, 08-14 
October 2004) that it is through active and visible participation by Africa’s 
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“emergent thinkers” to craft Africa’s development agenda, rather than bemoaning 
post facto the absence of indigenous approaches to Africa’s development 
initiatives, will prevailing perceptions (AU, 2004 cited in Mbeki, ANC Today, 
Vol.4 #40, 08-14 October 2004) of the imperceptible contribution by African 
intellectuals to the body of knowledge be challenged.  
 
For this to happen, African governments need to embrace diverse thinking in 
development planning/management, in order to facilitate the elaboration of 
relevant alternatives to what has been presented over the past decades. Such 
overtures will ensure that the development of knowledge can be translated into 
relevant policy interventions in alignment with situational specificity: they will 
also facilitate the development of institutional capacity for planning, project 
preparation, integrated practical implementation/implementation management of 
development programmes/ projects and spatial expansion.  
 
Although the arguments stated above may appear academic, they illustrate the 
persistence of complex phenomena in Africa’s development agenda namely, the 
rejection of domestic expertise, dependency on (often) inadequate external 
expertise because of the lack of financial resources, and capital flight. Obviously, 
the participation (or lack thereof,) by African emergent professionals in 
supporting the planning and implementation of Africa’s development 
programmes, such as NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, is informed by the 
confluence of systemic, corporate and individual factors. The negative aspects 
thereof have resulted in the evidenced situation where, according to NEPAD 
(2002i: 4), “…many of Africa’s brightest and most qualified professionals leave 
to study and never return.” Thus, processes to address this schism will go a long 
way to ensure that African emergent professionals make relevant contributions to 
crafting Africa’s development agenda. Such efforts would, as South Africa’s 
President Mbeki noted (ANC Today, ANC Today, Vol.4 #40, 08-14 October 2004: 
5): “…bless Africa with a generation’s creative genius that discovers its mission, 
fulfils it to its best, without betraying, diminishing, reducing or downsizing it – 
the mission to achieve Africa’s integration and renaissance.”  
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6.4.5 Ineffective links between planning hierarchies and implementation  
 
In APPENDIX F, the identified strengths in respect of NEPAD’s thinking or 
statements of commitment to Africa’s development appear to illustrate a 
significant departure from weaknesses that undermined the implementation of 
previous African regional development programmes. Curiously, some comments 
identified as a strength top-down formulation of NEPAD’s programmes with the 
subsequent invitation for popular participation during the implementation stages. 
A critical issue for the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, 
however, is: what sustainable institutional mechanisms and arrangements has 
NEPAD put in place to ensure that the outputs of its planning hierarchies are 
translated into practical actions to effectively support the attainment of planned 
development outcomes? The analyses of NEPAD’s performance in the 
implementation of the Infrastructure STAP in the previous chapters and earlier 
sections above already suggest that NEPAD has paid lip service to the 
underpinning principles articulated in its Strategic Framework and approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure.  
 
Thus, some of the identified strengths in NEPAD may turn out to be weaknesses 
because of the lack of effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements to 
translate planned implementation actions into concrete deliverables at the various 
spatial categories. In this respect, NEPAD’s commitment to “collective ownership 
and active engagement by political leadership in development processes” will be 
critical to ensure sustained political commitment and support (at national levels). 
Paul (1990) described sustained political commitment and support as critical to 
the successful implementation of development programmes. In addition, the 
active involvement of political leadership in development processes ensures that 
the influence of their commitment is cascaded to the lower levels of management.  
 
To paraphrase Mintzberg (1994: 256), political leaders need to immerse 
themselves in the daily detail, rather than abstracting themselves from it through 
the reliance on hard data presented in summary reports presented by technocrats. 
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This active participation would enable political leaders to “abstract the strategic 
messages (emphasis in original)” (ibid) from the experiences of practical 
implementation. The experiences from practical implementation would also 
provide a feed-back loop to policy formulation and implementation strategy 
development. 
 
The statements made above, however, are idealistic in NEPAD’s context: in 
theory, although NEPAD’s HSGIC play an active role in the implementation of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP at all the levels of management/planning, in 
practice their active participation appears limited to the higher levels of 
management and planning of trans-state trans-actions, rather than direct 
involvement in programmes and projects. Thus, NEPAD’s HSGIC appears to rely 
more on summary reports from the (NEPAD) Steering Committee (SC) – a 
structure that appears even more detached from the real action and coal face of 
project implementation or implementation management. Similarly, NEPAD’s 
Secretariat also appears to rely primarily on the reports of other institutional 
structures (such as its lead agencies, consultants and other regional, sub-regional 
and national structures as its modus operandi,) possibly because of its limited 
capacity since it was established as a small structure. The influence of diverse 
ideologies exhibited by NEPAD’s political leadership in their comments on 
NEPAD’s performance, however, appears to permeate the various levels of 
management/planning, including the implementation of programmes/projects, 
whether or not the said leaders are actively involved in practical implementation. 
 
And therein lie the proliferation of the pitfalls of what Mintzberg (1994) refers to 
as the “fallacy of detachment”: the preponderance of NEPAD governance and 
management structures at all levels of management/planning, but without clear 
responsibilities, accountability and practical involvement in regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects obfuscates the clear delineation of real implementation 
concerns from dogma in the identified project implementation delays, in order to 
propose relevant solutions for their resolution. In the circumstances, political 
commitment is neither guaranteed, or adding any value. The views articulated 
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above, however, do not pre-empt the development of creative mechanisms for 
collective engagement to ensure that NEPAD’s HSGIC establish closer links with 
the various stakeholders at different levels of management/planning.  
 
To paraphrase Mintzberg (ibid: 287), such links may facilitate effective 
communication, assessment and reassessment of strategy as well as informed 
assessment of programmes/projects and implementation challenges by the 
leadership as the process unfolds, in alignment with NEPAD’s prescriptive and 
centralised approach to the development of regional infrastructure. Alternatively, 
closer links between the development of strategy and implementation may also 
promote the development of alternative institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure in accordance with 
situational specificity, in order to support NEPAD’s espoused imperatives for 
regional integrated development.                  
 
6.4.6 Poor delegation of authority and predominance of political structures in 
operational matters 
 
One of the concerning issues in NEPAD’s programmes is the apparent 
“delegation” of authority and responsibility by the AU HoSG amongst themselves 
(i.e., the AU HoSG to NEPAD’s HSGIC) for implementation of NEPAD’s action 
plan and related programmatic interventions. It is possible this issue has more to 
do with AU HoSG protocols, which have been cascaded to NEPAD’s institutional 
arrangements for project organisation management. Also, NEPAD’s HSGIC had 
already assumed critical responsibilities/roles for the implementation of NEPAD’s 
programmatic interventions and projects – even before NEPAD’s sectoral 
programmes/projects were developed. For example, functions of NEPAD’s 
HSGIC in the implementation of NEPAD’s programmes, described in NEPAD’s 
Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) include the following:  
  
• “Identifying strategic issues that need to be researched, planned and 
managed  at the continental level; 
• Setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of 
mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards; 
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• Reviewing progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking 
appropriate steps to address problems and delays” (NEPAD, 2001, Para.201: 
57-58). 
 
In NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, the implications for structures responsible for 
implementation management/coordination of the delegation of authority between 
HoSG and political structures/operatives are, however, enormous. Not least are 
the questions of what authority, roles and responsibilities are in turn delegated by 
the HSGIC to the various levels of management; and what are the implications of 
the afore-mentioned roles for NEPAD’s strategy for integrated implementation 
management? Various institutional structures, including NEPAD’s governance 
and management structures appear to be delegated roles and responsibilities in all 
the levels of management, or outside their levels of work, or both the afore-
mentioned options.  
 
The afore-mentioned problem may be attributed to the centralisation of 
programme/project actions in alignment with NEPAD’s prescriptive approach to 
the development of regional infrastructure. NEPAD also appears to have 
compounded this problem by delegating authority within its governance/political 
structures or senior officials in multilateral institutions, as depicted in the issues 
raised in APPENDIX F, but who are all far removed from projects on the ground. 
This approach perpetuates the risks of the “fallacy of detachment” identified by 
Mintzberg in NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project 
development and implementation support. Thus, authority and flexibility in 
decision-making by project structures with the relevant delegated authority will be 
required during implementation phases.   
 
 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
NEPAD or the developers of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP possessed the 
relevant information to propose effective institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to either mitigate the consequential risks of the negative impact of 
the inadequate internal/external institutional environment on the implementation 
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of the planned development programmes/projects, or to redirect some of the 
critical institutional aspects positively where possible. The expectations for the 
fulfilment of NEPAD’s commitments have, however, not been met.  
 
For example, some of the key recommendations of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
reviews for action by RECs/REC Secretariats refer to issues that need to be 
addressed at different levels of management/planning and through various 
institutional mechanisms for collective engagement, including by Africa’s 
political leadership at the regional and sub-regional levels as well as in member 
states that form RECs. However, unless the attitudes to collective engagement in 
NEPAD, RECs and member states change, and until the contradictions or 
complexities of the underpinning premises for Africa’s regional integration and 
management of institutional relationships between the various spatial categories 
and institutional structures in conducting trans-state trans-actions are resolved 
(i.e., state centric, bilateral or multilateral contexts), shifting the responsibility to 
RECs to ensure compliance to collective agreements offers no guarantee that the 
desired changes will occur, or that planned development outcomes will be 
attained.  
 
NEPAD, however, appears to not have heeded the earlier articulated concerns 
regarding the implications of its internal/external institutional environment for the 
implementation of its development/programmatic interventions. In the 
circumstances, NEPAD’s interventions in the Infrastructure STAP seem to have 
travelled the well-trodden path in Africa’s development landscape, rather than 
introducing transformational interventions. Although the internal/external 
environment in which NEPAD is implemented is the same as the RECs’ 
environment, NEPAD, however, attempts to induce an artificial separation of the 
afore-mentioned environments through its detached analyses; NEPAD also 
selectively arrogates itself the status of an observer – although it is also the 
strategist, programme/project designer, participant, and appraiser of 
implementation progress. Thus, NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for programme design, project implementation planning or 
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integrated implementation management/coordination seem to exacerbate, rather 
than ameliorate its inability to facilitate effective integrated implementation 
management/coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP in RECs.  
 
Instead, NEPAD appears to have largely relied on institutions and institutional 
structures of the developed countries for programme/project delivery on its behalf. 
Therefore, accountability for the failure to deliver by foreign institutions/experts/ 
methodologies according to NEPAD’s expectations and subject to Africa’s 
regional, sub-regional and national specificity needs to be apportioned 
appropriately. For example, some of the comments in APPENDIX F indicate that 
the reliance by African institutions/institutional structures on all things foreign is a 
well-entrenched phenomenon in Africa’s development landscape. In the 
circumstances, the responsibility for the outcomes of NEPAD’s prescriptive 
approach to the planning and the inadequate planning of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP – regardless or cognisant of the lack of institutional capacity in regional, 
sub-regional and national institutions – must be placed squarely on the doorstep of 
NEPAD’s governance and management structures, such as the HSGIC, SC, and 
Secretariat. The afore-mentioned structures appear to have failed to provide 
transformational leadership and competent management of NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programme.  
 
Question is: why did NEPAD or the developers of the Infrastructure STAP ignore 
the issues raised or the constructive criticism proffered in the earlier responses to 
NEPAD’s Strategic Framework, which would make critical inputs to programme 
development and implementation planning of NEPAD’s programmatic 
interventions and detailed action plans such as the Infrastructure STAP? An 
analysis of NEPAD’s responses from planning and political perspectives, 
including some of the possible underpinning causal factors to the identified 
implementation challenges and poor performance by NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements is provided in the next chapter: this analysis 
provides insights into the possible rationale behind some of NEPAD’s untenable 
positions in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. 
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7. UNDERPINNING PLANNING, POLITICAL AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON NEPAD’S RESPONSES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the underpinning planning, political and socio-economic 
influences in respect of NEPAD’s performance in implementation 
management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP. Some of the causal 
explanations proffered in this chapter provide compelling insights into the 
possible rationale underlying NEPAD’s challenges or responses regarding the 
RECs’ performance in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP. The 
discussions in this chapter also make generalisations on the implications of the 
management of intra-/inter-state relations for the implementation of NEPAD’s 
cross-border development programmes/projects, or the management of Africa’s 
regional development programmes/projects in general. The afore-mentioned 
issues overlap with some of the discussions in the previous chapters.   
 
NEPAD’s programme for the regeneration of the African continent, and by 
extension the Infrastructure STAP, have been conceptualised in an institutional 
environment characterised by intractable challenges for the implementation of 
development programmes/projects. NEPAD’s governance and management 
structures, however, appear to have been imbued with a spirit of unadulterated and 
imprudent optimism of implementation success, based on the expectations and 
pronunciations  of others. As a result, NEPAD failed to interrogate issues that 
have previously led to implementation failure of Africa’s development 
programmes in order to execute requisite practical actions at the various levels of 
management in terms of their articulated obligations, within the capacity of 
institutions/institutional structures for implementation/implementation 
management. NEPAD also ignored the implications of the underlying causes to 
the identified challenges for the delivery of infrastructure to meet effective 
demand in the various infrastructure sectors. Instead, NEPAD’s assessments and 
responses to implementation challenges dealt with the effects. 
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This chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 explores from a planning 
perspective the possible underlying reasons for NEPAD’s responses to 
implementation challenges, particularly in respect of the REC’s inadequate 
performance in the Infrastructure STAP. The implications of the outcomes of 
planning processes at different levels of management for institutional structures 
for implementation management, and how these are related to practical 
implementation, are illustrated. Section 7.3 discusses from the institutional, 
political and socio-economic perspectives some of the underpinnings to NEPAD’s 
inadequate performance, which may or may not be gleaned from the responses to 
implementation challenges discussed in the previous chapters. The possible 
impact of the legacy of entrenched detrimental practices, behaviours and 
procedural aspects in the planning and implementation of Africa’s development 
programmes – particularly vis-à-vis the role of the state, inter-/trans-state 
transactions and economic performance – is discussed. Section 7.4 is the summary 
and conclusion.  
 
7.2 Planning Perspective on NEPAD’s Response to RECs’ Performance   
 
A planning perspective explains the management of different facets of the 
relationship between planning hierarchies and implementation outcomes in 
development programmes/projects, and how relevant institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements provide effective links to support the attainment of planned 
outcomes. The implications for project implementation outcomes of the 
relationship between the nature of inputs/outputs of the different planning 
hierarchies at the various stages of the project life cycle (including levels of 
management,) and structures for implementation management/coordination are, 
however, almost always ignored in assessments of implementation progress 
(particularly so when implementation failure is contemplated). As a result, 
recommended corrective interventions tend to address the effects of problems 
(which occur during implementation), rather than addressing the underlying 
causes (which may occur from project conception and are cascaded over the 
various stages of the project life cycle,) including their impact on, or relationship 
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with structures for project implementation/implementation management. 
Perspectives on the implications of some of the planning approaches for structures 
for implementation management/coordination in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
are discussed below. 
 
7.2.1 Implications of prescriptive approaches to planning for implementation 
management  
 
NEPAD appears to not have thoroughly considered the implications of its top-
down planning processes on programme implementation, particularly of large-
scale, multi-national cross-border regional infrastructure projects. Yet, when 
problems arose, as they surely would, NEPAD identified the already-vulnerable 
regional/sub-regional structures as the primary cause of implementation 
challenges. Mintzberg (1994: 25; 284-285) argued that when strategy fails, it is 
usual for those at the top of the hierarchy to blame those lower down for project 
implementation failure. Yet, as Mintzberg (ibid) argued, since strategy 
formulation and implementation – and by implication “thinking” and “acting” – 
are interrelated, the capacity for implementation should form an integral part in 
the consideration of strategy. Therefore, as Mintzberg (ibid) states, “…every 
failure of implementation is also a failure of formulation. If there is to be a 
separation between the two, so that one side thinks before the other side acts, then 
clearly, the capacity to act has to be taken into consideration in the thinking 
process.” Mintzberg, however, argued that the problem lies not so much in “poor 
implementation” or in “weak formulation” (ibid: 26) per se, as in the artificial 
separation between the two processes depicted above.  
 
Taking into account Mintzberg’s perspective regarding the relationship between 
strategy/formulation and implementation, one may conclude that the challenges 
for implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, or related sectoral 
programmes, may be linked to the artificial separation between programme 
conception and implementation. This is illustrated in the inadequate approaches to 
planning and project organisation management: institutional inadequacies or lack 
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of institutional capacity for implementation/implementation management at the 
various spatial categories and institutional structures exacerbate the status quo. (In 
NEPAD’s case, for example, the lack of institutional capacity at the various 
spatial categories and institutional structures at regional, sub-regional ad national 
levels was known at the time of project conception, and was therefore in the 
peculiar knowledge of the Infrastructure STAP’s developers.)  
 
Similarly, the inadequate approach to planning requirements of various stages of 
the project life cycle and project management functions may be traced to negative 
implications of prescriptive approaches to planning for the management of 
development programmes/projects. However, as planning does not occur in space, 
accepting that strategy/formulation and implementation are interrelated, then the 
characteristics of, and institutional capacity in structures for programme 
development and implementation/implementation management may circuitously 
be construed to also inform the outcomes of planning.   
 
Accepting this premise then, the ensuing challenges for project implementation in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP may be construed as a manifestation of the 
dysfunctional relationship between the underlying thoughts and attitudes on the 
one hand, and decisions and actions on the other at the integrative and strategic 
levels of management. The identified implementation challenges are in NEPAD’s 
case, arguably, instigated by NEPAD’s prescriptive approach to the development 
of regional infrastructure, which is cascaded from the integrative levels of 
management; the prescriptive approach epitomises the (inherent) detachment of 
programme planners/developers at the integrative and strategic levels of 
management from the realities on the ground, with implications for action 
planning and performance management at the operational levels of management.  
 
At the strategic levels of management, the problem to link strategy 
formulation/planning with practical implementation may be rooted in what 
Mintzberg (ibid) identified as the reliance of prescriptive models on the artificial 
separation between planning hierarchies and implementation structures. 
 175 
Mintzberg (ibid) also argued that the formalisation and detachment inherent in 
prescriptive models allows the developers of plans to abstract themselves from the 
relevant details of conditions on the ground. Thus, the lack of clarification in roles 
and responsibilities in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP at the strategic levels of 
management appears to result from the said artificial separation between planning 
hierarchies and structures for implementation management/coordination, which is 
cascaded from the integrative levels of management.  
 
Again, taking a leaf from Mintzberg (ibid) the detachment in prescriptive models, 
evidenced in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, also results in the failure of 
programme/project developers to tap into the innovation and creativity that comes 
with the broad-based participation evidenced in emergent/descriptive models. In 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, the detachment from conditions on the ground 
and the ensuing lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities is either amplified by, 
or results from the prevalence of the same integrative/strategic structures at all the 
levels of management. The characteristics of the afore-mentioned institutional 
structures themselves, as explained below, appear to have exacerbated the 
problems of what Mintzberg (ibid) identified as the “fallacies of detachment, 
predetermination and formalization” in projects, thereby increasing complexity 
for implementation/ implementation management.  
 
For example, in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP the structures responsible for 
planning and implementation management/coordination comprise senior trans-
state actors from public sector, political, diplomatic and multilateral structures as 
well as development partners at the higher levels of management (such as the 
integrative and strategic levels). As a result, the afore-mentioned structures seem 
far removed from events and actions on the ground at the project levels of 
planning/implementation. Using Mintzberg’s explanation (ibid) of the 
implications of different types of structures for project implementation in order to 
draw analogies with NEPAD’s project organisation management, the afore-
mentioned structures may be described as relying on aggregated data for decision-
making; they are also more likely to rely on (mostly) inappropriate economic, 
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political, international relations concepts to forecast or determine events that may 
occur or not occur during project implementation.  
 
In addition, the afore-mentioned structures/trans-state actors appear to generally 
represent NEPAD’s perceived status/importance in the management of 
institutional relationships or collective agreements between north and south, or 
between Africa and the industrialised countries, or between the various spatial 
categories (at international, regional, sub-regional and national levels) – rather 
than being properly constituted project structures with multi-/trans-sectoral and 
multi-/trans-disciplinary experts including project management professionals. As 
a result, rather than focusing on projects, the planning processes or forums for 
collective engagement in NEPAD’s case have tended to evolve, in a number of 
instances, into protracted discussions on political trans-state trans-actions and 
matters of national interest (by various national representatives), which have 
implications for what/who is included/excluded in the Infrastructure STAP in 
terms of national interest or sub-regional concerns.  
 
At times, the afore-mentioned forums focus on the enunciation and negotiation of 
individual national positions on the various matters under discussion, rather than 
the task at hand i.e., programme/implementation planning  (author’s personal 
experience during the following NEPAD/NEPAD-related meetings: 7th
Therefore, NEPAD’s discussions on projects tended to reflect either diplomatic/ 
political concerns, or national/regional interests at the various spatial 
categories/member states that needed to be accommodated during programme/ 
project planning and implementation. As a result, all the participating structures in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP have appeared to perceive the levels of 
 Meeting 
of the NEPAD Extended Steering Committee + G8, 14-17 May 2002, Maputo, 
Mozambique; Multi-country Meeting of the Medium Sized Project (MSP) of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), UNEP/GEF and select national 
representatives, 01-04 June 2002, Dakar: Senegal; NEPAD Implementation 
Workshop, 02-04 August 2002, Addis Ababa: Ethiopia).  
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management at which they operate as a measure of their status, or role of their 
respective constituencies in Africa’s development agenda, rather than being a 
reflection of the links developed between institutional arrangements, action 
planning/performance management and structures for implementation 
management to ensure effective programme/project performance. NEPAD has 
also failed to elaborate or clarify these afore-mentioned relationships, either at 
programme or project levels.  
 
Therefore, the formal, protracted decision-making and bureaucratic characteristics 
of institutional structures for implementation management/coordination in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP instigate, reflect or reinforce the prevalent 
artificial divide between strategy and implementation. In the scenario depicted 
above, programmes/projects, essentially the raison d’être for such meetings, 
appear to be mere side-shows to the political or trans-state discussions. The afore-
mentioned outcomes may be aggravated by the conduct of personalities or 
behaviours of the participating personages at the various levels of management/ 
planning in so far as these aspects affect project delivery; or the lack of alignment 
between the diverse platforms for collective engagement at the various spatial 
categories and institutional structures for implementation management/ 
coordination; or any combination of the afore-mentioned issues.  
 
Arguably, NEPAD’s prescriptive approach to planning of the regional 
infrastructure programme has provided fertile ground for the manifestation of the 
afore-mentioned complexities, with implications for implementation delays. In the 
final analysis, the singular casting of blame on RECs as the primary cause of 
implementation challenges/delays in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP provides 
minimal or no explanation of the dysfunctional relationship between NEPAD’s 
approach to planning (including its approach to project management functions) 
and institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate the development of 
regional infrastructure.  
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7.2.2 Sequence of project establishment interventions: a barometer for the extent 
of political support at various levels of management  
 
A project management perspective may also offer explanations for NEPAD’s 
failure to garner political support at national levels at the various stages of the 
project life cycle, particularly during conception of the Infrastructure STAP, and 
illustrate the implications of the afore-mentioned for implementation progress. 
According to Paul (1990), the sequence of programme establishment 
interventions, or the manner in which a programme is set up reveals the 
underlying degree of political support, with implications for the extent of political 
support for the implementation of development programmes/projects at the lower 
levels of management. Paul’s analysis (ibid) may provide a different perspective 
on some of the reasons for the perceived lack of political support for the 
implementation of NEPAD’s programmes.  
 
To illustrate this dynamic, Paul (ibid) identified two options for project 
establishment interventions: 
  
(i) The first option involves, as the initial step, a policy decision for a public 
intervention. Thereafter, a suitable leader is identified to plan, manage the 
programme, prepare the detailed strategy, and recommend programme plans. 
According to Paul (ibid), this option signifies “a high degree of trust in the 
programme leader by the political leadership and reflects the political 
leadership’s willingness to share ‘power’ with the programme leader in the 
program’s planning and implementation.”         
 
(ii) The second option also involves taking the initial step to make a policy 
decision for a public intervention; this step is thereafter followed by the 
detailed specification of programme goals and strategy development. Lastly, 
a programme leader or manager, who merely “steps in only as an 
implementor” (ibid: 25), is appointed. According to Paul (ibid), this option 
presents a “classic illustration” of the dichotomy between policy and 
implementation; or what Mintzberg (1994) referred to as the separation 
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between strategy and implementation, or thinking and acting.  Paul (1990) 
noted this option also reflects a relatively low level of political commitment 
and support. As he argued, the “power” allocated to the programme leader is 
limited and “there is little appreciation of the need for interaction between 
policy and implementation by the programme leader” (ibid).  
 
The sequence of programme establishment interventions discussed above is 
illustrated in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Sequence of Programme Establishment Interventions  
 
Route A Route B 
Policy decision Policy decision 
Identification of key programme leader/manager Specification of programme goals-strategy 
Establishment of agency with broad goals-mandate Establishment of programme agency 
Specification of programme goals-strategy Creation of organizational structure 
Choice of adaptation of organizational structure Appointment of key programme leader/manager 
Implementation Implementation 
Source: Paul, S. (1990).   Strategic Management of Development Programmes: Guidelines for action, p.26. 
 
The programme leader may include natural or juristic persons such as individuals, 
or institutional structures; the institutional structures may, or may not be duly 
authorised with the legal capacity to act (such as NEPAD’s HSGIC, SC and 
Secretariat, or RECs). In addition, natural persons may include political leaders, 
senior civil servants, advisors to political leaders, and other senior administrators 
in public-sector institutions. According to Paul (ibid: 26), the sequence of 
decisions flowing from policies to programmes and finally to implementation, as 
illustrated in Table 7.1, are two extremes of interventions to establish 
development programmes. In reality, Paul (ibid) argued that the sequence of 
interventions is likely to fall in-between, based on project’s specificity. Route A, 
for example, is preferred in situations involving complex technologies: the 
elaboration of the requisite programme elements and their implementation 
requires a high level of technical expertise that political leaders are usually 
unfamiliar with (ibid).    
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7.2.2.1 Implications of the sequence of programme establishment interventions for 
NEPAD 
 
Using Paul’s analysis of the sequence of programme establishment interventions, 
and their implications for development programmes/projects, the following 
inferences may be drawn for NEPAD:  
 
• First, NEPAD appears to have adopted a combination of the two options 
depicted in Table 7.1 at different levels of management/planning and stages 
of the project life cycle. At the integrative level of management, the various 
OAU Summit mandates to the Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika, Obasanjo and 
Wade regarding the different policy interventions (see: NEPAD, 2002f; 
NEPAD, 2002h), the subsequent consolidation of the diverse strategies and 
programme goals in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework, and the formation of 
NEPAD’s governance and management structures (ibid) are comparable to 
the sequence of programme establishment interventions described under 
Route A. This sequence of programme establishment interventions suggests 
a high level of political support to NEPAD’s founding political leaders, and 
the preparedness by the other OAU HoSG to share their power with the 
political leadership of the NEPAD (i.e., NEPAD’s founding HoSG: 
Presidents of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa). 
  
• Second, at the strategic level of management, the establishment of NEPAD’s 
governance and management structures (including the HSGIC, SC and 
Secretariat,) and the various organisational structures for implementation 
management/coordination was finalised after the approval of the programme 
goals and strategy. This sequence of interventions is comparable to the 
second option in Route B. According to Paul (1990: 25), the sequence of 
interventions described under Route B “…reflect(s) a relatively low level of 
political commitment and support. The “power” allocated to the programme 
leader is limited and there is little appreciation of the need for interaction 
between policy and implementation by the programme leader (author’s 
emphasis).” In NEPAD’s case, the programme leader may refer to the 
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collective of NEPAD’s governance and management structures, particularly 
so since the roles and responsibilities for the strategic programme and 
implementation of its sectoral plans appear to have been apportioned across 
the various levels of management (including the HSGIC, SC and 
Secretariat), rather than in the Secretariat alone with its internal 
organisational structures. This situation is confusing and may contribute to 
difficulties to apportion accountability for implementation challenges. 
 
7.2.2.2 Comparison with the LPA’s sequence of programme establishment 
interventions  
 
The sequence of programme establishment interventions described in Route A is 
comparable to the one adopted for structures at the strategic levels of management 
in the development of the LPA (see: LPA, 1980). According to Adedegi (2002: 
37), the development of the LPA was “…the culmination of a four-year long 
effort, initiated and led by the…(UNECA) to undertake an agonising review of 
the development paradigms and strategies that Africa had pursued since 
independence in 1960.” Subsequently, the OAU resolved to call “on the Secretary 
General (of the OAU), in collaboration with the Executive Secretary of 
the…(UNECA), to draw up annually specific programmes and measures for 
economic co-operation on a sub-regional, regional and continental bases in 
Africa” (LPA, 1980: Para. 3(iv): 5). With the adoption of the detailed programme 
goals and strategy specified in the LPA and the FAL, the OAU then called for the 
establishment of structures for project implementation at the operational levels of 
management, such as the RECs and MULPOCs. The Summit of HoSG also 
mandated the OAU and its General Secretariat “to enlist the active support of the 
international community as well as of the relevant international organisations” 
(ibid: 7). 
  
As illustrated above, the OAU’s Secretary General and the Executive Secretary of 
the UNECA were mandated to ensure the establishment of agencies or structures 
“at national, sub-regional and regional levels to facilitate attainment of the 
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objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment” (ibid, Para. 3 (iii): 4), and to 
coordinate implementation on behalf of the African governments and peoples. 
The establishment of the identified structures for implementation was in 
alignment with the HoSG’s resolution “to adopt a far-reaching regional approach 
based primarily on collective self-reliance” (ibid, Para. 1: 4).  In adopting the LPA 
and FAL, the African HoSG made emotive declarations of African ownership. 
These declarations were arguably also meant to demonstrate the levels of political 
commitment and support accorded the programme at the highest levels.  
 
For example, the LPA’s declaration read as follows:  
 
…we are conscious of the tremendous effort which will be required of us, 
individually and collectively, to attain the goals we have set for ourselves in 
these documents. We are confident that we have the determination to 
overcome the obstacles that may lie in our path and that our Organisation and 
its Secretariat will be able to enlist the active support of the international 
community as well as of the relevant international organisations (ibid: 7).   
 
(The LPA’s declaration bears some striking similarities to NEPAD’s declaration, 
which reads as follows: 
 
This New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African 
leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that 
they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, 
both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and 
development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world 
economy and body politic. The programme is anchored on the determination 
of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of 
underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world (NEPAD, 2001, 
Para.1: 1).)   
 
It is common cause that the LPA’s implementation never took off: various 
analysts (Anyang’ Nyongo’, 2002; N’diaye, 2002) have acknowledged that in 
over 20 years since the LPA’s inception, not much was achieved in practical 
terms. Mkandawire (2002: 106) argued that the reliance on the institutional 
mechanisms of the developing countries for implementation and, in particular, 
financial support contributed to the LPA’s failure. For the same reasons, various 
African intellectuals have raised concerns regarding NEPAD’s inordinate reliance 
on the institutional mechanisms and arrangements of the developed countries for 
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implementation support, as depicted in the detailed SWOT analysis presented in 
APPENDIX F and discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
The discussion above suggests that NEPAD’s sequence of project establishment 
interventions at the various levels management may be used as indicators of the 
levels of political support for the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP and related programmes. Significantly, the example of the sequence of 
programme establishment interventions in the LPA vis-à-vis NEPAD suggests 
that political commitment and support in Africa’s development programmes/ 
projects, either at the integrative or strategic levels of management, or both, offer 
no guarantee for successful implementation. Thus, other collective interventions 
are required at the various levels of management and spatial categories for 
successful project implementation, particularly at national levels, subject to 
situational and project specificity.  
 
In the development of cross-border  regional infrastructure, some of the key 
interventions that may be considered at the various levels of management, in 
addition to political support and commitment, include the following: active role of 
the state; transformational leadership; institutional reform/development; broad-
based and popular participation in development programmes/projects, which 
includes active participation by business and public-sector institutions/ 
institutional structures as well as civil society formations; adequate domestic 
resource mobilisation in order to facilitate effective project conception, 
development and implementation in relation to situational specificity; simplified 
project objectives within the capacity of institutional structures to implement 
subject to the available resource envelopes; adequate planning at the various 
stages of the project life cycle; and effective management of project management 
functions and institutional relationships between trans-state actors and various 
spatial categories.  
 
Various permutations of the afore-mentioned interventions may be combined 
subject to project and situational specificity. In particular, broad-based and 
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popular participation appears to provide the rationale, impetus and monitoring 
mechanisms for the effective and efficient implementation of development 
projects within, and between the various spatial categories. Rarely, if at all, will 
development programmes/projects that have failed to ensure broad-based and 
popular participation be implemented successfully – and in a sustained manner 
too.  
 
The various interventions depicted above also denote the requisite ingredients in 
the implementation of development programmes for change based on collective 
self-reliance at, and between the various spatial categories. Therefore, the 
prevalent citing of lack of political support/commitment at national levels as one 
of the primary reasons for tardy implementation in NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP, in addition to lack of institutional capacity in RECs, appears to ignore 
omissions of other key ingredients for successful implementation, as depicted 
above. In any event, according to the sequence of programme establishment 
interventions depicted above, the manner in which NEPAD’s programme was 
developed, and its structures constituted, ensured that it would have limited 
political support at national levels (or other spatial categories) because of its 
prescriptive and disempowering processes on the institutional structures that 
would ultimately perform the work of projects on the ground.    
 
7.3 Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives on NEPAD’s Responses  
 
7.3.1 Management of development programmes/projects vis-à-vis the role of the 
state 
 
Political and socio-economic analyses of NEPAD’s performance underscore the 
negative impact of Africa’s political economy on the implementation of 
development programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned situation is intensified 
by the adverse role of the neo-patrimonial state in the implementation of Africa’s 
development programmes/projects. For example, similar to the planning 
perspective proffered above, some analyses have attributed implementation failure 
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in Africa’s previous development programmes to the endemic lack of popular 
consultation. The perceived “elitist” trans-actions in development programmes/ 
projects, which are underpinned by the prevalence of patron-client relations and 
corruption, are cited as the reasons for project implementation failures or the 
elaboration of programmes/projects with little relevance to address the identified 
development needs, constraints and challenges on the ground.  
 
Some authors have viewed NEPAD in similar fashion. As Taylor (2005: 18) 
argued, the lack of inclusive planning has manifested in the proposal of “elitist 
programmes” by some few detached technocrats or African HoSG. Thus, the 
prevalence in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP of inoperative or discredited modes 
in the management of Africa’s development programmes/projects suggests that 
NEPAD has made minimal efforts to address some of the entrenched 
underpinning causes to project implementation failures at the various spatial 
categories.  
 
These afore-mentioned causes include the failure to reform/develop archaic or 
inadequate institutions and to develop the requisite institutional capacity to 
facilitate successful project implementation. According to Taylor (ibid: 76), the 
prevalent failure in institutional reform/development in Africa’s development 
landscape is attributable to the imperative to maintain corrupt patronage networks 
and client relations in Africa’s neo-patrimonial state. As Taylor (ibid) asserts: 
“What is avoided...by hook or crook, is structural reform and policies aimed at 
broad-based development.” However, the role of neo-colonialism, which is 
perpetuated by inadequate institutions/institutional structures in fomenting and 
abetting neo-patrimonialism and the related corrupt patronage networks, appears 
to be ignored in arguments to establish some of the underpinning causes to the 
failure of Africa’s development programmes.  
 
Cognisant of the arguments depicted above, it is possible that NEPAD has viewed 
any enforcement of (or efforts to facilitate) institutional reforms/development at 
the various spatial categories, particularly at national levels in alignment with its 
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(NEPAD’s) articulated policy strategy/response actions, as too contentions. This 
is because of the potential to create frictions in inter-state relations and trans-state 
trans-actions at the various spatial categories, or in the fragile relations between 
regional/sub-regional structures and member states through the enforcement of the 
requisite measures for effective delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, 
particularly so in the absence of a legally binding institutional framework for such 
enforcement mechanisms. (The afore-mentioned view takes cognisance of the 
implications for such interventions of the principle of sovereignty, which 
underpins inter-/trans-state relations in Africa’s political and socio-economic 
landscape, and (presumably) impacts on the development of cross-border regional 
infrastructure projects.)  
 
In this regard, by failing to enforce the planned and requisite institutional 
reforms/development and capacity building at national levels, NEPAD appears to 
have simply acquiesced to national prerogatives that are inimical to effective 
interventions for the development of regional infrastructure. Under the 
circumstances, delegating the functions for institutional reforms/development and 
capacity building to RECs, or recommending that RECs develop binding “legal 
frameworks” with supranational status, enforcement mechanisms and powers of 
sanction to compel member states to comply with collective agreements (TCII & 
NEPAD, 2005: 105) merely delays requisite action to ameliorate the status quo. It 
is also possible NEPAD’s action signifies its lack of power/relevant authority to 
enforce institutional reform/development at national levels (in addition to its lack 
of institutional capacity including resources to perform its delegated/assumed 
tasks).  
 
Therefore, the recommendations in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews that 
RECs perform roles beyond their levels of authority or capacity provides an 
effective mechanism to obscure NEPAD’s limitations in its assumed/professed 
roles as a facilitating mechanism, or mobilizer of political will and effective 
platform for collective engagement in Africa’s development trajectory. The 
“capacity deficits” (Hope, 2006) and institutional failures in RECs provide a 
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plausible explanation for the fallibilities of NEPAD’s governance and 
management structures in the implementation failures of the Infrastructure STAP.  
In other words, the weak institutional structures, or the acknowledged lack of 
institutional capacity for implementation in RECs or member states provide 
credible justification for implementation delays in NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
An internal reading of NEPAD’s approach to the development of regional 
infrastructure suggests that the scenario depicted above was a foregone 
conclusion. It is also possible that covert agendas of international institutions/ 
institutional structures – who may desire to maintain the status quo in order to 
serve their narrow mercantilist interests, or the inhibiting provisions of certain 
collective agreements and funding constraints have contributed to NEPAD’s 
inability to facilitate the requisite institutional reforms/development and capacity 
building at the various spatial categories. Some analyses also suggest that the lack 
of implementation progress may be condoned by the development partners, or at 
least ignored despite the rhetoric to the contrary, in order to perpetuate the status 
quo i.e., Africa’s perennial underdevelopment for the benefit of others. 
(According to Taylor (2005: 76), the failure to reform/develop inadequate 
institutions and to develop institutional structures characterises the charade in 
traditional relations between Africa’s ruling elites, donors and IFIs.) It is also 
possible that any combination of the afore-mentioned issues has resulted in 
NEPAD’s failure to enforce the reform/development of inadequate institutions.  
 
Thus, the afore-mentioned failures to integrate NEPAD’s intra-/multi-sectoral and 
intra-/multidisciplinary response actions during the development of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP appear to confirm Taylor’s argument above. Similarly, 
NEPAD’s failure to ensure/enforce the consistent cascade or integration of key 
elements of its response actions and pre-conditions to development contradict 
NEPAD’s articulated commitment (NEPAD, 2001) to the implementation of 
transformational development interventions to change the conditions that underpin 
the status quo in Africa’s development agenda. The afore-mentioned failures may 
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also be construed as a dereliction of duty by NEPAD’s governance and 
management structures, to supervise programme development in terms of their 
obligations in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework.  
 
7.3.2 A continuation of previous practices and behaviours in the implementation 
of development programmes/projects? 
 
The lack of commitment in NEPAD to implement agreed regional development 
plans, programmes or projects is not new. Previously, the lack of commitment by 
Africa’s (political) leadership to the effective implementation of their 
development plans has been identified as one of the perennial poor leadership 
behaviours to blight Africa’s development landscape (Adedegi, 2002; Gelb, 2001; 
Mills, 2002; N’diaye, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; Taylor, 2005). As President Wade of 
Senegal argued (cited in Taylor, 2005: 43), “The previous projects (in Africa’s 
development programmes) were made to be put in drawers! There wasn’t even an 
attempt to implement them. Not even the slightest attempt!” Similarly, one 
commentator in Food Security (ibid: 44) had the following to say about Africa’s 
implementation failures of regional programmes/collective agreements: “African 
Governments have largely failed to act on African-initiated programmes and 
plans. They have failed to act on the decisions reached at different levels of their 
own continental meetings, including summit conferences.” Yet, NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP appears not to address the range of issues that underlie the 
identified failures in a holistic and coherent manner, within a framework of 
integrated development.  
 
NEPAD, in its Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001), undertook to address this 
afore-mentioned perennial lack of commitment to the implementation of 
collective agreements. Thus, the frustration displayed by President Wade at 
NEPAD’s failure to ensure implementation progress of the Infrastructure STAP 
and related sectoral programmes/projects provides some insights into the slow 
pace of transformation in the implementation of Africa’s development 
programmes, or the lack of change from unproductive behaviours that have 
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previously blighted the implementation of Africa’s previous development 
initiatives.  
 
Taylor (2005: 44) also argued that the afore-mentioned concerns by President 
Wade dispelled notions advanced in some quarters regarding the “heroic efforts” 
made by African HoSG to ensure the implementation of their programmes. 
Arguably, the afore-mentioned concerns instead confirm the inherent risks for 
implementation in regional plans/projects developed or supported by Africa’s 
HoSG, or Ministerial Committees in RECs. Of concern is that the discussions 
above also suggest that even the consistent cascade of NEPAD’s response 
actions/policy strategy may achieve nothing: the fundamental (adverse) premises 
for the management of Africa’s development programmes/projects at the various 
spatial categories still remain the same.  
 
To reiterate, some of the key response actions in NEPAD’s approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure, which the developers of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP failed to consistently integrate into all the various 
infrastructure sectors in order to facilitate the development of institutional 
capacity for current implementation and for spatial expansion, include the 
following: institutional reform/development; broad-based and popular 
participation; institutional capacity assessment; and institutional capacity building 
at the different levels of management and spatial categories (see: NEPAD, 2001). 
In the circumstances, it is difficult to envisage how NEPAD will attain the 
development objectives it has set for itself, given the failure to ensure the 
implementation of its own strategic policy directives in the different sectoral 
interventions or at the lower levels of management.  
 
The vagaries of the external/internal institutional environment in which the 
development programmes/projects are implemented exacerbate the status quo.  As 
Taylor (ibid: 46) argued, as an example, the strictures of democracy, and good 
governance promoted by NEPAD are unrealistic in Africa’s context. According to 
Taylor (ibid): 
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…the logic and modus operandi of neopatrimonial rule and the dominance 
and nature of extractive economies in Africa, and their relationships with the 
international system, mean that Nepad’s strictures on good governance and 
democracy cannot be implemented without eroding the nature of the 
postcolonial African state and undermining the positions of incumbent elites 
– an unlikely position…Essentially, what is argued is that Nepad (and studies 
endorsing its credibility) ignore the reality that power in African politics 
must be understood as the utilization of patrimonial power and not the 
performance of legitimacy drawn from the sovereign will of the people. In 
other words, in spite of the façade of the modern state, power in most African 
polities progresses informally, between patron and client along the lines of 
political reciprocity, is intensely personalized, and is not exercised on behalf 
of the public good. ‘The state itself remains the major vortex of political 
conflict precisely because it presides over the allocation of strategic 
resources and opportunities for profit making’…And the extractive and often 
enclavist nature of many African economies serves to create a situation 
whereby broad-based economic activity and long-term planning for 
development militates against the imperatives of neopatrimonialism…In 
short, to have an Africa based on the enunciated principles of Nepad would 
actually erode the material base upon which the neopratrimonial state is 
predicated. And yet Nepad seems to advance the idea that the very same 
African elites who benefit from the neopatrimonial state will now commit a 
form of class suicide. The possibility seems improbable.        
 
Cognisant of the discussions above, one may conclude that NEPAD’s conflicting 
statements regarding the RECs’ performance allude to (concerning) diverse 
rationale for the RECs’ participation in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Such 
rationale may have little or no relation to the desire for effective implementation 
of regional/sub-regional infrastructure projects, or the development of institutional 
capacity for implementation of current pilot programmes/projects and future 
spatial expansion at the various spatial categories. The more concerning of such 
rationale may be to obfuscate the role and non-performance of NEPAD’s 
governance and management structures in the delivery of regional infrastructure 
in terms of their articulated obligations.  
 
Similarly, one may argue that NEPAD’s implementation of the Infrastructure 
STAP, in particular cross-border facilitation programmes/projects like the roads 
programme, may be premised upon erroneous assumptions regarding the needs to 
be addressed and sources of implementation support. This may have has resulted 
in NEPAD’s proposal of irrelevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
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implementation support, thereby resulting in some of the outcomes depicted 
below: 
  
• selective cascade of NEPAD’s response actions/policy strategy in order to 
suit the prerogatives for global integration/connectivity, openness and 
competitiveness at the expense of supporting the attainment of NEPAD’s 
multiple objectives in alignment with the requirements for integrated 
development; 
• ineffective prioritisation of programmes/projects;  
• erroneous sequencing of project establishment interventions, which may 
militate against broad-based initiatives to address the identified challenges 
and constraints in the development of regional infrastructure, in particular 
cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation, cognisant 
of the limited resources and lack of institutional capacity;  
• inadequate delegation of relevant authority to empower institutional 
structures to do the work of projects; and  
• inefficient project scope and project organisation management.  
 
NEPAD’s articulated global efforts also seem destined for nought without a 
systematic assessment of the influence of the complex institutional environment 
on the implementation of regional/sub-regional programmes/projects, in particular 
NEPAD’s, to inform the requisite support at national levels. This is because 
NEPAD appears to not have addressed the underlying influences to the identified 
constraints to the provision of regional/sub-regional infrastructure in a coherent 
manner, particularly at national levels. NEPAD also appears to have failed to 
manage the interface between the various spatial categories, particularly between 
sub-regional and national levels, in so far as it impacts on the implementation of 
its plans. In the circumstances, the assertions made by NEPAD’s officials in 
Chapter 4 regarding the NEPAD’s/Secretariat’s efforts to build states’ capacity 
and to ensure adherence to NEPAD’s values in support of project implementation 
at national levels are questionable given the tenuous relationship between national 
programmes/projects and NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. 
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As a result, the persistence of the age-old challenges that have blighted the 
implementation of Africa’s development programmes, including the intractable 
lack of institutional capacity at national levels, raise the spectre of implementation 
failure in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. As Clapham (ibid) argues, 
“…if…functions cannot be efficiently performed, as is unquestionably the case 
for a large number of African states, then developmental policies which depend 
on them will fail.” Therefore, the focus on lack of institutional capacity in RECs 
obfuscates the range of underpinning causal factors to implementation challenges 
in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP: it deflects attention from the tenuous 
relationship between NEPAD’s programme and various spatial categories, in 
particular at national levels. Thus, the lack of committed political support at 
national levels does not augur well for the effective implementation of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP.  
 
7.3.3 Paradox of low intra-African trade for the development of cross-border 
regional transport/roads infrastructure  
 
Poor intra-African trade presents a paradox for the development of regional roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation projects. As a result, there currently exists 
minimal incentive for African countries to invest in the development of regional 
roads infrastructure networks, or cross-border TTF systems in order to support 
NEPAD’s (or their) aspirations for regional development/integration. Just as 
NEPAD argued that there can be no trade without (transport) infrastructure 
(NEPAD, 2002c), investment in roads infrastructure for internal coherence 
appears uneconomical in the current environment of insignificant intra-African 
trade; or where basic economic and physical infrastructure to increase the 
individual countries’ productivity is lacking; or where the trade benefits are not 
equitably distributed amongst member-states in a sub-regional block, or REC, in 
order to facilitate cooperative sub-regional support for the development of 
improved transportation networks. 
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Circuitously, inefficiencies in the provision of Africa’s cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure contributes to increased transaction costs, poor intra-
African trade, the exclusion of various groups from trans-state and trans-regional 
entrepreneurial activities as well as Africa’s marginalisation in global trade. Poor 
intra-regional trade, however, is caused by a number of complex factors, including 
dissimilar trade profiles between the various countries and sub-regional blocks as 
a consequence of the diverse FTAs and RTA with institutions/countries of the 
developed north (such as the EU’s Cotonou Agreement, TICAD I & II, OECD, 
multilateral/bilateral donors, USA-AGOA, Franco-Africa Partnership, and so on). 
In the short-term, the tied aid in trade-related packages (e.g., provision of aid to 
support export promotion, sourcing of goods and services from donor countries, 
and so on), impede effective interventions for the removal of barriers to cross-
border movement of goods and services in alignment with Africa’s plans for 
regional integration as well as for internal coherence. Therefore, a significant 
question is: What burning platform will create a compelling need and 
commitment from African governments to invest in intra-/inter-regional roads 
infrastructure?   
 
A significant dimension, however, is that the implications of poor regional 
transport infrastructure for informal trade, the mode of survival for the majority of 
Africa’s citizens, appear to be ignored in NEPAD’s roads programme. Soko 
(2006: 20-21), for example, argued that non-tariff barriers hinder informal trade 
and the development of small and medium size enterprises (SMMEs). In this 
regard, the use of conventional transport theory and related models (that 
presumably underpin NEPAD’s approach to the roads programme) may stymie 
the development of informal trade and its contribution to the development of 
cross-border regional infrastructure to meet effective demand.  
 
For example, inputs/outputs of informal trade are not accounted for in 
conventional transport theory, which uses complex mathematical modelling to 
analyse the existing transport systems vis-à-vis the prevailing trade patterns (in 
the context of transit facilitation). The (conventional) models used in the 
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conventional transport theory only recognise formal inputs based on past 
performance. For these reasons, some authors (Castells, 1977) have previously 
criticised the focus of conventional transport theory on manifest demand, coupled 
with its inability to measure latent demand. The presumed use of conventional 
transportation models for the design of NEPAD’s regional transport/roads 
infrastructure projects, given the endorsement of “tried and tested” approaches to 
the design of NEPAD’s transit facilitation and regional roads infrastructure 
projects (NEPAD, 2002c), may perpetuate rather than transform the current 
fragmentary transportation patterns.  
 
The problem to design relevant programmes/projects, however, may also be 
related to the lack of reliable informal trade data that can be used for 
transportation modelling in order to provide adequate justification (to potential 
investors) for funding cross-border regional roads infrastructure for internal 
coherence. Informal trade data would also be useful for national governments and 
RECs to identify additional sources of revenues, and a larger tax base from road 
levies; it may also assist to unlock potential investment by national governments 
in specified inter-/intra-regional geographical areas in order to support the long-
term integrated development of “production” and “reproduction spaces,” and 
therefore facilitate the creation of transportation networks for internal coherence. 
 
Thus, alternative independent income streams have the potential to alleviate some 
of the pressures for reliable road funding at sub-regional and national levels. In 
addition, an independent revenue base increases the possibility for improved 
provision of various transport types to cater for diverse users, and to support the 
implementation of complementary investments in other socio-economic projects. 
Therefore, adequate institutional mechanisms need to be developed to collate 
informal trade data that will support the development of relevant cross-border 
regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services. In this 
regard, the ability to assess effective demand, given the complexity of 
information-gathering processes involved, emerges as a key influence for the 
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analysis and design of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure 
programmes/projects.  
 
The contribution of various stakeholder groups is critical in this context. A study 
to analyse actions by politicians, users, service providers, and other stakeholders 
in the water sector (Wambia, 1987) provides valuable insights into the complex 
interrelationships between institutional arrangements, power structures and policy 
outcomes to ensure the desired efficiencies in the provision of infrastructure. The 
study, however, established that adequate capacity is required for the task; also, 
some relevant information is difficult to obtain. As the study asserts: “…the 
ability to get adequate information on power groups within a society is difficult 
and time consuming and the ability to analyse it in a concise manageable fashion 
is cumbersome” (ibid: i). 
 
A conclusion drawn from the discussion above is that NEPAD’s development of 
cross-border regional roads infrastructure and related services needs to take 
cognisance that different efficiency measures assume different levels of 
significance for different users. Such efficiency measures, however, are all 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing; they are subject to the nature of 
interventions to address the identified challenges and needs.  
 
Thus, NEPAD may not have adequately explored a number of possibilities for the 
development of efficient cross-border regional roads infrastructure in order to 
support the attainment of it’s articulated multiple objectives. NEPAD’s approach, 
instead, appears to cater exclusively to the needs of the dominant groups (i.e., IFIs 
and foreign private sector companies), thereby entrenching the inequitable power 
relations between Africa and the developed countries/institutions. For these 
reasons, the further exploration of suggestions posited above would facilitate 
relevant programme/project design and the development of institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management that are more 
inclusive and representative of the various segments of African society than what 
is currently provided under NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and roads programme.   
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The discussion above also highlights the need to prioritise programme elements 
and related projects to facilitate integrated development of intra-African trade and 
cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure. As a starting point, the initial 
steps of harmonising the various transport-sector policies, regulatory and 
governance regimes in various member states in a REC may instigate the requisite 
institutional reforms/development in the transport sector at the various spatial 
categories in all the sub-regions of the AU. Given the tendency of transport 
policy, regulatory and governance regimes to entrench national prerogatives, it is 
possible that processes to ensure commitment to harmonisation at national levels 
will be complex, emotive and protracted. This view also takes cognisance of the 
time consuming processes for collective engagement to effect harmonisation, 
which may result in possible delays to develop and implement cross-border 
regional transport/roads projects. Inadequate transport-sector regimes may also 
impede the implementation of relevant socio-economic downstream interventions 
to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of cross-border regional roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation services and vice versa. In this context, 
strong political will be required to implement far-reaching transformational 
interventions and to facilitate the development of relevant enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure compliance to collective agreements by member-states. 
 
7.3.4 Impact of low productivity and poor economic growth on the development 
of regional (transport/roads) infrastructure  
 
NEPAD’s link of regional infrastructure development with productivity suggests 
the prioritisation of the development of regional infrastructure as a precursor to 
improving Africa’s productivity and, by implication, economic growth. As 
NEPAD (2001, Para. 98: 22) stated:    
 
If Africa had the same basic infrastructure as developed countries, it would 
be in a more favourable position to focus on production and on improving 
productivity for international competition. The structural gap in 
infrastructure constitutes a very serious handicap to economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Improved infrastructure, including the cost and reliability 
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of services, would benefit both Africa and the international community, 
which would be able to obtain African goods and services more cheaply.    
 
NEPAD’s position, depicted above, appears to ignore the role of institutions in the 
development of infrastructure: it also reflects a modernist bias on economic 
growth at the expense of the improvement of the quality of life for the majority of 
Africans – the objective of development. For example, Rostow’s growth theory 
used measures of material productivity, such as the GDP, as indices to measure 
economic progress (Fair, 1982: 6). The theory ignored other non-material indices 
that, for example, focus on the maximisation of social welfare (ibid). As a result, 
NEPAD’s tenuous link of Africa’s productivity with the development of regional 
infrastructure may be construed as equating development with economic growth. 
In this respect, NEPAD’s position appears to nullify the espoused integrated 
development measures to support the attainment of it’s articulated multiple 
objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. NEPAD’s position is 
also inimical to the development of a holistic approach to address the constraints 
and challenges in cross-border regional roads infrastructure to support the 
objectives of integrated development.  
 
Significantly, NEPAD’s stance appears to reveal a selective analysis and 
interpretation of structural constraints in the provision of regional infrastructure at 
the various spatial categories, and of Africa’s poor productivity. NEPAD’s stance 
also appears to contradict its articulated prerogative for the development of 
regional infrastructure namely, poverty reduction (NEPAD, 2001; 2002c). In this 
regard, poverty reduction appears to be an add-on, or it is used as a mechanisms to 
elicit support from institutions/institutional mechanisms and structures of the 
developed north.  
 
NEPAD’s views are, however, typical of reformist thinking about the 
redistribution of income. As McCarthy (Fair, 1987: 37) explained: “…the 
importance attached to redistribution and greater equality is not the result of 
viewing equality in income as a goal in its own right, but rather of the objective to 
eradicate poverty.” Similar views have been espoused in the contemporary global 
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debates on finance for sustainable development of global public goods 
encapsulated in the UN’s Millennium Declaration, Zedillo Report, and the UN’s 
MDGs (see: DBSA, 2003). These afore-mentioned premises have been 
incorporated in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework.  
 
As a result, NEPAD appears to link poverty reduction with the development of the 
whole economy, without making attempts to elaborate or institute institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements to support pro-poor development interventions in 
the development of regional infrastructure – amongst other requisite pertinent 
political, spatial, socio-economic interventions to reform/develop inadequate 
institutions. This perspective ignores Africa’s specificity. As argued by Onimode 
(cited in Ekpo, 2002: 168), Africa’s challenges are structural as they are also 
historical: they evolve from the weak nation-states inherited from colonial 
governments, exacerbated by the neo-colonial and post-SAPs crises (Anyang’ 
Nyong’o, 1990; Cheru, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Gelb, 2001). These crises 
inhibited the development of efficient, capable states that could deliver 
progressive development outcomes on behalf of their citizens, as measured 
through material and non-material indices.  
 
In addition, neo-patrimonial state relations, autocratic regimes, mal-governance 
and corruption have exacerbated the status quo (Gelb, 2001; Mills, 2002; Taylor, 
2005; Zenawi, 2002). As a result of the afore-mentioned issues, including a host 
of other related political, spatial, and socio-economic concerns, African states are 
characterised by the ineffective employment of factors of production. The afore-
mentioned issues have resulted in Africa being consigned to the periphery of 
development. Significantly, NEPAD acknowledged the prevalence of the afore-
mentioned issues and their deleterious impact on Africa’s development landscape 
(see NEPAD, 2001, Para.18-26:4-6). Yet, the simultaneous acceptance and denial 
in NEPAD of the negative consequences of uneven development, globally and 
regionally, is confusing. It permeates NEPAD’s proposals for the development of 
regional infrastructure and even the characteristics of NEPAD’s underpinning 
principles for Africa’s development: these proposals have placed global 
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partnerships and shared responsibility at the centre- stage of Africa’s development 
trajectory, whilst espousing Africa’s determination for self-reliant management of 
its development agenda.  
 
As NEPAD (ibid, Para. 6-7:1-2) stated:  
 
We are convinced that an historic opportunity presents itself to end the 
scourge of underdevelopment that afflicts Africa. The resources, including 
capital, technology and human skill, that are required to launch a global war 
on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance and are within our 
reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, 
is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained 
human development effort and the eradication of poverty, as well as a new 
global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest. Across 
the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be 
conditioned by circumstance. We will determine our own destiny and call on 
the rest of the world to complement our efforts. There are already signs of 
progress and hope. Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection 
of human rights, people-centred development and market oriented economies 
are on the increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal 
to accept poor economic and political leadership. These developments are, 
however, inadequate and need to be further expedited.    
 
Yet, income disparities between the rich and the poor countries have never been 
as wide. According to Cornwell (Kotzè & Steyn, 2003: 71), the world’s economy 
has experienced unparalleled growth over the past 30 years: GDP has increased 
from US$4 trillion to US$ 23 trillion; the GDP share of 20% of the world’s richest 
countries has grown from 70% to 80%. Over the same period, the number of 
people living in poverty has increased: the world’s GDP share of the 20% poorest 
countries has declined from 2.4% to 1.4% (ibid).  According to Guma (ibid: 77), 
20% of the world’s richest countries receive an 82% share of global exports, while 
the poorest 20% receive only a 1% share; 20% of the world’s richest countries 
attract 75% of global FDI; the world’s poorest 20% attract a measly 1% of the 
world’s FDI. The afore-mentioned perspectives indicate that income disparity and 
polarisation between the rich and poor countries of the world are worsening. 
 
Similarly, Kotzè and Steyn (ibid) noted that economic growth in Africa has 
declined steadily since 1998. For example, in 1997 the combined total GNP for all 
forty-eight sub-Saharan economies, with approximately 760 million inhabitants, 
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amounted to approximately US$ 315 million: this was estimated to be comparable 
to Belgium’s GNP over the same period, but with only 10 million inhabitants 
(Ekpo, 2002; Mills, 2002; World Bank, 2000).  Over the same period, the median 
GDP was estimated at just over US$2 billion – about the output of a town of 
60,000 in a rich country (World Bank, 2000). Likewise, Mashele (2006:1) noted 
that although the African continent houses approximately 12% of the world’s 
population, it produces less than 5% of the world’s income; Africa currently 
accounts for less than 3% of global trade.   
 
Africa’s negligible contribution to global economic growth is also evidenced in its 
share of votes in global decision-making forums. For example, Boyle (Sunday 
Times, 17 September 2006: 3) averred that in the 24-member IMF Board, all 48 
sub-Saharan countries hold less than 5% of the vote: on the other hand, other 
powerful emerging economies (such as China, India, Turkey and Mexico,) hold 
6,5% of the IMF vote; the USA holds 17% of the vote. According to Schepers 
(2003: 32), the share of world trade in the WTO’s Group of 90 (G90), which 
brings together the world’s least developed economies including the majority in 
Africa, has hardly improved since 1986. In essence, the indices depicted above 
reflect Africa’s ineffective and inefficient employment of factors of production, 
inequitable global political power relations and adverse effects of global 
capitalism on weak African economies, resulting in their poor performance and 
disempowerment in global economic structures.  
  
The nature and quality of factors of production at the various spatial categories are 
particularly critical for effective projects’ identification, preparation and 
successful integrated implementation management, particularly in the context of 
integrated development, where different competencies are required. In the context 
of conventional approaches to support the broader objectives of development, 
trade-offs must be made regarding technological approaches and institutional 
alternatives to achieve holistic development objectives. So far, the contradictions 
and failures of development arising out of ineffective policies, poor 
implementation capacity of development programmes, and low levels of human 
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development in Africa’s sub-regions/countries are evidenced in the multifarious 
negative effects of underdevelopment.  
 
 As a result, a range of mutually reinforcing causes of low productivity in addition 
to poor infrastructure at the various spatial categories, have contributed to 
Africa’s underdevelopment. As Todaro (1985: 90) noted, “…low productivity, 
low incomes and low levels of living are mutually reinforcing phenomena 
(emphasis in the original). These factors constitute what Myrdal termed ‘circular 
and cumulative causation’: low incomes lead to low levels of living (low income, 
poor health and education, and so on), which keeps productivity low, which in 
turn perpetuates low incomes, and so on.”  Thus, rather than NEPAD’s emphasis 
on transport infrastructure as the antidote for Africa’s poor productivity and 
related development burdens, integrated multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-
disciplinary interventions will be required to address Africa’s poor productivity 
and consequential marginalisation in global trade/forums. These interventions 
include a focus on human development as the “missing link” in indices to 
measure development (Breytenbach 2002a), institutional reform/development, 
and the development of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories, 
particularly at national levels.  
 
Similarly, NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of 
management (NEPAD, 2001) as well as the articulated multiple objectives for the 
development of regional transport infrastructure (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c) 
articulate NEPAD’s intent for integrated development. Similarly, NEPAD’s 
choice of priority sectors and programmatic initiatives for implementation in its 
Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) was presumably meant to facilitate 
integrated development. Although NEPAD’s proposal of the afore-mentioned 
sectoral interventions appears to address the afore-mentioned concerns with 
respect to integrated development, integrative links between the various initiatives 
are tenuous, if any; a strong sectoral focus appears to underpin all NEPAD 
programmes, thereby negating NEPAD’s articulated objectives for integrated 
regional development.  
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Arguably, as NEPAD’s primary concern and the raison d’être of its programmatic 
interventions is poverty alleviation, in the context of conventional approaches 
trade-offs that emphasise poverty reduction and improving the quality of life thus 
become particularly important. This matter is, however, not simple: various 
schools of thought emphasise competing, at times contradictory, interventions for 
poverty reduction. In integrated regional development, cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure projects are conceptualised and implemented in an 
environment where creative and integrated multi/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-
disciplinary solutions must be found to address the mutually reinforcing 
constraints and challenges in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure 
and transit facilitation services.   
 
For these afore-mentioned reasons, the programmes/projects in NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP – which appear to prioritise global integration/connectivity, 
openness and competitiveness – reinforce the perceived neo-liberal agenda and 
strong sectoral focus in NEPAD’s roads programme, with negative implications 
for the attainment of NEPAD’s multiple objectives for integrated regional 
development and for poverty reduction. Thus, in the absence of integrative 
frameworks at the integrative levels of management in NEPAD’s approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure and in the Infrastructure STAP, it may 
prove difficult to implement cross-border regional roads infrastructure 
programmes/projects to support the attainment of NEPAD’s multiple development 
objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation in a coherent and 
integrated manner at the strategic and operational levels of management. 
 
7.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The issues discussed in this chapter illustrate that NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
and the related sectoral programmes/projects for the development of regional 
infrastructure have been conceived in a complex internal/external institutional 
environment: the internal structural constraints and adverse institutional factors 
that have, for decades, contributed to poor infrastructure development and 
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performance in sub-Saharan Africa still remain the same. Asymmetrical relations 
with the developed countries, rules of global institutions in trade – including 
FTAs, EPAs, and RTA with institutions of the developed north – and 
prescriptions of the global financial architecture remain a problem for the 
implementation of Africa’s development programmes/projects to meet effective 
demand. It would, therefore, be difficult for NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP to 
address the vicissitudes of Africa’s adverse internal/external institutional 
environment without parallel trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary 
interventions at the various levels of management/planning.  
 
Instead, NEPAD ignored to address some of the fundamental underlying 
influences to implementation challenges, which were in its peculiar knowledge. 
As a result, NEPAD appears to have succumbed to the inadequacies of its 
prescriptive approach to planning, particularly in the context of development 
programmes. NEPAD also failed to plan project interventions or planning 
processes to suit situational specificity, and to factor the lack of institutional 
capacity in programme conception; when problems arose, as they surely would, 
NEPAD instead attributed implementation challenges to the lack of institutional 
capacity. As a result, NEPAD appears to have fallen foul of its internal 
organisational inadequacies, inordinate reliance on others for implementation 
support, but also of the failure to address intractable challenges in the 
external/internal institutional environment that have, for decades, stymied efforts 
to develop regional (transport/roads) infrastructure.  
 
For these reasons, the explication of structural impediments in the institutional 
environment region-wide and at sub-regional levels in RECS may provide a 
backdrop for the development of relevant interventions to facilitate effective 
integrated implementation management/coordination of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects. An examination of NEPAD’s articulated pre-
conditions for development in its Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) is also 
crucial to establish how NEPAD originally planned to address the inadequate 
institutional environment at the various spatial categories in the RECs’ and 
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NEPAD’s internal/external environments in order to facilitate effective 
implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/projects: what were the 
priorities for intervention and gaps for future action? These are some of the areas 
for future research into the development of effective institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for integrated implementation/implementation management of 
cross-border regional infrastructure programmes and projects.    
 
Similarly, an astute assessment of the internal/external institutional environment 
in which REC Secretariats operate will assist NEPAD’s governance and 
management structures to understand the RECs’ and their own (NEPAD’s) 
limitations and opportunities to propose relevant interventions for the 
development of cross-border regional infrastructure. A structured approach to 
integrated implementation management of regional infrastructure programmes 
will thus depend on the role of regional, sub-regional and national institutions and 
structures to support the development of regional infrastructure; the sustained 
active role of the state is critical in this regard, as opposed to the sullen distance 
(by national governments and structures) implied in NEPAD’s reports.  Openness 
about some of the key limitations and challenges to effective implementation that 
may be addressed internally at the various levels of management, as a starting 
point, would help. Some of these issues are addressed in the next chapter. 
Significantly, the related projects may also be used to initiate the requisite 
institutional reforms/development.  
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8. WHAT NEPAD HAS IGNORED: UNDERPINNING STRUCTURAL 
CONSTRAINTS  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the influence of key underpinning structural constraints 
that NEPAD failed to address in programme planning and assessments of 
implementation challenges. Specific reference is made to the transport/roads 
sector to illustrate the implications of flawed decisions and actions at the higher 
levels of management/planning for the implementation of different regional 
infrastructure sectoral interventions at the lower levels of management.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 discusses the impact of the legacy 
of inadequate states’ apparatus on the implementation of regional infrastructure 
projects, in particular cross-border regional infrastructure such as roads 
programmes/projects. Section 8.3 examines how NEPAD’s attitudes, such as 
oversimplification and unregulated imprudent optimism, have contributed to 
inadequate planning and management as well as poor prioritisation of 
interventions for effective delivery of the identified projects. Section 8.4 examines 
the influence of exogenous factors on the development of regional infrastructure. 
Section 8.5 discusses the implications of the reliance on external resources for 
implementation of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Section 
8.6 is the summary and conclusion.   
 
8.2 Legacy of Inadequate States’ Apparatus to Support Implementation 
of Regional Infrastructure Projects 
 
8.2.1 Lack of funding in member states  
 
Under the roads sub-sector, NEPAD allocated national governments the primary 
role to finance infrastructure, “…subject to rationing and prioritisation on the 
basis of economic criteria” (NEPAD, 2002c: 43). According to NEPAD (ibid), the 
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funding approach proposed for the roads sector is different from proposals in 
other transport sub-sectors (such as railways and ports,) in which the required 
investments are linked to the reform of PPPs. NEPAD, however, neither mapped 
an integrative nor strategic framework to increase roads transportation revenues at 
national levels, so that the affected member states may contribute to funding the 
portions of cross-border regional infrastructure projects within national borders. 
Instead, the AfDB/NEPAD identified a role for NEPAD to seek agreement among 
countries, RECs, and external supporting agencies for additional financial support 
of 10-15% of the road investment programs of the respective countries to be 
mobilised for regional programs within an agreed (unarticulated) framework 
(NEPAD, 2002c: 52). 
 
It is possible NEPAD’s failure to map a clear framework for reliable funding of 
cross-border regional roads projects resulted from the assumed delegation of such 
responsibilities to RECs and professional associations at sub-regional levels (ibid: 
53). It is also possible NEPAD expected detailed actions at operational/national 
levels to be mapped by the relevant institutional structures as the implementation 
process evolved – subject to the availability and accuracy of information. This 
expectation was, however, neither predictable nor assured. Again, the results of 
poor planning in the omissions depicted above cannot be downplayed i.e., to link 
policy strategies, planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for 
project implementation/implementation management in a structured framework 
for effective delivery.   
 
Therefore, in what seems a bold step by national governments to fund the 
development of regional roads infrastructure lies the double-edged sword of 
willingness versus ability: the majority of African countries rely on donor funding 
for the implementation of their national development programmes, or even for 
their capital budgets, with implications for the implementation of planned 
development programmes/projects. For example, Founou-Tchigoua (2002:157) 
noted that even pledged donor funds are included in national budgets, yet the 
actual disbursed resources are not known. Some authors (Cheru, 2002) have 
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attributed the inordinate reliance on external funding, in the majority of African 
countries, to the unsustainable debt burden and poor economic growth.  
 
Others (Mkandawire, 2002; Tandon, 2002; Taylor, 2005) attribute the lack of 
funding for national development programmes to poor domestic resource 
mobilisation as a result of corruption, mal-governance, massive externalisation of 
domestic resources, and inadequate instruments for domestic resource 
mobilisation. As a result, the consequential balance of payments constraints in the 
event that pledged funds are not committed results in the failure by some 
countries/RECs to implement the planned development programmes, or even 
projects for post-conflict reconstruction in affected countries (Patrick, 1998). Yet, 
even the management of disbursed funds by national governments has been 
described as, at best, precarious due to lack of institutional infrastructure to absorb 
and efficiently utilise donor funding (Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Patrick, 1998). 
 
Others (AfDB, 1999; Watson, 1998) have previously argued for an increased 
private sector role to ameliorate the evidenced constraints of limited government 
financial resources. For example, Watson (1998) identified inadequate 
institutional incentives for improving infrastructure and infrastructure services as 
one of the main reasons for poor performance in transport. He argued that 
establishing a new culture in the provision of infrastructure would require a 
paradigm shift in government’s understanding of its role i.e., to effectively 
manage transport provision and to increase the financing (and implementing) role 
of the private sector. These revised responsibilities, Watson (ibid) suggested, 
would go hand in hand with a re-think on the nature of partnerships between 
government and the private sector: these include PPPs between various tiers of 
government, local entrepreneurs, and foreign partners in order to build the trust 
that is essential for cooperation in improving the products and services provided 
(ibid).   
 
Whilst these afore-mentioned suggestions may be relevant at national and sub-
national levels, the institutional environment and related partnerships with respect 
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to the implementation of (cross-border) regional infrastructure projects are much 
more complex because of the magnitude of the proposed projects, exacerbated by 
the multiplicity of competing development partners and diverse institutional 
structures for implementation management at the various spatial categories. 
Watson’s proposals also appear to have been made within a particular ideological 
perspective i.e., that which seeks to circumscribe the (active) role of the state in 
the provision of infrastructure.  
 
In NEPAD’s case, the institutional arrangements and management of relationships 
at the strategic levels of management are made more complex by the inordinate 
reliance on international institutions/institutional structures for programme/project 
activities and implementation support. This reliance has precipitated the 
participation of multiple and diverse institutional structures including state-actors 
from the various special categories, apparently without an adequate framework for 
project organisation management. As Estache’s (2006a) comments regarding the 
evidenced failure of the (foreign) private sector to deliver according to 
expectations reinforce the need for Africa’s national governments and 
regional/sub-regional institutions need to develop self-reliance in the financing 
and development of their infrastructure assets. NEPAD, however, has failed in the 
assessments of implementation challenges to address the inordinate reliance on 
external funding as a primary reason for project implementation delays: this 
would facilitate the development of institutional mechanisms and arrangements 
for reliable self-financing of cross-border regional infrastructure projects from 
domestic resources.  
 
8.2.2 Use of inaccurate data for planning cross-border regional roads networks  
 
The inadequacy of planning frameworks for programme/project design is 
exacerbated by the use of inaccurate data for network planning. For example, 
NEPAD (2002c) identified DCs as the focus of the roads programme. DCs are 
more amenable to private sector financing through concessions, greenfield 
developments and management contracts (see: Estache, 2006a). For these reasons, 
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the DCs are facilitated through the mechanism of PPPs and related vehicles, 
which have been promoted by NEPAD, AfDB and World Bank. NEPAD’s 
identified DCs are also more amenable to donor and foreign private sector 
financing. 
 
The identified sectoral interventions in the Infrastructure STAP (including the 
roads programme) are by NEPAD’s admission (NEPAD, 2001) short-term 
projects and pilot projects, although NEPAD (ibid) stated that these projects are 
part of ongoing programmes. The veracity of the afore-mentioned statements is 
questionable, particularly so since NEPAD failed to illustrate in the Infrastructure 
STAP how its identified projects are linked to broader (regional or national) 
programmes. However, it has been observed in some quarters (du Pisanie, 2001; 
SATCC, 2000; UN, 2003; World Bank, 2003) that inconsistencies and duplication 
are a common feature in the definition of Africa’s regional transport and 
development corridors.  
 
Similarly, with reference to SADC, although du Pisanie (2001) identified a set of 
adjusted regional development corridors (RDCs), given the prevalent use of 
inaccurate data and consequential duplication of networks, he conceded that the 
lack of consistency resulted in confusion. Moreover, inaccuracies in network 
planning resulted in duplication of effort and wastage of limited resources (ibid: 
51).  As du Pisanie (ibid: 2) noted:  
 
The identification of actual RDCs in SADC is ambiguous, since different 
sources indicate different numbers of RDCs and in some cases attach different 
names to the same corridor. In other cases, the same name is attached to routes 
that are far apart. In addition, overlap of corridors may occur in a single 
publication.   
 
The persistence of this problem is concerning, particularly so since one of the 
reasons for implementation failure of the TAH and “missing links” initiative has 
been attributed (AfDB & ECA, 2003) to inadequate data and poor definition of 
roads networks. Therefore, inaccurate data and poor network planning may have 
contributed to confusion regarding which, and how the identified DCs in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP are linked to national and regional development 
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plans so that their implementation may be supported by the relevant 
institutions/institutional structures within the available resource envelopes.    
 
8.2.3 Failure to address ineffective state-ownership of transportation systems 
 
The dependence on external resources and inaccuracies in network planning are 
compounded by the ineffective state-ownership of transportation systems, which 
NEPAD failed to address. NEPAD’s intransigence in this regard is concerning, 
particularly since NEPAD (2002c: 86) delegated the responsibility for the 
practical implementation of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure projects to national 
structures. According to Mbeki et al. (2001/2: 177-179), in the SADC region the 
inadequacy of state-ownership patterns persists despite prevailing evidence, since 
the 1980’s, that donor funding and limited government expenditure was not 
conducive to the development of sustainable transportation systems. Similarly, 
SATCC (2000) argued that the dominance of transportation networks by 
ineffective state-monopolies has resulted in chronic mutually reinforcing 
problems: under-investment in transport by governments in the (SADC) region, 
lack of maintenance, infrastructure development backlogs, inadequate resources, 
minimal new capital investment, inefficient management systems, and so on. The 
SATCC’s report (ibid) also noted that regional governments have realised that 
existing forms of ownership are no longer sustainable, although no remedies 
appear to have been proffered to ameliorate the status quo.   
 
Similarly, sector-wide state-ownership of transport structures, and the dominance 
of key transport apparatus by one country (i.e., South Africa) have been cited 
(Mbeki et al., 2001/2; SATCC, 2000) as key challenges in the management of 
SADC’s transportation networks, with all the challenges these ownership patterns 
entail. As a result of South Africa’s sector-wide dominance, Mbeki et al. (2001/2: 
177-179) argued that the extent to which the management of South Africa’s 
transport networks and multi-modal logistic chains is efficiently executed has an 
impact on the entire region.   
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The SATCC’s statement depicted above, however, amounts to a generalisation of 
a complex issue: there needs to be differentiation on whether the contentious issue 
is ownership of transport structures by the state, or whether it is the 
ineffectiveness of these transport structures and transportation systems because 
they are owned by the inefficient state apparatus. This differentiation may elicit 
different interventions that are also linked to a clearer definition of the role of the 
state and other parties in the provision of transformational transport infrastructure 
products and related services, the reform/development of inadequate institutions at 
national levels, and the development of institutional capacity in the relevant 
institutional structures. Whether corrective interventions or institutional reforms/ 
development in this regard are implemented in the majority of SADC/African 
countries is doubtful, with the exception of a few countries. It is also unclear to 
what extent governments in SADC are cooperating around transport issues, 
despite the existence of protocols on trade and transport to this effect. 
 
In particular, poverty reduction has been described (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 
2002c) as NEPAD’s primary challenge. Significantly, an analysis of the cascade 
of NEPAD’s development objectives vis-à-vis the prioritisation of NEPAD’s 
policy strategy/response actions for the development of regional infrastructure 
suggests that any short-term, direct contribution of roads infrastructure and transit 
facilitation projects to poverty reduction have been sacrificed on the altars of the 
prevailing prescriptions of the global financial architecture. Therefore, NEPAD 
also failed to address how national governments that are unable to contribute to 
poverty reduction through transport/roads infrastructure developments would do 
so under NEPAD.  
 
The issues discussed in this section have immense implications for the attainment 
of the transport/roads sector’s multiple objectives for the development of regional 
infrastructure, such as regional integration, trade, capacity building, and poverty 
reduction. If the state’s apparatus is weak and incapable to deliver on project plans 
in the majority of African countries, then how could NEPAD expect delivery on 
its regional infrastructure programmes/projects without prior or parallel 
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interventions to develop the requisite institutional capacity at national levels? 
Since institutional capacity development is a long-term process, what were the 
implications for implementation of the identified projects; how were the alleged 
or proposed capacity development programmes (Mashele, 2006; TCII & NEPAD, 
2005) linked to the immediate planned implementation?     
 
8.3 Over-simplification Resulting in Imprudent Optimism of Successful 
Implementation  
 
8.3.1 Ambitious time frames for implementation  
 
NEPAD’s implementation scheduling for the roads programme reveals ambitious 
and unrealistic targets for implementation: almost all the identified projects were 
planned for implementation over a four-year period from 2003-2006 inclusive 
(see: NEPAD, 2002c). The same time-frames were depicted (ibid) for other 
transport sector-wide projects, with the exception of an air transportation project – 
the Global Navigation Satellite System (scheduled for implementation during 
2003-2007), and the Railway Interconnection Feasibility Study for ECOWAS 
Countries (scheduled for completion in 12 months from the end of 2002). An 
activity schedule illustrated in the Infrastructure STAP document (NEPAD, 
2002c: 89), reveals a similar orientation towards unrealistic time frames, as 
depicted below:  
 
• Activities relating to implementation planning were scheduled for 
completion by the 15th
• Implementation of (regional) facilitation/sector governance (including 
policy, regulation, and institutional reforms) projects was scheduled for 
completion by the 31
 December 2002, approximately six months after the 
STAP was launched;   
st
• Implementation of projects to establish/strengthen institutional capacity 
(such as regulatory frameworks) was also scheduled for completion by the 
 December 2005, approximately three-and-a-half 
years after the STAP was launched; and  
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31st
 
It now appears that lengthy time frames for financial closure of investment 
projects have constituted critical impediments to implementation progress. For 
example, the TCII and NEPAD report (2005: 99) averred that the delays and 
process failures at any stage of the project cycle can have a detrimental effect on 
infrastructure developments under NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP in any 
particular region. According to the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid), the 
consequential risks of inadequate project preparation are more pronounced in 
transit facilitation projects, where the attainment of free movement of goods and 
people still has many hurdles to overcome. The report (ibid: 95) also noted that 
because of complex, protracted planning processes, a typical facilitation project 
(such as regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects) can take 
from six to fifteen years or more to implement. During this process, the report 
(ibid) argued, the rationale for the projects and assumptions on which project 
development, funding, and implementation planning were based might change, 
thereby introducing further delays.  
 
To illustrate the afore-mentioned processes, Figure 8.1 provides an overview of 
critical stages and timelines in typical facilitation projects (such as the transit 
facilitation projects,) illustrated by the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid).   
           
Figure 8.1 Critical Stages and Timelines in a Typical Facilitation Project  
 December 2005), approximately three-and-a-half years after the STAP 
was launched. The responsibility for implementation of all the activities 
listed above was allocated to both member states and RECs, but who it was 
known/accepted (NEPAD, 2001, NEPAD, 2002c) lacked the institutional 
capacity to perform the planned project activities.   
 
    6-9 months 6-9 months       12-18 months    6-12 months          2-3 years           2-3 years               3-5 years 
Source: After TCII and NEPAD, 2005. NEPAD Infrastructure STAP – Second Review of Implementation Progress and the 
Way Forward, pp.95. 
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It is unclear from NEPAD’s reports at which stage, or approximately, the 
identified projects were, when NEPAD planned implementation schedules. Also, 
the TCII and NEPAD report does not indicate what planning processes may be 
implemented in parallel, and whether or not complex processes for collective 
engagement at national levels require the linear progression of the afore-
mentioned steps in order to mitigate implementation risks. Similarly, investment 
projects, such as the corridor developments adopted under NEPAD’s roads 
infrastructure programme, involve equally onerous processes for planning and 
collective engagement. These processes are illustrated in Figure 8.2.  
 
Figure 8.2 Critical Stages and Timelines in a Typical Investment Project 
Initial IG   Total Project Preparation Process:       Construction:    Economic Life 
Agreements:   8 years +           (dependent on    (or Operational  
9-18 months             technical     Contract) 
             complexity) 
 3-5 years + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  After TCII and NEPAD, 2005. pp.96. 
 
The examples of timelines for project preparation in both facilitation and 
investment projects illustrate the daunting challenges of institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements that need to be overcome to facilitate the completion of 
preliminary steps for effective implementation of agreed regional infrastructure 
projects. This situation appears to be exacerbated by the influence of unarticulated 
agendas, and the complexity to plan the interface between formal/informal 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements at international, regional, sub-regional 
and national levels in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure projects.  
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(vi) The dedicated management of all of the above 
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As a result, processes that are much more localised in individual business 
organisations, such as conducting a feasibility study or drafting procurement 
procedures, are much more difficult to conclude in inter-/trans-state trans-actions 
that involve multiple countries and stakeholders (who may include IFIs, donors, 
civil society organisation, international institutions/ structures, regional/sub-
regional structures, and national governments as well as private sector operators/ 
professional organisations), who all adopt diverse approaches to planning and are 
affected by planning differently. More often than not, the positions adopted by 
countries in sub-regional agreements are also influenced by political biases, 
differences in ideology, diverse alliances and allegiances, and the requirements of, 
or commitments to diverse RTAs and FTAs with the developed countries or their 
institutions.   
 
Small wonder then it sometimes takes more than three years to prepare terms of 
reference (TOR) (see, for example, the ECCAS’s Dousala/Brazaville Corridor 
(TCII & NEPAD Review, 2005: 66)). Yet, after such protracted processes of 
collective engagement, collective agreements often fail to be implemented at 
national levels because of lack of political will and commitment as well as lack of 
institutional capacity for implementation. For these reasons, institutional reforms 
and development, as well as the development of institutional capacity are crucial 
steps to support the attainment of NEPAD’s articulated objectives for the 
development of regional infrastructure, and to ensure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of technical interventions such as regional infrastructure projects. In 
this regard, the analysis of implementation processes in NEPAD’s roads 
programme suggest that many a promising initiative may flounder on the altars of 
the protracted and politically charged processes for collective engagement, 
cognisant of the diverse legislative and governance regimes as well as the 
characteristics of the diverse structures for implementation management at the 
various spatial categories.  
 
The identified constraints in project time lines depicted above are exacerbated by 
the lack of institutional capacity to support the attainment of agreed objectives. 
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For example, problems regarding the lack of harmonisation of transport-sector 
policies, standards and governance regimes have persisted for decades: various 
countries and sub-regions have over the years developed a multiplicity of policy, 
regulatory and governance regimes in various sectors and disciplines that are 
intersected by transport infrastructure. As some authors (Lackshmanan & 
Anderson, 2000) have argued, these regimes are not easily amenable to change, 
cognisant of the underlying political and economic prerogatives at national levels 
for the perpetuation of the status quo. Thus, the unrealistic scheduling evidenced 
in NEPAD’s roads programme gives even more cause for concern. 
 
Moreover, it appears that the negative implications of the lack of resources and 
institutional capacity for implementation were not considered by the developers of 
the Infrastructure STAP in scheduling time-frames for implementation. This 
assertion also takes cognisance that all the projects under the roads programme 
were scheduled for simultaneous implementation. The requisite activities for 
project preparation, when combined with the reality of lengthy timelines for 
facilitation and investment projects established by the TCII and NEPAD (2005), 
lend credence to the assertions by various authors (Baird, 1997; Baum and 
Tolbert, 1985; Burke, 2003; McCutcheon, 1997; Paul, 1990; Turner, 1999; van 
Der Merwe, 1995; Viljoen, 1997) that adequate planning is critical at all levels of 
the project’s life cycle for successful project implementation: longer periods were 
required for implementation planning than was provided for by the developers of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.  
 
Others (personal discussion with Peter Hirschowitz, School of Civil and 
Environmental Engineering, WITS, 18 September 2006) have suggested that 
because of the complex institutional environment, rather than displaying a rigid 
focus on the attainment of key milestones (as would be defined in project plans,) 
in the implementation of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes, or 
development programmes in the African context, one needs to celebrate the small 
steps completed towards moving a project or consultation process forward. 
Although the flexibility suggested by Hirschowitz above may either be congruent 
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or incongruent with certain social institutions and norms, depending on situational 
or project specificity, it also confirms the implications of the complexities in the 
reform/development of the institutional environment for the project life cycle and 
vice versa.  
 
For these reasons, the DFID (2003) argued that institutional inadequacy and the 
dynamism of the institutional environment poses extreme difficulties for 
implementation, especially in the context of the rigid traditional project life cycle. 
This afore-mentioned statement is particularly significant in an environment 
where even informal institutions are not so well-developed to ensure 
implementation progress in the event that formal institutions are not well-defined, 
or have been eroded. Therefore, mechanisms may need to be developed to align 
the project cycle with the reality of the implications of diverse formal and 
informal institutions in the external/internal projects’ environment. 
 
8.3.2 Poor programme/project communication  
 
NEPAD’s inadequate communication has resulted in questionable projects’ 
implementation status, thereby introducing other challenges for project 
implementation. For example, there is evidence of inadequate interpretation and 
integration of the requirements of diverse project cycles (adopted by various 
institutions or different sectors) resulting in disparate communication of 
implementation progress. The contradictory progress reports on the 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, presented by NEPAD’s 
Secretariat and its Lead Agency, the AfDB, are just some of the examples. On the 
one hand, NEPAD (2004/2005) reported that significant strides in implementation 
were made during the financial year 2003/4 (a year later from the last NEPAD 
report of 2002/3 wherein minimal progress was reported). Similarly, NEPAD’s 
report in the Infrastructure Sectoral Programme Review (NEPAD, 2004b: 1-2) 
confirmed the “remarkable progress” made in the implementation of the 
Infrastructure STAP. As NEPAD (ibid) stated:  
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There was remarkable progress in the implementation status of projects for 
infrastructure, considering that …STAP was developed only in 2002. Since 
March 2003 a number of pipeline projects have progressed following 
approval by the Boards of the… (AfDB) and the World Bank.     
 
On the other hand, the AfDB (2003: 8-9) indicated that implementation progress 
was slow, when measured against the activity schedule drawn up at the launch of 
the Infrastructure STAP during May 2002. The AfDB (ibid) acknowledged the 
lack of clarity in respect of roles and responsibilities as one of the reasons for 
implementation delays in the different RECs. As the AfDB report (ibid) stated:  
   
 The first year of implementation of the STAP has been a learning process 
for the RECs, for NEPAD and for their development partners. There has 
been a certain degree of perfectly understandable confusion and 
misunderstanding regarding roles and responsibilities (author’s emphasis). 
Understanding of roles, responsibilities and procedures has evolved at 
different rates across RECs; this is reflected in different rates of progress in 
the implementation of the STAP across RECs (ibid).  
 
At the same time, one may understand NEPAD’s optimistic sentiments regarding 
the “remarkable progress” in the identified projects. For example, a simplified 
version of the World Bank’s project cycle (Baum, 1982: 5-18) illustrates that 
approval of a project by the World Bank’s Board of Directors is a key milestone 
in the project cycle of World Bank-funded projects. This is particularly so since 
the processes entailed in the World Bank’s project cycle comprise “rigorous 
phases of project identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiation” (ibid: 5) 
before a project is presented to the World Bank’s Board of Directors and 
approved. The afore-mentioned processes may take years to complete. Therefore, 
assuming that the AfDB adopted a project cycle similar to the World Bank’s for 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, then the perception of “remarkable progress” 
appears justified. 
 
What NEPAD had suggested though through its various statements is that the 
identified regional infrastructure projects were already either at the 
implementation stage or advanced stages prior to implementation. Thus, the 
different versions on project implementation progress provided by the AfDB and 
NEPAD, depicted above, have resulted in confusion with respect to the 
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infrastructure projects’ status. In this regard, the veracity of NEPAD’s and 
AfDB’s reports on the project’s status is questionable.  
 
The assertion made above refers, in particular, to the lack of consistency in 
reporting between the AfDB’s 1st Infrastructure STAP review (AfDB, 2003), and 
other relevant NEPAD documents (NEPAD, 2004/5; NEPAD, 2004b). In 
contrast, in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, the TCII and NEPAD report 
(2005: 16) noted that projects across the spectrum of interventions, whether 
harmonisation, or facilitation, or investment projects “…are still taking too long to 
be implemented.” The challenges identified in the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid), 
for example, also related to the complex characteristics of the large-scale, cross-
border Infrastructure STAP projects.  
 
The afore-mentioned challenges are prevalent in projects from the traditional, 
heavy engineering sectors, such as the water, energy, transport, and 
telecommunications (WETT) industries (Turner, 1999: 2). According to Turner 
(ibid), some of these projects have lengthy development periods – on average ten 
years or more from project conception to financial closure: they involve large 
teams and require multiple sponsoring organisations for implementation support. 
Therefore, the afore-mentioned constraints should have been anticipated by 
NEPAD, and effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for their 
management developed within a coherent project plan/strategy and 
implementation management framework.   
 
It is thus unclear how comments in the TCII and NEPAD 2nd Infrastructure STAP 
review, with respect to implementation delays, are linked to NEPAD’s original 
project selection criteria and the original scope of programmes/projects approved 
by the HSGIC during June 2002. (For example, the Infrastructure STAP 
emphasised the selection of “…projects that are at an advance (sic) stage of 
preparation and that can be fast-tracked…projects that have stalled for political 
reasons and where NEPAD’s intervention could be expected to make a 
difference” (NEPAD, 2002c: 2).  
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It is also unclear what mechanisms and arrangements NEPAD put in place for 
action planning and performance control at the various levels of management and 
stages of the project life cycle, and why NEPAD’s HSGIC has failed to take 
“appropriate steps to address implementation delays” in adherence to its 
(assumed) mandate as illustrated in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework. It is also 
unclear why NEPAD/NEPAD’s Secretariat provided conflicting reports on the 
actual projects’ status vis-à-vis the reports provided by the AfDB and TCII and 
NEPAD report, as illustrated by various analysts and authors (see: Mashele, 2006; 
Taylor, 2005) in chapter 4 of this report, to the extent that some authors (Taylor, 
2005) questioned whether NEPAD’s projects existed at all.  
 
For example, the report of the TCII and NEPAD 2nd
With the exception of the EAC’s roads infrastructure project funded/implemented 
by the World Bank, the majority of RECs’ projects are still at the conceptual stage 
(TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 112-134). The project’s status at the time of the 2
 Infrastructure STAP review 
(TCII & NEPAD, 2005), conducted during 2004, also confirmed the lack of 
implementation progress in some sectors, in particular the roads sector. Similarly, 
the implementation of roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects appears 
limited to (preliminary) intangible deliverables, since 2002 when the 
Infrastructure STAP was launched. The author’s assertion takes cognisance of the 
status of the projects purportedly submitted by RECs, which were ostensibly at 
“advanced stages” in preparation for implementation (AfDB, 2003; OAU/AU, 
2002; NEPAD, 2002c). In addition, the cost estimates prepared for NEPAD’s 
transport programme arguably created expectations to the investors and the public 
alike regarding the identified projects. Yet, approximately four years later since 
the launch of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, project deliverables in the roads 
sector appear to have only advanced to the development stage: this includes the 
approval of concepts for programme/project design; completion of certain studies; 
obtaining grants (by some RECs) for studies on harmonisation of technical 
standards and institutional arrangements on joint border posts.  
 
nd 
Infrastructure STAP review included contemplated surveys; submission of project 
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proposals by RECs although the same RECs lack the resources for their 
implementation; feasibility studies; and programmes/projects that are still 
planned. In other cases, implementation progress on projects that some RECs 
have ostensibly focussed on cannot be ascertained: detailed records of the said 
projects are apparently not available (ibid). Thus, given the conflicting reports 
illustrated above, it is unclear whether NEPAD understood the substance of the 
various progress reports, or whether NEPAD merely appended its name to reports 
prepared by others on its behalf without the requisite quality control by NEPAD’s 
management structures. 
 
The inconsistencies in NEPAD’s reporting on the projects’ status may also be 
attributed to the lack of comprehensive project plans and strategies against which 
to measure implementation progress. The project plans would, for example, also 
illustrate how the interface between the diverse institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for programme/project development and implementation is 
managed. Without specific details on the actual projects, where they are 
implemented, measurable performance indicators (including detail work plans, 
milestone plans, responsibility charts, and measures of actual performance by the 
different RECs against the original targets approved by NEPAD), meaningful 
assessment would be, at best, almost impossible. The inconsistencies in NEPAD’s 
reporting may also illustrate the diverse perception, interpretation and use of plans 
by diverse institutional structures – such as professional organisations, project 
structures and political organisations as illustrated above. Lack of relevant project 
management competencies to facilitate adequate management and a clearer 
understanding of the projects’ progression at various stages of the project life 
cycle appears to have exacerbated the problem of poor NEPAD’s communication.   
 
8.3.3 Failure to conduct institutional capacity assessments  
 
Institutional capacity assessment has implications for project actions at various 
stages of the project life cycle. According to the EC’s Project Cycle Management 
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Guidelines (EC, 2004: 99), the results of an institutional capacity assessment 
inform decision-making on the following issues: 
 
- “Identification  and selection of institutional partners; 
- Defining the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders with respect to management, 
coordination, and financing arrangements; 
- Modulating the scope of the project (including financing levels) to take account of 
capacity constraints; 
- Determining the project’s institutional/organisational capacity building objectives 
and strategies, including realistic time-frames and resource requirements; and 
- Designing an appropriate sustainability strategy for the project.” 
 
In NEPAD’s case, institutional capacity assessment would facilitate the 
development of the programme/project scope, relevant institutional arrangements 
for project organisation management and strategies for project implementation or 
integrated implementation management/coordination subject to the identified 
capacity constraints or opportunities. However, at any stage of programme 
development at the different levels of management, there are no indications from 
the literature reviewed that NEPAD conducted focused institutional capacity 
assessment at the various levels of management, infrastructure sectors, 
institutional structures, and/or spatial categories in order to facilitate effective 
implementation of its programmes in alignment with NEPAD’s policy 
strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management.  
 
As a result, one may argue that the lack of institutional capacity in NEPAD’s 
institutional structures for implementation management (including lack of 
effective leadership, clearly defined project structures, effective systems for 
communication, and poor/limited strategic management ability,) are some of the 
key reasons for NEPAD’s failure to facilitate integrated implementation 
management of the Infrastructure STAP. Yet, NEPAD’s policy strategy/response 
actions at the integrative levels of management (NEPAD, 2001) included the 
following measures: facilitating intra-African trade; rationalising the institutional 
framework for economic integration; harmonising policies, regulations and 
governance regimes across national borders; mobilising domestic resources; and 
prioritising institutional capacity assessment and capacity building in order to 
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enhance the effectiveness of regional structures, including existing regional 
organisations. 
 
Although NEPAD did not illustrate how the afore-mentioned strategic actions 
would be prioritised or phased over the various levels of management in the 
various sectoral interventions, capacity assessment and capacity building were 
accorded priority for all the programmes. As NEPAD (ibid, Para. 87: 19) stated, 
“…targeted capacity-building should be given a high priority. Programmes in 
every area should be preceded by an assessment of capacity, followed by the 
provision of appropriate support.” Thus, the prioritisation of institutional capacity 
assessment and capacity building seemed to illustrate NEPAD’s recognition of 
their implications for programme/project planning at the various levels of 
management and, ultimately, project implementation success. This view takes 
cognisance of the possible burden of measures to support the attainment of 
NEPAD’s multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation, 
on fragile institutional structures with inadequate capacity for implementation. 
 
Some authors (McCutcheon, 1999: 10) have previously recommended the 
implementation of pilot projects, within a programme approach, to facilitate the 
development of the requisite institutional capacity. Accepting this premise, in 
NEPAD’s context this would also entail the development of a coherent sub-
regional/regional framework within which to integrate multiple projects at the 
various spatial categories within a programme approach, to ensure the alignment 
of objectives and to facilitate the prudent usage of limited resources for 
implementation. (This view takes cognisance of the negative implications of the 
proliferation of similar or disparate projects in the various sub-regions of the AU, 
described under APPENDIX B, to address the same challenges in regional 
infrastructure and transit facilitation.) In addition, the programme approach would 
facilitate the development of institutional capacity for future spatial expansion.  
 
In NEPAD’s context, however, it is difficult to ascertain whether the proposed 
projects form part of programmes, or not, because of the apparent obfuscation 
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regarding the projects’ status and inadequate use of planning concepts for project 
scope management. In this respect, NEPAD’s HSGIC failed in their duty to 
facilitate institutional capacity assessment and targeted capacity building as well 
as to mobilise resources for capacity building interventions at regional, sub-
regional and national levels as detailed in NEPAD’s Strategic Framework 
(NEPAD, 2001: Para. 83-84: 18; Para.87, 89:19).  
 
8.3.4 Failure to facilitate capacity development in RECs vis-à-vis expectations  
of delivery 
 
Linked to the issue of capacity assessment discussed above, NEPAD failed to 
facilitate capacity development in RECs cognisant of their mandate in the 
Infrastructure STAP. According to the report of the 1st Infrastructure STAP 
Review (AfDB, 2003), the issue of capacity building in RECs appears to have 
been addressed approximately a year into “implementation” (during 2003) – and 
integrated into NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP as one of the new priority projects. 
At the time of the 2nd
The capacity building assessment conducted by the ACBF, however, appears to 
have focused on select elements of the RECs’ mandated role to facilitate 
integrated implementation management/coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP and related sectoral programmes – i.e., providing technical support/ 
assistance to countries.  The selective capacity building in RECs and, where it is 
proposed, the apparent overlap with the role of member states and other regional 
institutional structures, such as the AfDB, brings us back to the question of what 
the RECs were actually supposed to do in the implementation/ implementation 
management of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.  Also, whether NEPAD would 
 Infrastructure STAP Review, during 2004, the ACBF’s 
report on the assessment of capacity-building needs in RECs (to provide technical 
assistance to countries and to monitor programmes for sector policy 
harmonisation and programme development,) was planned for finalisation by end 
August 2004 (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 140) – approximately two years into the 
“implementation” of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral projects.  
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have been able to effectively develop institutional capacity in RECs (in time) for 
implementation of its regional infrastructure projects, and whether RECs would 
have been able to perform their mandated tasks under NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP are questions for future research.    
 
For example, was/is the REC’s role in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP limited to 
providing technical advisory services to member states, such as assisting affected 
member states to apply for funding, agree on common standards (such as 
minimum design and axle load standards) and procurement of design, 
construction, and project management services, similar to the roles identified in 
the TAH for RECs to support the implementation of cross-border networks with a 
regional profile, as illustrated in APPENDIX B?  Would the RECs be able to 
effectively perform the afore-mentioned roles without the reform/develop of 
inadequate institutions and the effective development of institutional capacity at 
national levels? In any event, what capacity is available in RECs to perform the 
role of technical advisors to member states in NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
programme, particularly so since the lack of institutional capacity in RECs is 
widely acknowledged?  
 
What are the implications of the WTO’s instruments, such as the TRIPs and 
TRIMs for the RECs’ performance in the delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure (i.e., since the RECs do not have executing capacity, will they rely 
upon the procurement of foreign technology and professional/construction 
services for implementation either on their behalf, or on behalf of member 
countries, or NEPAD – and who bears the costs for the delivery of the afore-
mentioned products and services)? Similarly, what are the implications of the 
WTO’s TRIMs with respect to the limitations this instrument imposes on 
government procurement, i.e., will the RECs bear the responsibility to procure 
foreign contractors and service providers as a means to mediate conflicts in 
respect of international agreements that affect individual member states, or at 
national levels vis-à-vis the empowerment of national entities and domestic 
private sector (whose role in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure 
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appears circumscribed under the prescriptions of the afore-mentioned global rules 
and contemporary positions on the delivery of global public goods, which appear 
to benefit (large-scale) foreign private sector interest)?  
 
What is the essence of NEPAD’s use of the “principle of subsidiarity” (NEPAD, 
2001) in the context of transport infrastructure, i.e., is it meant to get the AU or 
NEPAD “off the hook” in the event of implementation failure/failure to manage 
stakeholder relationships and popular participation at national levels, since lack of 
institutional capacity in RECs was already known? In other words, were the 
RECs, or their lack of institutional capacity used as a ‘stalking horse’ in NEPAD, 
particularly in the Infrastructure STAP, in order to deflect attention from 
NEPAD’s (possible) lack of wherewithal to facilitate the development of regional 
infrastructure, or as a pretext to avoid addressing the intractable underlying causes 
of implementation challenges in the internal/external institutional environment?  
Was NEPAD’s promotion of the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ as the mechanism for 
decision-making on regional infrastructure, and the management of interfaces on 
projects between the various spatial categories merely a ploy to obtain funding 
from multilateral donors, including FDI, whilst at the same time using the 
protracted processes for collective engagement at national levels to deflect 
concerns, by same international institutions, in respect of delays for institutional 
reform/development at national levels (i.e., allow member states to maintain 
multiple and inadequate transport policy, regulatory and governance regimes that 
perpetuate the pursuance of narrow mercantilist national interests) because of the 
alleged/real lack of institutional capacity in RECs?  
 
Cognisant of articulated concerns regarding the lack of capacity in RECs, what is 
also not explained in both NEPAD Infrastructure STAP reviews is the relevance 
of the Transport Reform and Integration Support Facility (TRIFSA), which is 
located with the AfDB to support project preparation and implementation, to 
ameliorate implementation delays. This facility was established during 2002/2003 
with C$ 10 million funding from the Canadian government (NEPAD, 2003/2004), 
presumably at NEPAD’s instigation. It is therefore unclear what the direct 
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benefits of TRIFSA are to RECs, rather than the AfDB, vis-à-vis their mandate in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Similarly, if the RECs were assigned the 
responsibility for project preparation, what then is the essence of the Infrastructure 
Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) that is located within the AfDB, and how is 
this instrument related to the afore-mentioned TRIFSA, which is also located at 
the AfDB? Is the IPPF’s primary objective to prepare projects “with a strong PPP 
component” for which the RECs are said to be inadequate (TCII & NEPAD, 
2005)? Is there an overlap of roles and responsibilities between the AfDB and 
RECs in respect of the IPPF and who carries accountability for delivery in this 
context?  
 
And why is the AfDB being capacitated by NEPAD instead of RECs, rather than 
the other way round, where the AfDB would facilitate the development of 
institutional capacity in RECs in line with its responsibilities as a development 
finance institution (DFI)? Also, what is the AfDB’s obligation to develop capacity 
in RECs in terms of its traditional mandate as a DFI, as suggested in NEPAD’s 
Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001)? What are the roles of the RECs in the 
execution of various responsibilities vis-à-vis the overarching roles assigned to 
NEPAD’s structures to facilitate implementation management of NEPAD’s 
STAP, as discussed in the previous chapters? What are the RECs’ practical roles 
vis-à-vis national governments/structures in the implementation of the identified 
cross-border regional roads projects in NEPAD’s roads programme, for example?  
 
The issues raised above underscore the prevailing uncertainties with respect to the 
relationship between NEPAD, RECs and other structures for implementation 
management/coordination. They also accentuate the obfuscation in NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation support. 
Thus, an impression is created that NEPAD avoided addressing contentious 
issues, such as failure to reform/develop inadequate institutions in the various 
spatial categories, particularly so given their impact on the implementation of the 
identified regional infrastructure projects. Therefore, RECs’ appear to be 
casualties of NEPAD’s machinations in the inadequate management of project 
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management functions in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. The RECs also appear 
to be scapegoats of NEPAD’s inadequate management of various institutional 
relationships and trans-state transactions including the prescription of 
inappropriate institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of 
regional infrastructure.  
 
Similar to the issue of institutional capacity assessments discussed in an earlier 
section above, NEPAD’s HSGIC failed to institute adequate institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements to monitor/evaluate implementation progress in 
alignment with NEPAD’s articulated vision and objectives as well as to propose 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with agreed capacity-building 
agreements, at either regional/sub-regional or national levels. In this respect, 
NEPAD’s HSGIC abrogated their responsibility in terms of their articulated 
obligation to facilitate/ensure the execution of the capacity-building interventions 
to effectively support the implementation of NEPAD’s programmes/ projects.    
 
8.4 Inordinate Influence of Exogenous Factors on the Development of 
Regional Infrastructure 
 
Baum and Tolbert (1985: 6) argued that the influence of exogenous factors has 
resulted in a new understanding of the notion of “development,” including the 
interrelatedness and interdependence of development processes. They further 
argued that this new understanding of how development is interrelated directs the 
manner in which a country’s (sub-regions or regions) resources are managed.  The 
argument posited by Baum and Tolbert (ibid), however, fails to address how 
asymmetrical power relations between the developed and developing countries 
influence this new understanding of development, and how such notions impact 
on the management of institutional relationships in development projects in 
developing countries.  
 
It is also unclear how Baum and Tolbert’s argument may be applied or linked to 
recent notions of integrated development and its ideological underpinnings, and 
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what outcomes may be expected from such interrelationships. Previously, the 
influence of exogenous factors, particularly the different ideologies in the 
developed countries, has resulted in the inordinate influence of conventional 
thinking and action, dominance of international institutions/structures and reliance 
on external resources for implementation of Africa’s development programmes 
with deleterious consequences. The afore-mentioned issues have contributed to 
the proposal of programmes/projects that are tangential to the identified 
development needs, constraints and challenges as well as lack of institutional 
capacity development at the various spatial categories.  
 
NEPAD failed to address, or effectively manage the influence of exogenous 
factors on the Infrastructure STAP, with negative implications for the 
development of regional infrastructure. Instead, NEPAD appears to have been 
seduced by and inordinately relied on exogenous factors for the practical 
manifestation of its vision, thereby abdicating any responsibility or accountability 
for effective integrated implementation/ implementation management of the 
Infrastructure STAP.  These issues are discussed below.  
 
8.4.1 Influence of conventional thinking and action 
 
In terms of the thesis advanced by Baum and Tolbert, one may argue that the link 
between the new understanding of development and the adverse impact of 
exogenous factors on Africa’s development programmes gave rise to NEPAD in 
the first place. Regarding the implementation of NEPAD’s cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes, NEPAD’s thinking needed to illustrate the 
relationship between the new understanding of development and its (NEPAD’s) 
aspirations for integrated development and implementation/implementation 
management of regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Thus NEPAD 
needed to evince the delicate balance for strategic management of 
interrelationships between its articulated response actions/policy strategies, 
influences of the external/internal institutional environment in various spatial 
categories, programmes/projects, institutional structures for project 
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implementation or implementation management/coordination and various 
stakeholders who are either sponsors/beneficiaries of, or are affected by NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure programmes.  
 
One may surmise, however, that NEPAD’s professed new thinking about the 
interrelatedness of development presupposes a static evolution of the institutional 
environment where traditional roles of dependency on the largesse of international 
institutions/multilateral donors persist as a result of fiscal crises, lack of 
institutional capacity and inadequate institutions in the majority of African 
countries: this thinking appears to have had a deleterious impact on the 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. For example, contemporary 
development finance models promoted by the IFIs, upon which NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure programme is premised, prioritise aid and FDI as the key 
components to finance sustainable development; the provision of increased ODA 
and FDI also underpin the prevalent proposals for global partnerships for 
sustainable development (DBSA, 2003).  
 
Various authors, depicted below, have illustrated the ineffectiveness of aid and 
FDI to address Africa’s development needs, including the development of 
regional transport/roads infrastructure. Thus, some of the key exogenous factors 
with possible impact on the implementation of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
programme include the following: 
  
• Declining aid transfers and lack of consistency in the disbursement of aid, 
particularly in trade-related packages and post-war reconstruction efforts 
(ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4, #42; ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4, #45; ANC Today, 
2004, Vol.4, #46; Business in Africa, 2004; Cheru, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; 
Nabudere, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; OECD & AfDB, 2002; Oxfam, 2002; 
Patrick, 1998.  The declining ODA is exacerbated by its poor coordination 
(Mkandawire, 2002; Patrick, 1998), with inimical impact on poverty reduction 
and on the development of the requisite institutional capacity for project 
implementation and spatial expansion of development projects (ANC Today, 
Vol.4, #44; Cheru, 2002; Patrick, 1998). 
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• Inequitable and deteriorating terms of trade exacerbated by unilateral/bilateral 
trade preferences (Adedegi, 2002; IAG/JA, 2002; ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4 
#45; ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4 #46; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1990; Gelb, 2001; 
Bala et al, 2003; Bhagowat, 2005; Cheru, 2002; Ismail, 2002; Mills, 2002; 
Moshe, 2001; Oxfam, 2002; Rodney, 1972; Schepers, 2003/4; DFID, 2002; 
Tandon, 2002).  
 
• Unsustainable levels of external debt (recent debt-relief initiatives appear to 
have been largely ineffective in some African countries because of inadequate 
institutions and lack of requisite institutional reforms/development). Previous 
debt-relief initiatives were rendered ineffective by the unwillingness of the 
developed countries to resolve the matter in favour of Africa (Cheru, 2002): 
this phenomenon appears to have persisted even with recent debt-forgiveness 
initiatives announced by the G8 and IFIs during 2005. 
 
• Uneven patterns in FDI flows resulting in the exaggeration of their benefits in 
unmanaged contexts (Breytenbach, 2002(b); Cheru, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 
2002; Gelb, 2001; Mkandawire, 2002; Mills, 2002; Oxfam, 2002; Tandon, 
2002; DFID, 2002). As a result, expectations of increased FDI flows in the 
majority of African countries have not materialised, with adverse implications 
for the implementation of planned development programmes/projects. 
 
• Negative influences of TNCs in their relations with African countries 
(Business in Africa, 2003/2004; Cheru, 2002; Kaufman et al, 1998; Mail and 
Guardian, 2004 (b); Oxfam, 2002). As a result, the needs and priorities of 
TNC appear to have influenced the choice and prioritisation of projects in 
African countries. In the majority of cases, the TNCs play a significant role in 
influencing the direction of investment flows, resulting in their staggering 
impact on the world economy (Oxfam, 2002; Bende-Nabende, 2002). Yet, 
their investment and employment practices are, in the majority of cases, 
“…unencumbered by anything other than weak voluntary guidelines” Oxfam 
(2002: 4).  
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• In some cases, the activities of TNC’s have fostered state capture (Kaufman et 
al, 1998), or violent conflicts and political instability (Mail and Guardian, 
2004 (b); Oxfam, 2002) with negative impacts on existing infrastructure or 
planned infrastructure developments.  
 
• Externalisation of domestic resources, thereby making Africa a net exporter of 
capital to the developed countries (ANC Today, Vol.4, #44; Mkandawire, 
2002; Tandon, 2002; DFID, 2002). According to Cheru (2002), in various 
African countries, the combined influences and impacts of the afore-
mentioned negative consequences have instead exacerbated the reliance on 
external resources, resulting in “externalisation of decision-making and loss of 
sovereignty” (ibid: 19).    
 
As a result, the extent to which NEPAD has emphasised external institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements as the primary routes for funding, programme 
development, management and implementation/implementation support of the 
Infrastructure STAP gives cause for concern: it perpetuates the status quo of 
inordinate dependency on external resources for the implementation of Africa’s 
development programmes, which has resulted in the stranglehold of the negative 
influences of exogenous factors on Africa’s regional infrastructure development 
agenda.  
 
The issues discussed above reveal the inherent contradictions and covert agendas 
in NEPAD’s statements of prioritising the “reform of the ODA delivery system” 
and for seeking “increased ODA flows in the medium term” (NEPAD, 2001, Para. 
148: 38), whilst simultaneously propagating individual and collective self-reliance 
by African countries (ibid: Para.1:1), which are inimical to the attainment of 
NEPAD’s multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure, and 
to integrated development. For example, even though NEPAD stated that the 
roads programme will be financed by national governments (NEPAD, 2002c), 
there persists an inordinate dependency by African countries on the institutional 
mechanisms of the developed countries for development finance, technology, 
human capital, and technical support.  The proclivity for external reliance in the 
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Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes, however, stands in stark 
contrast with NEPAD’s articulated vision: for African countries to individually 
and collectively take responsibility for the attainment of their desired development 
outcomes (NEPAD, 2001, Para.1:1).  
 
In this respect, one would have expected African countries to be propelled by 
lessons from previous experiences and prevailing adverse conditions in the 
external institutional environment as the basis for change, in order to create a 
“burning platform” to address internal structural constraints and propose 
transformational interventions for the development of regional infrastructure. 
Such a process, however, would require long-term commitment by Africa’s 
political leadership and member states to redirect their energies to address internal 
impediments, develop sound institutions/institutional capacity from the bottom up, 
reform/develop inadequate institutions, and embrace a transformational ethos to 
Africa’s development.   
 
In particular, the issue of transit facilitation projects appears to be shrouded in 
complex dynamics that are linked to international/regional trade agreements and 
global rules in trade and related services. For example, Soko (2006: 21) indicates 
that the issue of trade facilitation was included in the WTO’s negotiations in 1996 
as part of the so-called “Singapore issues.” In the package of agreements 
concluded at the end of July 2004, the developed countries made specific 
commitments to assist the least-developed countries (the majority in Africa,) with 
technical support and capacity building so that they can meet their WTO 
commitments to address non-tariff barriers to trade and transit facilitation. Thus, 
it is possible that the developers of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP selected and 
prioritised projects with increased propensity to qualify for donor support under 
the WTO’s ‘July Package’: hence, the proposal of development corridors (DCs) 
in NEPAD’s roads programme, despite their acknowledged limited contribution 
to poverty reduction – NEPAD’s primary objective.  
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Cognisant of the links between the WTO’s ‘July Package’, ‘Singapore Issues’ and 
other related institutional mechanisms and arrangements, NEPAD’s prioritisation 
of DCs appears to explain the initial exclusion of critical roads construction, 
maintenance and rehabilitation projects from the roads programme (see: NEPAD, 
2002c, AfDB, 2003, TCII & NEPAD, 2005). But, it is also possible the developed 
countries reneged on their commitment for increased funding and technical 
support in terms of the WTO’s “July Package,” thereby leaving NEPAD’s 
proposed regional roads infrastructure projects/DCs in the lurch. Inadequate 
institutional capacity in sub-regional and national institutions/institutional 
structures as well as possible intransigence by national governments, however, 
also offer other possible explanations for the afore-mentioned omissions in 
NEPAD’s regional roads programme. These afore-mentioned issues have not 
been addressed in NEPAD’s assessments or, where they are, have been couched 
in diplomatic/vague language that obscures their significance and negative impact 
on the implementation of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects.   
 
Therefore, NEPAD’s failure to effectively manage the influence of exogenous 
factors on programme/project design in the Infrastructure STAP, specifically in 
facilitation projects such as the roads programme and the development of 
domestic institutional capacity, may have adverse implications for the attainment 
of NEPAD’s multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous 
implementation. In this regard, the historical, political, economic and social 
origins of Africa’s current development challenges, compounded by weak 
institutions and a plethora of internal structural constraints, illustrate that the 
development of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, particularly the roads 
programme, will require an effective integrative approach to its management: this 
will be premised upon the development of (internal) institutional capacity and 
institutional reform/development at the various spatial categories.  
 
Ultimately, one assumes that the adverse influences of the external institutional 
environment will increase complexity of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for implementation management. Regarding the roads sector, the 
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prevalence of policies of the developed north in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
may obviate any potential contribution of NEPAD’s roads programme to facilitate 
the development of regional roads networks for internal coherence; it may also 
stymie domestic efforts to facilitate a dignified exit for the majority of Africa’s 
people from the clutches of poverty and degradation through the use of 
employment intensive technologies in the construction and maintenance of roads 
infrastructure. 
 
8.4.2 Dominance of international institutions/structures  
 
The identified inadequacies in NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for implementation of the regional infrastructure projects appear to 
be exacerbated by the pressures of the global political economy and its 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integration of, and cooperation 
with African countries, sub-regions and region. For all intents and purposes, the 
prevailing relationships between African countries and international institutions/ 
institutional structures have tended to mirror the asymmetrical relationships with 
the developed countries of the north. As a result, NEPAD’s project scope and 
institutional arrangements for project organisation management appear skewed in 
favour of international institutional structures, resulting in external bias in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.  
 
This external bias, particularly in the roads programme, is concerning. For 
example, regional infrastructure development plans have implications for 
structural organisation at various levels of management and spatial categories: at 
national levels, relevant sections of regional infrastructure need to be included in 
NDPs and national budgets; at sub-regional levels, project prioritisation and 
implementation support need to be considered against the backdrop of regional 
integration plans, development priorities and collective agreements. At the various 
stages of the project life cycle, strong institutions and adequate institutional 
capacity are required to facilitate the requisite processes for effective development 
of infrastructure.  
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According to Founou-Tchigoua (2002: 161-162), however, “NEPAD is very 
confused about the problems of economic integration and pan-Africanism.” He 
argued that whilst NEPAD appeared to ignore in its plans the development of 
domestic institutional capacity, “…the institutionalization of participation by the 
G-7 in important decisions…(was) included” (ibid). As a result, Founou-Tchigoua 
argued that the inherent patterns in NEPAD’s engagement with 
institutions/institutional structures of the developed north “…will always hinder 
the creation of a Southern front” (ibid: 162). Founou-Tchigoua (ibid) cited the 
following incident as one of the examples to substantiate his assertions regarding 
NEPAD’s (perceived) accommodation of external interests:  
 
At the Abuja Summit of the HSGIC, in October 2001, African Heads of State 
discussed an EU proposal to have permanent representation in the new 
organisation. At the Dakar Conference on the financing of NEPAD, the 
investors, essentially the TNCs…decided to ‘institute an international 
coordinating structure in order to better collaborate with the NEPAD 
Managing Committee and to promote other actions in favour of the important 
initiative (ibid). 
 
Similarly, Taylor (2005: 42) underscored the external bias in the Omega Plan, 
which may have resulted in the lack of consistency to cascade NEPAD’s policy 
strategy/response actions and multiple objectives for the development of regional 
infrastructure from the integrative to the strategic levels of management1
 Wade’s (OMEGA) plan was highly problematic. It involved obtaining 
repayable treasury bonds from the developed world to finance what was 
essentially a pan-continental infrastructure scheme that, Wade readily 
admitted and advertised, would advantage Western contractors and 
. As 
Taylor (ibid) argued: 
 
                                                 
1 [Senegal’s Omega Plan was merged with the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP), 
spearheaded by Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Bouteflika of Algeria and Obasanjo of Nigeria, 
resulting in the New Africa Initiative (NAI). The NAI was subsequently re-named NEPAD. The 
MAP was a product of successive OAU mandates, the first being the mandate of the OAU 
Extraordinary Summit in Sirte: Libya, during September 1999, for Presidents Mbeki and 
Bouteflika to engage Africa’s creditors on the total cancellation of Africa’s external debt. At the 
OAU Summit in Lomé: Togo, during July 2000, the afore-mentioned three HoSG (Presidents 
Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo) were mandated to engage the developed North with a view to 
developing a constructive partnership for the regeneration of the Continent (NEPAD, 2002f). 
According to NEPAD (ibid), the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU, held in Sirte: Libya on the 
01-02 March 2001, gave a mandate for the merger of the initiatives developed for Africa’s 
recovery and development – OMEGA Plan, NAI and UNECA’s Compact – to ensure that a single, 
coordinated plan was presented by Africa to its international cooperating/development partners.] 
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businesses. As Wade asserted, ‘I will show how the West will benefit. To 
carry out this infrastructure work we will need foreign and European firms, 
which are technically more advanced than ours and which can build roads 
much faster than we could do…two thirds of the resources I’m talking about 
would go to Western companies to do the work.’  
 
The example depicted above reinforces perceptions of lack of transformation in 
NEPAD’s relationship with institutions/institutional structures of the developed 
world, as the microcosm of Africa’s relationship with the developed north.   For 
these reasons, IAG and JA (2003: 9) argued that albeit NEPAD’s pronouncements 
of a “new partnership,” Africa’s irrefutable reality of integration into the global 
order on unequal terms cannot be ignored. The IAG and JA (ibid) further argued 
that the “viability of initiatives such as NEPAD and the AU depend critically on 
whether they are able to obtain buy-in from OECD countries, both in terms of 
agreement on the basic concepts and in terms of resource provision.” Yet, 
obtaining buy-in from various key stakeholders, or simply acquiescing to the 
prerogatives of the more powerful groups, as President Wade’s assertions 
depicted above, NEPAD’s pronouncements and project prioritisation suggest, are 
two different things.  
 
Similarly, accounts by various African intellectuals – which illustrate either 
NEPAD’s surrender to, or dominance of NEPAD’s development agenda by the 
international development partners – lend credence to the assertions made above, 
with implications for domestic implementation support. According to Adedegi 
(2002: 39): 
  
 …in the Omega Plan which together with the Millennium Africa Recovery 
Programme (MAP) constitutes the NEPAD, it had been suggested that the 
management and administration of the African initiative should be entrusted 
to a board of directors comprising debtor and creditor representatives, IMF, 
World Bank, European Union, Japan, USA and Canada. This is worrisome. It 
will exacerbate neo-colonialism rather that advance the cause of economic 
decolonization. In other words, NEPAD should aim to cut Africa loose from 
the noose of both multilateral and bilateral financial institutions rather than 
tighten it. It should not be predicated on the assumption that its goals will be 
unattainable without tightening further the colonial umbilical cord.     
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Thus, rather than partnership based on cooperation, NEPAD appears to have 
simply acquiesced to the prerogatives of the developed north. As a result, there is 
evidence of indisputable dominance by the development countries and their 
institutions in the development of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Arguably, this 
dominance has influenced the objectives, development priorities, project 
selection, and pace of project implementation to develop regional infrastructure. 
Therefore, obtaining buy-in of from the OECD countries, on their terms (such as 
the associated conditionalities, tied aid, and so on), is tantamount to a poisoned 
chalice for Africa’s development agenda: it impedes the development of 
institutional capacity in various segments of society for effective future delivery 
of regional infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
African countries must also shoulder responsibility for the failure to develop 
institutional capacity to support implementation of development programmes/ 
projects. For example, the failure to develop a strong private sector has also been 
attributed to the nature of neo-patrimonial relations in African states. Taylor 
(2005: 79) argued that there are political reasons for the failure to develop a 
capable private sector: “…‘because a strong private sector represent[s] a threat to 
the ruling group, little [has been] done to promote the advance of indigenous 
private capital’…Where the ruling elites have sought to encourage African 
business, it has ‘tended to go primarily to those with political and bureaucratic 
connections.’” Taylor (ibid) argued that the political considerations in the 
development of indigenous private sector capacity “dampen any development of a 
nascent and independent – and more crucially, efficient (emphasis in original) 
bourgeoisie in many parts of Africa, further exacerbated by the continent’s 
notoriously unreliable and degenerated transport and communications networks.” 
Thus, NEPAD’s perceived adherence to the demands of international institutions 
(along the lines of prescriptions of the Washington Consensus and global financial 
architecture) appear to be practical manifestations of the inequitable power 
relations between Africa and the developed northern/OECD countries as well as a 
reflection of internal structural/institutional inadequacies.   
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The prevailing development or trade agreements between the regional/sub-
regional institutions, national governments and developed countries/their 
institutions may further complicate the status quo as: they may determine the 
nature and extent of participation by the international institutions/structures in 
NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme. This participation by diverse 
institutional structures possibly alludes to complexity of institutional 
arrangements in NEPAD’s plans for the development of regional infrastructure 
vis-à-vis international agreements. Arguably, any conditionalities prescribed by 
the international structures in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP will perpetuate the 
lack of institutional capacity in regional, sub-regional structures and national 
structures. The negative implications of the afore-mentioned conditionalities may, 
circuitously, be exacerbated by the lack of (domestic) institutional capacity to 
support the development of regional infrastructure projects.  
 
8.5 Reliance on External Resources for Implementation Support 
 
According to Paul (1990), availability of adequate resources is one of the pre-
conditions for project success: it facilitates the creation of non-transferable 
physical infrastructure assets, the acquisition of transferable assets (such as 
technology and equipment), and the development of institutional infrastructure 
including human capital with relevant competencies to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of physical infrastructure assets. The afore-mentioned considerations 
are of paramount significance for the success of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. 
Given the lack of institutional capacity in the majority of African countries, 
NEPAD’s expectations for assistance by the developed countries (NEPAD 2001: 
Para.8:2) arguably had their genesis in contemporary global discourse on 
financing for sustainable development (see: DBSA, 2003:28-40): the international 
community proffered unequivocal support for the provision of global public goods 
in developing countries. This support is subject to certain preliminary conditions 
being met, such as good socio-economic management, governance, and an 
increased role of the (foreign) private sector in the delivery of regional 
infrastructure (DBSA, 2003; Taylor, 2005).  
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Empirical evidence and anecdotal observations (Business in Africa, 2003/2004; 
Cheru, 2002; City Press, 03 April 2005; Guest, 2004; Onyeani, 1990; Oxfam, 
2002; Estache, 2006a), however, indicate that the lack of adequate resources for 
development projects negates the building of domestic institutional capacity for 
sustainable development of Africa’s physical infrastructure assets. In NEPAD’s 
roads programme, for example, this situation is compounded by the inordinate 
dependency on foreign firms or TNCs (engineering and construction companies,) 
and IFIs for procurement of resources to develop the requisite physical 
infrastructure assets. In some cases, (Mail and Guardian, 2004b; Oxfam, 2002) 
foreign investment and associated activities have resulted in inter-/intra-state 
political instability, and the fomenting of violent resource wars in African 
countries. In addition, the activities of TNCs have, according to (Oxfam, 2002: 4), 
increased polarisation and environmental degradation. In countries like Equatorial 
Guinea, it is alleged (Mail and Guardian, 2004b:12) that the activities of TNCs 
(to foment political instability and corruption,) have inhibited the construction of 
new roads and the maintenance of existing ones.  Therefore, NEPAD appears to 
not have adequately explored the implications of its reliance on external support 
for the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes, or 
attainment of its multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous 
implementation.    
 
8.5.1 Implications of global policy prescriptions for sustainable development 
finance 
 
The design of NEPAD’s roads programme, including other sectoral interventions 
under the Infrastructure STAP, are arguably influenced by contemporary (global) 
debates on sustainable development finance for the provision of global public 
goods, such as regional transport/roads infrastructure. Thus, a number of issues 
flow from NEPAD’s statements regarding the financing of regional infrastructure 
through external funding arrangements, which need to be interrogated. First, the 
erroneous expectation that some benevolent external forces will be committed to 
the development of Africa’s infrastructure, presumably because of historical 
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incidents (NEPAD, 2001, Para.46: 9), has arguably resulted in significant 
challenges for the design and implementation of NEPAD’s roads programme. 
This approach has arguably influenced the choice of NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support.  
 
Second, NEPAD’s expectations of foreign private-sector support reflect the 
resurgence of an age-old phenomenon, since the 1980’s, where African 
governments expected unsuccessfully for the (foreign) private sector to resolve 
infrastructure crises and related institutional inadequacies in African countries 
(Estache, 2006a).  The resurgence of this expectation in NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP, therefore, goes against the grain of NEPAD’s own assertions to develop 
individual and collective self-reliance in the quest for Africa’s regeneration 
(NEPAD, 2001, Para.1:1). Yet, ideas abound (Mkandawire, 2002: 105-118) for 
Africa to develop capacity in self-financing, based on domestic resource 
mobilisation.   
 
It also appears that NEPAD’s faith in considerable foreign private-sector 
involvement in the delivery of regional infrastructure is based on the hope that 
national governments (that have either no, or inadequate institutional capacity), or 
the under sourced NEPAD machinery (see Table 5.5, Chapter 5) shall provide the 
necessary regulation based on prescriptions of the global financial architecture. 
Yet, empirical evidence (Estache, 2006a; World Bank, 2006) on the challenges to 
enforce contracts in African countries illustrates the implications of inadequate 
institutions at national levels for NEPAD’s expectations. The afore-mentioned 
issues are significant because of NEPAD’s inordinate reliance on the foreign 
private sector for investment and construction of physical regional roads 
infrastructure projects. Therefore, NEPAD needs to prioritise the development of 
institutional capacity, mobilisation of domestic resources, stakeholder 
commitment to transformational change, and sustained political commitment/ 
support to support implementation of programmes/projects for sustained delivery 
for sustained delivery. Wide-ranging institutional reform/development at national 
levels will be critical to support the effectiveness of technical interventions.  
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For example, institutional reforms undertaken by Rwanda to enforce contracts 
involved entire legislative and judicial reforms (World Bank, 2006:51). In 
addition, this process required a range of interventions to facilitate and support 
integrated implementation: the development of human capital with the relevant 
competencies; strong political support from the highest political levels to 
overcome obstacles and resistance to change; transformational leadership; 
persistence; consistent management of behavioural aspects; effective 
communication; and commitment from all sectors of society to beneficial change. 
(According to the World Bank (ibid), in Rwanda, President Kagame drove the 
process of institutional reform.) The interventions depicted above lend credence to 
assertions (Mills, 2002) that African countries can make certain domestic 
interventions, such as improving governance regimes, without requiring foreign 
support.  
 
Regarding technological assistance, the majority of African countries rely mainly 
on external invention and innovation, with the exception of a few countries.  Yet, 
under the WTO’s TRIPs, it has been estimated that Africa’s reliance on foreign 
technology will cost an estimated US$40 billion annually in royalties and other 
intellectual property payments (ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4, #46: 10), thereby 
making development interventions in African countries difficult.  As Mark 
Weisbrot (ibid) argued:  
 
By tightening the enforcement of patents and copyrights, the TRIPs 
agreement will make it much more difficult, if not impossible, for 
developing countries to industrialise in the way that countries such as 
South Korea and Taiwan did, on the basis of borrowed technology, while at 
the same time draining tens of billions of dollars of scarce capital from 
South to North, for royalties and other intellectual property payments.   
 
 Thus, NEPAD appears to not have considered thoroughly the negative 
implications of its reliance on external resources for the delivery of cross-border 
regional infrastructure, so that creative instruments for domestic resource 
mobilisation or indigenous private-sector capacity in and between the various 
African countries may be developed. The effectiveness of institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements to address the identified challenges is, however, 
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predicated upon the development of an enabling institutional environment and 
committed support to broad-based transformational change at national levels. So 
far, according to UNCTAD (Founou-Tchigoua, 2002), the policy and regulatory 
environment as well as institutional failure have hindered, in particular, the 
creation of an enabling environment for (indigenous) private-sector participation 
in Africa.  
 
8.5.2 Implications of reliance on donor funding and FDI for project 
implementation 
 
 At the same time, Africa’s/NEPAD’s political leadership appears to have failed to 
demonstrate the requisite courage for transformation of Africa’s development 
landscape because of conflicting behaviours regarding Africa’s development 
trajectory under NEPAD. According to Wilmont (2002: 54), these conflicting 
behaviours have manifested in, for example, the demands by African leaders for 
an annual investment of $64 billion in NEPAD programmes, when 40-50% of 
Africa’s domestic savings are repatriated annually. Wilmont (ibid) further argued 
that the annual brain-drain of Africa’s intellectuals and experts goes unchecked in 
similar fashion – because the policies instituted by African leaders devalue the 
talents of Africa’s intellectuals and experts. At the same time, the same leaders 
“import expensive purveyors of fallacies such as that Africa is short of experts” 
(ibid). Therefore, the development of Africa’s regional infrastructure under 
NEPAD appears to be weighed down by the reliance external resources, rather 
than NEPAD breaking new ground by fostering the development of self-reliant 
financing, with external resources augmenting internal efforts.  
 
NEPAD’s reliance on external investment for implementation of Africa’s regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects, particularly FDI and (foreign) private sector 
participation for construction and engineering services belies the painful lessons 
of false promises, during the 1980-1990’s, to finance the development of Africa’s 
infrastructure. According to Estache (2006a) these false promises have resulted in 
the current crisis in the provision of Africa’s infrastructure. Arguably, NEPAD’s 
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inordinate reliance on external resources for the implementation of regional 
infrastructure has perpetuated the adoption of inappropriate conceptual 
frameworks, models for programme design and strategies for project 
implementation and implementation management with previously resulted in 
failure to develop Africa’ infrastructure assets to meet effective demand.  
 
One of the preferred financing instruments in NEPAD’s model for the 
development of regional infrastructure is ODA. Yet, the argument that aid can 
create or even sustain development outcomes at the level required to broaden and 
deepen Africa’s development agenda has been widely refuted (Oxfam, 2002, 
Mkandawire, 2002, Tandon, 2002). Similarly, Tandon (2002) argued that 
NEPAD’s approach and responses to the issue of ODA reveal a myopic and naïve 
understanding of the political economy of reform. Since time immemorial, 
African intellectuals have raised concerns regarding the predominance of, and 
dependency on donor financing for the development of Africa’s infrastructure 
projects (Mandaza, 1990).  
 
Some of the afore-mentioned concerns, however, have sub-regional specificity 
(such as SADC’s inordinate reliance on donor funding for implementation of its 
development projects). With the passage of time, Mandaza’s questions (ibid: 151) 
regarding the possibility, or not, for African countries to develop capacity to 
translate donor funding for Africa’s beneficial development have become a self-
fulfilling prophesy: African countries appear unable to extricate themselves from 
the inordinate dependency on donor funds for the implementation of development 
programmes/projects. Thus, NEPAD has ably demonstrated the intractable nature 
of aid dependence under its “new” approach to Africa’s development. Lack the 
institutional capacity at national levels to fund the implementation of domestic 
development programmes perpetuates this malaise.  
 
ODA, for example, has been associated with ubiquitous conditionalities, some of 
which effectively couch mechanisms for capital flight. In the majority of cases, 
ODA has previously amounted to funding institutions of the developed countries 
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via the ‘recipients’ in developing/African countries through “tied aid” – a 
phenomenon that includes provisions for trade with, and technical support from 
the developed countries as the conditions upon which concessionary loans, grants 
and aid are granted.  
 
Similarly, Jawara and Kwa (2004) argue that in global (WTO’s) trade 
negotiations, some of the conditionalities include the surreptitious extrication of 
support from the developing countries for positions that favour developed 
countries in return for aid/ODA, at the expense of the developing countries – 
Africa in particular. (Hence, Jawara and Kwa (ibid) argue that the World Bank 
and IMF “carrotize” loans and technical assistance to developing countries.) 
Cheru (2002) also argued that aid conditionalities are tantamount to the cession of 
control of Africa’s development processes to the ‘benefactors’ from the developed 
countries. In development programmes, donor conditionalities have previously 
manifested in inappropriate approaches to development, project design and 
strategies for project implementation.  Moreover, project interventions that are 
reliant on donor funding often ignore its negative implications for the 
development of institutional capacity for spatial expansion.  
 
A critical concern is the impact of increased ODA disbursements on inadequate 
institutions. For example, the poor absorptive capacity in the majority of African 
countries – either for donor funds or concessionary loans – has often resulted in 
disbursed funds either not being used or not used for the intended purposes. This 
phenomenon is ascribable to both the lack of institutional capacity and 
macroeconomic constraints, exacerbated by “political interference, corruption and 
other governance concerns” (Estache, 2006a: 9). As Estache (ibid) noted, “Once it 
is accepted that the public sector will be the main actor and that donors will have 
to scale up their commitments, everyone needs to accept that the dramatic scale-
up in aid risks overwhelming fragile institutions.”  
 
Estache (ibid) further argued that the current funding environment imposes 
particularly stringent requirements on both African governments and donors to 
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implement the requisite institutional reforms. Cognisant of NEPAD’s “deal” with 
institutions of the developed north (Mills & Oppenheimer, 2002; Taylor, 2005), 
concrete practical plans to implement the requisite improvements in  governance 
regimes will also be required in order to facilitate increased disbursements of 
donor funding. These requirements will further burden Africa’s fragile 
institutions.  In this regard, arguments for increased aid to implementation of 
NEPAD’s programmatic interventions provide no guarantees that such aid will be 
effectively used for the articulated purposes – and in an efficient manner too. 
 
Similarly, NEPAD’s reliance on FDI for resource mobilisation to support the 
development of regional infrastructure has raised a range of concerns regarding 
NEPAD’s decisions on funding instruments for the development of regional 
infrastructure. For example, Tandon (2002) argued that the negative constitutional 
and political implications of NEPAD’s reliance on FDI to support the attainment 
of development objectives, which include access by the poor to basic 
infrastructure services, cannot be ignored. Even for the large-scale regional 
infrastructure developments, which may be driven by purely economic 
imperatives, Estache (2006a: 13) provides compelling evidence of foreign private 
sector failure, since the 1980’s, to deliver at a scale similar to that required by 
NEPAD.  
 
As Estache (ibid) averred, foreign private-sector finance to meet Africa’s 
infrastructure investment needs did not exceed 10% during the 1990’s. 
Historically, the transport sector has fared worse, especially when compared to the 
ICT and energy sectors, as illustrated in Estache’s analysis (ibid). As a result, 
Estache had the following to say about Africa’s reliance on foreign private sector 
participation on the development of Africa’s infrastructure: “If government had 
not internalized the hope of increased private sector financing of infrastructure, 
Africa’s infrastructure problems may not have been as dramatic” (ibid: 6). 
NEPAD neither appears to have heeded lessons of history, nor planned for the 
eventuality mapped above. 
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8.5.3 Implications of reliance on DFIs for project implementation 
 
Because of macroeconomic constraints, the majority of African countries rely on 
DFIs, such as the AfDB and DBSA for concessionary loans. However, the fiscal 
rules governing operations of DFIs appear to penalise infrastructure investments 
with long-term cost-recovery. The preference in DFIs for short-term cash flows 
encumbers their (DFIs) effective contribution in the development of projects with 
long-term timelines. For example, Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate on average time-
frames for financial closure on investment projects of ten years or more; 
according to the TCII and NEPAD report (2005: 151-152), the cumulative time-
frames for facilitation projects, from project conceptualisation to full 
implementation, can amount to 15 years or more. In this context, the downside is 
the possible preference by DFIs for projects that generate short-term cash flows 
irrespective of the broader development impact of such projects. Such preferences 
result in ‘cherry picking’ (by the IFIs and DFIs), and the selection/design of 
projects that meet investor needs, rather than those that address broader 
developmental concerns. As a result, for the majority of African countries, the 
viable alternative to support implementation of development programmes/projects 
is ODA.  
 
The lack of commitment to ODA agreements by the developed countries, 
however, is legendary.  A case in point is the failure by the majority of the OECD 
countries to meet the UN target for 0.7% of the developed countries’ GDP that 
was made since the 1970’s, in line with the recommendations of the Brandt report 
(Business in Africa, August 2004: 9).  Similar commitments to scale-up ODA – 
first during 2002 under the Monterrey Consensus (DBSA, 2003), and second 
under the Africa Commission report (CFA, 2005) – appear to not have yielded 
tangible response from the international community. Whilst there has been a 
dearth of alternative development finance instruments to fund Africa’s 
infrastructure development, the increasing dependence on ODA and FDI has been 
found to stifle self-reliant development of infrastructure assets (Estache, 2006a).  
Thus, it is possible that the lack of donor funding, in addition to limited FDI 
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inflows and unfavourable DFI conditionalities are some of the reasons for the for 
identified implementation challenges in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. This is in 
addition to the failure by African governments to contribute to the development of 
regional roads infrastructure, as originally depicted under the Infrastructure 
STAP.  
 
Some authors (Founou-Tchigoua, 2002: 163) have concluded that the 
contradictory underpinnings of NEPAD’s programme, particularly in the light of 
the inordinate external dependency for funding of its sectoral priorities, such as 
regional infrastructure, can only point to ominous intentions: “…that NEPAD and 
the OECD are building a deceptive partnership, which is simply an indigenised 
version of management of excessive debt.” The afore-mentioned assessment, 
therefore, cast doubts on NEPAD’s integrity regarding its commitment to the 
attainment of its articulated multiple objectives for regional infrastructure, which 
are planned for simultaneous implementation. Founou-Tchigoua’s assessment 
above relays an ominous message for the implementation of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP, particularly so cognisant of NEPAD’s origins from the OAU 
Sirte mandate to negotiate with Africa’s creditors, during September 1999 (see: 
NEPAD, 2002f; NEPAD, 2002g).         
 
8.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The analyses of some of the mutually reinforcing underpinning causes of 
challenges in the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and roads 
programme reveal a static evolution in NEPAD’s identification of mutual interests 
and management of relationships with the developed countries. Whether this 
outcome is a consequence of the prevailing lack of institutional capacity, or 
embedded notions of the colonial utilisation of space vis-à-vis the interests of 
developed countries, or whether it is a combination of the afore-mentioned is a 
moot point. The point is, in the management of projects, whoever funds, operates, 
and manages infrastructure assets has significant influence on project design, 
implementation planning, and construction of physical infrastructure assets.  
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Therefore, if foreign governments, their (foreign) private sector and institutional 
mechanisms predominate in NEPAD’s infrastructure planning processes, then the 
resulting spatial patterns in Africa’s transportation networks will continue to 
reflect primarily their interests at the expense of Africa’s national, sub-regional 
and regional prerogatives. NEPAD, however, appears to have lacked the courage 
to address ignoble patterns in the development of Africa’s regional infrastructure, 
particularly cross-border regional roads infrastructure. 
 
In Africa’s development landscape, the inequitable power relations with 
institutions/institutional structures of the developed north have gained substance 
from the inordinate dependency of African countries on the developed countries 
for institutional infrastructure (including funding for capital projects and budget 
support, technology, human capital and technical support,) and for basic survival 
because of fiscal crises and lack of institutional capacity at national levels. This 
status quo has reinforced and perpetuated the impact of traditional notions of 
development albeit under different ideological persuasions, although the 
underlying premises still remain the same. Thus, in the context of Africa’s 
integration into the global political economy, and by extension NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP, the premises of traditional thinking about development 
appear to still remain the same.  
 
Given the inordinate reliance on external resources, it is doubtful NEPAD 
mobilised domestic resources for immediate implementation, either at regional, 
sub-regional, or national levels, in accordance with the original time-frames for 
implementation. National support for practical implementation would, for 
example, be reflected in the inclusion of the relevant sections of the identified 
regional projects in NDPs and capital budgets at national levels. This process 
would also encourage the disbursement of funding from national treasuries for 
project implementation – where funds are available; it would also facilitate the 
necessary political and popular support for the projects at national levels.  
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Thus, a host of the identified endemic and debilitating challenges in regional 
roads infrastructure and transit facilitation may be addressed in the short-term 
from internal resources, with significant impact on sectoral performance. The 
assessment made above has implications on the extent, depth and relatedness of 
integrated development interventions in the various sub-regions or member states 
in RECs, and how the related institutional issues can be addressed concurrently. 
An integrated development perspective will also facilitate the coherent integration 
of planned regional roads infrastructure and other interrelated inter-sectoral 
interventions in NDPs into the regional transport/roads programmes. The 
development of regional domestic resource mobilisation instruments/institutional 
mechanisms may also assist to extricate NEPAD or African countries from the 
clutches of the global financial architecture and inordinate influence of 
institutions/institutional structures of the developed north; the mobilisation of 
domestic resources may also assist to provide reliable funding and an incentive for 
countries to support agreed regional infrastructure developments.  
 
Therefore, only African governments can individually and collectively drive the 
process to reverse the evidenced burdens in the provision of Africa’s regional 
infrastructure, particularly cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit 
facilitation services. Other external efforts may supplement, rather than supplant 
internal efforts. The active role of national governments is critical in this context: 
to facilitate the building of relationships that engender mutual respect and support 
with the relevant institutions at sub-regional and regional levels. This quest will 
only be achieved through active investment by African countries in the 
development of their/regional infrastructure assets, including physical and non-
physical infrastructure.  
 
Also, the impetus and requisite support for the implementation of NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure plans at sub-regional/regional levels will be facilitated 
through the active involvement of various stakeholder groups within the national 
or sub-regional/regional contexts i.e., in the planning, funding, implementation, 
and management of programmes/projects for the development of cross-border 
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regional infrastructure and transit facilitation services, rather than the 
emasculation of broad-based participation evidenced in NEPAD.   
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9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Concluding Remarks 
 
Various commentators, including NEPAD’s governance and management 
structures, have generally attributed the identified challenges in the 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP to the lack of institutional 
capacity in RECs. In addition, some development analysts, NEPAD’s officials, 
and media reports also identify the lack of political will, resources, capacity, 
cooperation and support from member states as contributing to project 
implementation delays. Within the range of the articulated concerns regarding 
tardy implementation, the failure of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation management of the 
Infrastructure STAP has received scant attention, if at all.  
 
It appears the concerns regarding the implementation delays in NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP, including NEPAD’s self-assessments of implementation 
progress, are based on NEPAD’s projections for delivery of unique regional 
infrastructure projects: these afore-mentioned assessments have failed to 
interrogate, in the first place, the feasibility of NEPAD’s approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure cognisant of regional/sub-regional 
specificity, and to establish the impact of the internal/external institutional 
environment on the effective implementation NEPAD’s programmes/projects. 
Thus, the adverse perceptions of implementation failure, or delays, appear to have 
been instigated by the unreasonable expectations for the development of (cross-
border) regional infrastructure created by NEPAD in the first place. These 
expectations appear to have been based on erroneous assumptions, by NEPAD’s 
management and governance structures, on the following key issues: 
 
• essence of, and requirements for integrated development, regional integrated 
development in a context of globalisation and existing collective 
agreements/institutional relationships at, and between the various spatial 
categories and integrated project implementation; 
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• measures of effective demand for (cross-border) regional infrastructure 
products and services in order to support NEPAD’s articulated multiple 
objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation;  
• relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the 
attainment of  objectives to facilitate regional integrated development and 
integrated project implementation;  
• capacity in institutional structures for project implementation/ 
implementation management in alignment with NEPAD’s articulated 
objectives for regional integrated development and integrated project 
implementation; 
• planning requirements, which in turn appear to have been informed by 
unarticulated objectives for the development of regional infrastructure, lack 
of clarity on the viability of the identified projects and their levels of 
readiness for implementation, and  incorrect estimates of the time it would 
require to prepare the projects, plan for their implementation, and implement 
them; 
• sources and availability of resources – in particular funding, knowledge 
capital and technical support to facilitate/support effective programme/ 
project development and implementation/implementation management;  
• characteristics of the institutional environment at the various spatial 
categories, its readiness to facilitate/support integrated implementation/ 
implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects in order to support the objectives for regional 
integrated development, and the potential impact of the current institutional 
relationships and collective agreements across international borders on the 
delivery of agreed projects subject to articulated constraints; 
• relevant multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-disciplinary inputs required to 
facilitate effective and efficient development of (cross-border) regional 
infrastructure in order to support the attainment of NEPAD’s articulated 
multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation; 
• levels of political support and commitment at regional, sub-regional and 
national levels; and 
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• support from development partners, international institutions/institutional 
structures which appear to be determined by the centrality of global 
institutions in Africa’s development agenda.   
 
As a result, the comments by the development partners, analysts, media and 
NEPAD leadership/officials allude to the lack of a common understanding, or lack 
of clarity regarding the purpose and role of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP: i.e., 
what it aims to deliver, where, for whom, and by when. In addition, how project 
activities/action planning and performance control/management are linked and 
how the responsibilities and roles of the different institutions/institutional 
structures to support NEPAD’s programme for the development of regional 
infrastructure are defined remain ambiguous. The apparent absence of agreed 
frameworks, or pre-determined measures to evaluate project implementation 
success adds to the confusion of diverse perceptions regarding project 
implementation progress or challenges.  
 
One of the defining characteristics of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews is 
the pattern of providing reasons for implementation delays in respect of projects 
that were never elaborated in the first place, or processes for collective 
engagement that were not undertaken/integrated in programme design in 
alignment with NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels 
of management. Similarly, a lack of common understanding prevails regarding the 
status of NEPAD’s infrastructure programmes/projects that are proposed for 
implementation, and whether or not such projects were, in any event, ready for 
implementation – or whether they existed at all. This lack of clarity regarding the 
projects’ status signifies the negative implications of poor communication: it also 
underscores the adverse implications of prescriptive, secretive workings of 
bureaucratic structures, such as the IFIs and other global/regional institutions, for 
Africa’s regional development programmes.  
 
Therefore, it is difficult to envisage how RECs will enforce commitment to 
processes that are not even elaborated as part of the Infrastructure STAP’s modus 
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operandi or implementation of unprepared projects – or those which might not 
even exists. In this respect, the inordinate focus on RECs’ inadequacies to 
facilitate effective integrated implementation management of cross-border 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP is 
curious: it is tantamount to passing the buck for the inadequacies of NEPAD’s 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements as well as possible implementation 
failure. It is also unclear clear how credible/beneficial assessment of NEPAD’s 
implementation challenges can be made by the different stakeholders if, and 
when, it is based on limited understanding of the range of issues underpinning the 
development and implementation/implementation management of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP. The lack of up-front agreement on how the projects’ success 
will be judged, or effective communication on the projects’ status exacerbate the 
problem to identify clear patterns of causality in the assessments of project 
implementation challenges.  
 
Significantly, the various assessments of project implementation delays, including 
the analysis of possible underlying causal factors, illustrate that NEPAD has failed 
to consider the impact of the underlying structural constraints during programme 
conception, development, or implementation planning. Therefore, one may argue 
that the identified challenges in implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP, or related sectoral programmes, are linked primarily to NEPAD’s poor 
programme conception, prescriptive approach to planning and chaotic project 
organisation management: they are not a reflection of institutional inadequacies 
or lack of institutional capacity for implementation/implementation management 
at the various spatial categories and institutional structures alone. However, the 
various assessments of implementation progress, including the recommended 
actions, reveal a tendency to focus corrective interventions on the effects of 
problems, as opposed to addressing the underlying causes of problems. The key 
findings of this research are summarised below. 
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9.2 Key Findings   
 
The key findings of this research include the following issues: 
 
9.2.1 Poor leadership and ownership of programme 
 
Arguably, NEPAD’s decisions at the integrative and strategic levels of 
management set the tone for the neo-liberal approach to the development of 
regional infrastructure, prescriptive approach to planning, strong sectoral focus, 
and over-simplification of constraints and challenges in the implementation of 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects. These afore-mentioned premises 
appear to have resulted in the lack of alignment between NEPAD’s policy 
strategy/response actions, influences of the internal/external institutional 
environment, programmes/projects, and institutional structures for 
implementation/implementation management. As a result, despite claims by 
NEPAD’s leadership in the Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) to institute 
transformational interventions, intractable problems in the delivery of Africa’s 
(cross-border) regional infrastructure still prevail. These include the following 
issues: weak institutional environment; inappropriate approaches to development 
planning; legacy of colonial influences in trade that are reflected spatially in the 
existing transportation patterns; lack of inclusive stakeholder participation; lack of 
institutional capacity for implementation compounded by the entrenched 
inordinate dependence on external resources; and lack of sustained political 
support at national levels for the implementation of agreed programmes at 
regional/sub-regional levels.   
 
The evidenced poor leadership and ownership by NEPAD of its own programme 
appears to have contributed significantly to the perpetuation of the afore-
mentioned challenges. As a result, NEPAD’s governance and management 
structures have failed to create an enabling environment for integrated 
implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral 
programmes. Suffice to say, the lack of strong leadership appears to be one of the 
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major shortcomings in the implementation of Africa’s development programmes, 
and in efforts to chart directions for collective self-reliance in Africa’s 
development trajectory (see: Adedeji, 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o et al, 2002; Bond, 
2002; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Gelb, 2002; Herbert, 2003; Hope, 2002; 
Mkandawire, 2002; Mills, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; Tandon, 2002). Therefore, the 
characteristics and overall implications of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure need to be thoroughly 
examined: their roles and responsibilities as well as obligations arising out of the 
afore-mentioned need to be rendered explicit, cognisant of the constraints and 
challenges of external/internal institutional environment in which Africa’s 
development programmes are implemented.  
 
For example, Adedegi (2002: 39) cautioned that institutional arrangements in 
NEPAD, such as partnerships with the developed world, might 
“compromise…cardinal principles… (of) self-reliance, self-sustainment, socio-
economic transformation, holistic human development and democratisation of the 
development process espoused in some of the previous (failed) African 
initiatives.” Therefore, references by NEPAD’s political leaders to “going back to 
the authentic Nepad approach”, discussed in Chapter 1, suggest either a 
misunderstanding of, or oblivion to impediments in NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.  
 
Therefore, any future actions for the development of cross-border regional 
infrastructure need to be supported by an informed understanding of the 
situational specificity in which decisions are made and supported, wherein 
regional infrastructure development programmes are conceptualised, prepared and 
implemented. The development of relevant institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to support effective project conception, planning, and 
implementation management will be critical in this respect.  
 
This process includes reviewing strategies at the various levels of management in 
order to establish how they are linked to inputs/outputs of planning hierarchies, 
                                                                                                                              258 
 
programmes/projects, and institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation support to minimise or avoid repeating past mistakes. Where 
necessary, such a process would allow for the crafting of corrective interventions 
in the underlying precepts at the various levels of management in order to 
facilitate successful integrated implementation management subject to situational 
and project specificity. As Browett and Fair (Fair, 1987: 57) noted, “…it is very 
difficult to achieve change in a system if the parameters of a system remain the 
same.”    
 
9.2.2 Inordinate focus on institutional inadequacies in RECs 
 
The findings of this research are different from the general perception of exclusive 
lack of institutional capacity in RECs to perform their mandate for integrated 
implementation management/coordination of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP as 
the primary reason for implementation delays. For example, NEPAD’s 1st 
Infrastructure STAP review (AfDB, 2003) identified the lack of institutional 
capacity in RECs to discharge their obligations, vis-à-vis the expectations of 
NEPAD, as one of the key constraints to the implementation of NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure programme. The 2nd Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & 
NEPAD, 2005: 14), however, identified a range of institutional constraints and 
challenges at the various spatial categories and levels of management/planning, 
with implications for implementation progress. These include, but are not limited 
to, the lack of capacity in RECs, and the lack of political will including resistance 
by national governments/member states to fully implement the requisite 
institutional reforms (including reforms to legislative, regulatory and governance 
regimes in order to support harmonisation in transit facilitation projects,) despite 
the existence of decades-old regional agreements to this effect.  
 
As the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid) argued:  
 
  …lack of institutional stakeholder buy-in, bureaucratic and institutional 
resistance to reforms, legal complexities and a lack of political willingness 
to implement genuine reform continue to hinder efforts to facilitate the 
movement of people and goods across borders within the continent.   
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In addition, the TCII and NEPAD Infrastructure STAP review (ibid) cited 
inadequate project preparation, funding constraints, ineffective stakeholder/ 
relationship management, lack of commitment to collective agreements, and 
inability by the development partners to modify their systems and practices to suit 
NEPAD’s development priorities. The prevailing general perception and 
collective acceptance of lack of institutional capacity in RECs as the reason for 
implementation delays of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects 
is, therefore, concerning. 
 
The narrow focus on RECs’ inadequacies potentially limits the development of 
relevant corrective interventions to ameliorate the identified programme/project 
implementation challenges. This is particularly so since the lack of institutional 
capacity in RECs was in NEPAD’s peculiar knowledge at the time the RECs were 
mandated (by NEPAD) to coordinate integrated implementation management of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. For these reasons, the obfuscation highlighted in 
the discussions regarding the causes of, and accountability for project 
implementation delays raises the spectre of previous failures in the 
implementation of Africa’s development/regional infrastructure programmes. The 
emphasis on lack of institutional capacity in RECs also appears to be used as a 
stalking horse, or mechanism to deflect attention from the inadequacies of 
NEPAD’s conception, planning, and management of the regional infrastructure 
programme.  
 
In addition, NEPAD has linked proposals for integrated implementation of 
regional infrastructure interventions in the different sectors to regional integrated 
development: the afore-mentioned spheres (i.e., “integrated development,” 
“sectoral integration/cooperation,” and “regional integrated development”) are 
fraught with unresolved complexities at ideological, spatial and practical levels 
with implications for programme design and strategies for project 
implementation/implementation management at the lower levels of management/ 
planning. NEPAD, however, appears to assiduously avoid addressing the 
underpinning causes to the identified implementation challenges, hence prevalent 
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postulations regarding the lack of delivery in RECs to ensure the attainment of the 
desired implementation outcomes (TCII & NEPAD, 2005) – yet RECs do not 
have the capacity to do so.  
 
Therefore, the sentiments expressed in the various assessments of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP regarding the lack of institutional capacity in RECs possibly 
obscure the unwillingness or lack of know-how on NEPAD’s part to address the 
identified implementation challenges, or their underlying causes, effectively. In 
the circumstances, the RECs’ inability to articulate their position or defend their 
integrity regarding the ensuing concerns in respect of implementation challenges 
in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP also signals their powerlessness and lack of 
institutional capacity to effectively manage institutional relationships between the 
various spatial categories and institutional structures. NEPAD’s stance, however, 
is even more indicative of poor leadership in blaming the RECs for 
implementation failures, rather than identify effective mechanisms for their 
support. As Maxwell (2001: 47-48) averred, “…as the challenge escalates, the 
need for teamwork elevates (emphasis in original)… (yet) One mistake…people 
repeatedly make is to focus on their dream and too little on their team…” 
 
9.2.3 Negative implications of prescriptive models for integrated 
implementation plans 
 
Prescriptive models have traditionally proved inadequate to integrate the different 
planning hierarchies, thereby exacerbating the dilemma for integrated 
implementation. Moreover, the driving forces in integrated development are the 
requirements for broad-based collective engagement, which integrate trans-/multi-
sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary approaches to effectively address the 
challenges of development. Therefore, the articulation, integration in planning 
frameworks, and integrated implementation of the afore-mentioned requirements 
may not be suited to the controlled processes that characterise the corporate 
sector, bureaucratic organisations, or institutional structures with a strong sectoral 
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focus that characterise NEPAD’s prescriptive institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to support implementation of the Infrastructure STAP.  
 
For example, Mintzberg (1994: 297) argues that “empty platitudes” inherent in 
prescriptive strategy development fail to provide “…simulation of complex 
managerial processes… (or reflect) any understanding of the reality and so 
remained essentially devoid of real content.” Moreover, regarding the failure to 
develop any effective strategy in prescriptive models, Mintzberg argues that the 
process of “integrating decisions at a point in time” is not strategy making, but 
simply “planning’s approach to strategy making (emphasis in original)” (ibid: 
12). As a result, NEPAD failed to ensure that the requisite planning and related 
actions were performed at the various stages of the project life cycle, in order to 
ensure that links were developed between NEPAD’s policy strategy; 
development/ programme objectives; influences of the external/internal 
institutional environment; NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects; 
and development priorities, objectives and programmes/projects of institutions/ 
institutional structures for project implementation/implementation management. 
As a result, NEPAD appears to have relied on ‘empty platitudes’ for programme 
development and implementation support. Significantly, it remains unclear 
whether NEPAD’s response actions for integrated development constitute a policy 
strategy or a check list of aspirational implementation actions.  
 
Notably, the lack of institutional capacity for planning at regional, sub-regional 
and national levels militates against the exclusive use of prescriptive approaches 
to planning in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Given the lack of institutional 
capacity to perform the requisite work at the strategic levels of management, a 
concern in this study is that the identified frameworks for integrative project 
management, which are based on prescriptive models for planning, may not on 
their own provide adequate guidelines for the management of complex projects, 
particularly in a spatial and ideological context similar to that presented by 
NEPAD.  
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For example, Turner’s framework for a structured approach to project 
management (Turner, 1999), or even the guidelines outlined by the PMBOK 
(PMI, 1996), appear to be premised on prescriptive models of the design or 
planning schools of thought. These guidelines/models have been used universally 
for environmental analysis, quality and performance control. Their effectiveness, 
however, may be stymied in the context of inadequate institutions and lack of 
institutional capacity to support the requisite rigorous planning processes. In 
addition, although the PMBOK (ibid) addresses project integration management, 
this integration is proposed at the level of individual projects, rather than being 
applied to integrated development as a concept.  
 
Similarly, the framework proposed by the PMBOK may be inadequate for the 
concurrent implementation of multiple, trans-sectoral projects across international 
boundaries in RECs, or at national levels in the majority of African countries. 
This is particularly so since the PMBOK appears to be underpinned by the 
assumption that adequate institutions and institutional capacity in structures for 
project implementation already exist to facilitate the integration of its various 
knowledge areas. Yet, in the majority of African countries, the relevant 
institutions may not exist or are underdeveloped. As a result, the structures for 
implementation management of cross-border multinational projects may not 
possess the requisite institutional infrastructure and human capital with the 
relevant competencies – assumed to exist in conventional project management 
guidelines or models – in order to facilitate integrated implementation or 
integrated implementation management/coordination of the identified projects. 
This is particularly so since politics, socio-economic imperatives, political power 
relations, requirements for territorial integrity, technology, and global capitalism 
appear to drive the implementation of Africa’s cross-border development projects 
at all the stages of the project life cycle. Thus, different management skills, 
systems and frameworks for integrated project implementation and 
implementation management may need to be developed subject to project and 
situational specificity.  
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The point of the argument above is that development programmes/projects are 
implemented in a much more complex internal/external institutional environment 
with diverse constituencies than that presupposed by NEPAD. Notions for 
integrated development/implementation increase complexity. In this respect, 
linking the development programmes/projects to the objectives and priorities of 
institutional structures that manage/coordinate their implementation, or structures 
that are responsible for their implementation, provides better chances for their 
success than the imposition of unique, large-scale regional infrastructure pilot 
projects with no links to NDPs and RECs. The afore-mentioned concerns suggest 
that NEPAD needs to adopt an astute and prudent combination of diverse 
planning and management frameworks based on the specific requirements of 
projects and situational specificity. The use of such frameworks, however, needs 
to be premised upon integrative planning and implementation management 
frameworks in order to ensure overall alignment with objectives for integrated 
development or integrated implementation.  
 
In other contexts in the global arena, frameworks for collective engagement have 
been developed for adoption by institutional structures at different spatial 
categories in order to accommodate the dynamism in the global institutional 
environment, whilst retaining individual organisational identity or territorial 
integrity. Initiatives within this context take cognisance of the prevailing 
challenges of development in the context of globalisation, and the recognition that 
old methods of addressing development, infrastructure provision, poverty 
reduction, and doing business in individual organisations may no longer be 
operative across international/national borders. (Examples of the afore-mentioned 
frameworks include the UN Global Compact, which was developed to facilitate 
cooperative engagement between the UN, governments, labour, business and civil 
society organisations as the representatives of broader communities (UN, 2004). 
Similarly, the Caux Round Table Principles for Business were launched to 
facilitate “a truly global, ethically-based business system” (Goodpaster, undated), 
cognisant of the unique requirements of diverse business organisations, and the 
need for accessibility of this framework to diverse cultures globally.) 
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9.2.4 Incompatible interface between the “project approach” and “regional 
perspective” 
  
It is unclear how NEPAD aimed to balance its “project approach” to ensure 
alignment with a programme context at regional/sub-regional levels, particularly 
so since the identified regional infrastructure projects do not appear to be designed 
as part of a programme. Similarly, NEPAD’s simultaneous adoption of a 
“regional perspective” as the starting point for the development of regional 
infrastructure increases confusion, particularly so cognisant of the differences 
between large-scale regional infrastructure projects in individual countries (i.e., 
energy projects) and multinational cross-border regional infrastructure projects 
(i.e., transport/roads projects). In other words, how is NEPAD’s “project 
approach” related to the “regional perspective”?  
 
For example, how will the application of the regional perspective co-exist with the 
“principle of subsidiarity” in relation to decision-making, project selection, 
management of institutional relationships between the various spatial categories, 
and allocation of resources to projects? This is particularly so since popular 
participation in project selection, construction and management was one of the 
key actions proposed by NEPAD in the development of regional infrastructure 
(NEPAD, 2001, Para.103: 23). In other words, how will regional and sub-regional 
structures address the issue of implementation support/funding from national 
governments, within the context of a regional perspective that appears to 
circumscribe the role of the state and national structures/formations in project 
selection?  Therefore, the analysis of how the afore-mentioned issues are 
interrelated and how they have collectively impacted on the characteristics of 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the implementation of 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP needs further examination.  
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9.2.5 Lack of institutional capacity 
 
One would have expected NEPAD to emphasise, at the outset, institutional 
capacity assessment and the development of institutional capacity to support the 
implementation of pilot projects in the short-term and for spatial expansion in the 
long-tem, particularly so given the objectives of the identified projects: to “kick-
start” Africa’s development. Instead, at the integrative levels of management 
NEPAD predetermined at the conceptual stages (during the development of 
NEPAD’s Strategic Framework) the institutional partners, financing 
arrangements, project scope, and institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
project implementation support and management/coordination, seemingly without 
having conducted the proposed institutional capacity assessments.  
 
The afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms and arrangements appear to have 
been based on NEPAD’s inadequate understanding of the internal/external 
institutional environment and expectations of support from development partners 
vis-à-vis NEPAD’s objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. It 
appears, however, that NEPAD’s (inadequate) understanding of the institutional 
environment at the integrative levels of management was not subsequently 
verified during programme development in the Infrastructure STAP, resulting in 
erroneous assumptions being made and cascaded to the Infrastructure STAP at the 
various levels of management/planning and infrastructure sectors. 
 
The lack of institutional capacity assessment also appears to be linked to 
NEPAD’s prescriptive approach to planning: this approach has instead facilitated 
the top-down elaboration of programmes/projects that focus on NEPAD’s narrow 
interests for global connectivity/integration, openness and connectivity, in 
contradiction to the range of response actions depicted in NEPAD’s Strategic 
Framework for the development of regional infrastructure and NEPAD’s various 
sectoral programmes. The lack of institutional capacity assessment also appears to 
be linked to NEPAD’s inadequate prioritisation of requisite interventions to 
facilitate effective integrated implementation management/coordination of 
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NEPAD’s infrastructure STAP. In this regard, NEPAD’s HSGIC appear to have 
failed in their mandated/assumed role to facilitate and oversee institutional 
capacity assessment at the various spatial categories, so that effective plans would 
be elaborated for implementation relative to the identified capacity constraints. 
 
As a result, the analyses of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and roads programme 
reveal an endemic lack of institutional capacity for effective implementation or 
implementation management/coordination of the identified projects, let alone for 
integrated implementation. It also appears that the lack of institutional capacity is 
exacerbated by NEPAD’s inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements 
for programme/project development and implementation management, 
particularly in the context of integrated development and integrated 
implementation management/coordination proposed by NEPAD. In addition, 
inadequate institutions, complex and inadequate institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to manage institutional relationships at the various spatial categories 
as well as intractable constraints in the external/internal institutional environment 
in RECs appear to have exacerbated the problem of lack of institutional capacity 
for the implementation of NEPAD’s projects.  
 
Arguably, the lack of institutional capacity appears to have resulted in the 
inordinate influence on NEPAD’s strategic decisions, of idealistic foreign and 
inoperative economic doctrines and methodologies, rather than the espousal of 
practical approaches including relevant programmes/projects for the development 
of cross-border regional roads infrastructure. It is thus possible that the lack of 
institutional capacity has also contributed to NEPAD’s adoption of the 
prescriptive approach to planning, although the lack of institutional capacity to do 
the requisite detailed planning entailed in this approach circuitously contributed to 
poor planning. Thus, capacity assessment at national levels, in respect of the 
wherewithal of states’ apparatus to facilitate harmonisation of sector policy, 
governance and regulatory regimes, for example, appears to not have been 
conducted at all. Capacity assessment in RECs also appears to overlap with the 
AfDB’s role in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, thereby creating confusion. 
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Similar practises, as depicted above, characterised the failed implementation of 
previous regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects (such as the 
TAH and LPA’s transport programme discussed in APPENDIX B,) where 
institutional capacity was not assessed before the proposal, approval, and roll-out 
of programmes for implementation. As a result, this research has identified the 
lack of institutional capacity as a significant constraint in the implementation of 
NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programmes/projects: it affects programme/ 
project design as well as the determination of the relevant institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation and implementation 
management. (In project management, constraints in the management/ 
implementation of projects are generally identified as time, cost, and quality. 
Thus, one may argue that certain levels of institutional/organisational capacity to 
effectively implement projects are assumed to exist at the time projects are 
approved for implementation. In Africa’s development programmes/projects, 
however, conditions are different and such assumptions may not hold: projects 
generally appear to be planned and approved without establishing the requisite 
capacity for implementation resulting in implementation failure. For these 
reasons, the EC’s Project Cycle Management Guidelines (2004:99) have 
identified the importance of institutional capacity assessment in development 
projects. Similarly, the explanation of processes entailed in the World Bank’s 
institutional appraisal (Baum, 1982) underscores the importance of institutional 
capacity assessment and development for project implementation success.)  
 
Thus, the 1st NEPAD Infrastructure review overlooked the fundamental structural 
causes of the problems it sought to address: it only treated the superficial 
symptoms by recommending technical interventions, whilst leaving inadequate 
institutions/institutional structures intact. For these reasons, it may well be that the 
recommendations of the AfDB report (2003) had little palliative effect on some of 
the fundamental reasons for the failure of African institutions – i.e., institutional 
structures trying to do too much but with no capacity for implementation.  
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Therefore, the recommendations in the illustrative SWOT analysis, depicted in 
APPENDIX F and discussed in Chapter 7, underscore the significance of NEPAD 
to address internal institutional capacity deficits/constraints as a priority, rather 
than focusing on the management of institutional relations with donors and 
development partners.  
 
9.2.6 Inadequate project organisation management 
 
 
The inconsistencies with respect to the levels of work in which many regional, 
sub-regional or national institutions operate to implement regional infrastructure 
programmes (or even other development programmes) appear to result from 
inadequacies in project organisation management. For example, NEPAD does not 
explain in the AfDB’s report (2003) how institutional structures that ostensibly 
possess a wealth of experience and expertise in the implementation of similar 
development programmes, such as the World Bank and AfDB, got entangled in 
“perfectly understandable confusion and misunderstanding regarding roles and 
responsibilities” (ibid: 35)in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.  
 
This is particularly so since, in explaining how the World Bank’s project cycle 
evolves, Baum (1982) argued that the requisite processes at the various stages of 
the project life cycle involved experienced multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary 
technical specialists and projects staff, “who are expected to have a broad 
understanding of development issues and the capacity to make sound, independent 
judgements” (ibid: 5). Cognisant of the expected high levels of application area 
expertise and experience in projects facilitated by the World Bank’s staff, it is 
possible that the “perfectly understandable confusion” (AfDB, 2003:35) displayed 
in NEPAD’s projects either illustrates the inadequate use of relevant project 
management methodologies for project organisation management, or the negative 
implications for project implementation of the diverse institutional structures in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP, or both of the afore-mentioned issues.   
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The 2nd Infrastructure review also stopped short of addressing the more 
controversial issues in NEPAD’s project organisation management: the 2nd 
Infrastructure review shifted the responsibility to RECs to develop a framework to 
manage institutional relationships in processes over which RECs evidently have 
no control. It also recommended technical interventions in order to ameliorate the 
identified problems. Therefore, the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review failed to 
address the issue of inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements to 
support integrated implementation management of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
and associated sectoral programmes/projects. 
 
For example, NEPAD’s 2nd
The multiplicity of diverse institutional structures for project implementation 
support and implementation management/coordination exacerbates the problem 
for project organisation management, particularly so in the absence of strong 
supranational structures to guide consistent programme planning and support 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated 
 Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 
106-108) confirmed the prevalence of overlapping institutional arrangements, 
which arguably contribute to the obfuscation around roles and responsibilities of 
various institutional structures at various spatial categories in the implementation 
of regional development programmes. However, instead of recommending 
practical instruments to resolve the identified overlaps, or inconsistencies in 
project organisation management, the TCII and NEPAD review (ibid) 
recommended the development of a framework (by RECs) for the management of 
institutional relationships. This position was adopted by all the affected parties or 
their representatives (such as NEPAD Secretariat, AfDB, RECs). Such a stance is, 
however, to be expected given the apparent reluctance in regional, sub-regional 
and national institutions to resolve overlapping regional integration arrangements 
in the short-term. It also appears there is a measure of reluctance to articulate what 
the identified structures for implementation/implementation management are 
actually expected to deliver, or to ensure accountability for project deliverables in 
the relevant institutional structures.  
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implementation management/coordination. Thus, it is possible that the planning 
inputs from different institutional structures have also contributed to NEPAD’s 
adoption and cascade of diverse and contradictory messages, with negative 
implications for the design of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP programmes/ 
projects including institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation 
management.  
 
9.2.7 Delegation of critical project activities to aspirational project structures 
 
Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned constraints, there is an evidenced (in the 
recommendations of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP,) delegation  of overlapping 
roles and responsibilities for implementation/implementation management to 
structures that lack the requisite capacity, or assigning tasks to institutional 
structures at their levels of incompetence, or to intended or aspirational project 
structures. Likewise, NEPAD’s failure to posit a structured approach to project 
organisation management has resulted in the indiscriminate delegation of roles 
and responsibilities in NEPAD’s various Infrastructure reviews to structures that 
do not posses the power, authority and capacity to address the identified 
constraints (such as NEPAD’s Secretariat or RECs). Some of the 
recommendations of the Infrastructure STAP reviews, while relevant, extend 
beyond the spheres of the RECs’ operations; some of the recommendations in the 
TCII and NEPAD report (2005) are more pertinent to the management of states’ 
apparatus (at national levels,) in spheres of influence beyond the control of RECs. 
Such proposed interventions result in confusion regarding the purpose and role of 
NEPAD, or its institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of 
regional infrastructure.   
 
Such practices are prevalent in the management of Africa’s regional development 
programmes/projects. Similar practices characterised the LPA’s Transport and 
Communication’s programme (of 1980) and TAH and “missing links” initiative 
(of 1970), discussed in APPENDIX B. Thus, the discussions on the various 
assessments of implementation challenges of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and 
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the related sectoral programmes, in particular the roads programme, suggest that 
since the failed implementation of the LPA’s programme and the TAH and 
“missing links” initiative, little has changed with respect to the institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for the implementation of Africa’s infrastructure 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
The issues highlighted in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP reviews (AfDB, 2003; 
TCII & NEPAD, 2005) are not unique to Africa or programme/project 
implementation of regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation in the 
African context. As a result, the previous implementation of similar projects in the 
international context provides valuable lessons for NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure programme. The mechanisms to ameliorate the identified challenges 
between the international experience and NEPAD’s, however, differ markedly. 
For example, the EU’s TENs initiative emphasised institutional reform/ 
development; harmonisation of diverse and multiple transport sector policies 
regulatory and governance regimes; active role of the states in the planning, 
financing and implementation of agreed transportation networks; and support by 
strong, competent supranational authorities with the authority to act.  
 
The afore-mentioned interventions helped to increase the effectiveness of 
technical interventions. In addition, the EU’s TENs initiative illustrated that 
institutional reform/development is a long-term process: it requires the active 
participation and commitment of all stakeholders, particularly at national levels. 
Also, the effective implementation of agreed infrastructure projects requires the 
commitment of adequate domestic resources at national levels for the planned 
development outcomes to manifest. Almost all of the afore-mentioned 
conditions/success factors are neither met in NEPAD’s roads programme, nor in 
the Infrastructure STAP. 
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9.2.8 Inadequate scheduling  
 
NEPAD, including its lead agencies responsible for the development of the 
Infrastructure STAP, must shoulder the blame for creating unreasonable 
expectations of the immediate realisation of physical regional infrastructure 
projects. This is because most of the reasons for implementation delays proffered 
in the various comments above were already prevalent in Africa’s development 
landscape and in the implementation of regional integration initiatives before, and 
at the time that NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP was developed. In fact, one may 
argue that NEPAD’s initiative for Africa’s regeneration was also conceived 
precisely to address the afore-mentioned impediments to the effective 
implementation of programmes/projects, which were developed to support the 
realisation of Africa’s development agenda to facilitate a better future for its 
peoples. Therefore, NEPAD or the developers of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
possessed the relevant information to propose effective institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements to either mitigate the consequential risks of the negative impact 
of the inadequate internal/external institutional environment on the 
implementation of the planned development programmes/projects. The 
expectations for the fulfilment of NEPAD’s commitments have, however, not 
been met. 
 
Some of the stakeholder responses to NEPAD’s implementation challenges reveal 
a limited grasp of the implications of time-consuming and at times delicate 
(requisite) political, funding, technical and governance processes that must be 
integrated in the planning for the development of large-scale regional 
infrastructure projects, in particular cross-border regional infrastructure and transit 
facilitation projects. The timelines in relation to the afore-mentioned multi-
disciplinary and multi-sectoral activities are, in the majority of cases, protracted 
and politically charged.  
 
For example, project preparation processes may include the following 
steps/elements: 
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• Protracted funding negotiations with multiple sponsors in order to obtain 
funding. Such negotiations and the characteristics/priorities of sponsors 
determine the characteristics of project elements, project scope, project 
constraints and risks, service providers, and stakeholders;  
• Lengthy processes for collective engagement with various sectors of 
society/institutions at national levels and other relevant institutions/ 
institutional structures at the different spatial categories;  
• Complex trans-state political negotiations at the levels of states, or RECs, 
involving multiple departments in each of the participating member states, in 
order to finalise bilateral/multilateral protocols for the implementation of the 
identified projects, apportion the project’s work and benefits, and identify 
the  requisite complementary investments to ensure integrated development; 
and 
• Harmonisation of policies, regulatory and governance regimes including the 
associated institutional reforms and/or development. 
 
Therefore, it takes a while to see the physical manifestations of planning in the 
development of cross-border regional roads infrastructure. This is particularly so 
in the event that multiple countries with diverse policy, sector, regulatory, 
governance and macro-economic regimes are participating in the implementation 
of the identified regional projects in a multilateral context.  
 
The time frames allocated for NEPAD’s HSGIC to mainstream institutional 
reforms in the areas of democracy, political, economic and corporate governance 
(i.e., six months) are too ambitious or may even be deemed idealistic for the 
requisite for institutional reforms. The author’s view on this aspect takes 
cognisance of the erosion, over a number of decades, of Africa’s institutions 
through the legacy that colonialism bequeathed Africa, neo-patrimonialism, mal-
governance, and endemic corruption. For these reasons, NEPAD’s focus on 
institutional reform and development as well as institutional/individual capacity 
building, from the outset, would be critical for the envisaged regional 
infrastructure development outcomes to manifest.   
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NEPAD’s ambitious time-frames have also obviated processes for popular 
participation, where such processes were to be instituted. In some cases, it may 
even prove difficult for some of the fragile or underdeveloped states, or NEPAD’s 
HSGIC, to promote participatory decision-making in the development of regional 
infrastructure projects: the related institutions are either weak or non-existent in 
some African countries. 
 
9.2.9 Inordinate reliance on external resources 
NEPAD’s prerogative for the development and implementation of the 
Infrastructure STAP is illustrated in the inordinate dependency on external 
resources (including funding and technical support). As a result, NEPAD has 
identified donor support (including the negotiation of donor relations), support 
from the (UN) multilateral system and international community, and increased 
FDI inflows as some of the key elements to support the development of regional 
infrastructure. In addition, NEPAD has identified the support of a benevolent 
global financial architecture and commitment to global governance as some of the 
critical institutional mechanisms to support the attainment of its objectives for the 
development of regional infrastructure. NEPAD’s inordinate reliance on external 
resources or exogenous factors for the development/implementation of regional 
infrastructure programme/projects is erroneous.  
 
The afore-mentioned situation gives the impression that even the implementation 
of projects identified under the roads programme, which are planned for funding 
by national governments, is conditional on their attracting donor finance or 
foreign private-sector investment. As a result, global financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank, appear to have an invasive influence on project scope and 
prioritisation of regional roads networks. Given the extreme levels of institutional 
inadequacy at national levels, the additional financing burden of the identified 
NEPAD projects also increases implementation risks irrespective of the projects’ 
merits and their benefits to national and regional development agendas. Thus, 
NEPAD’s stance suggests an abrogation of responsibility in favour of short-term 
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quick wins that benefit foreign private sector investors and global financial 
institutions at the expense of addressing internal structural constraints at national 
levels that may stymie the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure projects 
in the long term.  
 
For example, in the majority of African countries, the limitations to improve roads 
infrastructure stocks are linked to macro-economic distress, fiscal and monetary 
constraints, debt, reliance on foreign private sector investments and related 
funding constraints to support planned infrastructure investments. Presumably 
because of the afore-mentioned problems, NEPAD reserved the development of 
PPPs for certain categories of projects, such as investment projects. Yet, 
facilitation projects that address NEPAD’s key objectives for regional integration, 
inter-African trade, capacity building and poverty reduction will be financed 
through domestic funding instruments or donor support.  
 
Similarly, TCII and NEPAD (2005: 14) accedes that it is now generally 
recognised that investment in the roads sector will be made primarily by the 
public sector; private-sector participation will be targeted at performance-based 
contracts for greenfields developments, asset management, and roads 
maintenance. The TCII and NEPAD report (ibid: 15), however, acknowledges 
that so far, private sector participation in Africa’s infrastructure investments has 
been limited for a number of factors, such as the “perception of a poor investment 
climate, high cost, high risk, shortage of risk capital for project development, and 
limited availability of instruments and structures to mitigate risk.” The afore-
mentioned concerns have been raised previously by some authors (see: Watson, 
1998); yet, the pace of reforms to address these concerns is excruciatingly slow.  
 
Some of the negative implications of the external sources of finance on 
programme design illustrate the need for NEPAD/Africa’s institutions to develop 
effective domestic instruments for sustainable financing of regional infrastructure 
developments and implementation support. In the current dispensation, for the 
planned positive development outcomes to manifest under NEPAD, effective use 
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and management of aid for the development of regional infrastructure will require 
transformational changes in the ethos of both the donors from the industrialised 
countries and the recipient African governments.  
 
As a result of NEPAD’s inordinate reliance on external interventions to support 
the implementation of its trans-/multidisciplinary and trans-/multi-sectoral 
programmatic interventions, the possible proposal of diverse interventions by 
different institutional structures at different levels of management and across 
international boundaries may ensue. The inordinate influence of international 
institutions and institutional structures in NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
development agenda also increases the potential for the proposal and prioritising 
of inappropriate interventions for the development of regional infrastructure. In 
addition, a wide scope of diverse interventions may overwhelm fragile 
regional/sub-regional institutional structures. The inordinate reliance on external 
resources also has implications for programme design and strategies for project 
implementation/implementation management to support the attainment of 
NEPAD’s multiple objectives as well as to develop institutional capacity for 
spatial expansion. Thus, a related concern is whether the ability exists (in Africa’s 
regional and sub-regional institutions) to propose programmes/projects to reverse 
the entrenched colonial spatial patterns in regional transport infrastructure, 
cognisant of NEPAD’s reliance on private foreign finance, credit, and aid for 
regional infrastructure improvements.  
 
9.2.10 Adverse impact of complex global rules/trade agreements 
 
The elaboration and operationalization of NEPAD’s strategy for the 
implementation of the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes 
appears to reflect the pressures of the WTO’s prescriptions or its institutional 
mechanisms, such as the TRIPs and TRIMs. This includes rules pertaining to 
financing, government procurement, provision of services, and access to 
technology. Complexity in Africa’s development landscape has also increased 
because of globalisation: rules of global institutions, such as the WTO and IFIs 
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including the World Bank, IMF and IFC have far-reaching implications for the 
implementation of regional, sub-regional or national infrastructure projects, 
particularly since these afore-mentioned institutions more often than not tie 
financial support and technical assistance to trade-related packages and export-
promotion incentives. Yet, the processes for collective engagement in global trade 
and related sectoral interventions also have a life of their own, with implications 
for the implementation of projects within limited time-frames.  
 
Therefore, included under the considerations of NEPAD’s strategy for project 
implementation are the prescriptions of the global financial architecture, diverse 
imperatives for regional integration, obligations of member states in RECs and 
across overlapping RIAs with respect to RTAs and FTAs with the developed 
countries and/or their institutions, and external/internal pressures for 
implementation progress of the NEPAD initiative itself. These afore-mentioned 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements have diverse and exacting 
requirements that may particularly burden fragile institutions, with implications 
for the effective implementation of the identified programmes/projects. 
 
Other pressures on the elaboration and implementation of NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure projects include requirements of neo-liberal prescriptions for world 
connectivity, openness and integration; FDI imperatives for market access, 
efficiency and access to resources vis-à-vis internal concerns with poor 
productivity that are linked to structural constraints including the small size of 
African economies; and development of infrastructure networks (particularly 
regional transport/roads) that facilitate cost effective and competitive access of 
African exports to external and internal markets. Other influences include 
considerations for the capital intensity and size of projects vis-à-vis the nature, 
multiplicity and size of participating organisations in NEPAD’s regional 
infrastructure initiatives and anticipated returns on investment. Therefore, the 
capacity of projects structures for programme/project development and 
implementation management counts.  
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The associated administrative requirements to comply with global rules are 
cumbersome, particularly so in the context of inadequate institutions. This 
situation is exacerbated by the lack of institutional capacity at regional, sub-
regional and national levels. Lack of alignment or contradictions between the 
requirements of global rules and national interests also require prudent and astute 
management, negotiation, and careful balancing of interests in order to achieve the 
work of NEPAD’s projects. Whether territorial integrity – a significant principle 
in NEPAD’s aspirations for Africa’s regeneration – is attainable under such 
conditions is debatable. 
 
NEPAD, however, appears to not have factored the impact of the afore-mentioned 
issues in its programme/project planning at the various stages of the project life-
cycle. Instead, NEPAD appears to have replaced rigorous planning and astute 
management of influences of the external/internal environment with imprudent 
and unadulterated optimism of programme/project success based on the proposed 
partnerships with institutions of the developed north. Thus, the understanding of 
the implications of the global political economy for the development of Africa’s 
regional infrastructure assets is significant for the understanding of some of the 
underpinning causes of problems in the implementation of the identified 
programmes/projects in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP. Such understanding will 
facilitate the development of appropriate policies and financing instruments for 
the effective development of regional infrastructure in order to support the 
transformation of African economies. Different approaches to and uses of 
planning may also need to be adopted with implications for NEPAD’s project 
implementation management systems. 
 
9.2.11 Failure in integrated implementation management 
 
The various definitions of integrated development detailed in APPENDIX A 
articulate subtly varying notions of expected outcomes of integrated development, 
subject to situational specificity. As a result, the seemingly diverse understanding 
of integrated development in NEPAD’s context, and the extent to which the 
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objectives of integrated implementation management are articulated, or met, 
appears to arise from the diverse frames of reference of different institutional 
structures at the different levels of management, the different systems/principles 
to manage institutional relationships at the various spatial categories, the different 
models for regional integration, and the unique requirements of NEPAD’s 
multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned 
for simultaneous implementation. In this respect, NEPAD’s governance and 
management structures failed to propose a consistent framework for integrated 
development of integrated implementation/implementation management in the 
development of regional infrastructure.  
 
The complexity in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP is exacerbated by the 
challenging context for integrated development in Africa’s development 
landscape, which includes diverse and mutually exclusive ideologies regarding 
approaches to regional integration or sectoral cooperation. In addition, the 
harmonisation of diverse policy, regulatory and governance regimes in various 
member states will require political will/commitment and concerted effort from 
the various stakeholders and trans-state actors to ensure effective integrated 
coordination and implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure projects. 
The multiple institutional structures for implementation management/ 
coordination, which appear to be led by international institutions/institutional 
structures in NEPAD’s partnerships for project implementation support, add to the 
complexity – particularly so since the afore-mentioned institutional structures 
appear to operate under premises that are inimical to notions for integrated 
development in Africa’s situational specificity.  
 
The problem with NEPAD, however, appears to go deeper than the lack of a 
common understanding of concepts or approaches to the integrated delivery of 
development or (cross-border) regional infrastructure programmes/projects. It 
appears that there is even lack of a common understanding of the objective and 
substance of programmes/projects identified under NEPAD’s Infrastructure 
STAP, and how these are linked to the planned outcomes for integrated practical 
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implementation and integrated regional development. (For example, in the 
facilitation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects, such as 
NEPAD’s roads programme, the complexity arises from the following factors: the 
multiplicity of actors and diverse development interventions to attain the same 
objectives; different frames of reference for all the role players; magnitude of 
development constraints and challenges across international borders;  and 
influence of PESTLE factors and related institutions across the various spatial 
categories – particularly so cognisant of the diversity in levels of development of 
member states at regional/sub-regional levels.)  
 
The implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/projects is also 
influenced by the legacy of historical and contemporary approaches to 
development programmes/projects that are often underpinned by a strong sectoral 
focus. This environment increases complexity for the implementation of 
integrated development initiatives. It also increases complexity to implement 
effective approaches for integrated implementation management of regional 
development programmes/projects, particularly so since the institutional structures 
and proposed regional projects are also underpinned by a strong sectoral focus. As 
a result, the effective integration of multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-disciplinary 
inputs will be required in the development of (cross-border) regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects, in alignment with NEPAD’s articulated 
multiple development objectives that are planned for simultaneous 
implementation.  
 
The success of integrated practical implementation or integrated regional 
development in regional infrastructure programmes/projects is, however, more of 
a function of the effectiveness of the relevant institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to support the attainment of objectives for integrated development 
of regional infrastructure. In addition, the characteristics, capacity, or ethos of 
institutional structures/organisations tasked with project implementation or 
implementation management/coordination will play a significant role to facilitate 
effective integrated development, rather than the efficacy of technical 
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interventions alone. In this regard, institutional reform and development of 
inadequate institutions as well as the development of institutional capacity to 
support the attainment of objectives for integrated development is paramount. 
 
In addition, multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-disciplinary inputs will be 
required to facilitate the development of integrative linkages in planning 
hierarchies, together with the relevant programmes/projects for integrated 
development/implementation. Nevertheless, the complexity of the external/ 
internal institutional environment in which NEPAD’s roads programme, for 
example, is implemented will require a minimalist approach in the short-term – 
which is less overwhelming to fragile institutions. This suggested approach needs 
to support the development of adequate institutional capacity for spatial expansion 
in the medium-term to long-term, and to ensure the adequate sharing of available 
resources (as NEPAD originally intended in its Strategic Framework,): it may also 
facilitate the development of building blocks for vertical and horizontal 
integration of NEPAD’s policy strategies/response actions, development 
objectives, influences of the external/internal institutional environment, 
programmes/projects, and institutional structures for project implementation/ 
implementation management. In this regard, the analysis of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP, or roads programme, raises a range of issues that transcend 
the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure, with implications for 
Africa’s development agenda as a whole. 
 
9.2.12 Failure in communication 
 
NEPAD’s communication of implementation progress/challenges and/or projects’ 
status may at best be described as inconclusive: it has resulted in the questionable 
status of projects and impaired NEPAD’s integrity in the eyes of development 
partners, media, and development analysts. In cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure projects, the requirements for coherent coordination 
and effective communication to support the implementation are critical. This is 
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because in multinational projects that involve multiple sponsoring/implementing 
institutions/organisations across international borders and complex internal/ 
external institutional environments for implementation of regional development 
programmes, the potential for distortion of messages is increased. These afore-
mentioned dynamics are illustrated in the detailed SWOT analysis of perceptions 
of NEPAD presented in APPENDIX F.  
 
In NEPAD’s case, the complexity of the external/internal institutional 
environment is exacerbated by the pressure to facilitate the attainment of multiple 
objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation. In addition, the 
inadequate planning and preparation of programmes/projects, multiplicity of 
diverse structures and inter-state actors increase complexity and associated 
challenges for project implementation. To paraphrase Mintzberg (1994), how the 
afore-mentioned institutional structures and trans-state actors perceive planning, 
use planning, or are affected by planning has implications for programme/project 
implementation or implementation management.  
 
The afore-mentioned project technical interventions do not supplant the requisite 
processes, in NEPAD’s case, for collective engagement and communication at 
and across the various levels of management and spatial categories, in order to 
develop an effective strategy for project implementation. Broad-based inclusive 
participation in NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP will facilitate the development of a 
common vision and allow for consensus building on the way forward. A broad-
based inclusive approach to the development of regional infrastructure will also 
assist NEPAD to garner the much-needed emotional/practical support and 
commitment to the implementation of the identified regional infrastructure 
projects. Agreement on the proposed implementation processes to support the 
integration of trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multi-disciplinary inputs for 
programme/project implementation will also facilitate the effective and efficient 
multi-usage of limited resources, particularly in the context of integrated 
development. 
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Given the unique characteristics of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure projects, 
where international, multinational, institutional and trans-state actors are involved, 
other relevant multidisciplinary frameworks may be integrated in the development 
of appropriate strategies for programme/project implementation planning, project 
scope and organisation management. Therefore, an effective communication 
strategy becomes imperative.  
 
9.2.13 Failure to learn from the lessons of past implementation failures 
 
The identified challenges in the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP 
underscore NEPAD’s failure to learn from the lessons of history regarding the 
implementation failures of previous regional transport/roads infrastructure 
development programmes/initiatives. For example, after decades of grappling 
with the same challenges in the provision of cross-border regional roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation services, NEPAD appears to have replicated 
the same mistakes in its approach to the development of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects. The parameters of NEPAD’s approach 
include the use of “acceptable” orthodox economic policies, so-called “economic 
heresies,” “universal truths,” and “sophistries” (Robinson, 1971: vii), which were 
previously identified as having “…little relevance to the problems to which they 
pronounced” (ibid). As a result, NEPAD’s approach to the development of 
regional infrastructure appears to have limited applicability to the identified 
challenges and constraints in the development of cross-border regional 
infrastructure in a dynamic institutional environment.  
 
This problem is exacerbated by NEPAD’s unrealistic expectations of institutions/ 
institutional structures of the developed north for implementation support, which 
has resulted in impracticable arrangements regarding the management of 
institutional relationships (i.e., between African states; and between Africa, 
development partners, and bilateral/multilateral donors) in so far as they impact 
on the selection, preparation and implementation of regional infrastructure 
projects. The afore-mentioned challenges are exacerbated by the multiplicity of 
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projects with no clear links/interface with programmes, lack of collective 
engagement in programme/project development and management systems, and 
ineffective structures to coordinate/manage implementation or implementation 
management. Previously, the ensuing challenges in the afore-mentioned areas 
contributed to the implementation failures of the LPA’s Transport and 
Communications programme as well as the TAH and “missing links” initiative.   
 
The development of large-scale projects similar to those proposed by NEPAD 
requires extensive institutional capacity, which is typically found in large 
bureaucracies such as the EU and the World Bank. As Dunham (1978: 11) argued, 
such large-scale projects (previously) presented a greater degree of 
“administrative complexity…more bureaucratic (organisational structures)…with 
an in-built tendency towards formalisation which creates problems of access for 
weaker groups.” It is perhaps for such reasons that Stöhr and Tödtling (Gore, 
1984: 158) described the manifestations of regional development planning to 
depict “…increasing functional and spatial integration of interacting systems of 
growing size, complexity and controllability.”  
 
The standardised and bureaucratic approaches to the management of development 
programmes have not worked previously in developing countries: it is therefore 
curious why NEPAD opted for this approach.  These approaches, however, 
allowed for a certain measure of external control by international 
institutions/institutional structures on development programmes/projects at the 
various spatial categories in developing countries, Africa in particular. The reality 
then is that contrary to the objectives of people-centred development, the people 
as the drivers and beneficiaries of the proposed development processes have been 
emasculated by the confluence of prescriptive, bureaucratic and secretive 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements that fail to support the development of 
regional infrastructure.  
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Notably, NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for 
implementation management/coordination mirror the institutional frameworks 
introduced during the LPA of 1980 to facilitate coordination of regional 
integration initiatives, with ineffective results.  
 
It is hoped that lessons from NEPAD’s interventions in the Infrastructure STAP, 
particularly the roads programme, will serve as building blocks to address the 
extensive, debilitating problems in roads infrastructure and transit facilitation 
discussed briefly in this chapter, and to develop institutional capacity for effective 
integrated implementation management and for spatial expansion in the medium-
long term. In this regard, the effective use of integrative project management 
methodologies may assist to minimise complexity in planning. In addition, other 
planning frameworks/models and institutional mechanisms for collective 
engagement and integrated development may be used in combination, to develop 
effective links between strategy and implementation as well as to link 
programme/project objectives, action planning, and performance management to 
the purpose, development objectives, programmes/projects, and structures for 
integrated implementation management/coordination. 
 
9.3 Recommendations 
 
The issues discussed in this research report underscore complexity in NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure programme. These issues suggest that extensive planning, 
and effective management of regional infrastructure developments – which 
include effective communication, negotiation and consensus-seeking – will be 
required in order to develop a common vision for effective implementation 
support. This will facilitate broad-based commitment and support to the delivery 
of regional infrastructure programmes/projects than what has been provided in 
NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements. Thus, a thorough 
understanding of what, and how the causal variables that impact on the 
conception, preparation, implementation/implementation management of cross-
border regional infrastructure programmes/projects have been managed, and by 
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who, may facilitate the development of relevant corrective interventions to 
support future integrated implementation management/coordination of regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
Furthermore, an understanding of the diverse premises for planning and 
implementation of Africa’s development programmes/projects may facilitate a 
better understanding of how intractable challenges in the external/internal 
institutional environment impact on the implementation of NEPAD’s 
Infrastructure STAP. This understanding may also allow for the effective 
apportioning of accountability for implementation failure, or success: it will also 
facilitate the development of relevant corrective interventions where problems are 
effectively identified. Although development concerns and needs will be different 
at different levels of managements, sectors and spatial categories, the alignment of 
thinking facilitates convergence, rather than divergence; it facilitates unity of 
purpose and commitment to collective agreements at various spatial categories, 
rather than the evidenced pre-occupation with national interest or narrow 
mercantilism in regional, sub-regional and national institutions for coordinating 
regional integration initiatives.  
 
Thus, the development of prudent policy strategies by national governments, and 
their elaboration into relevant programmes/projects that are supported by effective 
strategies and structures for project implementation/implementation management 
will be required to facilitate the attainment of planned development outcomes in 
the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure projects, similar to those 
mooted by NEPAD. In addition, effective institutions and institutional structures 
will be required to support the implementation of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects at, and within the various spatial categories 
(i.e., regional, sub-regional and national levels). 
 
In the context of integrated development and integrated implementation/ 
implementation management of development projects with multiple objectives 
and multiple inputs from multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary contexts, one may 
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argue that the objectives and substance of implementation planning need to be 
planned for integration at the outset. In this regard, the inputs and outputs of 
planning in project implementation strategies need to integrate decisions at 
institutional, trans-sectoral, trans-/multidisciplinary spheres and structures across 
the different levels of management, rather than adhering to the rigid dictates of 
hierarchical planning processes or operational silos that predominate in 
prescriptive models. 
 
Project management models and methodologies in this context provide a link 
between strategy, planning and implementation: at an operational level, these 
translate to the integration of tactics, action planning, project structures for 
implementation management, and performance management/control. In other 
words, project management models and methodologies provide a vertical and 
horizontal integration of decision-making, planning hierarchies and project 
activities at different levels of management, programmes/projects, and structures 
that perform the work of the projects. Thus, project management methodologies 
may be described as illustrating a practical link between what Mintzberg (1994: 
78) termed “action planning” (illustrated in hierarchies of what he argues are 
supposed to be before-the-fact strategies and programmes) and “performance 
control” (illustrated in the hierarchies of operating plans, objectives and budgets) 
in prescriptive models.  
 
(i) Pertinent questions that may be addressed in order to propose relevant 
corrective interventions include the following:  
 
• What are the programme/project objectives and how are these linked to the 
constraints and challenges in the external/internal institutional environment 
including the elaboration of programmes/projects; are the projects feasible 
and within the capacity of states and sub-regional structures to implement 
within the available resource envelopes; how are these afore-mentioned 
planning hierarchies linked to strategies for project implementation and 
implementation management?  
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• What management system is proposed for integrated implementation 
management of the identified programmes, and has the identified system 
been developed in association with the relevant stakeholders in order to 
obtain buy-in and consensus as well as to ensure support for the attainment 
of articulated programme/project objectives in the different sub-regions? 
• What are the implications for integrated implementation management of the 
underlying principles to manage institutional relations between the various 
states in trans-state trans-actions, and what are the implications of principles 
for cooperation between the institutional structures at various spatial 
categories for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure?  
• What roles and responsibilities are assigned to the various structures 
mandated to facilitate integrated implementation management/coordination; 
what is the role of the state in order to ensure alignment between cross-
border regional infrastructure programmes/projects with policy 
interventions, NDPs, and development priorities in member-states; and what 
existing or new structures need to be created or strengthened in order to 
facilitate or support integrated implementation management of the identified 
regional infrastructure projects? 
 
(ii) The key areas with impact on institutional structures, which require 
NEPAD’s careful consideration, are the following: 
 
• Establishing links with policy/organisational strategies, objectives, 
programmes/projects, and influence of external/internal environments and 
structures for implementation management in order to effectively link action 
planning with performance control;  
• Considering the characteristics, objectives and development priorities of 
institutional structures for implementation management/coordination in 
order to  ensure alignment with the strategies for project implementation and 
implementation management in a context of clearly defined responsibilities 
and roles;  
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• Monitoring and actively managing the impact of behavioural aspects (i.e. 
personalities, attitudes) and competencies of people who lead, or are 
assigned to do the work of projects in terms of their “role definition” vis-à-
vis their “role set” (Handy, 1993), and enforcing corrective mechanisms 
where necessary. These afore-mentioned aspect are particularly pertinent in 
the context of international projects that involve multiple and diverse 
multinational institutions, institutional structures and stakeholders in and 
across international borders/various spatial categories;  
• Establishing the link between the purpose and objectives of individual 
project team members/institutional structures, and determining how their 
motivation and emotional commitment are linked to project performance in 
the context of predetermined objectives and evolving internal/external 
conditions; and 
• Understanding and actively managing the impact of the confluence of a 
combination of systemic, corporate and individual issues on the performance 
of structures for integrated implementation management, particularly in the 
absence of coherent frameworks for collective engagement in the 
development of cross-border regional roads infrastructure projects.  
 
(iii) Expediting the implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP projects 
may depend on such factors as the following: 
  
• Combination of transformational leadership and strategic management of the 
impact of the external and internal environment on projects; 
• Willingness by national governments and political commitment to address 
the challenges and constraints to implementation of regional infrastructure 
projects in a holistic manner subject to situational specificity;  
• Active role of the state’s broad-based institutional apparatus in project 
selection and implementation;  
• Relevant approach to planning subject to situational and project specificity. 
In particular, the relevance and effectiveness of planning processes at the 
various spatial categories and levels of management/planning, and the 
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adequacy of institutional capacity to scrutinise and modify NEPAD’s policy 
strategy/response actions in order to elaborate relevant programmes/projects 
for implementation are paramount;  
• Attention to projects’ characteristics in order to establish relevant 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation 
management; 
• Adequacy of project preparation and implementation planning;  
• Availability of domestic resources for implementation (including funding, 
technical capacity and human capital with the relevant competencies); and  
• Sustained committed political support for implementation, particularly at 
national levels.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGY 
 
This section defines operationally the terms or concepts used in this research.  In some 
cases, other definitions by select authors are discussed in order to illustrate the different 
perspectives, highlight the multi-faceted nature of the identified concepts or terms, and 
explain how the identified diverse variables underpinning such terms and concepts are 
interrelated and impact on each other in so far as they relate to this research. The terms 
and concepts defined in this section include the following:  
 
1. Institutions;  
2. Institutional structures;  
3.  Institutional mechanisms;  
4. Institutional arrangements;  
5. Institutional capacity;  
6. Integrated implementation management;  
7. Project management;  
8. Project;  
9. Programme;  
10. Levels of management;  
11. Physical and non-physical infrastructure;  
12. Transit facilitation;  
13. Spatial categories;  
14. Region and sub-region; and 
15. “technical hair-splitting”.    
 
 
1 Institutions: The terms “institution” and “organisation” are often used 
interchangeably. There is, however, a general pattern to narrowly define institutions 
as organisations. As a result, the associated policy, legal, political, cultural, 
economic, technical, social, spatial, environmental, leadership, management, 
governance and regulatory frameworks that characterise institutions, and within 
which organisations operate, are de-linked. In some cases, either the association 
between the organisation and the afore-mentioned institutional frameworks is used 
synonymously to illustrate parts of a (multifaceted) system, or it is completely 
ignored.  
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A discussion on the various definitions of institutions follows. Some of the issues 
addressed in the discussion below highlight the implications of institutions for 
development projects. Other views articulated in the discussion are relevant to the 
development of a broader understanding of the conceptual, technical, political, 
socio-economic and spatial underpinnings in NEPAD’s approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure, particularly so cognisant of NEPAD’s 
multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned 
for simultaneous implementation. In particular, the issues highlighted in the 
discussions also allude to the implications of the international institutions for the 
development and implementation of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme. 
(This view also takes cognisance of the multiple and diverse institutions/ 
institutional structures for programme development and implementation support in 
NEPAD, with implications for NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for integrated implementation management.)  
 
 1.1 Related Definitions 
 
The Oxford (Advanced Learner’s) Dictionary – International Student’s Edition 
(2005: 774) defines an “institution” as: “…a large important organization that has a 
special purpose…a custom or system that has existed for a long time among a 
particular group of people…” In contrast, according to Møller (2005: 6), “…(the) 
concept of institutions is broader than that of organisations, and institutions may or 
may not include organisations.” Thus, the narrow view of institutions including the 
limited understanding of their impact on development in general, and on 
infrastructure development specifically, stymies the exploration of a wide range of 
possible interventions to support the implementation of development 
programmes/projects, particularly cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects similar to those mooted by NEPAD.  
 
Various authors (Deng, 2002; DIFD, 2003; European Commission (EC), 2004; 
Møller, 2005; Velasquez 2006) have defined institutions as collective forms of 
action to guide or support the activities, conduct and behaviours of individuals or 
organisations. In the afore-mentioned context, institutions are viewed as 
mechanisms and arrangements that are underpinned by the values, principles and 
culture of the society in which they are determined, in order to guide individual and 
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collective behaviours. It appears, however, that institutions carry different 
connotations for either individuals or groups, thereby signifying the implications of 
institutions for individual behaviour/action in groups and vice versa. Commons (in 
Deng, 2002: 213,) explained the role of individuals in an institutional environment 
when he argued that institutions denote “collective action in restraint, liberation, 
and expansion of individual action.” In this framework, Commons (ibid) elaborates 
the link between institutions and individual action to signify trans-actions between 
individuals. As Commons argued, this perspective denotes a “shift from 
commodities, individuals…(and) exchanges to transactions and working rules of 
collective action” (ibid).  
 
For Ruttan and Hayami (ibid), institutions are enabling instruments of governance 
to regulate individual behaviours in groups. DeRienzo (ibid) took this argument 
further when he clarified the relationship between the “institution” and 
“community” to signify a critical link between institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements to guide collective action. As DeRienzo (ibid) argued: “…(if) a 
community is a collection of people united around common goals, then institutions 
are those vehicles created by the community to achieve shared purposes, be they 
educational, commercial, industrial, recreational, cultural, or religious.” Davis and 
North (ibid) also defined an institutional environment as a “…set of fundamental 
political, social, and legal rules that govern economic and political activity” (ibid). 
Although referring largely to a business or corporate context, Velasquez (2006: 12) 
defined institutions in relation to group trans-actions i.e., as systems of “relatively 
fixed patterns of activity” designed to organise and support society to achieve 
common goals. 
 
Various disciplines or sectors appear to have their own peculiar or unique 
explanations of traits that characterise institutions, although the overall frameworks 
in subjective or objective explanations are the same. For example, in international 
relations, Bull (Møller, 2005: 6-7) identified the following features as defining 
institutions: “…the balance of power, international law, diplomacy…managerial 
system of the great powers, and war as well as the state itself.” Similarly, Keohane 
(ibid) argued that institutions are similar to regimes with their “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actor expectations converge.” Using a definition derived from North, the UK’s 
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Department for International Development (DFID, 2003: i-iii) defined institutions 
as the “rules of the game.” According to the DFID (ibid), institutions include not 
only the “…formal rules, (and) informal constraints …(such as) norms of 
behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct,” but also “incentives 
and enforcement mechanisms.” The DFID (ibid) provides some practical examples 
of the relationship between institutions and their application at various spatial 
categories, including the implications for development programmes of their cascade 
at the various levels of management. As the DFID (ibid) argued: 
“Institutions…may be formal – legal systems, property rights, enforcement 
mechanisms; or informal – customs, traditions. They may also operate at different 
levels – international (eg. (sic) WTO rules), national (eg. laws, constitutions), social 
(eg. norms of conduct, status of women), family (eg. inheritance rules). They may 
nest within larger institutions – eg. village-based collective institutions nested 
within the policy institutions of government.” The DFID’s example of the cascade 
of institutions suggests that interventions to reform/develop institutional 
frameworks, or institutions themselves, need to facilitate alignment between such 
interventions at the various levels of management and different spatial categories, 
in order to effect sustainable transformation of the institutional environment in any 
specified spatial category.     
 
Baum and Tolbert (1985) defined institutions as the totality of mechanisms and 
arrangements for the development of an enabling policy environment at the 
identified spatial categories i.e., at national/country levels. Previously, Baum (1982: 
12) used an example of the World Bank’s activities, in the context of its project life 
cycle, to illustrate the significance of institutions for the implementation/ 
management of development programmes/projects at the various levels of 
planning/management or stages of the project life cycle. Baum’s example (ibid) 
also highlighted the implications of institutions for the various participating 
institutional structures/organisations, particularly so in respect of the levels of 
institutional capacity required to facilitate the planning and implementation of 
development programmes/projects (i.e., political support, technical/financial 
resources, leadership and managerial competencies and stakeholder-management 
skills).  
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Box A.1: The World Bank’s Project Cycle 
Baum (1982:5-18) explains how the World Bank’s project cycle evolves: it 
comprises rigorous phases of project identification, preparation, appraisal, 
negotiation and presentation to the Board of Directors, implementation and 
supervision, and evaluation. Experienced multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary 
technical specialists and projects staff, “who are expected to have a broad 
understanding of development issues and the capacity to make sound, 
independent judgements” (ibid:5) support projects’ preparation as the various 
phases of the project cycle evolve. They are also required to assess the potential 
impact of institutional issues on the project’s success as part of the project’s 
appraisal.  
 
The institutional appraisal is not only concerned with determining the ability of the 
structure to implement the project, but also to understand the cultural context of 
institutional arrangements with the objective of facilitating sound institution 
building for successful implementation and operation. In this regard, institutional 
appraisal covers not only the organisational arrangements of the borrowing entity, 
such as “its organization, management, staffing, policies, and procedures, but also 
the whole array of government policies that conditions the environment in which 
the institution operates” (ibid:12). According to Baum (ibid:13): 
 
Institutional appraisal is concerned with a host of questions, such as whether 
the entity is properly organized and its management adequate to do the job, 
whether local capabilities and initiatives are being used effectively, and 
whether policy or institutional changes are required outside the entity to 
achieve project objectives. These question are important for traditional 
project entities; they are even more important (and difficult to answer) for 
entities charged with preparing and carrying out the new-style projects 
intended to benefit the rural and urban poor where there may be no 
established institutional pattern to follow. The Bank’s experience to date has 
not yielded any ready-made solutions for putting together an institution that 
can effectively and economically deliver goods and services to large numbers 
of people…and that can motivate them to change their behaviour” (ibid: 13).   
 
At the stage of negotiations, which typically involves the World Bank and the 
borrowers (i.e., countries), loan agreements specify how the project’s activities 
and those of the ministries involved will be coordinated, with detailed schedules 
for project implementation to ensure the project’s success. After completion of the 
negotiations stage, an amended appraisal report (substantiated by the World 
Bank President’s report and the loan documents) is submitted to the World Bank’s 
Executive Directors for approval. This process marks the end of this phase of the 
project’s cycle prior to implementation (ibid: 17-18).  
Source: Derived from Baum, W.C. 1982. The Project Cycle, The World Bank, pp.5-18.   
 
Cognisant of the discussions above, institutions may be defined in this research to 
include the structures, formal and informal systems, rules and regulations for 
collective engagement that influence, guide and regulate individual or collective 
action/behaviour in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects in order to support the attainment of the articulated 
programme/project objectives for the benefit of society. (In this study, individual 
includes natural or juristic persons; the latter include institutional structures/ 
organisations that perform the work of institutions.) Institutions may also be 
construed to include frameworks, mechanisms and arrangements for action across 
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the various spheres of influence, disciplines or sectors in the delivery of cross-
border regional infrastructure: these include the political, economic, social, 
technical, cultural, traditional, financial, legislative, legal or regulatory spheres. 
Institutions also articulate the frameworks and modalities for collective engagement 
in and across the various sectors/participants in society – such as the public sector, 
private sector, civil society, individual organisations or state/trans-state actors 
across the various spatial categories – in order to facilitate integrated development 
of regional infrastructure through the relevant institutional structures, mechanisms 
and arrangements.  
 
In the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, global institutions play an 
active role in regional, sub-regional and national programmes/projects in alignment 
with the prevailing policy prescriptions for the provision of global public goods. As 
a result, the interface between institutions and institutional relationships in the 
delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure transcends national, sub-regional, 
regional and international boundaries, with implications for the management of 
stakeholder/institutional relationships in the implementation of development 
programmes/ projects.  
 
2. Institutional structures: The Oxford (Advanced Learner’s) Dictionary – 
International Student’s Edition (2005:1468) defines “institutional” as “connected 
with an institution”; it defines “structure” as “the way in which the parts 
of…(something) are connected together, arranged or organized; a particular 
arrangement of parts.” In this study, institutional structures are also referred to as 
“organisations.” The DFID (2003), European Community (EC, 2004), Møller 
(2005), and Velasquez (2006) also articulate the existence of a symbiotic 
relationship between institutions and organisations: according to the definitions of 
the afore-mentioned authors, institutions provide the framework and platform for 
organisations to perform the work for which institutions have been designed. As the 
DFID (2003) and Møller (2005) explain, institutional structures/organisations have 
a physical presence or identity, which may include any combination of the 
following aspects: offices, staff, letterheads, or web pages.  
 
The EC (2004: 96), in defining the parameters of organisations in relation to 
institutions, argued that the organisational framework is embodied in the collective 
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of vehicles created by society to regulate collective action, namely the institutions. 
For the EC (ibid), formal and informal rules as well as regulations that characterise 
institutions provide the linkages with the organisational structure individual 
organisations/institutional structures. For example, according to the DFID (ibid: ii), 
“Organizations encompass political bodies, such as political parties or parliaments; 
economic bodies such as firms or businesses; and social bodies such as churches 
and schools. They usually have discrete boundaries, a budget, and a structure.” 
Møller (2005: 6) explained this analogy further when he stated as follows: 
“Organizations usually require regimes or institutions in order to function, but they 
add to these a formal shape as well as a physical presence.”   
 
The DFID (2003) provided a similar distinction between institutions and 
organisations, but added that the significance of institutions was to enable 
organisational improvements. The DFID (ibid) further stated that the frameworks 
provided by institutions (aptly termed ‘the rules of the game’) “shape the incentives 
that drive behaviour…performance, and expectations about rights and obligations. 
They have a major influence on economic development, and on the success and 
sustainability (or lack of it) of specific projects and programmes.” Within this 
context, the DFID (ibid) noted that organisations “adapt their tactics,” and “play to” 
the externally set rules, but they are not the same as…those rules.” The DFID (ibid: 
3) also made a distinction between institutional and organisational 
reform/development within the framework explained above. The DFID argued, 
however, that in both institutions and organisations reform or development “are 
concerned with the process and content of change” (ibid).    
 
Cognisant of the definitions above, in this study institutional structures may be 
defined as the organisations, establishments, formations, bodies, agencies, 
units/departments, or entities that are linked to institutions. The work of institutions 
is performed through the institutional structures/organisations, within the 
framework of rules, regulations and modalities for collective engagement or 
management of stakeholder/institutional relationships set by institutions at and 
across the various spatial categories.  
 
3. Institutional mechanisms: may be defined as the tangible or non-tangible 
systems, instruments, behaviours and processes through which the work of 
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institutions is performed in order to support the delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects. Institutional mechanisms include the 
machinery, infrastructure, methodologies, tools, knowledge, competencies, 
principles, and values that facilitate performance of the work of institutions, 
institutional structures/organisations. Institutional mechanisms also include 
policies; regulatory and governance regimes; systems of rules and procedures; 
systems of cooperation; and processes or systems for collective engagement to 
manage institutional relationships or to facilitate cooperation and trans-actions with 
multiple institutional structures, stakeholders, and trans-state actors at/across the 
various spatial categories in order to execute collective agreements to deliver cross-
border regional infrastructure. Also included are planning, management, 
communication, governance, legislative, legal, cultural, production, trade and 
consumption systems that impact on collective and individual trans-actions in the 
delivery of cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure.  
 
At the level of programmes/projects, institutional mechanisms facilitate the 
development of links between the institutions, institutional structures/organisations 
and development programmes/projects at the different levels of management/ 
planning and at the various spatial categories at which decisions and actions are 
taken to support the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. Institutional 
mechanisms also facilitate the translation of ideological perspectives into practical 
modalities for collective engagement and trans-action at the various spatial 
categories and levels of management/planning in order to deliver cross-border 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
In the context of integrated development and integrated implementation 
management, particularly in cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects, institutional mechanisms are essentially multi-/trans-/inter-sectoral, and 
multi-/trans-/inter-disciplinary; their influence in such contexts is non-linear, 
diffuse, and integrative. Thus, NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
or NEPAD’s/African Union’s (AU) Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance are examples of trans-disciplinary 
institutional mechanisms with relevance to the delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure. Other examples of global institutional mechanisms with relevance to 
the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure at the various spatial categories 
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include the World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs); the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); the United Nation’s (UN) Global Compact; 
and the Caux Round Table Principles for Business.  
  
Development programmes/projects themselves may also be construed as 
institutional mechanisms: according to Paul (1990), development programmes are 
the instruments through which the state delivers on its policy objectives. Project 
management methodologies, tools and techniques may also be construed as other 
examples of institutional mechanisms that are universally applied to manage 
programmes/projects at the various levels of management/planning. Project 
management methodologies also provide the practical modalities to actualise the 
vision of institutions/organisations in the planning and implementation of 
(development) programmes/projects. To achieve the afore-mentioned outcomes, 
project management methodologies facilitate the development and articulation of 
links between strategies, objectives, external/internal environment, programmes/ 
projects and institutions/institutional structures for project implementation or 
implementation management; they provide links between action planning and 
performance management/control in order to achieve the work of project/s.    
 
4. Institutional arrangements: Davis and North (Deng, 2002: 213) define an 
institutional arrangement as “…an arrangement between economic units that 
governs the ways in which these units can cooperate or compete.” Cognisant of the 
definition above, in this research, institutional arrangements may be defined as the 
structuring of agreements for cooperation between institutions, institutional 
structures and mechanisms at the various spatial categories in order to deliver the 
work of the identified development programmes/projects in the development of 
cross-border regional infrastructure. The institutional arrangements thus include the 
articulation of links between specific trans-state trans-actions and programmes/ 
projects at the different levels of management/planning or spatial categories in 
order to achieve common objectives. Also included in the definition of institutional 
arrangements is the articulation of formal and informal links between development 
programmes/ projects and trans-state actions/actors; the application of institutional 
mechanisms for collective engagement between institutional structures across 
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various spatial categories – such as international/regional/sub-regional and national 
laws, conventions and protocols to execute specific (infrastructure development) 
programme/project activities; and the use of common/agreed principles, customs, 
culture, long-standing behaviours/attitudes/practices (that are accepted by society 
as the norm), and emergent modes for collective engagement across the various 
spatial categories in order to support institutional structures/organisations to 
perform the relevant trans-actions vis-à-vis the specified requirements of 
programmes/projects to develop cross-border regional infrastructure. 
 
The trans-actions may be tangible or non-tangible: such as how the relationship 
between various institutions and different spatial categories on the one hand, and 
between institutions and institutional structures on the other hand is defined or 
managed in order to collectively support the delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure programmes/projects; the linking or assignment of institutional 
structures/organisations and related trans-state actors to clearly defined cross-
border regional infrastructure programme/project activities; the choice of 
international and domestic partnerships to undertake specified responsibilities and 
roles at the various levels of management/planning, spatial categories and stages of 
the project life cycle; and the linking of partnerships or institutional structures to 
institutional mechanisms for collective engagement in order to deliver the work of 
projects. 
 
At the level of the individual organisation, institutional arrangements may include 
the internal configuration of levels of management or project organisation 
management in trans-national project units for the delivery of (cross-border) 
regional infrastructure  (i.e., linking institutional structures or trans-state actors to 
the performance of specific responsibilities, roles or project activities). This 
includes the definition of links and mechanisms/agreements for cooperation 
between the internal/external organisational structures, or project units or trans-
state actors; the hierarchical/ vertical structuring of programme/project activities, 
roles and responsibilities; the approach to the mobilisation and management of 
resources by institutional structures vis-à-vis the prevailing institutional 
architecture and trans-state relationships with other institutional structures/spatial 
categories performing the work of the project; the approach to the management of 
behaviours/attitudes to the work of the organisation in relation to other institutional 
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structures, so that they can collectively perform the agreed work in the related 
development programmes/projects; and the approach to the management of 
internal/external relationships and stakeholders for effective implementation and 
management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
At the project level, institutional arrangements may include the approach by the 
participating (trans-state) institutional structures to jointly deliver/manage project 
activities and project management functions at the various stages of the project life 
cycle in order to deliver the work of the projects. How these afore-mentioned 
aspects are linked to, or integrated at the various levels of management/planning 
with relevant trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multi-disciplinary interventions by the 
various institutional structures in integrated project implementation and integrated 
implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects defines the character, effectiveness and success of institutional 
arrangements. 
 
5. Institutional capacity: Hope (2006: 210) defines capacity as:  “…the competency 
of individuals, public sector institutions, private sector entities, civil society 
organisations, and local communities to engage in activities in a sustainable manner 
that permits the achievement of beneficial goals such as poverty reduction, efficient 
service delivery, good governance, economic growth, effectively facing the 
challenges of globalisation, and delivering the greatest possible benefits from such 
trends as rapid changes in information technology and science.”           
 
The definition of capacity depicted above, however, appears to minimise the 
significance and role of the state, as an institution in its own right, in its duty to 
bring about beneficial change and to ensure the attainment of sustainable 
development outcomes on behalf of the citizenry. For example, the DFID (2003) 
advances a significant argument that institutional reform/development supports the 
development of institutional capacity required to attain the objectives of 
development. According to the DFID (ibid: iii), recent studies indicate that  
“institutional factors have been a key cause of poor development performance.” 
Arguably, the state needs to play a leading role to facilitate institutional 
reform/development in order to effect transformational change. The DFID (ibid) 
also avers that institutions are often manifestations “of the rich and powerful,” with 
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the result that they (institutions) “commonly discriminate against the poor,” In this 
regard, the DFID (ibid) notes that the key capabilities governments require to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will require improvements in 
the broader institutional environment. For the DFID, the process of institutional 
reform or development includes the development of technical competencies taking 
into account capacity development at the institutional, organisational, and 
individual levels. An example of the DFID’s capacity building context, in Figure 
A.1, illustrates how this process is cascaded at the various levels of management. 
 
 
 Figure A.1 The capacity building context   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: After DFID, 2003. Promoting institutional and organizational development, p.(v)   
 
In this study, institutional capacity may be defined as the wherewithal of 
institutions, institutional mechanism and arrangements, institutional structures/ 
organisations and trans-state actors/individuals to facilitate or effect the delivery of 
policy interventions, such as development programmes/projects, for the planned 
development interventions and related outcomes to manifest. These interventions 
include the development of an enabling institutional environment; the effective 
conception, planning and implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects; and the effective management of regional infrastructure programmes/ 
projects through the use of relevant trans-state actions, institutional mechanisms 
and arrangements in order to provide sustainable products and services in the 
provision of cross-border regional infrastructure. Institutional capacity at the level 
of institutional structures/organisations includes the adequacy of institutional 
infrastructure and human capital (with the relevant competencies) to facilitate the 
development of and translate planning processes and management systems into 
practical inputs and outputs at the various levels of management/planning for the 
effective and efficient delivery of regional infrastructure programmes/projects.   
                 OUTCOMES 
 
3 
1. Institutional Context 
2. Organisational Context 
 
3.  Individual 1 2 
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The development of institutional capacity at the levels of the individual state or 
organisations is influenced by external and internal factors. The external factors 
include the influence of political, economic, social, technical, environmental and 
legal (PESTEL) factors. Also included are the opportunities/constraints provided by 
trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary interventions at international, 
regional, sub-regional, and national levels. The afore-mentioned PESTEL factors 
impact on the availability of resources and the nature of relationships with key 
stakeholders including partnerships and strategic alliances at the various levels of 
management and spatial categories in order to support the delivery of cross-border 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
Internal factors include the following mutually reinforcing issues: the adequacy of 
internal organisational structures/arrangements; the availability of resources 
(technical, financial and human capital); and the adequacy of institutional 
infrastructure (policies, procedures, systems, knowledge and skills) including the 
influence of factors such as leadership, management, attitudes to identified 
programmes/projects, organisational behaviour, motivation, and communication in 
order to enable effective and efficient delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure/development programmes/projects. Included in the determinants of 
institutional capacity is the impact of perceptions of institutions and institutional 
structures, either by external/internal stakeholders or other disinterested parties, in 
so far as this affects the work of institutions/ institutional structures. The effective 
and efficient management of the afore-mentioned factors reflects on the capacity of 
institutions and institutional structures to support the effective and efficient delivery 
of cross-regional infrastructure projects.  
 
6. Integrated Implementation Management: The concept ‘integrated 
implementation management’ is likely to be defined or understood differently by 
different people based on their frames of reference. In this study, the definition of 
“integrated implementation management” is derived from NEPAD’s proposals for 
“regional integrated development” and “integrated practical implementation” in its 
approach to the development of regional infrastructure. As NEPAD (2001, 
Para.194: 56) averred: “The view of the initiating presidents is that unless the issue 
of infrastructure is addressed on a planned basis – that is, linked to regional 
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integrated development – the renewal process of this continent will simply not take 
off.” NEPAD (ibid) also argued that inherent externalities or cross-border 
spillovers in the provision of regional infrastructure require integrated coordination 
and management in order to optimise the delivery of physical infrastructure and 
related services. In addition, NEPAD argued that effective delivery of regional 
infrastructure would be based on the commitment of broad-based partnerships 
(including governments, private sector, and civil society) “to a genuine integration 
of all nations into the global economy and body politic” (ibid: Para.4:8). 
 
 This study also takes cognisance of NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions for 
the delivery of regional infrastructure including the diverse multiple objectives for 
the development of regional (transport/roads) infrastructure that are planned for 
simultaneous implementation i.e., poverty reduction, capacity building, regional 
integration, and global/intra-African trade. Thus, this study envisages that 
implementation plans to support the attainment of NEPAD’s multiple objectives 
will set the scene for the development of an inclusive multi-/inter-/intra-sectoral 
and multi-/inter-/intra-disciplinary environment in which to operationalize 
NEPAD’s proposals for integrated development (ID) in the delivery of (cross-
border) regional infrastructure. As NEPAD argued, as opposed to the previous 
unsuccessful attempts to implement “continent-wide development programmes, 
today a new set of circumstances lend themselves to integrated practical 
implementation” (ibid, Para. 42:9) of its strategic programme of action.  NEPAD 
further argued that in the “new phase of globalisation (which) coincided with the 
reshaping of international relations in the aftermath of the Cold War”, and with the 
increase of democracy in many African countries (ibid, Para.43: 9), the adoption of 
an “integrative perspective” would thus facilitate this process in recognition of the 
challenges facing the continent in the delivery of global public goods (ibid, Para. 
21: 8).  
  
 This study also takes cognisance of the diverse sectors and disciplines that are 
integral to NEPAD’s articulated pre-conditions for development, in so far as they 
impact on the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. (The afore-
mentioned pre-conditions include the peace, security, democracy and political 
governance initiative; economic and corporate governance initiative; and sub-
regional and regional approaches to development. NEPAD recommended that the 
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aforementioned pre-conditions be integrated in all its programmatic interventions, 
including the regional infrastructure programme.) In addition, this study takes 
cognisance of NEPAD’s detailed sectoral priorities and cross-cutting programmes 
(such as human development including reversing the brain drain; agriculture; 
gender mainstreaming; environment; and science and technology initiatives),  
which also have implications for the development of (cross-border) regional 
infrastructure and vice versa. Thus, the diverse spheres of influence intersected by 
NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme define the parameters for, and 
contribute to our understanding of the context for integrated implementation 
management of NEPAD’s identified projects. The afore-mentioned spheres also 
allude to complexity.  
 
 This study also refers to the concept “global public goods,” in a regional context, in 
order to propose a holistic conception of integrated implementation management in 
NEPAD’s context. The afore-mentioned concept carries connotations for the 
influence of global institutions in domestic programmes for the delivery of regional 
infrastructure, or NEPAD’s. The prescriptions of international finance institutions 
(IFIs) in the development of global public goods also provide an indication of the 
characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements that may be 
considered under NEPAD’s programme for the development of regional 
infrastructure. In addition, this study takes cognisance of the contemporary 
definitions of the concept “human security1
                                                 
1 For example, the evolving definition and conception of ‘human security’ in the aftermath of the Cold War 
has been described (Lamin, 2006: 1) to incorporate issues that impact directly on the lives human beings and 
their freedoms, such as “freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.” The afore-
mentioned desired conditions may also be construed to encapsulate NEPAD’s imperatives for the 
development of (Africa’s) cross-border regional infrastructure, both as an objective of development and as a 
human right. As NEPAD (2001: Para.43) argued: “The new phase of globalization (has) coincided with the 
reshaping of international relations…associated with the emergence of new concepts of security and self-
interest, which encompass the right to development and the eradication of poverty.” In addition, NEPAD 
states that a new wave of “democracy and state legitimacy” that is sweeping the continent has resulted in the 
re-definition of these concepts to include accountable government, a culture of human rights, and popular 
participation as central tenements of development (ibid). NEPAD also argued as follows: “…the numbers of 
democratically elected leaders are on the increase. Through their actions, they have declared that the hopes of 
Africa’s peoples for a better life can no longer rest in the magnanimity of others” (ibid). 
” as a measure of the multifaceted role 
of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects in the context of 
globalisation, global/intra-African trade, and poverty reduction. The afore-
mentioned parameters are juxtaposed with the global focus on poverty reduction 
and human security in order to develop a holistic perspective of ID and the nature 
of institutional mechanisms and arrangements that will be required to facilitate the 
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attainment of these objectives in the delivery of cross-border regional 
infrastructure.  
 
 In this regard, one may argue that integrated implementation management of 
NEPAD’s cross-border regional infrastructure is underpinned by additional 
concepts of “democracy,” “human security,” “transformational leadership,” 
“African ownership,” “inclusive/popular participation,” “self interest,” 
“collective/self-reliance,” and “accountability” in order to enable Africa’s regional, 
sub-regional and national institutions/institutional structures to collectively and 
individually deliver on agreed development objectives. In an environment of 
globalisation and regionalism, particularly in the provision of global public goods 
such as cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure, concepts such as 
“common or shared interest” (CFA, 2005) supplement the afore-mentioned 
concepts. 
 
 Since NEPAD adopted a “project approach” to the development of regional 
infrastructure (NEPAD, 2001), this study also takes cognisance of the definition of 
“project integration management” (PMI, 1996) in order to illustrate how multi-
/inter-/intra-disciplinary and multi-/inter-/intra-sectoral inputs/outputs may be 
integrated in a project management context. According to the PMI (ibid), project 
integration management describes a context where inputs of project management 
functions and related knowledge areas are integrated in the management of 
projects, in order to deliver the work of projects to attain the agreed objectives. 
Thus, the definition of integrated implementation management in this study 
underscores the integration of theoretical, institutional, spatial, behavioural, inter-
/intra-/trans-/multi-sectoral and inter-/intra-/trans-/multidisciplinary aspects in a 
context of participatory and broad-based processes of decision-making, collective 
engagement, and trans-action in the planning and implementation of cross-border 
regional infrastructure development programmes/projects. The effective integration 
of the various spheres of influence described above, which has influenced 
NEPAD’s conception of integrated implementation management of cross-border 
regional infrastructure, will be determined by, and circuitously determine the nature 
of NEPAD’s institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of 
regional infrastructure. 
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 The various definitions discussed below assist to improve our understanding of the 
diverse underpinnings in NEPAD’s context for, or conception of integrated 
implementation/implementation management of regional infrastructure 
programmes/projects. 
 
 A.6.1 Other related definitions 
  
 Various definitions and debates on the origins and application of the concept ID 
articulate the ideological, substantive, objective and process issues, which also 
influence the design, implementation, and management of Africa’s regional 
integration initiatives. Some definitions of ID provide possible explanations to the 
individual characteristics or combination of NEPAD’s multiple objectives for the 
development of regional (transport/roads) infrastructure. The definitions discussed 
below also provide some insights into NEPAD’s conception of how the identified 
multiple objectives would be integrated into a coherent approach in order to 
facilitate the development and implementation/implementation management of 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects.  
 
 Other definitions of ID illustrate the possible links between NEPAD’s interventions 
in the development of regional infrastructure and the various models for regional 
integration in RECs, with implications for the proposed concept (in this study) of 
integrated implementation management as an approach to the management of 
regional integration initiatives, and as an instrument for effective implementation 
management of regional infrastructure programmes/projects. In other words, the 
concept integrated implementation management has wider applicability in Africa’s 
development landscape, beyond the confines of NEPAD’s regional infrastructure 
programme: the concept as defined in this study builds on the existing institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for the management of development 
programmes/projects at the various sectors, disciplines and spatial categories.  
 
 Other related concepts considered in this study,  in order to illustrate the diverse 
requirements of NEPAD’s policy strategy/response actions and multiple objectives 
for the development of regional infrastructure, include the following: “regional 
planning and development” (Fair, 1987; Gore, 1984); “integrated rural 
development” (IRD) and “integrated rural development planning” (IRDP) (Paul, 
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1990). The afore-mentioned concepts denote the integration of the ideological, 
theoretical, spatial, institutional, political, socio-economic, sectoral and technical 
aspects in integrative approaches to development or development management. As 
Paul (1990:10) argued, the concepts IRD and IRDP also prioritise popular 
participation and decision-making at the lower levels of management, cognisant of 
the dimensions and multifaceted nature of development. Ultimately, Paul (ibid) 
noted that the definitions of IRD, for example, identify the poor as the recipients of 
the equitable distribution of development benefits; in IRD the challenge to propose 
appropriate interventions lies in determining with clarity the desired outcomes, and 
how these will be attained (ibid). The afore-mentioned concepts appear to dove-tail 
with key aspects of NEPAD’s conception of ID, particularly so since NEPAD’s 
primary objective is to reduce poverty. 
  
 The concepts “integrated development planning” (IDP) and ID have previously 
been applied to illustrate the integration of participative and broad-based 
development planning and management systems as well as to illustrate how 
institutional, spatial, multi-/inter-/intra-sectoral and multi-/inter-/intra-disciplinary 
inputs may be incorporated in development programmes/projects based on 
situational specificity. For example, the DBSA (2005: 11) defines IDP “in a South 
African (national) context” as: “A participatory process to integrate economic, 
sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, environmental and fiscal strategies in order to 
support the allocation of resources between sectors and geographical areas and 
across the population in a manner that provides sustainable growth, equity and the 
empowerment of the poor and marginalised.” The emphasis on the spatial context 
in the DBSA’s definition of IDP suggests that a combination of diverse cultural, 
spatial and institutional elements, in addition to any combination of PESTLE 
factors, may induce different planning and implementation processes or 
development outcomes based on situational/project specificity. 
 
 Some scholars (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006: 41) have attributed RID to Pan-Africanist 
epistemology, both as an ideology and as a regional policy guide for sectoral 
cooperation and regional integration. The afore-mentioned sentiments, however, 
appear to disregard the influence of the inherited foreign methodologies (at 
independence from colonial rule in the early 1960’s) on Africa’s approaches to 
regional integration and sectoral cooperation. According to Senghor (1990), the 
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concept ID (as it applies to regional integration in Africa,) is traceable to the 
evolution and application of the functional and neo-functional theories of regional 
integration in Africa’s regional integration discourse. The integration of the 
functional and neo-functional approaches arguably lent credence and provided 
technical substance (i.e., the political and socio-economic variables) to the adoption 
by the newly-independent African governments of the gradual functionalist 
approach to regional integration (ibid).  
 
 As Senghor (ibid: 18) argued: “…at independence, African governments inherited a 
spirit of, an approach to, and a methodology for organising cooperation. These 
were to have long-lasting implications in the post-colonial era.” Arguably, foreign 
methodologies have had a lasting influence on present-day notions of RID and on 
the dominant precepts underpinning Africa’s regional integration and sectoral 
cooperation initiatives, including NEPAD’s regional infrastructure programme as 
will be discussed in this study.  
 
 Sectoral integration as in the context of functional and neo-functional approaches to 
integration is, arguably, dissimilar to some of the contemporary definitions and 
applications of ID: a strong sectoral focus and a high degree of specialisation 
underpin the former. As Senghor (ibid: 20) stated, in the functional and neo-
functional approaches, “Functions are linked together in a network of organisations 
each of which is structured to cater for particular needs. The organisational system 
as a whole is expected to be responsive to the changing nature of these functions.” 
It appears, however, that even within the afore-mentioned context, certain 
technical/institutional elements of the functional and neo-functional approaches to 
regional integration have been distorted in Africa’s case by the predominance of 
politics and national interest in regional integration initiatives; this status quo is 
exacerbated by the circumscribed role of technocrats. As a result, certain (inherited) 
practices in Africa’s development landscape signify the lack of underpinning 
integrative influences between and across sectoral interventions, spatial categories 
and institutional structures for managing regional integration initiatives.  
 
 Arguably, Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s afore-mentioned assertions regarding the ideological 
and policy content for regional integration elucidate the lasting impact on Pan-
Africanist ideology of the incorporation of functional and neo-functional 
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approaches to regional integration in Africa’s development agenda, as explained 
earlier by Senghor. The perpetuation of the gradualist approach has also been 
entrenched by Africa’s continued adoption of the Westphalian ‘principle of 
sovereignty’ in the management of institutional relationships between and amongst 
member states. Some authors have also argued that to the extent that Pan-
Africanism underpinned the activities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
(Diescho, 2002:35) and inspired the latter AU (Møller, 2005:15) reflects the 
continued integration of historical ideologies in Africa’s contemporary approaches 
to sectoral integration and regional integration initiatives: contradictions thus seem 
inevitable, particularly where ID is considered in the context of globalisation and 
the related dominant neo-liberal prescriptions.  
 
 Bende-Nabende (2002:10) also argued that many international economists have 
provided different definitions of “integration.” This diversity is illustrated in the 
examples of definitions of integration proffered by Balassa, Pinder and Vadja2
                                                 
2 Bende-Nabende (2002:10) cites Balassa, who defined integration to depict progress in the various stages of 
regional integration – from “trade integration” (i.e., the removal of barriers to trade), to “factor integration” 
(i.e., the liberalisation of factor movements or free movement of goods and services), to “policy integration” 
(i.e., the harmonisation of national economic policies), and to “total integration” (i.e., the complete 
unification of the afore-mentioned policies). According to Bende-Nabende (ibid), Balassa’s definition was 
criticised for conforming to the principles of classical economic doctrines, which are perceived as less 
applicable to the economies of the developing countries, or economies typified by “a considerable degree of 
state intervention” (ibid). Pinder (ibid), defined “economic integration” to denote “both the removal of 
discrimination between the economic agents of the member countries, and the formation and application of 
coordinated and common policies on a sufficient scale to ensure that major economic and welfare objectives 
are fulfilled.” This definition was criticised for its generality (ibid). Vajda (ibid), distinguished between 
“market integration” (i.e., “the guarantee of the sale of each other’s products within the framework of the 
social system of participating countries”), and “production and development integration” (i.e., a process that 
involves “raising to an international level and programming the production of those branches of industry, 
which cannot be developed to an optimum size within national boundaries”).  
 
 
(ibid). According to Bende-Nabende (ibid: 11) international economic integration 
denotes “a state of affairs or a process involving attempts to combine separate 
national economies into larger economic regions.” The process depicted above may 
assume any of the following sequential forms of integration: “sectoral integration,” 
“preferential trade/tariff areas,” “free trade areas,” “customs unions,” “common 
markets,” “single markets,” “monetary unions,” “complete economic unions,” and 
“complete political unions” (ibid). In the context mapped above, Bende-Nabende 
(ibid) argued that “regional economic integration” or “regionalism” concerns the 
geographical/regional economic co-operation/integration.   
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 The definitions of “integration” depicted above reveal some alignment with 
NEPAD’s approach to the development of regional infrastructure; the afore-
mentioned definitions also appear to be aligned to NEPAD’s policy 
strategy/response actions and multiple objectives for the development of regional 
infrastructure. Some dissonance may be experienced with the application of the 
models for “integration” depicted above to the practical experiences of regional 
integration in the various RECs, with implications for NEPAD’s institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for the development of cross-border regional 
infrastructure. (For example, McCarthy (Mail & Guardian, 08-14 June, 2007) 
noted that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has adopted the 
conventional (or classical) model to integration: this model prescribes “a linear 
process of consecutive stages in the integration of goods, labour and capital 
markets and, finally, monetary and fiscal integration” (ibid). Cheru (2002) also 
provided a different perspective of models to regional integration adopted by the 
various RECs. In addition, the gradual functionalist approach to regional 
integration, which was adopted by Africa’s political leaders after independence in 
the 1960’s, still underpins Africa’s approaches to regional integration and sectoral 
cooperation initiatives.) The diverse definitions of “integration,” and how they are 
integrated in NEPAD’s approach to the development of regional infrastructure have 
implications for implementation or implementation management of NEPAD’s 
regional infrastructure programmes, particularly so cognisant of NEPAD’s 
prescriptive framework for the development of regional infrastructure. Also, some 
complexity may ensue in the application of prevalent models for regional 
integration to programmes/projects. 
 
 It is against this background of the multiple and complex spheres of influence that 
this study has formulated a broad-based conception of the key elements that 
constitute integrated implementation management of NEPAD’s cross-border 
regional infrastructure programmes and projects. The inclusive framework for 
integrated implementation management in this study attempts to incorporate 
NEPAD’s diverse and contradictory elements in its approach to the development of 
regional infrastructure as well as to address the major issues that impact on the 
effective delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. The effectiveness and 
efficiency of planning interventions, and how well NEPAD implements its planned 
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actions, will be determined by the success of NEPAD’s approach to the 
development of regional infrastructure. 
 
 Therefore, in this study integrated implementation management may be defined as 
a participatory project management system in the implementation of cross-border 
regional infrastructure programmes/projects. This system   integrates the relevant 
institutional, spatial, organisational, behavioural, trans-/inter-/multidisciplinary, 
trans-/multi-/inter-sectoral inputs at, and across the various levels of management, 
spatial categories and stages of the project life cycle in order to support the 
attainment of NEPAD’s articulated objectives for the development of (cross-
border) regional infrastructure. In this regard, parallels may be drawn between 
integrated implementation management and a thread that weaves parts into a whole 
in order to ensure that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Covey, 1989; 
Maxwell, 1998).  
 
 A combination of prescriptive and descriptive/emergent planning approaches as 
well as a combination of vertical and horizontal, rather than linear management 
systems and processes, are envisaged to support the attainment of the articulated 
outcomes based on the programme/project requirements and situational specificity. 
With specific reference to NEPAD’s roads programme, the envisaged approach to 
integrated implementation management takes particular cognisance of the spheres 
of influence intersected by the regional transport/roads sector: this is in order to 
develop the relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated 
implementation management of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and 
transit facilitation projects in alignment with NEPAD’s policy strategies/response 
actions and multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation.  
 
At the various levels of management/planning and practical implementation of 
projects, the integrative processes may be facilitated by the structured use of 
relevant project management methodologies. Effective integrated implementation 
management will be linked to the integrated management of project management 
functions (i.e., project integration management). Other relevant disciplines are 
included for effective project integration management and to demonstrate the trans-
/inter-/multidisciplinary management context. These afore-mentioned disciplines 
are defined in the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) to include 
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project human resource management, communication management and 
procurement management. (Project management functions include the management 
of project scope, organisation, constraints (time, cost, quality) and the risks inherent 
in all the afore-mentioned.) In addition, other relevant trans-sectoral and multi-
/inter-/trans-disciplinary and multi-/inter-/trans-sectoral frameworks that are critical 
to the facilitation and implementation of regional integration initiatives will be 
determined for integration by the programme/project requirements at the various 
spatial categories, based on situational specificity. This approach to integrated 
implementation management also aims to facilitate effective external/internal 
environmental or institutional analysis including the integration of the 
inputs/outputs of planning hierarchies into action planning and performance 
management/control of project implementation. Effective integrated 
implementation management will also facilitate the integration of complex 
institutional mechanisms and arrangements that span international, regional, sub-
regional, and national realms of activity or influence at various levels of 
management/planning and stages of the project life cycle in order to deliver the 
work of the identified programmes/projects.  
 
7. Project Management: according to the PMI (2000), project management is 
defined as: “The art of directing and coordinating human and material resources 
throughout the life of a project, using modern management techniques to achieve 
predetermined objectives of scope, cost, time, quality and participant satisfaction.” 
Peter Morris (Burke, 2003: 3) described project management as: “…the process of 
integrating everything that needs to be done (typically using a number of special 
project management techniques) as the project evolves through its life cycle [from 
concept to handover] in order to meet the project’s objectives.”   
 
In this study project management may be defined as the structured and effective 
employment of resources (physical, geographical, human capital, technical, and 
financial resources), which includes the coherent use of relevant institutional 
mechanisms and arrangements for collective engagement, in order to facilitate the 
implementation of agreed cross-border regional infrastructure projects to support 
the attainment of set project objectives and to meet stakeholder expectations. The 
management process typically uses relevant project management methodologies at 
the various levels of management/planning and stages of the project’s life cycle in 
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order to define, plan, prepare, and execute the work of the projects as encapsulated 
in the predetermined qualitative and quantitative objectives and project 
management functions (i.e., project scope management, project organisation 
management, time, cost, quality and the risk that permeates all of the afore-
mentioned).  In the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, the project 
management system integrates knowledge areas covered in the PMBOK as well as 
other relevant international/regional/sub-regional/national frameworks and/or 
institutions based on the projects’ specificity.    
 
8.  Project: the PMBOK (PMI, 1996: 4) defines a project as: “…a temporary 
endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service.  Temporary means that 
every project has a definite end.  Unique means that the product or service is 
different in some distinguishing way from all similar products or services.”     
Turner (1999: 3) defines a project as: “…an endeavour in which human, material 
and financial resources are organized in a novel way to undertake a unique scope of 
work, of a given specification, within the constraints of cost and time, so as to 
achieve a beneficial change defined by qualitative and quantitative objectives.” 
Projects are also construed (PMBOK Guidelines, 2004: 1) as a means of organising 
activities that cannot be implemented within the organisation’s normal operational 
parameters: that is, as a means of achieving the (organisation’s) strategic plan.  
 
Deriving from the definitions above, in this study a project may be defined as a 
policy intervention to deliver a unique scope of work or undertaking in order to 
bring about transformational change through the attainment of articulated 
quantitative and qualitative objectives for the development of (cross-border) 
regional infrastructure. The project comprises a defined scope of work, with a clear 
beginning and an end. A series of interrelated, structured activities that incorporate 
institutional, sector-wide, trans-/multidisciplinary and multi-/trans-sectoral 
inputs/outputs form the totality of a project. The project is managed by a defined 
project structure/organisation. Specified milestones, including monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms, provide measurable checkpoints throughout the project’s 
life cycle.  
 
The definition of projects referred to in this study does not include interventions 
described by McCutcheon (1999) as ad-hoc, or once-off, or crisis interventions 
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(such as drought or flood relief). Rather, the projects must form part of a 
programme and should meet the criteria for sustainable development and 
feasibility: according to Baum (1982: 7), “…a prima facie test of feasibility…(is) 
that technical and institutional solutions are found at costs commensurate with the 
expected benefits.”       
 
9. Programme: the PMBKOK Guidelines (2004) define programmes as a group of 
related/discrete projects that are managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits 
and control not available from managing them individually. The programmes may 
also include elements of (related) continuous work; they may also include a series 
of repetitive or cyclical (supporting) undertakings that fall outside the scope of the 
discrete projects within a programme (i.e., marketing, human resource 
management, finance and administration functions in an organisation, which affect 
the performance of programmes and related projects). According to Paul (1990: 
12), “Irrespective of classification, development programmes are ‘instruments’ of 
public policy and ‘intermediaries’ between the beneficiaries at the grassroots and 
national or regional governments…Development programmes are usually 
conceived at the national level and operate through sub-programmes designed to 
cover different geographic regions such as states or different functions and groups 
of services.”   
 
In this study, a programme may be defined as a portfolio of projects, which 
combine interrelated and discrete projects or related undertakings: it includes 
elements of continuous, inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary inputs and diverse 
management processes in order to support the attainment of specified short-term 
and long-term regional infrastructure development objectives. The elaboration of 
various projects within the programme and the nature of management systems for 
integrated implementation management of the programme will be determined by 
the articulated vision, strategy and objectives at the integrative and strategic levels 
of management. For example, Paul (ibid) illustrated that a programme to develop 
sustainable agriculture may include the following interrelated distinct projects, 
multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary and recurring undertakings: provision of 
agriculture extension services, development of appropriate credit facilities to small 
farmers, construction of infrastructure such as storage facilities and rural roads, 
research, and institutional capacity development projects.   
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 In cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, the 
programme elements or related projects may include the construction and 
maintenance of physical and non-physical infrastructure services, harmonisation of 
transport/roads sector policies, regulatory and governance regimes, development of 
instruments for domestic resource mobilisation, research, institutional/individual 
capacity development, development of measures to ensure road safety, 
implementation of pro-poor multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary projects linked to 
the cross-border transportation network, and development of integrated TTF 
systems.  
 
10. Levels of management: using Turner’s (1999) definition, levels of management 
may be defined as the integrative, strategic/administrative, or tactical/operational 
levels at which decisions and actions on projects are taken. The afore-mentioned 
levels are described by Turner (ibid: 16-18) as the three fundamental levels of 
management that form one of the dimensions of project management. As used in 
this study, the levels of management also correspond to the planning objectives at 
the development, programme and project levels. (Some confusion may, however, 
ensue as NEPAD’s levels of management overlap – in and of themselves and over 
the different levels of planning.) 
 
11. Physical and non-physical infrastructure: the definitions adopted in this study 
are taken from Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 7): 
 
(i) Physical Infrastructure: in the context of transport and transit facilitation, 
physical infrastructure may be defined as “…transport sub-systems such as 
physical infrastructure and facilities, which are combined with and 
complemented by information sub-systems such as communications 
infrastructure.”  
 
(ii) Non-physical infrastructure: in the same context as (i) above, non-physical 
infrastructure may be defined as “…knowledge and competencies applied to 
physical infrastructure in transport and trade facilitation within specific legal, 
economic, financial and governance frameworks. Elements of the non-
physical infrastructure system, developed to create the desired changes and 
improve transport and trade facilitation, include the following aspects: overall 
governance of transport and trade facilitation, business logistical systems, 
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quality of financial coordination, and systems of governance of physical 
flows.”  
 
12. Transit Facilitation: may be defined as the employment of physical and non-
physical infrastructure in transport and trade facilitation, such as roads 
transportation, multi-modal transport logistic chains, and related knowledge, skills 
and systems in order to facilitate cross-border movement of goods, services, and 
people. The process refers essentially to trans-state, inter-regional, intra-regional 
and extra-regional activities and trans-actions to remove formal and informal 
barriers (in transport) to the movement of goods and people. This process includes 
addressing the physical and non-physical infrastructural, operational and 
facilitation deficiencies in cross-border transportation; it also includes efforts to 
harmonise policy, regulatory and governance regimes at national levels in order to 
facilitate the efficiency of cross-border transport activities at sub-regional and 
regional levels.    
 
13. Spatial Categories: may be defined as the physical/geographical spaces at 
national, sub-regional, regional, and international levels; these spaces are identified 
in this study as the units for analysis. In Africa’s context, various criteria (described 
below,) are used either individually or in combination to delimit spatial categories: 
these criteria include a combination of geographical, political, economic, 
ideological and behavioural considerations. This status quo leads to confusion to 
the extent that in the delimitation of physical spaces, the various criteria sometimes 
overlap in substantive and objective terms.  
 
14. Region and Sub-region:  
• Region is defined as the African continent (the continent-wide, geographic 
space);  
• Sub-region is defined as the activity space of regional economic communities 
(RECs) such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community 
(EAC), l’Union du Maghreb Arabe/Arab Maghreb Union (UMA/ AMU), and 
so on. To the extent that RECs are determined more by political and economic 
notions for affiliation, rather than the geographic proximity of contiguous 
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member-states alone, and to the extent that membership (of RECs) by the 
various states overlaps considerably, the definition of sub-region in this study 
assumes the dimension of an “imagined geographical community,” rather 
clearly defined and homogeneous physical spaces.  
 
15.  “Technical hair-splitting”: this term has been used (Todaro, 1985) to refer to the 
prevalent unproductive administrative practices in developing countries, where a 
task/tasks that can be competently performed by one person or a single 
unit/department or organisation is/are split amongst various people, units, or 
organisations thereby leading to confusion, lack of accountability, low levels of 
productivity, low morale, and under-employment.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
PREVIOUS AND CURRENT INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
REGIONAL TRANSPORT/ROADS INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
This appendix describes previous and current interventions to develop (cross-
border) regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services. 
Examples of international experience are also included. These afore-mentioned 
examples illustrate the impact of the institutional environment on 
programme/project implementation; they also underscore the positive impact of 
the relationship between an adequate institutional environment and relevant 
technical interventions to support the attainment of desired outcomes. The 
following initiatives are discussed: 
 
(a)  The Transport and Communications Plan of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
of 1980;  
(b) The Trans-African Highway (TAH) and “missing links” initiative that was 
first launched in the 1970’s; 
(c) The previous and current UN programmes, multilateral/bilateral donor and 
REC interventions to address various challenges in regional roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation services, with specific focus on the 
plight of landlocked countries;  
(d) The EU’s Trans-European Networks (TENs) infrastructure programme, an 
initiative launched in 1994 to fill the gaps in transportation networks in the 
EU region; and  
(e) The examples of cross-border regional roads infrastructure development in 
other global regional trade blocks, which sought to address similar 
challenges in transportation and transit facilitation as those identified in 
NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP and in various African RECs. The global 
regional trade blocks discussed in the Appendix include the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercado Commûn del Sur (Mercosur), and South 
Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). 
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B.1 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 1980: The Strategy for the Transport and 
Telecommunications Decade for Africa. 
 
The LPA focused on the joint transport and communications sectors in 
recognition of their critical role in Africa’s economy. The LPA’s strategy 
underscored the need to facilitate integrated development of these afore-
mentioned infrastructure sectors, because of their complementary influence on the 
development of other sectors including the socio-economic integration of Africa 
and the promotion of intra-/ extra-African trade (LPA, 1980, Para.205: 58). A 
resolution – first mooted and adopted at the ECA Conference of Ministers of 
Transport, Communications and Planning, in March 1977 – called for the 
declaration of a Decade for Transport and Communications. This resolution was 
endorsed by the following institutional structures: first, the UN Economic and 
Social Council (UNECOSOC); second, the General Assembly of the UN, which 
proclaimed 1978-1988 the Transport and Communications Decade for Africa; and 
third, this resolution was (subsequently) adopted by the Organization of African 
Unity’s (OAU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government (HoSG), in July 
1979 (ibid, Para. 206: 58).  
 
The LPA’s Transport and Communications programme (hereinafter referred to as 
“the LPA’s transport programme”) comprised a strategy that focused primarily at 
facilitating the attainment of the following outcomes:  
 
• increased intra-African trade, access and internal coherence;  
• harmonisation of regulatory regimes;  
• technical standardisation; 
• reduction of non-tariff barriers to facilitate movement of goods and people; 
• increasing the efficiency of transport and transit facilitation systems; 
• institutional capacity building including the development of human capital; 
• domestic resource mobilisation to attain the articulated objectives (ibid). 
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The 1979 OAU Summit of HoSG endorsed the principal goals of the strategy that 
member states should work towards. These goals, detailed in Box B.1, were first 
defined by the ECA Conference in 1977.    
 
Box B.1: The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) – Principal Goals of the Strategy for the 
Transport and Communications Decade for Africa.  
 
The principal goals of the strategy for the Transport and Communications Decade for Africa 
were: 
a) Promotion of the integration of transport and communications infrastructures with a view to 
increasing intra-African trade; 
b) Ensuring the co-ordination of the various transport systems in order to increase their 
efficiency; 
c) Opening up of the land-locked countries and isolated regions; 
d) Harmonisation of national regulations and reduction to a minimum of physical and non-
physical barriers with the aim of facilitating the movement of persons and goods; 
e) Stimulating the use of local, human and material resources, the standardisation of networks 
and of equipment, research and dissemination of techniques adapted to the African context 
in the building of transport and communications infrastructures; 
f) Promotion of industry in the field of transport and communication equipment; and  
g) Mobilisation of technical and financial resources during the decade, with a view to 
promoting the development and modernisation of transport and communication 
infrastructures in Africa.  
Source: After OAU, 1980. Lagos Plan of Action, p. 58. 
 
The LPA’s transport programme mapped steps to facilitate the attainment of its 
articulated objectives for integrated development. Initially, these steps focussed 
on the following aspects:  
• addressing sub-regional and regional constraints that include fragmented 
systems;  
• reforms to policy and regulatory regimes to ensure harmonisation of cross-
border TTF systems;  
• creating improvements in communications and transport physical/non-
physical infrastructure, to ensure efficiencies of integrated data exchange 
(IDE) systems; and 
• development of non-physical infrastructure, such as knowledge and human 
capital, to support the attainment of identified objectives.    
 
The LPA’s transport programme was planned for implementation in two phases 
over a period of eight (8) years. This programme was also linked to the LPA’s 
trade agenda to promote, specifically, intra-African trade and to develop collective 
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self-reliance in trade with other developing countries. These objectives were to be 
achieved by “systematically” exploiting, exploring and harnessing the potential 
for collective “trade and economic cooperation…with other developing regions 
and countries (author’s emphasis),” in order to address the inequitable power 
relations in international economic relations (ibid: 68). The model that informed 
the design of the roads sub-sector projects, most of which formed part of main 
trunks and feeder roads, was aimed at promoting linkages between national 
networks and those of neighbouring countries. The long-term objective was to 
provide an effective network for the efficient movement of goods, people, and 
communication within and between member states (ibid).     
 
The LPA’s transport programme also reflected the objectives of integrated 
development: it encompassed a multi-sector and multi-disciplinary focus that 
posited inter-sectoral linkages between transport, communications and trade. To 
support the attainment of the afore-mentioned objectives, the LPA’s vision for the 
transport programme extended beyond the Africa region to mobilise intra-regional 
cooperation with other developing countries (ibid). The LPA’s approach was 
designed to garner collective self-reliance amongst African countries on the one 
hand, and between African countries and other developing countries on the other 
hand as envisaged under the dictates of the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) for which, according to Todaro (1985), there was growing acceptance in 
developing countries. The elements of the NIEO are detailed in Box B.2. 
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Box B.2: Elements of the New Economic International Order (NIEO)  
 
According to Todaro (1985: 560), the NIEO can be traced to the analyses of dependency theorist during the 
1950’s and 1960’s; it received political endorsement at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly in 1974. The concerns of the developing countries the NIEO sought to address dealt with their de 
facto economic colonization after the end of formal political colonization (ibid). Some of the articulated 
concerns included the following: 
  
• the legacy of the colonial project and its negative effects, which manifested in insignificant global trade 
that still reflected overwhelming colonial trade patterns, particularly with former colonial powers;  
• the inordinate dependence (by developing countries) on few primary commodities for export earnings;  
• the dominance of foreign investment as the primary mechanism for financing development; and  
• the inordinate reliance on technology from the developed countries, which had 98% of the world’s 
research and development capability, and 94% of all patents (ibid).  
 
The NIEO emphasised collective self-reliance, and greater cooperation amongst developing countries. The 
selected agenda items of the NIEO, with respect to the commitments sought from the developed world, 
included the following: 
  
• Attaining the UN ODA  targets (from the developed countries) of 0.7% of GNP on an unconditional, 
long-term, continuous basis; 
• Provision of technical assistance for development (by developed countries) and eliminating the brain 
drain to avoid “reverse transfer of technology”; 
• Renegotiating debts of the developing countries to obtain “cancellations, moratoriums, rescheduling of 
debt to ‘soft’ terms over a longer period of time, or interest subsidisation; 
• Undertaking special measures to assist landlocked, least developed and island developing countries; 
• Improving terms and conditions of trade by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and ensuring 
improved access to world markets; 
• Strengthening economic and technical cooperation among developing countries via economic integration 
at sub-regional and regional levels, trade, financing fields and sectors industry, technology, transport and 
communications;   
• Reforming the IMF to ensure a stable flow of development assistance through the use of the Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) and to “maintain ‘the real value of currency reserves…by preventing their 
erosion from inflation and exchange rate depreciation”; 
• Increasing transfers of resources through the World Bank and the IMF “to make additional capital 
available to the poorest countries on highly concessionary terms; 
• Establishing mechanisms for the transfer of (modern) technology which is essential to enable developing 
countries to reach their development objectives; and 
• Regulating and supervising the activities of trans-national enterprises and eliminating restrictive business 
practices, as set out in the proposed NIEO international code of conduct for trans-national corporations.    
 
Source: Derived from Todaro, 1985. Economic Development in the Third World, p.560-561, and Appendix 
17.1, pp.68-571 
 
Notwithstanding the detailed plans for harmonisation proposed in the LPA, the 
mechanisms to address the underlying inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary issues 
that inform policy, governance and regulatory regimes at national levels were not 
spelt out. In the first place, the pursuance of national prerogatives appears to have 
caused the persisting dilemma in Africa’s regional transport and communications 
operations since independence in the 1960’s. As Cheru (2002: 133) notes: 
“…each country has its own cumbersome transport regulations, custom 
requirements, charges and levies. All these factors add up to high transportation 
costs for exporters and importers.” The failure of the LPA to institute practical 
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institutional mechanisms and arrangements to address, at national levels, 
impediments to the implementation of collective regional agreements in the 
transport-sector is just one of the practical examples where lofty plans, which are 
underpinned by impressive principles, are proposed in Africa’s development 
programmes without articulating practical mechanisms to implement even the first 
steps.     
 
It is also not clear from the literature reviewed what processes were instituted to 
monitor progress on the implementation of the LPA’s transport programme. Also, 
it does not seem documentation exists of the lessons learnt, by sector. It may well 
be that the lack of proper documentation characterises all previous African 
development initiatives. For example, Adedegi (2002: 37) stated that the LPA 
“…was a culmination of a four-year long effort, initiated and led by the UNECA 
(ECA) to undertake an agonising review of the development paradigms that 
Africa pursued since independence in the 1960’s.” It is not clear, however, 
whether the outcomes of such a review were published. Thus, the lack of 
documentation and transparency on the evaluation of Africa’s development 
programmes poses dire consequences for the availability of feedback loops and 
relevant data to inform future planning processes; this information gap also 
highlights the questionable ownership of Africa’s development agenda by African 
institutions.   
 
A review of the related literature suggests that some of the key constraints with 
impact on the management of the programme’s scope and organisation functions 
(including the constraints) can be summarised as follows:    
 
(i) First, it is not clear whether the ECA, or its Inter-Agency Committee and 
Multinational Programming Centres (MULPOCs) – that were established 
to facilitate implementation of the LPA’s agenda, possessed the requisite 
political legitimacy and institutional capacity for implementation. It is also 
questionable whether the ECA’s MULPOCs had the capacity, authority, 
and political support to pronounce on national prerogatives in transport 
  
                                                                                                                         325 
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                          
  
policy, regulatory and governance regimes including systems and 
standards.  
 
 Governance issues, in particular, were not included at the LPA’s 
integrative levels of programme development (Anyang’ Nyong’o, 2002: 
24). Thus, the requisite governance requirements could not be cascaded to 
the lower levels of management during implementation processes at the 
higher levels of management, as the institutional frameworks did not exist. 
Moreover, the entrenched systems’ fragmentation, in addition to the 
narrow mercantilist national interests that underlie national transport and 
communications policy and regulatory regimes, were arguably tangential 
to the overall stated goals of harmonisation and increased inter-African 
trade.    
  
(ii) Second, the delegation of key roles to national governments and 
institutional structures for the implementation of a regional programme’s 
elements, but who often lacked the political will and institutional capacity 
to implement collective agreements, appears to have been the Achilles’ 
heel of the LPA’s programme and its sectoral interventions. Based on the 
experiences of other trading blocks in developing countries, such as 
SAFTA (Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000), and the patrimonial nature of 
the African state (Gelb, 2001; Taylor, 2005; Zenawi, 2002), it is 
reasonable to surmise that national governments were interested in 
maintaining the status quo: this would be to pursue national policy 
objectives, abetted by their narrow (in the regional context) prerogative of 
‘national sovereignty’ (that was enshrined in the OAU Charter and also 
adopted by the AU). It is also possible that the reversal of this situation 
was hindered by the absence of capable, supranational institutions with the 
relevant authority and power to monitor implementation progress, and 
enforce collective decisions. 
 
(iii) Third, the time frames scheduled for phased implementation of the LPA’s 
transport programme, over a period of eight years, were overly ambitious.  
This assertion takes cognisance of the deeply entrenched complexities in 
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technical and safety regulation of cross-border physical flows. Moreover, 
Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000) have argued that the associated 
regulatory regimes at sectoral, sector-wide and inter-sectoral levels are not 
easily amenable to change, with propensity to delay harmonisation plans.  
 
(iv) Fourth, the dereliction of duty by member states, to politically and 
financially support the regional or sub-regional institutions tasked with the 
development of institutional infrastructure and human capital, in order to 
ensure the efficacy of TTF systems and other inter-sectoral interventions, 
appears to have been ignored by both the OAU and ECA (the latter which 
developed the LPA on behalf of African HoSG).                  
 
(v) Fifth, the ideological difference between the developed countries 
(including their institutions, such as the Bretton Woods institutions), and 
the purported socialist principles of collective self-reliance espoused by 
the LPA undermined its acceptance to the international development 
financiers. As Anyang’ Nyong’o (2002: 24) noted, “Given that the West 
was generally hostile to arguments in favour of the NIEO, it was not 
surprising that they paid scant attention to the LPA and FAL (Final Act of 
Lagos).” It is possible that the argument advanced by Anyang’ Nyong’o 
explains the lack of financial support by governments of the developed 
north to requests by African governments (LPA, 1980, Para.15: 7; 
Mkandawire, 2002: 116) for implementation of the LPA and its 
programmatic interventions. In this regard, one may argue that the LPA 
promoted institutional mechanism that perpetuate external dependency in 
Africa’s development initiatives were, whilst it simultaneously cajoled 
African governments to “…cultivate the virtue of self-reliance” and 
emphasise domestic resource mobilisation (ibid, Para. 14(iii): 7).    
  
 
Without debating the merits or demerits of the LPA’s transport programme, to the 
extent that immense problems in regional roads transport infrastructure, trade and 
transit facilitation that it sought to address still abound, one may surmise that its 
success was minimal, if at all. As N’diaye (2002: 42) noted, “…(the LPA) was an 
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idealistic plan even though the analysis was pertinent. Its idealism meant that it 
could not be implemented.” It also seems that the principles of “collective self-
reliance” amongst African and developing countries that the LPA promoted had 
negative implications for the overall implementation of the various sectoral 
interventions; this is particularly so given the West’s reluctance to support such 
objectives at the time, as some authors (Adedegi (2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 2002) 
have argued.  
 
In addition, Mkandawire (2002: 116) argued that the reliance on external 
resources negatively impacted on the implementation of the LPA, “…whose own 
political understanding of the development of the African continent was 
immediately undermined by the assumption that aid would play an important 
role.” Thus, the LPA’s programme seems to have been stymied primarily by the 
negative influences of the external institutional environment on inadequate 
internal institutions and inadequate institutional mechanisms, arrangements and 
capacity for implementation, over and above the inordinate reliance on external 
funding.   
 
B.2 The Trans-African Highway (TAH) and “Missing Links” Programme: 
1970’s - Current 
 
B.2.1 Definition  
 
According to the AfDB and ECA (2003: 3), the Trans-African Highway and 
“missing links” programme (hereinafter referred to as “the TAH”) was originally 
conceived in the early 1970’s: its aim was to establish a network of paved all 
weather roads of good quality in order to achieve the following objectives:  
• provide as direct routes as possible between the capitals of the continent;  
• contribute to the political, economic and social integration as well as to 
facilitate cohesion in Africa; and  
• ensure the development of road transport facilities between important areas of 
production and consumption.    
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According to the AfDB and ECA (ibid), the physical layout of the roads network 
turned out to be a compromise: between the development of networks that 
supported the attainment of the afore-mentioned objectives, and the use of 
available financial resources to improve roads serving important population and 
production centres at national and regional levels. Consequently, it appears that 
the objective of providing the most direct routes between capitals was neglected. 
These routes, commonly referred to as the ‘missing links’, now form sections of 
the TAH network. Roads that do not meet the technical criteria described above 
are included in the TAH as well as existing routes that, according to the AfDB and 
ECA (ibid: 3), are “…teetering on the brink of deterioration beyond repair.” Also, 
roads for which no contracts were concluded, although financial closure was 
attained, are also included under the TAH programme.  
 
Suggestions were recently made (NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB & ECA, 2003) to revive 
the TAH programme under the banner of NEPAD.  However, there are possible 
overlaps and potential for duplication between the TAH and NEPAD’s roads 
programme, thereby indicating a greater need for coherence in programme/project 
planning and implementation management arrangements. The AfDB and ECA 
report (2003: 3) has also referred to inconsistencies in data and documentation on 
the network. Moreover, lack of clarity regarding the authorised structures 
responsible and accountable for defining components of the TAH appears to be a 
persistent problem. This institutional gap also applies to structures to determine 
the required provisions and agreements to amend the network.  According to the 
AfDB and ECA (ibid), RECs traditionally identified sub-regional networks that 
are critical to advance political integration and socio-economic development of a 
sub-region. However, the AfDB and ECA (ibid) notes that the lack of authority in 
RECs (to control decision-making processes in project design, and prioritising 
projects to ensure the attainment of articulated collective objectives,) has resulted 
in national governments incorporating certain sections to the TAH, although such 
networks do not coincide with sub-regional priorities. This has resulted in the 
existing alignment of the TAH being contested, resulting in the promotion of 
several alternative alignments (ibid).    
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B.2.2 Approach to programme development 
 
B.2.2.1 Funding requirements 
 
There is no indication from the literature reviewed of original cost-estimates for 
the TAH programme. Current funding requirements to complete the TAH are 
estimated at approximately US$4.2 billion (AfDB & ECA, 2003; Estache, 2006a). 
However, the AfDB (World Highways, 2003: 17) notes that even available funds, 
amounting to US$200 million and which constitute 16% of total disbursements, 
are still not allocated because of institutional inadequacy: according to the AfDB 
(ibid), there are no prepared projects for which to disburse the available funds. 
 
B.2.2.2 Approach to programme design 
  
Institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support implementation of the TAH 
programme are restrictive and not coherently structured to ensure an integrated 
approach between the various spatial categories. The approach to programme 
design seems to be determined by ownership of networks vis-à-vis national 
priorities including the potential for the availability of funding (or foreign 
investment) for implementation. The TAH programme essentially takes 
cognisance of two types of road networks: internal country links not extending to 
a border, and cross-border road networks that link countries. With respect to the 
internal country links, national government priorities prevail. The involvement of 
RECs in this category of networks is only limited to “keep the issue alive” (AfDB 
& ECA, 2003: 5), and to actively review possible funding options available to 
national governments.    
 
Regarding the inter-country connections (ibid), ownership also remains firmly 
with the individual countries. However, projects receive strong support from the 
respective RECs because of the regional development profile of this category of 
networks. According to the AfDB and ECA (ibid), the upgrading of the inter-
country connections has increased potential to attain reasonable economic returns 
and to attract funding assistance from multilateral structures, such as the EU and 
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the AfDB. For this category of projects, RECs also provide advisory services and 
assist affected member countries to apply for funding, agree on common 
standards, and procure design, construction and project management services. 
Arguably, ownership of both types of networks identified above rests with the 
member countries.  
 
According to the AfDB and ECA’s report (2003: 6), it also appears that the 
possibilities for RECs to influence developments regarding the missing links 
differ between the different types of missing links. This status quo has been 
attributed (ibid) to the possible influence of unresolved issues regarding minimum 
standards, fragmentation in transport policy and related regulatory instruments, 
lack of harmonisation of technical and safety regulations, and onerous funding 
requirements for different sections of the TAH. Also, it appears that before any 
serious discussions on priorities can be taken, the afore-mentioned institutional 
issues must be prioritised through collective engagement at national, sub-regional 
or regional levels, in order to identify least cost solutions relative to total project 
costs.  The RECs’ overall influence and significance in this process appears to be 
curtailed by the multiplicity of institutional structures and arrangements for 
implementation.   
 
Also, the intractable process to harmonise technical and safety-regulation is 
exacerbated by the lack of private-sector capital for this type of projects. As a 
result, the role recommended (ibid) for RECs is that of sub-regional technical 
advisors on minimum design and axle load standards for the TAH. Based on 
financial possibilities, the matters under RECs’ spheres of operation are escalated 
for deliberation at the regional level. This process facilitates the prioritisation of 
least-cost solutions and projects with limited total costs at all the various spatial 
categories, such as national, sub-regional and regional levels. The AfDB and ECA 
(ibid) also recommended, as desirable, a similar process of gradually harmonising 
the axle load and total weight regulations between RECs.   
 
 
  
                                                                                                                         331 
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                          
  
B.2.3 Progress in implementation  
 
The AfDB and ECA report (ibid) has identified the following challenges with 
influence on implementation progress: 
  
• minimal or lack of progress to implement sub-regional and regional 
agreements, and protocols, often “…with political agreements and 
interventions from the highest levels of government a pre-requisite for 
sustainable solutions” (ibid: 7); 
  
• a plethora of non-physical barriers for which the TAH could be used as a focal 
point to address; 
 
• lack of financial support from member countries for establishment of 
multinational administration structures (such as the TAH Bureau that was 
proposed without success by the ECA in 1993).  Preference seems instead to 
be for planning and coordination at national and sub-regional levels. As a 
result, the AfDB and ECA report recommended the establishment of “…a 
simple institutional structure to handle the fairly modest set of activities at 
regional level” (ibid: 14). Whether this modest structure is suitable within the 
context of its envisaged activities, given the complexities of cross-border 
regional infrastructure and transit facilitation described above, is debatable; 
and 
 
• negative influence of national prerogatives in transport policy, which affect 
sections of the TAH falling within the borders of individual countries. As the 
AfDB and ECA (ibid: 12) noted:  
  
 “The Governments of Africa, through their relevant ministries and 
responsible road authorities, consider decisions regarding what road to 
build, rehabilitate, and maintain and at what time a purely national issue 
(author’s emphasis).”    
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B.2.4 Recommendations of the AfDB and ECA report  
 
The AfDB and ECA (ibid), have made recommendations to expedite progress in 
the implementation of sub-regional and regional agreements. These 
recommendations emphasise activities at strategic and operational levels, but with 
a strong sectoral and sector-wide focus. They include the following elements:  
 
• Adopting measures to foster “competition among different corridors 
connecting the landlocked countries.”  These measures are planned  to focus 
on increasing efficiencies to improve technical and safety regulation, 
customs management and clearance procedures. Also included are cost-
containment and improved physical infrastructure/facilities in multi-modal 
logistic chains; 
  
• (Suggested) consideration (ibid) by financing institutions to extend 
conditionalities to commitment (by the recipients of funding) to reduce non-
physical barriers. The AfDB and ECA’s report (ibid) suggests that this 
requirement would include, for example, that recipient countries commit (in 
return for funding,) to reduce delays in border crossings and borders, or 
route closures resulting from political or security concerns; rationalising and 
streamlining road blocks; and improving transport facilitation measures; and 
 
• Adopting a bottom-up approach to transport and trade facilitation, similar to 
the approach adopted by SADC. This approach is premised upon assigning 
specialists from the public or private-sectors to identify and analyse 
problems as well as to propose concrete solutions for approval at ministerial 
levels. According to the AfDB and ECA (ibid); this proposed approach is 
different from the prevalent approaches of starting with a decision at 
ministerial levels, and then cascading it to the lower levels of management 
for implementation.   
 
The measures recommended by the AfDB and ECA report, however, appear to 
superficially address the symptoms rather than the underlying causes (such as 
institutional inadequacy) at the various spatial categories. This report makes this 
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assertion cognisant of institutional inadequacy and lack of capacity for 
implementation at national levels, but where ownership of decision-making 
processes, approaches to design including arrangements for funding and 
implementation reside. The underlying problems at national levels, when not 
addressed, escalate to crises when attempts are made to develop road 
infrastructure and transit facilitation at sub-regional and regional levels. The 
AfDB and ECA’s recommendations also appear to be limited to managing crises 
within the existing institutional frameworks, rather than proposing 
transformational interventions for institutional reform and development in order to 
support the effective provision of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and 
transit facilitation services. 
 
The AfDB and ECA’s technical recommendations also appear to downplay the 
dire picture that the same institutions so eloquently articulate in their analysis of 
the following issues: the underlying causes to the parlous state of non-physical 
and physical transport infrastructure at national, sub-regional and regional levels; 
the range of challenges confronting the TAH programme; and the inability of 
RECs to authoritatively address the status quo. What also emerges from the AfDB 
and ECA report is that the perpetuation of problems in the provision of regional 
transport infrastructure and transit facilitation services is attributable to the lack of 
political will and commitment to change at national levels for their resolution. 
This is so since it is with the national governments that ownership and decision-
making regarding national and cross-border transportation networks resides. Also, 
the identified problems are exacerbated by the diverse national transport policy 
instruments and regulations including the proliferation of rules arising out of 
multifarious national, sub-regional and regional bilateral FTAs and RTAs. Under 
the intractable conditions mapped above, the TAH’s example of implementation 
failure illustrates a key observation by the DFID (2003: iv): technical 
interventions that leave inadequate institutions intact may achieve nothing.   
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B.2.5 Lessons from the TAH 
 
The TAH initiative is relevant in NEPAD’s context for the following reasons: the 
TAH initiative has been resuscitated; and there are suggestions (NEPAD, 2002c; 
AfDB & ECA, 2003) that the TAH programme must be encompassed within 
NEPAD in order to expedite its implementation. However, it is not clear how far 
the thinking and institutional environment that underpins the TAH will be 
transformed under NEPAD’s umbrella, to avoid emulating previous 
implementation failures.       
 
B.2.5.1 Impact of institutions, organisations and institutional capacity  
 
In the current global political economy, the AfDB and ECA’s recommended 
approach to the (resuscitated) TAH appears to ignore the possible influence of the 
diverse and dynamic external/internal institutional environment on cross-border 
regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes/projects.  For 
example, positive influences include the possible beneficial impact of properly 
managed international institutional arrangements to instigate rapid changes on the 
domestic political and socio-economic environment, particularly so in the context 
of globalisation. To this extent, the role of the RECs to advise their principals 
(i.e., member states) on the appropriate institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements for the desired benefits to manifest seems to be constrained by the 
adverse internal institutional environment. This includes the negative impact of 
inequitable power relations between national governments and sub-regional/ 
regional institutions and institutional structures, the (at times) disruptive influence 
of member-states on RECs’ decisions, the predominance of political agreements 
in technical spheres, and lack of institutional capacity at national, sub-regional 
and regional levels. (The latter includes lack of physical and non-physical 
infrastructure, funding, limited administrative competence and wherewithal to 
make sustained transformational contributions to support the attainment of the 
articulated strategic objectives.)    
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Yet, the AfDB and ECA (2003: 8) identify RECs as the appropriate structures to 
play a central role in the TAH initiative, ostensibly because of their experience in 
managing stakeholder relationships and in providing technical advice. As the 
AfDB and ECA (ibid: 14) note: “…(the RECs’) close contacts with individual 
countries, interest and competence in technical matters in the road infrastructure 
sector are generally appreciated by member governments.” This suggestion, 
however, contradicts the well-documented structural crises in RECs: these crises 
are compounded by poor leadership in member-states and lack of institutional 
capacity (technical, financial and human capital) for implementation. The 
allocation of additional complex responsibilities to RECs thus belies their well-
documented institutional inadequacies. Notably, observations regarding the lack 
of capacity in RECs appear to ignore the impact of the often inappropriate, flawed 
and contradictory ideologies that underpin policy interventions in the transport 
sector at national levels, which the RECs are often powerless to influence or 
change in favour of sub-regional/regional agreements.    
 
B.2.5.2 Institutional arrangements 
 
The programme design and institutional arrangements for the TAH need to be 
reviewed if it is resuscitated. For example, the planning framework for the TAH 
requires a holistic approach that will facilitate the development of appropriate 
interconnected urban hierarchies, rather than treating production or consumption 
centres, or capitals, as mutually exclusive spatial enclaves. In this regard, the 
development of adequate institutional capacity in and across the different spatial 
categories and levels of management will be required. In this context, the role of 
institutional structures at the various spatial categories would be, for example, to 
facilitate integration of project scope and project organisation management. Also, 
their role would be to ensure a planned interface with NEPAD’s roads programme 
and to re-define the overlap of functions between the political, technical, and 
administrative mechanisms at national, sub-regional, and regional levels. 
Therefore, roles and responsibilities of various institutional structures in the 
various spatial categories would need to be clearly defined. Such interventions 
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need to be supported by institutional reform and development at the various 
spatial categories.     
 
It is, however, concerning that the AfDB and ECA report (2003) views the 
process of harmonisation in the TAH as desirable rather than imperative: the 
complexity in harmonising and streamlining cross-border transport regimes results 
from the preponderance of multifarious national transport-sector regimes. 
Therefore, the influence of harmonisation of policy, governance and regulatory 
regimes on project design as a critical condition for the success of cross-border 
transport and transit facilitation is significant. Moreover, the recommendations by 
the AfDB and ECA report (ibid) for the “gradual” harmonisation of axle loads 
appears to replicate entrenched approaches to Africa’s regional integration, such 
as the gradual functionalist approach to regional integration (see: Senghor, 1990: 
17-31). However, the success of the “gradualist approach” has, at best, been 
limited. In this regard, the harmonisation of transport policies, standards, 
regulatory and governance regimes are critical components of the initial steps to 
support institutional reforms that will facilitate improvements in regional 
transportation. Such institutional reforms will determine the success of technical 
interventions at the levels of programmes and projects.  
 
Thus, the example of the TAH indicates the need for a paradigm shift – in the 
delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads programmes and projects – at the 
different spatial categories, institutional structures and levels of the management. 
In a regional and sub-regional context, care must be taken to prevent the 
predominance of national prerogatives in transport policy, including the related 
regulatory and governance regimes, as tools to pursue the narrow mercantilism of 
national governments in the transport sector.   
 
B.3 Other Regional Interventions  
 
In the Africa region, various international agencies, donors, regional/sub-regional 
institutions, and RECs have implemented or proposed a multiplicity of 
  
                                                                                                                         337 
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                          
  
overlapping programmes to address the challenges in regional transport 
infrastructure and transit facilitation as well as other challenges in various sectors 
or disciplines related thereto. These programmes include the UN’s Transport and 
Communications Decades in Africa (UNTACDA) I and II to address the problem 
of land-locked countries, the RECs’ separate programmes and, recently, the 
proposed programmes under NEPAD. There is, however, an overlap in the 
various programmes designed to attain similar or diverse objectives. In this 
regard, it is not clear whether there is a coherent framework within which the 
various programmes/projects are conceived, prepared, and implemented to 
support the goals of integrated development. For example, the following 
interventions have been mooted or implemented by institutional structures at, 
within, and across the different levels of management and spatial categories:  
 
(i) The related programmes in UNTACDA I and II. These programmes were 
adopted by African leaders to increase the efficacy of transport and 
communications systems (Amoako, 1997: 3). The long-term objective was 
to establish efficient integrated systems in the transport and communications 
sectors, as a basis for the physical and market integration of Africa (ibid). 
The TAH was one of the earlier initiatives originally formulated in the early 
1970’s in this context (AfDB & ECA, 2003). In addition, various inter-REC 
coordination structures (involving key stakeholders such as the donors, 
development partners, UN machinery, and AU) have been mooted by the 
UN to operate under an AU-designed mechanism (UNECOSOC, 2003: 8). 
Their (proposed) mandates include the harmonisation of continent-wide 
policies, strategies, and programmes as the envisaged basic framework for 
inter-REC coordination. It is not clear from the literature reviewed whether 
these processes are only planned for the transport sector interventions or 
across various sectors in an integrated approach.  
 
(ii) Specific REC interventions are also implemented on a case-by-case basis. 
Examples in this regard include the SADC Protocol on Transport, 
Communications and Meteorology (ratified in August 1996), and the SADC 
Protocol on Trade (also ratified in August 1996). These REC interventions 
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demonstrate a strong sectoral focus. Other similar technical interventions to 
harmonise “inter-state road transit” were adopted by the member states of 
l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) in 2001 
(NEPAD, 2002c: 46). The UEMOA interventions, which demonstrated a 
strong sectoral focus, comprised the harmonisation of transport regulatory 
aspects, inter-state border control physical infrastructure, and monitoring of 
non-physical barriers on inter-state roads (ibid). In addition, a plethora of 
other separate REC programmes are being implemented to attain similar 
objectives.  
 
(iii) Similar roles are also assigned to different (international) structures to fund, 
provide technical assistance, and/or promote efficient cross-border trade and 
transit facilitation in the Africa region. These structures include the 
UNECA, UNCTAD, WTO, World Bank, and World Customs Organization 
(ibid). However, the interface between these current UN programmes and 
NEPAD’s roads programme is not clear, if at all.  Moreover, there is lack of 
clarity regarding processes, if any, to build on successes of previous 
initiatives and lessons learnt.  
 
(iv) Member states and national governments have been assigned key roles and 
responsibilities to ensure successful implementation of other agreed and 
follow up programmes under the UNECOSOC/ECA Programme for 
Landlocked and Transit developing countries. These programmes are to 
benefit both the landlocked and transit countries (UNECOSOC, 2003). 
However, it is not clear how these initiatives have performed, and whether 
or not they have been evaluated to establish their effectiveness.   
 
B.4 International Experience 
 
According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000), in other international regional 
blocks – such as the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, Mercosur, and SAFTA – effective 
institutions (together with the related institutional mechanisms and arrangements) 
played a decisive role in the successful implementation of sub-regional/regional 
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transport and transit facilitation projects. Institutional interventions included the 
development of enabling policy, governance and regulatory regimes for the 
member-countries to implement integrative transport and trade integration 
initiatives (ibid).   
 
B.4.1 The EU’s Trans-European Networks (TENs) initiative   
 
According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid: 19), the EU, as the oldest and 
most highly evolved regional trading block, embarked on a transportation process 
that compelled member states to relinquish jurisdiction over a broad range of 
economic, social, and environmental policy issues. Given the large number of 
national borders within the EU area (then comprising 15 countries with a 
combined population of 375 million), the integration of transportation markets 
and infrastructure as well as the harmonisation of transportation policies were 
important preconditions for achieving the free movement of goods and people. 
The establishment of a common transportation policy was stated as a goal in the 
EU’s founding documents.  
 
The TENs initiative was announced in 1994 as a major infrastructure programme 
to specifically fill the gaps in (then) European transportation networks. The 
programme was planned for implementation over a 15 year-period, at an 
estimated cost in excess of €400 billion. However, national prerogatives stood in 
the way of harmonisation.  As Lackshmanan and Anderson (ibid) stated:  
          
 Little progress was made, however, in the area of transportation policy 
over the first three decades of the EU’s existence because of the presence 
of state-owned suppliers of transportation services and the desire by 
member governments to use transportation policy to promote their separate 
national economic programs.    
 
According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid: 22-24), the EU followed an inter-
sectoral and sector-wide integrated phased approach in order to facilitate and 
expedite the attainment of the agreed objectives. This approach (including the 
development of the process and prioritisation of activities,) was supported by 
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effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements. The process depicted below 
was followed: 
 
(i) The preliminary process focussed on market access, interoperability, and 
common work rules for transportation employees. This process required 
the enactment of “major new legislation,” which dealt with air, marine, 
road and inland water transportation over a five-year period between 1987 
and 1992.  
  
(ii) The EU Commission then focussed on issues of interconnection. This 
aspect entailed transformation of fragmented production and consumption 
patterns, to facilitate ease of management in complex logistics and value 
chains. This process was supported by the enactment in 1993 of a White 
Paper, which emphasised a goal enshrined in the 1992 Treaty of the 
European Union: i.e., (to call for) the development of integrated and 
complementary information, transportation and energy networks. The 
EU’s supranational structures supported project selection in line with the 
objectives of the TENs initiative and disbursement of funds for approved 
projects. They had authority to overrule national decisions. Projects were 
selected for their contribution to the objectives of the TENs initiative.    
 
(iii) EU funding was provided for up to 10% of total project costs in the form 
of co-financing for feasibility studies, fees for loan guarantees, interest rate 
subsidies, and direct investment grants in limited circumstances. The 
remaining 90% funding gap was filled by member states and the private 
sector in member states under PPPs (ibid: 23-24).    
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Box B.3: Institutions of the European Union 
 
The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1958, established the European Economic Community (EEC) as the 
predecessor of the EU. A distinguishing factor of the EU is that it is equipped with a set of powerful 
supranational institutions that can make policy and even override the policies of member states. These 
supranational institutions include the following: 
 
(i) The most conspicuous of the EU institutions is the European Commission (EC), which is essentially 
the executive branch of the EU. There are 22 Directorates-General within the Commission, with 
mandates for specific areas of administration such as external affairs, industry, environment, 
fisheries, and transport. 
(ii) In addition to its administrative responsibilities, the Commission initiates all EU legislation. Bills 
are passed from the Commission to the European Parliament for approval and amendment. 
(iii) Final approval of legislation is by the Council of Ministers. Legislation relating to the Common 
Transport Policy would be approved by transport ministers of the (then) 15 member-states of the 
EU. The Council of Europe, comprising the heads of government (Prime Ministers or Presidents) 
from each member state only takes up very high level issues.   
(iv) The EU also has its own judicial institution, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has the 
critical responsibility of ruling on whether or not the laws and actions of national governments are 
consistent with EU laws, or whether or not the laws implemented by the EU according to the 
legislative process described above are consistent with the Treaty of Rome and all later treaties. For 
example, in 1985, the ECJ ruled that the European Commission had failed to act appropriately to 
implement the Common Transport Policy required under the Treaty of Rome. This ruling related 
specifically to the opening up of national transportation markets to suppliers from other member 
states. The ruling marked a major turning point after which the Commission and Parliament became 
more active in all aspects of transportation policy. Thus, the ECJ played a critical role in breaking 
down traditional national prerogatives that stood in the way of a Common Transport Policy for 30 
years. 
(v) In the case of air transportation, the European Commission put forth an argument for regulatory 
reform that was opposed by all member states in 1979, but which was to come into force after 
almost a decade of debate and litigation.           
Source: Excepts derived from Lakshmanan and Anderson, 2000. pp. 20-24. 
 
B.4.2 Lessons from the international experience 
 
B.4.2.1 Institutional issues  
 
In the examples of the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, Mercosur and SAFTA, 
Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid) confirmed the significance of prioritising 
institutional reforms and developing appropriate institutional arrangements in 
cross-border transport infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes, to ensure 
successful implementation of the agreed programmes. In addition, the overview of 
the other sub-regional blocks (ibid) underscores the significance of harmonising 
technical and safety-regulation regimes (in addition to other transport policy 
prescriptions,) as a precondition to be enforced at national levels.     
 
In the afore-mentioned examples of international regional blocks, these measures 
sought to ensure successful implementation of cross-border trade, transport and 
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facilitation initiatives. They also sought to avert the detrimental influence posed 
by the predominance of entrenched national prerogatives. For example, in the 
EU’s case, traditional national prerogatives stood in the way of a Common 
Transport Policy for 30 years (ibid: 24). The identified impediments were only 
effectively addressed pursuant to intervention by powerful supranational 
authorities of the EU (Box B3). These supranational authorities created a burning 
platform to facilitate change, and to ensure successful implementation of the 
agreed multinational transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects.   
 
The institutional mechanisms and arrangements of the EU also ensured that 
managed openness (presumably at regional and national levels) was balanced by 
the development of effective systems in order to ensure territorial integrity at 
lower levels of management in member states. For example, Lakshmanan and 
Anderson (ibid: 22) argued that whilst the EU’s supranational authorities gave it 
“…a degree of authority that is greater than other regional blocks, its 
power…(was) limited by the principle of subsidiarity (emphasis in the original), 
which prevents the EU from interfering in decisions that can be taken effectively 
at national levels.”   
 
The implementation of the EU’s programme to achieve common transportation 
policy was described (ibid: 24) as “painful”; it still remains incomplete 50 years 
since the inception of the EU’s antecedents (ibid). However, member-states 
demonstrated strong political commitment in support of common goals. Other 
measures included the implementation of inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary 
processes to support transportation objectives. These are described by 
Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid) to include the following:  
 
• the effective use of information and communications technologies (ICT) to 
support the development of efficient roads infrastructure and TTF systems;  
• the development of adequate institutional infrastructure including the 
development of relevant non-physical infrastructure assets (such as 
knowledge and human capital) to increase the effectiveness of the physical 
infrastructure assets; and  
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• the commitment of adequate funding by national governments, which helped 
to ameliorate some of the administrative constraints. National governments 
employed various domestic and international financial instruments to fund 
capital investments. But, these funding arrangements were premised 
primarily on domestic resource mobilisation to support the implementation 
of agreed interventions.  
 
B.4.2.2 Funding arrangements 
 
The funding arrangements depicted in the example of the EU’s TENs initiative are 
different from those employed by the majority of African countries, sub-regional 
and regional institutions, described in the examples of the LPA and TAH 
initiatives in earlier sections above. In the African context, regional infrastructure 
projects are seemingly identified and approved for implementation without first 
establishing the sources of funding (which are linked to the determination of 
appropriate instruments for resource mobilisation). The perennial lack of 
commitment to funding of regional/sub-regional projects from the national 
budgets of member-states and their PPPs has entrenched a culture of dependency 
on external sources of funding. The risks inherent in this dependency possibly 
manifest through the lack of attention to financing aspects of regional 
infrastructure projects at the outset, during project conceptualisation.   
 
Increasingly, individual countries are reported (AfDB & ECA 2003: 8) to consider 
donor funds (including concessionary grants and non-concessionary loans from 
the international finance institutions (IFIs)) as the sources of funding for capital 
investments in national physical infrastructure development and maintenance 
programmes. This dependency has significant negative implications for 
programme/project design, ownership of development processes, and political 
issues. 
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B.4.2.3 Standardisation/harmonisation of relevant policy, sectoral, technical and 
regulatory regimes 
 
In the case of NAFTA, Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 15) indicate that efforts 
to deal with the variety of technical and safety-related regulations developed in 
various member states over the years proved to be complex and multidimensional. 
This problem was ascribed (ibid) primarily to the narrow mandates of the 
independent review panels established to address the most contentious issues via 
inter-governmental negotiations. According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (ibid), 
considerable effort was often required to remove inconsistencies. In the case of 
SAFTA and Mercosur (ibid: 39), special efforts were often required to overcome 
“historical intra-regional transport frictions”. According to Lakshmanan and 
Anderson (ibid), the hurdles encountered by SAFTA and Mercosur characterise 
the problems of developing countries that band together to form trade blocks, 
because of persisting semi-colonial links with north-America and Europe. In this 
case, issues that needed to be addressed to harmonise trade and transport-sector 
regimes included the following: 
 
• the inward-oriented trade regimes; 
• the pervasive role of the public sector; 
• the insignificant role of trade in national incomes, which resulted in low trade 
intensity;  
• the low proportion of intra-regional trade to total trade, as a consequence of 
historically stronger colonial-era trade and financial links; and 
• a plethora of impediments to transport and trade facilitation.  
 
B.5 Conclusion 
 
The significance of the LPA’s regional Transport and Communications 
programme and the TAH initiative is that they draw attention to the consequences 
of approaches that ignore to combine technical interventions with institutional 
reform/development and institutional capacity development, particularly in the 
context of integrated (development and) implementation of regional development 
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programmes. These afore-mentioned programmes underscore the implications of 
inadequate external/internal institutional environments for programme/project 
implementation, particularly so in the context of inadequate institutional capacity. 
The LPA’s Transport and Communications programme also illustrates the 
complexities that ensue for programme implementation when principles of 
divergent ideological perspectives are integrated incoherently in attempts to 
address the inequitable power relations in the global political economy, 
particularly in an environment of inadequate institutional capacity.   
 
The studies of interventions to improve cross-border regional transport/roads 
infrastructure and transit facilitation services in other global regional blocks 
confirms that technical improvements in cross-border TTF systems require 
parallel reforms in the institutional environment (such as rules governing cross-
border physical flows including the elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers). On the one hand, the findings of this study highlight the impact of 
efficient inter-sectoral interventions on the implementation of programmes/ 
projects to ensure improvements in the provision of cross-border regional 
transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services; on the other hand, 
they highlight the significance of the symbiotic relationship between technical 
interventions and the institutional environment to elicit the desired/planned 
transformational outcomes, and the need for simultaneous transformation and 
development thereof.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATIO PROGRESS: INFRASTRUCTURE STAP AND ROADS PROGRAMME 
 
1st 2 STAP Review: 2003 nd Roads Infrastructure Projects: STAP 
Review, 2004 
 STAP Review: 2004 Transit Facilitation Projects: STAP 
Review, 2004 
• 52 Facilitation Projects: 46 percent of 
the projects were being implemented; 
 
• 18 Capacity Building Projects: 33 
percent of the projects were being 
implemented (16 projects in 2004); 
 
• 36 Investment Projects: 22 percent of 
the projects were being implemented; 
 
• 18 Studies Projects: 16 percent of the 
projects were being implemented (17 
projects in 2004) 
 
• A NEPAD Infrastructure Project 
Preparation Facility (IPPF) has been 
established with the support of C$ 10 
million from the Canadian 
government. This multi-functional 
facility will be used for project 
preparation purposes. Plans are 
underway to mobilise contributions 
for additional funds from other 
development partners. The AfDB 
hosts NEPAD’s IPPF. 
 
• The NEPAD Secretariat is consulting 
key development partners and 
IFIs/DFIs (including the AfDB, 
World Bank, EU Commission, and 
DBSA,) on studies and regional 
infrastructure projects scheduled for 
2004 / 2005. 
 
• ICT Sector: Progress was reported in 
most regions on key areas, such as 
harmonisation of policies, 
regulations, liberalisation and the 
associated legislative framework.  
The Regional African Satellite 
Communications Organisation 
(RASCOM) had achieved financial 
closure. The identified key challenges 
relate to the provision of sufficient 
technical skills to move the projects 
forward, and to manage the transition 
to fully liberalised markets. 
• Energy Sector: Considerable 
progress was made in a number of 
regional projects, such as the West 
African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), which 
achieved financial closure; the 
Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP); 
and the development of generating 
and transmission capacity within 
UMA/AMU.  The key challenges 
identified in the 2nd
• Transport Sectors: 
 Infrastructure 
STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 
2005) relate to the “…continued 
development of the power pools and 
sustainable power trading 
mechanisms, restructuring of utilities, 
attracting partners for sustainable IPP 
development and the realisation of 
the Grand Inga Project.” 
• Air Sector: The sector displayed 
wide variation in both the 
• The corridor concept is accepted in 
most regions. Road corridor 
programmes under current 
implementation include Programme 
Routier One (PR1) – 
Accra/Ouagadougou/Bamako; and 
Mombassa/Nairobi/Addis. 
• The EAC has focussed on securing 
investment for the development of 
the East African Road Network 
Programme (EARNP).  The 
programme, which replaced the 
individual corridor projects 
originally listed in the 2002 STAP, 
consists of five corridors across the 
region.  Since 2003, the required 
improvements were identified by 
member states; funding and 
procurement procedures were agreed 
to. 
• A World-Bank funded study on road 
concessioning in Corridor 1 – 
Mombasa/Katuna, has been 
completed.  
• Plans are underway for an ECCAS-
sponsored feasibility study for a 
corridor linking Doussala/Brazzavile, 
to form part of the Trans-African 
Tripoli/ Windhoek (TATW) road.  
Difficulties in communication, 
between ECCAS and Congo, hamper 
progress on the project. Terms of 
reference of reference (TOR) are 
being prepared. 
• One-stop border posts: SADC has 
concentrated on the establishment of 
unified procedures and systems 
within the existing legal framework, 
rather than the construction of new 
facilities.  Projects supported by 
SADC include the pilot one-stop 
border post initiatives at Mutare and 
Chirundu, which include training and 
harmonised documentation. 
• EAC is working on two initiatives to 
strengthen road transit within the 
region: the first initiative with the 
East Africa Business Council 
(EABC) will be to promote the 
reduction of trade barriers including 
simplification of border crossing 
procedures; in the second initiative, a 
pilot scheme at Malaba has been 
developed, in conjunction with 
SADC and COMESA. This pilot 
scheme follows a second study the 
EAC conducted, in 2004, on the 
implementation of one-stop border 
crossings. Phase 1 of the pilot 
scheme will be funded by the 
USAid. 
• ECOWAS and UEMOA have 
sponsored several studies on the 
legal aspects and the organisational 
structure one-stop border posts.  
Several draft multi-lateral and bi-
lateral agreements have been drawn 
in line with the Customs Inter-State                  
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• Discussions are underway with the 
US Trade Department Agency, to 
undertake studies on some projects 
including the Ports of Mombasa, 
Djibouti, and Dakar; the COMESA 
Border Crossing / Customs 
Facilitation, and SADC Upper 
Airspace Control. 
 
• The Treaty that relates to the 
Yamoussoukro Decision, to liberalise 
African Air Space has still not been 
implemented (in the majority of 
African countries), despite being in 
existence for more than 10 years.  
implementation of reforms and the 
willingness of member states to 
comply with the agreed requirements 
of the 20-year old Yamoussoukro 
Decision (YD) to liberalise markets 
and enforce decisions at all levels.  
According to the TCII and NEPAD 
review report (ibid: 16), the YD had 
called for all African countries to be 
fully compliant by 2002.  However, 
the main obstacles identified by the 
review resulted from the failure by 
member states to honour 
commitments in terms of collective 
decisions. Instead, various countries 
seemingly insisted on the pursuance 
of historical restrictive policies and 
agreements which had been 
superseded by the YD. According to 
the TCII and NEPAD review, the 
failure to implement the YD is made 
much more difficult by NEPAD’s 
failure to support RECs/AU 
institutions to mobilise political will 
for its implementation.   
• Road, Rail and Maritime Sectors: 
These sectors displayed wide 
variation in the quality of 
infrastructure and in implementation 
progress. Common problems in 
respect of project implementation 
were identified: some of these 
problems relate to financing, legal, 
and institutional constraints to 
overcome. 
• A Fougamou/Doussala corridor that 
will form a second link in the TATW 
road has been proposed.  However, 
ECCAS lacks the resources to 
manage the project. 
• ECCAS is also sponsoring a 
feasibility study for a new rail/road 
bridge linking Brazzavile – 
Kinshasa. 
• An Emergency Recovery 
Programme funded by the AfDB, 
EU, and World Bank is planned for 
Angola and DRC. The programme 
has a transport infrastructure 
recovery component with an 
estimated budget of US$ 1.5 billion. 
• ECOWAS has identified a 
20,000km priority road network 
comprising the Trans-West African 
Highway, the Trans-Sahelian 
Highway and other roads linking 
landlocked countries to seaports and 
other important trade links. 
• A survey will be conducted to 
prepare a road infrastructure 
improvement programme. 
• The World Bank is considering 
funding a US$ 100million road 
rehabilitation programme that 
includes Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Ghana. 
• UMA has focused on the completion 
of the Maghreb Highway linking 
Nouakchott/Casablanca/Algiers/ 
Tunis/Tripoli/Messad; development 
of the Mauritanian road network; and 
EuroMed Project. UMA has, 
however, not maintained detailed 
records on the projects, although 
progress has been reported in respect 
of the first and third projects depicted 
       Road Transit Declaration (ISRTD). A 
number of special facilitation 
committees have been established 
and workshops have also been held.  
• ECOWAS has obtained a Policy and 
Human Resources Development 
(PHRD) grant of approximately US$ 
1million from the Japanese 
government.  Six TOR have been 
prepared for studies in the following 
areas: 
(i) Axle load control and 
harmonisation in West 
Africa; 
(ii) Harmonisation of vehicle 
technical inspections; 
(iii) Road tracking system; 
(iv) Computerised 
interconnection of customs 
system; 
(v) Port security audit; and  
(vi) Institutional arrangements on 
joint-border posts. 
• Other transit and trade facilitation 
instruments: A wide range of 
COMESA trade and transit 
facilitation instruments have been 
operational for a while: Yellow Card 
(a regional Third Party Motor 
Vehicle Insurance); COMESA 
Carrier Licence; COMESA Customs 
Document; and high frequency land 
radio communications. 
• Overload Control: Few projects 
have been established so far to 
examine overload control.   
• A survey was conducted in 2004 to 
review current vehicle overload 
practices in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Nearly all the countries that provided 
information on the survey were from 
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above.           SADC and COMESA.  
• Following the recommendations of 
the survey, the World Bank-managed 
sub-Saharan African Transport 
Policy (SSATP) programme is 
financing a study of issues affecting 
the implementation of overload 
control in COMESA. These issues 
include: harmonisation of 
weighbridge equipment; weighing 
procedures; acceptance of tolerance 
limits; the use of Overload Control 
Certificates; and practical 
management of weighbridges.  The 
results of the study will be used to 
prepare Model Guidelines and 
Procedures, for use by member 
countries.  
 
Source: Derived from: NEPAD Annual Report 2004/5; NEPAD Infrastructure Sectoral Programme Overview, October 2004; NEPAD Infrastructure STAP – Second Review of 
Implementation Progress and the Way Forward, TCII/NEPAD Report, 2005, pp.66-70.  
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APPENDIX D 
1st
Constraints 
 Infrastructure STAP Review (2003) – Constraints to Implementation Progress and Recommendations 
Recommendations 
1. Lack of clarity as to what NEPAD really is:  
• Lack of clarity regarding NEPAD’s status, its objectives and its envisaged contribution towards the implementation of STAP; 
• Lack of clarity regarding the responsibilities for implementation and funding arrangements for projects included in the STAP; 
• Expectations that NEPAD would acquire and disburse funds from special sources, thereby obviating the need for RECs to follow normal 
procedures to source funding from bilateral and multilateral agencies;    
• There was confusion regarding the roles of NEPAD and the AfDB in the implementation of the STAP; 
• Compounding the problem of lack of role and responsibility clarification was the involvement of multiple players at different institutional 
and spatial levels including “…countries, RECs, African technical institutions, not to mention a plethora of foreign partners” (AfDB, 
2003: 35). According to the AfDB (ibid), the perception that “…NEPAD leadership, Heads of State and the Secretariat were preoccupied 
with ensuring that NEPAD was understood and well-received outside of Africa (authors emphasis) in order to obtain the backing of the 
international community” (ibid), may have contributed to the pervasiveness of this problem.  
“NEPAD Secretariat would intensify its efforts to:  
Clarify for RECs and countries the role that NEPAD expects 
to play in the implementation of the STAP with regard to 
mobilising political will and facilitating obtaining of donor 
support and financing” (AfDB, 2003: 35). 
 
2. Lack of clarity as to what is expected of the RECs and countries:  
• There was confusion regarding the expectations of NEPAD on RECs and countries in the implementation of STAP. According to the 
AfDB, it was difficult to establish whether the confusion was ascribable to lack of effective communication with RECs at the top levels, 
resulting in the lack of accurate messages filtering to the relevant internal (lower-level) structures within RECs, or whether 
communication failure resulted from RECs being “slow to formalise their activities with respect to NEPAD” (ibid). 
“The NEPAD Secretariat would intensify its efforts to: Clarify 
for RECs and countries the role that NEPAD expects them to 
play in the implementation of the STAP with regard to 
identifying and preparing projects, mobilising funding and 
carrying out projects; Encourage the RECs to establish formal 
procedures to deal with NEPAD; and Encourage Heads of 
State to formalise arrangements for NEPAD coordination in 
their respective regions” (ibid: 36). 
3. Lack of definition regarding linkages between countries and the RECs:   
• Inadequate thought was given to the management of REC/country relations, resulting in different processes of implementation adopted:  
        (i)   Countries on one hand implemented projects that should be in STAP without the RECs’ awareness;  
        (ii)  On the other hand, RECs promoted projects without the necessary buy-in from their member states.   
       (iii) In some sub-regions, such as ECOWAS, countries established NEPAD Coordinating Units without defining the relationships (and   
interface) between these units and the existing ECOWAS Coordination Units. 
 “NEPAD would intensify its efforts to encourage the RECs 
to: Establish procedures for coordinating with the countries to 
ensure that the countries are well aware of the challenges and 
opportunities of NEPAD, so that both countries and RECs can 
play their proper role and maximise synergies.” (ibid).   
 
4. Overlapping REC responsibilities:  
• Overlapping REC’s responsibilities including multiple memberships (by countries,) in more that one REC hampers implementation of the 
STAP. As a result, RECs (possibly) either duplicate each other’s activities, or fail to address pertinent issues under the mistaken belief 
that another REC is addressing them. This status quo resulted in the squandering of limited resources or missed opportunities.  
 
The NEPAD Secretariat would encourage the overlapping 
RECs to:  
• Jointly examine their programmes with a view to 
identifying:  
      (i) Areas where one REC has a clear comparative 
advantage   and can play a leading role;  
      (ii)Areas where both have capacity and joint programmes  
can be developed; and  
      (iii)Areas where neither has capacity and it needs to be 
developed, or an alternative technical partner found.  
• Set up explicit joint teams and joint programs in areas 
where both intend to work on a topic (ibid: 37). 
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5. Failure by RECs to keep abreast of “NEPAD-type programmes” in which they are not directly involved:  
• Lack of awareness, by RECs, of the scope of programmes and projects undertaken in their respective sub-regions, although the existence 
of a number of projects that the RECs were not aware of was known to consultants in the infrastructure environment; 
• Lack of incorporation of a number of donor-sponsored, cross-cutting initiatives (such as the World Bank’s SSATP, which specifically 
supports road management through its Road Management Project,) into the planning processes of RECs and NEPAD during the 
development of their own programmes for the STAP. 
 
“The NEPAD Secretariat would encourage the RECs to:  
• Identify programmes for which alternative technical 
agencies can provide leadership, permitting the RECs to 
concentrate their scarce resources on technical areas where 
no alternative source of expertise exists;  
• Include such programmes and projects in the STAP;  
• Establish procedures for liaising with these agencies to 
ensure that the RECs are well informed regarding the 
programmes and projects that are being undertaken in their 
areas of influence” (ibid: 38). 
6. Lack of alignment of REC programmes and NEPAD priorities:  
• There was lack of alignment between the REC’s programmes with NEPAD’s, to enable interconnected performance of their designated 
role in terms of NEPAD; 
• RECs needed to reassess their programmes, to ensure alignment of their activities with NEPAD’s  agenda and priorities, as opposed to 
the pursuance of “legacy” programmes that were undertaken for historical reasons: “…some RECs are still working on programmes and 
projects that derive from Heads of State and ministerial resolutions that can be up to twenty years old, but which are no longer a priority 
in today’s circumstances” (ibid) 
 
The NEPAD Secretariat would 
• Encourage the RECs to:  
(i) Take steps to align their programmes with NEPAD 
priorities;  
(ii) Undertake a review of “legacy programmes” to ensure 
that resources are not being devoted to non-priority 
programmes;  
(iii) Approach their authorities – Heads of State and 
Ministers – to validate any re-alignment of priorities.  
• Encourage Heads of State or Ministers to promote such an 
exercise (ibid). 
 
7. Lack of financial and technical capacity:  
• A chronic shortage of financial and human resources due to cumulative funding constraints over a number of years resulting from the 
following factors: inadequate revenue from Community Levies and predetermined share of customs; and reliance for budgetary 
allocation from member states “…many of who are in a parlous state and cannot pay” (ibid). 
 
• Lack of financial resources has resulted in the RECs implementing hiring freezes, or retrenchments (or both options under extreme 
circumstances). Even under moderate conditions, the Infrastructure STAP review established that RECs fail to attract and retain high 
quality staff as the salaries are often too low. 
 
• Flawed institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme design and implementation management compound the problem.   
 (i) RECs undertake over-ambitious programmes, usually accumulated over many years through a multiplicity of unfunded mandates from 
their political authorities.  The relevance of these programmes in changing circumstances is not reviewed;   
(ii) There is lack of human capital development to enhance the ability of staff to deal with the requirements of the current complex 
environment in the development of infrastructure; and 
(iii) Out-dated bureaucratic procedures and technological instruments result in low morale and productivity. The afore-mentioned factors 
constrain the RECs’ ability to deliver on NEPAD’s mandate. 
 
“The NEPAD Secretariat would: 
• Encourage Heads of State to ensure that the RECs have 
adequate resources to meet the responsibilities that the 
Heads of State expect them to perform under NEPAD;  
• Use its good offices to influence Ministers of Finance to 
meet their financial obligations to RECs;  
• Encourage the Heads of State and Ministers to avoid 
assigning unfunded mandates to the RECs;  
• Encourage the RECs to develop financial and human 
resource development plans to meet the additional 
requirements of NEPAD;  
• Encourage funding agencies to do everything possible to 
support the RECs in this endeavour” (ibid: 39). 
Source: Derived from AfDB. 2003. NEPAD Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) – Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward, pp.34-39. (The review’s findings and 
recommendations, summarised where possible, are detailed in this table as close as is possible to the original text in the AfDB’s Report, to avoid possible distortions as a result of the author’s interpretation of 
data. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
2nd Infrastructure STAP Review (2004) – Constraints to Implementation Progress and Recommendations1
Constraints 
 
 
Recommendations 
1. Long time-frames for project  implementation 
Unduly long time-frames for facilitation or investment projects, even when allowing for the 
relatively lengthy gestation periods in the development of infrastructure projects. From project 
conception to financial closure, it takes on average 10 yrs or more for both types of projects 
without practical implementation. The reasons for this problem are interlinked and mutually 
reinforcing as discussed in the various sections below. 
1. Make RECs’ decision-making more efficient and effective 
“At a minimum, RECs should examine and, where appropriate, reform their decision-
making processes and operating mechanisms to ensure they are efficient and streamlined to 
meet the requirements of their current NEPAD mandate without compromising 
transparency and democratic accountability.”  
 
2. Difficulties to deliver necessary sectoral reforms at regional and national levels 
• A number of barriers and bottlenecks preclude necessary reforms to national policies, 
practices and regulatory mechanisms in line with collective agreements at regional and 
continental levels (i.e.  conventions, protocols and treaties) including the following: 
(i)  Lengthy, complex and  cumbersome decision-making processes in RECs due to 
multifaceted and inefficient processes of consultation  that must be followed;  
(ii)   Failure by national governments to timely implement regional agreements,  because 
of the following impediments: 
-  protracted institutional mechanisms and arrangements for collective engagement at 
national levels;  
- inadequate institutional frameworks, mechanisms and structures to translate  
collective agreements into implementable plans and programmes;  
-  Lack of political will to translate collective agreements into practical actions; and 
- Lack of institutional mechanisms at national levels – across all infrastructure sectors 
– to ensure compliance with regional agreements;   
(iii)   Limited financial, technical and human resource capacity within RECs to support 
sectoral harmonisation programmes. 
 
2. Facilitate the translation of political will into concrete actions 
To ensure collective agreements that are binding to all the affected parties, a legal 
framework should be established that clearly identifies the respective responsibilities and 
obligations of RECs and countries with respect to the implementation of collective 
decisions on NEPAD’s infrastructure projects. For the afore-mentioned to happen, 
• RECs need to be delegated authority and effective powers to enforce agreements and sanction 
member states in the event of failure “to implement ratified decisions and non-adherence to 
specified time-frames”; 
• Within a REC, a legal regime needs to be developed to enable an appropriate regional institution, 
such as the Council of Ministers or Council of Heads of State and Government to be transformed 
into a supranational body with vested powers to enact regulations and issue binding directives to 
member states (such a structure already exists in UEMOA, EAC and is planned for ECOWAS); 
• NEPAD and the RECs, with support from the AfDB, need to consider providing technical 
assistance and funding to countries so that the countries are enabled to reform their 
administrative and legal frameworks to comply with the agreed regional decisions. 
• RECs, in collaboration with countries, should take steps to “address the ‘Communications Gap’ 
and tackle the deadening hand of vested interests” by developing and implementing an effective 
communications strategy with existing and potential stakeholders as well as citizenry in member 
states, in order to maintain ongoing dialogue with respect to the NEPAD agenda. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Source: Derived from TC Infrastructure Limited (TCII) and NEPAD, 2005.  NEPAD Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) – Second Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward, Continental 
Synthesis Report, pp. 95-110.  According to the TCII and NEPAD report, the second Infrastructure STAP Review, held in 2004, was conducted with the cooperation of RECs, the AfDB NEPAD unit, and the NEPAD 
Secretariat. The review’s findings and recommendations, although summarised to some extent, are recorded in this annexure as close as is possible to the original text in the TCII and NEPAD report, to avoid possible 
distortions as a result of the author’s interpretation of data.  The TCII & NEPAD report (ibid) also integrates in its findings and recommendations issues raised in various workshops and related reports on 
implementation of NEPAD’s Infrastructure STAP.  The workshops, cited in the TCII and NEPAD report (ibid) include the following: “Workshop on Mechanisms for Capacity Building of Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) and Speeding Up Implementation of NEPAD Short Term Action Plan (STAP) Projects”, March 2005, Abuja: Nigeria; “Report prepared by the African Development Bank for the NEPAD 
Summit on Accelerating Implementation of NEPAD Programmes”, 7-8 March 2005, Abuja: Nigeria; and the “Seminar on Fostering Private Investments in NEPAD Infrastructure Projects organised by the African 
Development Bank In Collaboration with the NEPAD Secretariat and the African Business Round Table (ABR)”, 15 May 2005, Abuja: Nigeria. 
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Constraints Recommendations 
3. Lack of dedicated regional project preparation facilities 
Institutional structures, within RECs and countries, have inadequate technical and financial 
capacity to consistently identify, prepare and implement bankable cross-border infrastructure 
projects, particularly those with a PPP component. Although the RECs possess certain technical 
skills, and have demonstrated the ability to facilitate consensus-building processes with 
national and regional governments, they lack the necessary skills and resources to prepare and 
implement major cross-border projects, because they were not traditionally mandated to 
perform the roles assigned to them under NEPAD. 
3. Accelerate the preparation of bankable cross-border projects 
To meet this objective, dedicated regional project development and implementation units 
(PDIUs) equipped with the relevant human capital and appropriate funding instruments, 
including grant funding, need to be created. A similar structure is planned for 
implementation in ECOWAS (see proposed approach in TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 107).    
 
4. Limited capacity within RECs 
 Most RECs lack the capacity to provide technical assistance to countries for sectoral 
harmonisation programmes 
4. Boost the capacity and resources of RECs 
Additional resources need to be committed and availed to the RECs to enable them to 
provide technical assistance to countries with respect to sectoral harmonisation 
programmes, and monitoring compliance therewith. COMESA and ECOWAS have 
effectively facilitated harmonisation in the ICT and aviation sectors respectively. 
Expansion of NEPAD’s Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) should be 
considered to encompass facilitation projects. 
5. Limited financial resources within RECs:  
• Almost all RECs lack financial resources to fulfil their mandate as NEPAD’s 
implementation organs; 
• Projects are often stalled because RECs lack funding for basic administrative overheads 
such as experts’ meetings, recruitment of critical staff, or to purchase IT equipment 
(unless they appeal to development partners for funding). Four principal aspects to this 
problem were identified as the following (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 101):  
(i)   Failure of RECs’ funding mechanisms to adapt over time to appropriately reflect   
current needs; 
(ii)   Failure of contributions from member states to increase in real terms over the years; 
(iii)  Non-payment of contributions by member states including delays or deficits where   
payments by member countries are made; and 
(iv)  Inability by RECs to cover shortfalls with borrowings as they cannot raise loan 
capital in their own right.    
5. Increase the financial resources of RECs 
Member states should be encouraged to provide the RECs’ Secretariats with regular 
funding so that they can at least support the execution of basic functions/activities in RECs. 
RECs’ funding should also be restructured to facilitate the development of the requisite 
capacity for the implementation of NEPAD’s programme. The structuring of RECs’ 
funding also needs to be reviewed to facilitate alignment with the “new realities in terms of 
the REC’s (sic) commitments under NEPAD”   
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6. Lack of a coherent package of policies to support and encourage private sector 
investment 
6. Produce a coherent package of policies to scale up Private Sector Participation 
(PSP) 
The recommended package of policies includes the following key instruments/mechanisms: 
 
• Rationalise legal and regulatory regimes relating to infrastructure development, with 
the future objective to ultimately create a common model for Africa; 
• Create innovative instruments and structures to lever funds from within and outside 
Africa for investment and early stage project development work; 
• Ensure that innovative, flexible, complementary and accessible financial instruments 
to mitigate risk, that are appropriate to special challenges of African infrastructure 
projects, are made more widely available; 
• Establish dedicated Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV’s) for pan-continental projects, 
with parallel public sector structures to drive facilitation, harmonisation and capacity 
building aspects; 
• Develop durable policies and structures to facilitate consistent engagement at all 
levels with the private sector, such as improving the independence, credibility, 
efficiency and enforcement powers of the judiciary and implementing sectoral reforms 
to achieve competitive and well-regulated markets; 
• Establish partnerships with the private sector through risk sharing and inventive 
project structures such as Transfer Operate Transfer (TOT). 
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7. Weak or ineffective institutional relationships between the key stakeholders:  
Lack of institutional structures, amongst all key stakeholders (at national, regional and 
continental levels) to facilitate the development of  efficient and effective liaison and 
monitoring mechanisms both on general NEPAD-related matters and on sector or project- 
specific issues. In the event that such institutional structures are established, they are set up in a 
piecemeal and inconsistent manner, thereby inhibiting the development of robust, strategic, 
continent-wide institutional relationships to ensure better coordination of programmes and 
projects.      
 
7. Strengthen institutional relationships between stakeholders 
As agreed at the Workshop on Mechanisms for Capacity Building of Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) and Speeding Up Implementation of NEPAD STAP, held in Abuja: 
Nigeria (March 2005), the RECs (with the assistance of the AfDB and NEPAD’s 
Secretariat) will define and support the creation of a co-ordination framework to enhance 
institutional relationships with various stakeholders.  
 
• Furthermore, focal points need to be established in RECs, countries and NEPAD 
Secretariat to enhance both coordination and communication; 
• The stakeholder co-ordination framework should take into account the overlapping 
responsibilities of NEPAD’s Secretariat, RECs, and member states in order to avoid 
duplication of effort and confusion about responsibility (the lead agency) for each 
project; 
• The creation of internal Task Forces, holding of internal workshops and video-
conferencing facilities is  recommended to facilitate and enhance inter-REC 
communication, facilitate and resolve leadership of coordination activities where 
projects cut across RECs; 
• To help alleviate institutional capacity constraints, the Abuja workshop recommended 
the creation of pooled knowledge bases, data banks and emphasised the sharing of 
information between all the stakeholders, such as the RECs with NEPAD Secretariat 
and AU Commission, RECs with RECs, RECs with member countries, as well as with 
the development partner community; 
• The Abuja Workshop also identified the need for each REC to establish a database of 
its projects and keep it up-to-date; the NEPAD Secretariat should establish a web-
enabled continental database, linked to all the RECs databases, with details and status 
of all the projects in the Infrastructure STAP  
 
Constraints Recommendations 
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8. Limited capacity within the AfDB and NEPAD’s Secretariat  
Limited capacity within the AfDB and NEPAD’s Secretariat to meet the growing demands for 
their services and support in relation to NEPAD, in particular the Infrastructure STAP 
8. Expand the capacity of the AfDB and NEPAD Secretariat 
Both the AfDB and NEPAD Secretariat should carry out an assessment of their mounting 
workloads vis-à-vis the Infrastructure STAP programme in order to formulate appropriate 
strategies, and to put in place adequate resources and internal structures to meet the 
growing demand for their services and facilities under the Infrastructure STAP.   
 
RECs made the following specific recommendations to expand the capacity of the AfDB:  
(a)   The AfDB should 
• Create a Regional Integration Division within the AfDB; 
• Establish appropriate regional funding instruments and facilities; 
• Adopt a proactive approach to bring to the market innovative financing approaches and risk 
mitigation instruments to catalyse a scale-up of private sector participation; and 
• (Post the Gleneagles G8 Summit and the Africa Commission Report) Develop policies, 
structures and facilities in order to take a leadership role in mobilising funds from within and 
outside the continent for infrastructure development. 
(b)    No specific recommendation were made in respect of the NEPAD Secretariat 
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9. Development partner systems and practices do not always align with NEPAD priorities 
The “traditional” funding model by donors, while crucial to the development of infrastructure 
across the continent, is not always suited to the efficient preparation and implementation of 
regional infrastructure programmes and projects for the following interrelated reasons:    
(i) Complexity of donor funding and associated conditionalities 
-     First, the deleterious impact of  protracted and inflexible donor funding processes on timely project 
implementation; 
-   Second, associated conditionalities for complementary social reforms or related inter-sectoral 
interventions in recipient countries, often with little or no relevance to the overall policy objectives 
that inform the affected project; and 
-     Third, funding eligibility criteria may exclude one country in a regional project. 
(ii) Fractured funding approach:  
The multiplicity of donors with varying systems, different criteria and approval processes result in delays, 
with negative implications for project implementation management or timely attainment of various 
programme elements.   
-   These delays also increase the risk in the management of project management functions;  
-  Executing diverse accounting procedures and requirements confuses the few REC officers who are 
expected to understand and manage all the underlying requirements, procedures and preferences of 
different donors, with negative impact on staff motivation;  
-   Implementation of overlapping projects with similar objectives – owing to project funding by different  
donors – results in the development of competing programmes/projects and institutional arrangements 
that are targeted at the same goals;  
(iii) Lack of focused programme and project definition due to inordinate reliance on various donor 
institutions for programme and project development associated with the funding.   
9. Align donor systems and practices with NEPAD priorities 
Cognisant of NEPAD’s challenge to the existing donor-recipient relationship, by placing 
the responsibility for Africa’s development squarely on Africa’s shoulders, a pooled fund 
should be created in each region, through which development partners can contribute 
collectively to support regional development efforts.   
 
This proposed approach could address the current problem of competing and poorly 
defined projects as well as provide a shared ‘pot’ of funds for RECs to use for approved 
projects.  The benefits of this proposed pooled fund are as follows:  
• Enhanced coordination between donors; 
• Administrative simplification; 
• Cost savings for all the parties, including both REC Secretariats and the (donors) 
development partners, as RECs will cease to make separate funding applications for 
each project component; 
• Enable RECs to have a more coherent and holistic development planning approach; 
• The production of relevant annual budgets that take all sectors and areas into account; 
• Rational prioritisation and planning of programmes and projects to ensure that 
mobilised resources are directed into priority projects, such as those identified in 
STAP; and  
• Facilitate more studies being transformed into workable implementation action plans 
as a result of secure funding.   
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APPENDIX F 
 
DETAILED SWOT ANALYSIS OF (PERCEPTIONS OF) NEPAD’S INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT1
  
 
STRENGHTS OPPORTUNITIES 
Reaffirmation of Commitment by African HoSG to Political, Economic, 
and Corporate Governance and Related Principles: 
• Admission, by African leaders, that leadership failures contributed to the current 
development crisis (as detailed in NEPAD’s  Strategic Framework); 
 
• Renewed effort including articulated political will and commitment to address 
the continent’s poor governance and development challenges; 
 
• Reaffirmed commitment by African Heads of State and Government (HoSG), to 
the principles and core values contained in the NEPAD/AU Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance (2002); AU 
Declaration on the Implementation of the NEPAD (2002); and acceding to the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – institutional mechanisms that seek 
to improve democracy and governance on the continent as well as the 
implementation of collective decisions; 
 
• Delegation of authority and responsibility by the African HoSG to the NEPAD 
governing structures to ensure implementation of the NEPAD Initial Action 
Plan; 
 
• Visible leadership, and active participation of a “new generation” of leaders and 
HoSG – who are not associated with autocracy, inordinate largesse, corruption, 
and maladministration – to make NEPAD work; 
 
 
Strengthen Leadership and Management Structures at Sub-regional and 
Regional Levels:  
• Use NEPAD, which is baggage-free unlike the AU with its inherent 
contradictions and links to its predecessor the OAU, to fully drive the AU’s 
economic success; 
 
• Utilise the potential collective strength and unity in alignment of purpose, 
strategy, and commitment to delivery by African leadership (AU); specifically 
the Heads of State who are NEPAD’s sponsors and promoters (Algeria, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa); the governing and management structures 
namely, the 20-member NEPAD HSGIC, the SC, Expanded SC and the 
Secretariat located in South Africa; 
 
• Avoid trying doing too much, in too short a space of time.  In this regard, 
NEPAD cannot – and must not – be presented as a ‘cure for all’ for the 
continent’s problems; it must be used in a focused and goal-directed manner in 
spheres of influence where the collective African leadership and its peoples can 
be most effective to make a difference, and to provide strategic direction and 
management; 
 
• Create a “democracy surplus” at sub-regional levels, which currently is placed at 
a “democracy deficit”.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Source: Derived from various sources including the following: Adedegi, 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1990; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 2002; Anyang’ Nyong’o et al, 2002; Bond, 
2002; Buthelezi, 2001; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; ECA, 2002; Ekpo, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Herbert, 2003; IAG/JA, 2002; Mills, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; 
NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2003/4; Tandon, 2002.  In addition, the author has converted some of the negative comments into positive statements to illustrate 
some of the opportunities available to support NEPAD implementation.   
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Collective Ownership of and Active Engagement By Political Leadership 
in Development Processes:   
• Collective leadership engagement of the international community, to support 
Africa’s efforts to regenerate the continent, in an open, transparent, and forward-
looking manner, as building blocks to transformational change in favour of the 
continent and its people; 
 
• Passion for NEPAD to succeed, as exhibited by its leadership: the five Heads of 
State who are NEPAD’s promoters; the 20-member Heads of State and 
Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC); the management structures 
including the Steering Committee (SC); the expanded SC that is made up of 
representatives of the twenty HoSG including Secretary Generals of RECs, AU 
Secretariat, and representatives of the ECA and AfDB; and the Secretariat based 
in Midrand: South Africa;       
 
• NEPAD a reference point and the development framework for international 
engagement on Africa’s development. 
 
• Availability of Strategic Framework, Development Objectives and 
Detailed Action Plans, with the Invitation for Inclusive Participation 
by All Stakeholder Groups:  
• Development of an initial integrative Strategic Framework, for further 
elaboration of sectoral priorities, with an invitation to all the peoples of Africa 
and various stakeholder groups, to participate in the implementation of action 
plans and foster continuous improvement of  NEPAD;  
 
• Development of a detailed strategic Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan 
(STAP), with detailed Action Plans in the various infrastructure sectors (namely, 
Transport, Energy, Water, and ICT), and linked to time frames for delivery;  
 
• Ongoing review of the Infrastructure STAP, to update the process and review 
progress on projects’ implementation in various designated Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs), to identify challenges and constraints, lessons learnt, re-
evaluate projects’ prioritisation, and recommend broad principles and specific 
future action.  
Address Long-Standing Political, and Socio-Economic Structural 
Constraints in African States and Sub-regions: 
• Re-examine core challenges with the African State that is so weak, fragmented, 
and arbitrarily defined, including the single most divisive factor of inherited 
colonial boundaries that the OAU and its successor the AU chose to honour – the 
colonial boundaries. After all, Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar in 1966, and 
the sky has not fallen; nor has the earth caved in, as a consequence thereof;  
 
• Address the inherent contradictions, in the multiple and overlapping membership 
of RECs and other sub-regional bodies. 
 
Provide Inspired Political Leadership and Building Blocks for Ethical 
Conduct: 
• Avoid wavering and reneging on commitments made to Africans, and the rest of 
the world, on improving governance in Africa and making innovative 
institutional mechanisms (in the African sense) like the APRM to work – 
efficiently and effectively;               
 
• Avoid planning the future of cooperation and integration arrangements by 
merely extrapolating from the past, but to rapidly move forward – strengthened 
cooperation and integration is necessary to move Africa forward; 
 
• Develop self-acceptance by the current breed of leadership, so that they can 
unleash and leverage their demonstrated capacity for collective engagement for 
the benefit of themselves first, their countries, and the African continent;  
 
• Imbue Africans with the indomitable spirit to seize the moment and break new 
ground, and carve indelible positive impacts, for future generations – inch by 
inch, step by step, and mile by mile; 
 
• Cast aside fears and doubts on issues and challenges that might currently appear 
insurmountable – like the crippling debt, insignificant aid, unfair rules of trade, 
and debilitating poverty – and soldier on self-reliantly: after all, the pyramids of 
Egypt and the mosques of Mali were not built in one day, and they are some of 
the architectural wonders of the world;  
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Common Identity:  
• There is a strong sense of common identity across the African continent; 
 
• African leaders like to meet together;  
 
• The idea of a united Africa and African common interests still resonates 
strongly.  
• Manage divisive influences on NEPAD, especially amongst the HoSG, by 
utilising and strengthening existing AU structures, and also empowering other 
normal channels of engagement like regional / sub-regional ministerial 
committees and fora with inputs from various stakeholder groups;   
 
• Provide inspiring, consistent, high-level political leadership that repeatedly 
emphasises the imperative of unification;   
 
• Be involved, by ‘going down to the trenches’, so as to invent a world for the 
majority of Africans that would otherwise not be: by developing an informed 
understanding of where we are, learning from lessons of the past, and aiming for 
attainment of the basic tenements of ‘self- reliance’ and ‘self- sustainment’ – that 
were espoused in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA, 1980-2000). 
 
Promote and Support the Development of the African Private Sector: 
• (For African leadership) Mobilise, engage, facilitate, and support the 
development of an empowered African private sector, that can invest and 
actively participate in the re-building of the continent, for its benefit first, the 
peoples of Africa, and future generations – to ensure that funds disbursed in 
projects remain in, and are further re-invested in Africa; 
 
Ensure Inclusive Stakeholder Participation: 
• Make the process more inclusive and participatory; 
• Reach out to the ordinary people of Africa, including institutions of civil society 
– to inform, and involve them in the total value-chain of NEPAD activities – in 
order to promote empowerment, enthusiasm, and cooperation (and foster 
emotional, political, and economic support for NEPAD from the ground), that 
will also ensure checks and balances in planning of development processes and 
implementation of related programmes;  
 
• Address the Achilles’ heel of communication and marketing of NEPAD, to the 
masses, so as to “capture and electrify the imagination of the African masses 
without whose support and internalisation …(NEPAD) cannot be sustained in 
the long run”; 
 
• Involve a wide array of multi-disciplinary African intellectuals, professionals 
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and experts including ordinary people in the development and implementation of 
NEPAD – instead of limiting engagement to politicians, senior civil servants, 
senior members of the diplomatic corps, and economists.   Successful integrated 
development planning and implementation management requires multi-
disciplinary approaches, inter-sectoral cooperation, and involvement of people 
from different segments of society: i.e., project managers, statisticians, 
geologists, engineers, town and regional planners, political scientists, 
nutritionists, scientists, human resource practitioners, accountants, youth, people 
with disabilities, and the old; 
 
• Institutionalise NEPAD in all spheres of African society, and with all stake-
holder groups, so that it is not seen as a “political leaders’ programme” that 
translates into negative and counter-productive tendencies to adopt ‘wait-and-
see’ attitudes by everybody else. 
  
Address Gender Discrimination and Promote Women’s Empowerment: 
• Spearhead efforts to address gender discrimination in decision-making, and other 
spheres of society, and meaningfully involve women in NEPAD’s planning  
processes including particularly in the implementation of related programmes, 
beyond the scant rhetoric and token appointments; 
 
• Visibly support women’s political and socio-economic empowerment in African 
countries.    
 
Facilitate Development of Infrastructure, in Particular Transport 
Infrastructure and Related Services:  
• Satisfy the demand for infrastructure services, particularly in the areas of 
electricity, water supply, transport (including ports and airports), and 
telecommunications; 
 
• Facilitate the development of basic physical infrastructure, especially road and 
rail infrastructure, and to cooperate jointly with other African states and non-
state stakeholders in the development of physical infrastructure and transport 
services to maximise the efficiency of cross-border transport and 
communication; 
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• Acquire a certain minimum technical capacity to identify and prepare 
infrastructure development projects, including the capacity to undertake 
feasibility studies; 
 
• Secure internal financing for the implementation of large-scale infrastructure 
projects particularly at the sub-regional level;  
 
• Free Africa’s highly mobile forces from the clutches of constraints imposed by 
colonial boundaries. 
 
Mobilise Domestic Resources: 
• Strengthen intra-regional finance and investment.  
 
Facilitate Appropriately Prioritised Interventions for Institutional 
Reform, Institution Building, and the Development of Leadership and 
Management Capacity: 
• Pay careful attention to the requirements of institution-building, and examine 
relevant best practises in management and institution-building; 
 
• Examine standards for developing leadership capacity, and management 
selection processes; 
 
• Adopt basic rules of management, of linking goals to a clear map as to who will 
act to implement them; 
 
• Prioritise: the NEPAD’s full text (Strategic Framework, 2001) mentions every 
known African problem, with no indication given of what should, could happen 
first;  
 
• Develop strategic management capacity that uses best-practise approaches from 
various disciplines, to benefit implementation of projects within programmes. 
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WEAKNESSES  THREATS/CONSTRAINTS 
Lack of Trust in the Ability of Political Leadership to Deliver on 
Articulated Development Objectives:  
• Lack of breath and depth in activist orientation amongst African leaders, except 
a few: this is required to deal with the “ills of illiteracy, poverty, 
underdevelopment, the spread of opportunistic diseases like HIV/AIDS, 
corruption, and the general malaise of moral degeneration and chronic mimicry 
in post-colonial societies”;  
 
• Empire building, patronage politics, and rent-seeking activities; 
 
• Questionable leadership and African ownership of NEPAD in the first instance; 
and of the leadership “fitness” to rule.   
 
Entrenched Colonial Mindset:  
• Lack of “decolonisation of the mind”, which is critical to precede the dialogue 
between Africa and its development partners, so that a transformed “new” 
mindset would lead appropriate efforts at economic decolonisation; 
 
• Entrenched belief that Aid can develop the continent’s economy; 
 
• The tendency for African leaders to exhibit fear and resentment towards their 
own nationals, or race groups, resulting in the inability to meaningfully utilise 
the resource base in their own backyards: they prefer instead to accept at face 
value advice from outsiders – whose advice is regarded as fine and scientific, 
primarily because it comes from outsiders, hence the brain drain of many 
capable Africans. 
 
Lack of Confidence in Regional and Sub-Regional Institutions to Bring 
About Transformational Change: 
• Lack of teeth, in both NEPAD and AU, to deal with member-states who violate 
the norms of democratic practice and good governance;  
 
• Inherent contradiction in the notion of a Peer Review Mechanism, within a 
system where state sovereignty and non-interference in another state’s affairs is 
sacrosanct; 
Political Conflicts, Civil Wars, and Lack of Peace and Security: 
  
Continuing Poor Governance (Political, Economic, and Corporate) and 
Lack of Commitment to Collective Agreements: 
• Failures in addressing excesses of African leaders including non-adherence to 
collective agreements and commitments; 
 
• Inability of Africa do deal with member states who violate the norms of 
democratic practice and good governance;   
 
• Failure of external actors to devise and implement acceptable policy regimes; 
 
• Low quality of governance, instability, overvalued exchange rates, high levels of 
taxation, and excessive regulation. 
 
Negative Perceptions and Damaged Integrity Of Political Leadership: 
• High level of political demoralisation across the continent, and a clear lack of 
confidence in political institutions and political leaders; 
  
• Negative perceptions that mostly the same African leaders, who have plundered 
and pillaged Africa for their own personal enrichment and aggrandisement, are 
now re-packaged and presented as reformed, to the point where the leaders even 
acknowledge responsibility for (their) past failures, and are now ostensibly 
committed to inspired leadership and the development of their people; 
 
• Negative perceptions that NEPAD’s HSGIC is made up of discredited members 
who include corrupt long-serving autocrats, states with shaky commitments to 
multi-party democracy and human rights, undemocratically “elected” presidents, 
and leaders of unstable states plagued with military rebellion or religious / ethnic 
violence, or others who have in the past instituted armed insurrections against 
political opponents – with the assistance of multinational oil companies;    
 
• Aloof, elitist, pompous, power-mongering, and self-important notions of African 
leaders and their followers, including the senior civil servants who are their 
advisors; 
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• Lack of unity: long-standing intra-rivalries between members of various regional 
blocks – SADC, COMESA, AMU, ECOWAS; 
 
• Evidenced lack of commitment by member-states to implement protocols and 
various multilateral agreements aimed at facilitating Africa’s regional 
cooperation and integration arrangements; 
 
• Lack of serious commitment by individual African states, as important cogs in 
the NEPAD wheel, as to how they will devote their own resources to the 
programmes of NEPAD; 
  
• ‘National interest’ a strong motivating force to the detriment of sub-regional and 
regional initiatives; 
 
• Relatively weak political constituencies and economic interests backing 
integration, deriving from the poor quality of governance and diverse levels of 
economic development in African countries.   
 
Weak States, Weak Institutional Environment, and Poor Governance 
Record: 
• Weak States, with the highest number of so-called ‘failed states’ in the world 
perceived to be in Africa; 
 
• ‘State capture’ and non-existent governance systems and institutional 
mechanisms in a number of countries fail to inspire the trust and cooperation of 
the populace; 
 
• High extent of dysfunction and abuse of institutional mechanisms, particularly 
public sector organisational structures, in many African countries; 
 
• Lack of a liberal value-system by the leaders and their followers; 
 
• Severe curtailment of individual freedoms by the state;    
 
• A number of Africa’s so-called “big states”  (including Nigeria, DRC, Ethiopia, 
Sudan) have performed particularly badly since independence, with incidents of 
• Lack of commitment, by African Leaders, to build people-oriented economies 
and to serve their people to ensure improvement in the quality of life (in their 
countries first);   
  
• Lack of humility in African leadership, and the ability to subjugate self-interest 
in favour of common goals and agendas; 
 
• Absolute corruption of leadership and lack of conscience and empathy for their 
citizens, who are in the main poor. 
 
Lack of Unity on NEPAD Amongst the Heads of State, Compounded by 
Political Rivalry 
• Political and territorial rivalries; 
 
• Reported incidents of disagreement on some of the principles NEPAD espoused, 
some of which were linked to the perceived erosion of states’ sovereignty.   
These were construed, in NEPAD’s early stages, to reveal the lack of unity on 
NEPAD amongst the OAU/ AU HoSG at sub-regional and continent-wide levels 
namely:  
 
- the Libyan leader, Gaddafi, publicly criticised NEPAD as a neo-colonialist 
venture; 
 
- some HoSG questioned the “right of the development partners to demand 
‘good governance’ as a basis for economic cooperation with Africa,” when 
in their own countries their governance records were flawed; and 
  
- assertions attributed to President Mkapa of Tanzania (in a symposium 
organised by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation in Kampala, on the 11th 
April 2002), where he allegedly said: “When development aid or loans are 
made conditional to certain domestic decisions regarding political, 
economic, or social systems, is this a breach  of the United Nations Charter 
(on sovereignty), or is it not…the way things are going, we in Africa will 
soon have no image beyond geography, no identity besides colour and no 
decency except flags.” 
          
• Lack of unanimous support of NEPAD by African leaders, exacerbated by 
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economic collapse, social and political unrest, state decay, and open civil war of 
varying intensities with implications for the implementation of regional 
development programmes/projects; 
 
• There is a core problem within the African state: the state (and its leadership) is 
weak and insecure; its response to development challenges is through patronage, 
divide-and-rule tactics, and external aggression towards its neighbours. 
  
Poor Development Planning, Prioritisation, and Communication: 
• Multiplicity of development initiatives and institutions with overlapping 
structures, lack of clearly defined roles, responsibilities and interfaces (such as in 
the AU, NEPAD, CSSDCA and RECs); lack of clear allocation of 
responsibilities within the NEPAD process; 
 
• Lack of prioritisation in NEPAD – “if it’s known, it’s not communicated to the 
public”; 
 
• Coyness and incorrect analysis and categorisation of the African market, that in 
NEPAD is described as “vast” and “growing” instead of  “stagnant” and 
“backwards”; 
 
• Lack of inter-sectoral cross-pollination, and inclusive involvement of other 
stakeholders outside of government, multilateral or government-aligned 
structures; 
 
• Communication gaps with no effective engagement of civil society structures by 
NEPAD; this is compounded by the weak co-ordination capacity in NEPAD’s 
Secretariat, cognisant of dozens of bodies that must be engaged internally and 
externally;  
 
• Poor communication of the NEPAD initiative, with minimal effort to harness 
and garner emotional support from ordinary people to guarantee its success; 
 
• Limited operational effectiveness of the NEPAD Secretariat (in its earlier days) 
because of the failure by African countries to second staff or to offer practical 
assistance; 
• Overlaps between the structures and functions of the AU, NEPAD, CSSDCA 
rivalry for resources and funding from the international community to address 
competing national concerns (and needs), instead of the agreed NEPAD-related 
programmes;  
  
• Threats to unity, progress, and support of NEPAD and its programmes because 
of a major short-coming in its evolution: the process is perceived as to not have 
evolved as a product of hard-nosed thinking and dialogue amongst African 
leaders (and intellectuals), but as an obsession of a few, who started to market 
the plan before there was sufficient buy-in. 
   
Lack of Meaningful Support and Commitment by the International 
Community to the Attainment of Agreed Development Objectives:   
• Competing development initiatives with other developing countries outside the 
African continent alternatively, diverted attention to global challenges and 
negative externalities such as the “fight” against terrorism and the war in Iraq; 
 
• Fatigue at lack of effectiveness of various institutional interventions, to address 
Africa’s development crises; 
 
• Waning interest of development partners and donor fatigue; 
 
• Negative perceptions of the APRM as a peer learning function akin to the 
comparatively mild technocratic OECD peer reviews; 
 
• Lack of commitment and support from International Finance Institutions and 
banks – who previously participated in and facilitated looting of funds from 
Africa – to cooperate in repatriating what was stolen before;  
 
• Negative implications for progress and availability of committed support 
structures because of negative perceptions by OAU/AU staff of NEPAD’s 
Secretariat staff as a threat; these negative perceptions are exacerbated by delays 
in the Secretariat’s integration into the AU structures, as agreed by the HSGIC 
when the Secretariat was initially established;   
 
• National governments not ceding some state sovereignty to ensure attainment of regional objectives, 
which is partially ceded anyway, given the inordinate reliance on donor funding.    
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(Conference for Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa). 
 
Lack of Financial Resources, Poor Domestic Engagement and Resource 
Mobilisation Resulting in Inordinate Reliance on External Sources:  
• Unsustainable and crippling debt exacerbated by low levels of domestic savings, 
low domestic and foreign investment exacerbated by capital flight in the form of 
foreign savings and investments, to the extent that Africa has earned the dubious 
distinction of being a net exporter of capital; 
 
• Lack of economic growth due to stunted role of markets by the hostile political 
and cultural environment, exacerbated by the interference of the state;    
 
• Unfavourable balance of payments due to excessive imports of technology, 
manufactured goods and technical know-how at prices way in excess of export 
earnings; 
 
• Lack of market access and unfavourable/declining terms of trade, with foreign 
earnings limited to low-priced raw materials;   
 
• Dependence on doubtful or highly mobile external sources of funding in the 
form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDIs) for development projects (and the entire NEPAD programme itself); 
 
• Lack of clarity and questionable strategic assumptions regarding the depiction of 
Capital Flows for the NEPAD programme; 
 
• High dependence of African countries on concessional finance from the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries for 
their basic budgeting requirements;   
 
• Lack of financial resources and inordinate dependency on external sources, 
characteristic of the “begging bowl” syndrome; 
 
• NEPAD a “sophisticated begging-bowl”;  
 
• Preoccupation to establish partnerships with the developed north, instead of first 
establishing a firm foundation for a workable integration of programmes within 
Political Leadership Burdens and Lack of Goal-Directed Leadership 
Behaviours: 
• Ambitions of individual leaders may work to the detriment of collective 
leadership decisions; 
 
• Some of the members of the AU, because of their negative image and perceived 
lack of integrity, should not be allowed to play a leading role in NEPAD: “How 
can African leaders who are clearly part of the problem, be part of the solution”;  
 
• Lack of acknowledgement that, in addition to colonialism, the politics of 
liberation have underdeveloped Africa; this necessitates that the AU not play a 
leading role in certain spheres, because of its membership burdens that have 
created some of the current problems facing the African continent;  
  
• Myopic, megalomaniac tendencies of African leaders; 
 
• Leadership surrounding themselves with political party loyalists, chance-takers, 
and sycophants, who prey on leaderships’ insecurities and manipulate their fears 
to get jobs; 
 
• Lack of  ‘common-room culture’, where every individual can participate as 
equals in the search for truth and solutions; this has been traded for obsession in 
African leaders with upstaging one another at the expense of collective 
leadership; 
 
• Lack of urgency on the part of African leaders, who instead display tendencies to 
waste time in self-praise, backslapping, and celebrating themselves, instead of 
getting on with the job; 
 
The Preoccupation with the ‘South African Factor’ and Related Fears of 
Political Dominance:  
• Negative perceptions of South African hegemony; 
 
• The potential to alienate other African leaders and Heads of States, because of 
South Africa’s (SA) incorrect characterisation of NEPAD (by South African 
commentators the media) as President Mbeki’s initiative; 
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Africa, as a basis upon which to seek additional support from outside; 
 
• Little effort to sell NEPAD to people of Africa, as opposed to extraordinary 
efforts to obtain acceptance and buy in from the G8 and other external 
institutional mechanisms; 
 
• Lack of concerted efforts to address structural problems, such as Africa’s high 
levels of externalised expenditure, by introducing instruments that would stem 
the seepage to improve domestic resource mobilisation;  
 
• The inexplicable embracing by NEPAD of Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs), whilst admitting that they have failed, and centralising them on a 
competitive bid in efforts to attract FDI. NEPAD has pursued this approach in 
the face of empirical evidence of the social crises SAPs have engendered (as 
documented in the findings of the research project by the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review International Network – SAPRIN).  
 
Human Development Crisis and Dependency Burdens: 
• Endemic illiteracy, general illness, and communicable diseases; 
 
• Debilitating poverty and associated dependency burdens; 
 
• Unfavourable preponderance of inadequately skilled and trained human element; 
 
• Shortage of management skills exacerbated by poor management practices; 
 
• Lack of a mature and well-informed civil society in the majority of African 
countries (non-existent in some countries). With appropriate capacity and a 
facilitative environment, a capable civil society would interrogate the proposed 
development issues and keep leadership on its toes.     
 
Transfer of Inappropriate Development Models to Africa’s Unique 
Circumstances: 
• Negative perceptions that Africa is marketed to the international community 
“according to the same old tune, penned by Europeans when they marketed 
Africa to and for themselves, replete with its ‘song-and-dance’ and scantily-
dressed people dancing for guests at airports”; 
• Comments regarding NEPAD, to the effect that  for the “first time that Africans 
are taking their destiny in their own hands”; these assertions incorrectly imply 
that that nothing was done before to address developmental challenges on the 
continent, until President Mbeki arrived on the scene; 
 
• The perceived over-enthusiasm, over-optimism, ignorance and even national 
arrogance by South Africans with respect to the development of NEPAD can 
derail some of the plans, if such attitudes continue unchecked; 
 
• The so-called regional aspirant-hegemonic role of South Africa, ranging from 
military, economic and political terrains undermines SADC’s potential; 
 
• Fuelling of SADC rivalries namely, Angola’s seeing itself as a regional power, 
linked to its long-standing hostility towards South Africa;  
 
• Hostility arising from perceptions that South Africa is trying to take over and 
“re-invent the wheel by claiming to have discovered the cure for Africa’s ills 
when so many have tried and failed”; 
 
• Perceptions that since NEPAD was formulated in Pretoria – with reference 
initially to Washington, Davos, and the G7 – it can never be “owned” by African 
people and it is not going to be successful.   
 
Elitist Tendencies and Political Patronage in Appointments, and 
Participation in Programmes and Projects: 
• The crippling reality of politics of patronage in Africa, where positions, roles and 
material well-being are distributed to loyal members of the ruling political 
parties only; in Africa, these political parties have subsumed everything in life, 
some even surpassing religion and becoming the line that determines whether 
one is relevant or not in life; 
 
• Lack of grass-roots support. 
 
Negative Impact of Dependency and External Reliance for Funding on 
NEPAD: 
• Negative impact on Africa’s credibility due to ambivalent and inconsistent 
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• NEPAD an attempt at ‘Africanisation’ of the European Union (EU) experience; 
 
Lack of Readiness Resulting in Marginalisation from Participation in the 
Global Economy: 
• African countries remain increasingly on the margin of the global economy; 
 
• Low growth in merchandize exports, due partly to policies that discouraged such 
growth;  
 
• Reliance on and primary exporters of a narrow base of traditional commodity 
sectors, that are negatively affected by the related deterioration of terms of trade; 
 
• African countries are primary exporters of capital, resulting in Africa having the 
lowest savings rate in the world, at 16% of GDP; 
 
• Failure to industrialise;  
 
• Economic stagnation and political security upheavals;  
 
• Limiting of diversification and expansion in trade by colonial networks and 
associated tariffs, usually directed towards, and for the benefit of the former 
colonial power.      
  
                           
approach to the developed north: asking for aid, at the same time attacking the 
very institutions for subjugating Africa to colonial domination and 
underdevelopment;  
  
• Negative political implications of perceived accountability by NEPAD’s 
processes and African states to external parties because of reliance on aid; 
 
• Failure to learn from lessons of history: that domestic resources are central to 
any sustained development efforts; and external dependence is likely to lead to 
levels of economic dependence that are not politically sustainable and are 
unlikely to be the basis for credible policy initiatives; 
 
• Effects and long-term impacts of such external reliance for funding on the 
viability and credibility to NEPAD’s processes;  
  
•  Impact of external dependence on self-esteem, dignity, and credibility of 
Africans; 
 
• Failure to understand that as long as Africa is an expense on the balance-sheet of 
developed countries, they will keep it in a state of underdevelopment;  
 
• Failure to concede that it is unlikely that non-Africans will allocate the necessary 
resources and attention required for the task outlined by NEPAD, with 
implications for failure; 
 
• Threats of external dependency to national sovereignty and an onerous burden 
on both nation-building and democracy; 
 
• The possibility that NEPAD’s approach to liberate Africa could well turn out to 
be the final and utter submission to the rule of the international 
institutions/institutional structures, such as the IMF/World Bank and WTO.  
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